2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
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#include <openssl/ex_data.h>
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2015-03-28 07:12:01 +00:00
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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#include <openssl/lhash.h>
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2015-03-28 07:12:01 +00:00
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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#include <openssl/stack.h>
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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#include <openssl/thread.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
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struct crypto_ex_data_func_st {
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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long argl; /* Arbitary long */
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void *argp; /* Arbitary void pointer */
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CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func;
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CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func;
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2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
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};
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
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int CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS *ex_data_class, int *out_index,
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2015-12-05 04:14:35 +00:00
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long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *funcs;
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2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
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int ret = 0;
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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funcs = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS));
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if (funcs == NULL) {
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2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CRYPTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
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return 0;
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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}
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funcs->argl = argl;
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funcs->argp = argp;
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funcs->dup_func = dup_func;
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funcs->free_func = free_func;
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2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
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CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(&ex_data_class->lock);
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
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if (ex_data_class->meth == NULL) {
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ex_data_class->meth = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_new_null();
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}
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if (ex_data_class->meth == NULL ||
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!sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_push(ex_data_class->meth, funcs)) {
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2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CRYPTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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OPENSSL_free(funcs);
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goto err;
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}
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Reserve ex_data index zero for app_data.
In the ancient times, before ex_data and OpenSSL, SSLeay supported a
single app_data slot in various types. Later app_data begat ex_data, and
app_data was replaced by compatibility macros to ex_data index zero.
Today, app_data is still in use, but ex_data never reserved index zero
for app_data. This causes some danger where, if the first ex_data
registration did not use NULL callbacks, the registration's callbacks
would collide with app_data.
Instead, add an option to the types with app_data to reserve index zero.
Also switch SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx to always return zero
rather than allocate a new one. It used to be that you used
X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data. I only found one consumer that we probably
don't care about, but, to be safe and since it's easy, go with the
conservative option. (Although SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx wasn't
guaranteed to alias app_data, in practice it always did. No consumer
ever calls X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index.)
Change-Id: Ie75b279d60aefd003ffef103f99021c5d696a5e9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5313
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-06-30 04:36:17 +01:00
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*out_index = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_num(ex_data_class->meth) - 1 +
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ex_data_class->num_reserved;
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2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
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ret = 1;
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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err:
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2016-05-24 16:28:36 +01:00
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CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ex_data_class->lock);
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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return ret;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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int CRYPTO_set_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int index, void *val) {
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int n, i;
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if (ad->sk == NULL) {
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ad->sk = sk_void_new_null();
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if (ad->sk == NULL) {
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2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CRYPTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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}
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n = sk_void_num(ad->sk);
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/* Add NULL values until the stack is long enough. */
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for (i = n; i <= index; i++) {
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if (!sk_void_push(ad->sk, NULL)) {
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2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CRYPTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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}
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sk_void_set(ad->sk, index, val);
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return 1;
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}
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void *CRYPTO_get_ex_data(const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx) {
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2014-10-01 02:00:38 +01:00
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if (ad->sk == NULL || idx < 0 || (size_t)idx >= sk_void_num(ad->sk)) {
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return NULL;
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}
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return sk_void_value(ad->sk, idx);
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}
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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/* get_func_pointers takes a copy of the CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS pointers, if any,
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* for the given class. If there are some pointers, it sets |*out| to point to
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* a fresh stack of them. Otherwise it sets |*out| to NULL. It returns one on
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* success or zero on error. */
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static int get_func_pointers(STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) **out,
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2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
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CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS *ex_data_class) {
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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size_t n;
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*out = NULL;
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/* CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS structures are static once set, so we can take a
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* shallow copy of the list under lock and then use the structures without
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* the lock held. */
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2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
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CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(&ex_data_class->lock);
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n = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_num(ex_data_class->meth);
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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if (n > 0) {
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2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
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*out = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_dup(ex_data_class->meth);
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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}
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2016-05-24 16:28:36 +01:00
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CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_read(&ex_data_class->lock);
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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if (n > 0 && *out == NULL) {
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2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CRYPTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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2015-12-05 04:14:35 +00:00
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void CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad) {
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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ad->sk = NULL;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
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int CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS *ex_data_class, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to,
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from) {
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2015-12-05 04:20:43 +00:00
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if (from->sk == NULL) {
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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/* In this case, |from| is blank, which is also the initial state of |to|,
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* so there's nothing to do. */
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return 1;
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}
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2015-12-05 04:20:43 +00:00
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STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *func_pointers;
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2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
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if (!get_func_pointers(&func_pointers, ex_data_class)) {
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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2015-12-05 04:20:43 +00:00
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size_t i;
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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for (i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_num(func_pointers); i++) {
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CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *func_pointer =
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sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_value(func_pointers, i);
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Reserve ex_data index zero for app_data.
In the ancient times, before ex_data and OpenSSL, SSLeay supported a
single app_data slot in various types. Later app_data begat ex_data, and
app_data was replaced by compatibility macros to ex_data index zero.
Today, app_data is still in use, but ex_data never reserved index zero
for app_data. This causes some danger where, if the first ex_data
registration did not use NULL callbacks, the registration's callbacks
would collide with app_data.
Instead, add an option to the types with app_data to reserve index zero.
Also switch SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx to always return zero
rather than allocate a new one. It used to be that you used
X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data. I only found one consumer that we probably
don't care about, but, to be safe and since it's easy, go with the
conservative option. (Although SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx wasn't
guaranteed to alias app_data, in practice it always did. No consumer
ever calls X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index.)
Change-Id: Ie75b279d60aefd003ffef103f99021c5d696a5e9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5313
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-06-30 04:36:17 +01:00
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void *ptr = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(from, i + ex_data_class->num_reserved);
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2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
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if (func_pointer->dup_func) {
|
Reserve ex_data index zero for app_data.
In the ancient times, before ex_data and OpenSSL, SSLeay supported a
single app_data slot in various types. Later app_data begat ex_data, and
app_data was replaced by compatibility macros to ex_data index zero.
Today, app_data is still in