2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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*
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* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
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* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license.
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*
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* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
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* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
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* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
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*
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* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
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* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
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* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
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*
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* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
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* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
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* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
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* to make use of the Contribution.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
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* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
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* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
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* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
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* OTHERWISE. */
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <openssl/engine.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/lhash.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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/* The address of this is a magic value, a pointer to which is returned by
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* SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(). It allows a session callback to indicate
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* that it needs to asynchronously fetch session information. */
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2015-01-29 00:20:02 +00:00
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static const char g_pending_session_magic = 0;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
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2015-03-10 22:30:08 +00:00
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static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
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2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(void) {
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return (SSL_SESSION *)&g_pending_session_magic;
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}
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl)
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2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
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{
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/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
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return ssl->session;
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}
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) {
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/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
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2015-02-09 08:35:43 +00:00
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return SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session);
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2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
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}
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
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2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
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CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
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CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
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return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
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new_func, dup_func, free_func);
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}
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int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg) {
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return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg);
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}
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void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx) {
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return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx);
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}
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) {
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SSL_SESSION *ss;
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ss = (SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
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if (ss == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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memset(ss, 0, sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
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ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
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ss->references = 1;
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ss->timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
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ss->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
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CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
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return ss;
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}
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const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) {
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if (len) {
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*len = s->session_id_length;
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}
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return s->session_id;
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}
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/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space.
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* SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random
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* gunk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to complete in one
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* iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it
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* takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a
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* reasonable point to call it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone
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* is trying to open roughly very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our
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* server. How you might store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting
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* question ... */
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static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *id,
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unsigned int *id_len) {
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static const unsigned kMaxAttempts = 10;
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unsigned int retry = 0;
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do {
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if (!RAND_bytes(id, *id_len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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} while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
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(++retry < kMaxAttempts));
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if (retry < kMaxAttempts) {
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return 1;
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}
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/* else - woops a session_id match */
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/* XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of a
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* collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent creation
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* of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have means to
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* atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make a
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* reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the internal
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* cache as well). */
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return 0;
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}
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int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) {
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/* This gets used by clients and servers. */
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unsigned int tmp;
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SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL;
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GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
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if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_SESSION_CREATION) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session,
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SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
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return 0;
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}
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ss = SSL_SESSION_new();
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if (ss == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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/* If the context has a default timeout, use it over the default. */
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if (s->initial_ctx->session_timeout != 0) {
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ss->timeout = s->initial_ctx->session_timeout;
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}
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if (s->session != NULL) {
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SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
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s->session = NULL;
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}
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if (session) {
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if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == TLS1_VERSION ||
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s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION ||
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s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) {
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ss->ssl_version = s->version;
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ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
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} else {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session,
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SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
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SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
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return 0;
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}
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/* If RFC4507 ticket use empty session ID */
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if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
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ss->session_id_length = 0;
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goto sess_id_done;
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}
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/* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
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CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
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if (s->generate_session_id) {
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cb = s->generate_session_id;
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} else if (s->initial_ctx->generate_session_id) {
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cb = s->initial_ctx->generate_session_id;
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}
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CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
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/* Choose a session ID */
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tmp = ss->session_id_length;
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if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) {
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/* The callback failed */
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session,
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SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
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SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor set it
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* higher than it was. */
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if (!tmp || tmp > ss->session_id_length) {
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/* The callback set an illegal length */
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session,
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SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
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SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
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return 0;
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}
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ss->session_id_length = tmp;
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/* Finally, check for a conflict */
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if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id, ss->session_id_length)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session,
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SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
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SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
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return 0;
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}
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sess_id_done:
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if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
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ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
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if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
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|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ss->session_id_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof(ss->sid_ctx)) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_new_session, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
|
|
|
|
ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
|
|
|
|
s->session = ss;
|
|
|
|
ss->ssl_version = s->version;
|
|
|
|
ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
|
|
|
|
* connection. It is only called by servers.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
* ctx: contains the early callback context, which is the result of a
|
|
|
|
* shallow parse of the ClientHello.
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns:
|
|
|
|
* -1: error
|
|
|
|
* 0: a session may have been found.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Side effects:
|
|
|
|
* - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an
|
|
|
|
* existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session.
|
|
|
|
* - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 1
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
* if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise). */
|
|
|
|
int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
/* This is used only by servers. */
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int fatal = 0;
|
|
|
|
int try_session_cache = 1;
|
|
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->session_id_len == 0) {
|
|
|
|
try_session_cache = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
r = tls1_process_ticket(s, ctx, &ret); /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected */
|
|
|
|
switch (r) {
|
|
|
|
case -1: /* Error during processing */
|
|
|
|
fatal = 1;
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case 0: /* No ticket found */
|
|
|
|
case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */
|
|
|
|
break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */
|
|
|
|
case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */
|
|
|
|
try_session_cache = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
abort();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (try_session_cache && ret == NULL &&
|
|
|
|
!(s->initial_ctx->session_cache_mode &
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION data;
|
|
|
|
data.ssl_version = s->version;
|
|
|
|
data.session_id_length = ctx->session_id_len;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->session_id_len == 0) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(data.session_id, ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len);
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
2015-02-09 08:34:47 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = SSL_SESSION_up_ref(lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->initial_ctx->sessions,
|
|
|
|
&data));
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (try_session_cache && ret == NULL &&
|
|
|
|
s->initial_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
int copy = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = s->initial_ctx->get_session_cb(s, (uint8_t *)ctx->session_id,
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_id_len, ©);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (ret == SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr()) {
|
|
|
|
/* This is a magic value which indicates that the callback needs to
|
|
|
|
* unwind the stack and figure out the session asynchronously. */
|
|
|
|
return PENDING_SESSION;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us to do so
|
|
|
|
* (note that if the session structures returned by the callback are
|
|
|
|
* shared between threads, it must handle the reference count itself
|
|
|
|
* [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be thread-safe). */
|
|
|
|
if (copy) {
|
2015-02-09 08:34:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as well if and
|
|
|
|
* only if we are supposed to. */
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->initial_ctx->session_cache_mode &
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) {
|
|
|
|
/* The following should not return 1, otherwise, things are very
|
|
|
|
* strange */
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_add_session(s->initial_ctx, ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length ||
|
|
|
|
memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) {
|
|
|
|
/* We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to use it
|
|
|
|
* in this context. */
|
|
|
|
goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context, which is
|
|
|
|
* especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application should have
|
|
|
|
* used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For this error case, we generate an error instead of treating the event
|
|
|
|
* like a cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to
|
|
|
|
* effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone
|
|
|
|
* noticing). */
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_get_prev_session,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
|
|
|
|
fatal = 1;
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) {
|
|
|
|
/* timeout */
|
|
|
|
if (try_session_cache) {
|
|
|
|
/* session was from the cache, so remove it */
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->initial_ctx, ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->session != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session = ret;
|
|
|
|
s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
if (ret != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
|
|
|
|
if (!try_session_cache) {
|
|
|
|
/* The session was from a ticket, so we should
|
|
|
|
* issue a ticket for the new session */
|
|
|
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (fatal) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) {
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *s;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though it
|
|
|
|
* has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and an
|
|
|
|
* lhash */
|
2015-02-09 08:34:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(c);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
|
|
if (!lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, &s, c)) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. In this case, s
|
|
|
|
* == c should hold (then we did not really modify ctx->sessions), or we're
|
|
|
|
* in trouble. */
|
|
|
|
if (s != NULL && s != c) {
|
|
|
|
/* We *are* in trouble ... */
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s);
|
|
|
|
/* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot
|
|
|
|
* handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the same
|
|
|
|
* cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently obtain the
|
|
|
|
* same session from an external cache) */
|
|
|
|
s = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
|
|
|
|
if (s == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference count
|
|
|
|
* because it already takes into account the cache */
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
|
|
|
|
while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
|
|
|
|
if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0)) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) {
|
|
|
|
return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lock) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *r;
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (c != NULL && c->session_id_length != 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (lock) {
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c);
|
|
|
|
if (r == c) {
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, c);
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, c);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (lock) {
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
|
|
r->not_resumable = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, r);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(r);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-09 08:34:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
|
|
|
if (session) {
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return session;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss) {
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ss == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
i = CRYPTO_add(&ss->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
|
|
if (i > 0) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key, sizeof ss->master_key);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id, sizeof ss->session_id);
|
|
|
|
if (ss->sess_cert != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ss->peer != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
X509_free(ss->peer);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ss->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_hostname);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ss->tlsext_tick != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_tick);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ss->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ss->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ss->ocsp_response != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ss->ocsp_response);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ss->psk_identity != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ss->psk_identity);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss, sizeof(*ss));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ss);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
|
|
|
if (s->session == session) {
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->session != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session = session;
|
|
|
|
if (session != NULL) {
|
2015-02-09 08:34:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
s->verify_result = session->verify_result;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) {
|
|
|
|
if (s == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->timeout = t;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s) {
|
|
|
|
if (s == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return s->timeout;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s) {
|
|
|
|
if (s == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return s->time;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) {
|
|
|
|
if (s == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->time = t;
|
|
|
|
return t;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(SSL_SESSION *s) { return s->peer; }
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *s, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int sid_ctx_len) {
|
|
|
|
if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(s->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t) {
|
|
|
|
long l;
|
|
|
|
if (s == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
l = s->session_timeout;
|
|
|
|
s->session_timeout = t;
|
|
|
|
return l;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s) {
|
|
|
|
if (s == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return s->session_timeout;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
typedef struct timeout_param_st {
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx;
|
|
|
|
long time;
|
|
|
|
LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) * cache;
|
|
|
|
} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *sess, void *void_param) {
|
|
|
|
TIMEOUT_PARAM *param = void_param;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (param->time == 0 ||
|
|
|
|
param->time > (sess->time + sess->timeout)) {
|
|
|
|
/* timeout */
|
|
|
|
/* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to
|
|
|
|
* save on locking overhead */
|
2015-01-09 23:42:58 +00:00
|
|
|
(void) lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(param->cache, sess);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(param->ctx, sess);
|
|
|
|
sess->not_resumable = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (param->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
param->ctx->remove_session_cb(param->ctx, sess);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t) {
|
|
|
|
TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tp.ctx = s;
|
|
|
|
tp.cache = s->sessions;
|
|
|
|
if (tp.cache == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tp.time = t;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
|
|
lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, timeout_doall_arg, &tp);
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s) {
|
|
|
|
if (s->session != NULL && !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
|
|
|
|
!SSL_in_init(s)) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) {
|
|
|
|
if (s->next == NULL || s->prev == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_tail) {
|
|
|
|
/* last element in list */
|
|
|
|
if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) {
|
|
|
|
/* only one element in list */
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail = s->prev;
|
|
|
|
s->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) {
|
|
|
|
/* first element in list */
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head = s->next;
|
|
|
|
s->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
|
|
|
|
} else { /* middle of list */
|
|
|
|
s->next->prev = s->prev;
|
|
|
|
s->prev->next = s->next;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->prev = s->next = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) {
|
|
|
|
if (s->next != NULL && s->prev != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head = s;
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail = s;
|
|
|
|
s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
|
|
|
|
s->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
s->next = ctx->session_cache_head;
|
|
|
|
s->next->prev = s;
|
|
|
|
s->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head = s;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess)) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->new_session_cb = cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) {
|
|
|
|
return ctx->new_session_cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->remove_session_cb = cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess) {
|
|
|
|
return ctx->remove_session_cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *data, int len,
|
|
|
|
int *copy)) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->get_session_cb = cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *data,
|
|
|
|
int len, int *copy) {
|
|
|
|
return ctx->get_session_cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
|
|
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->info_callback = cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl, int type,
|
|
|
|
int val) {
|
|
|
|
return ctx->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY **pkey)) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->client_cert_cb = cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
|
|
|
|
return ctx->client_cert_cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
void (*cb)(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey)) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->channel_id_cb = cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void (*SSL_CTX_get_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
|
|
|
|
return ctx->channel_id_cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION, PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
|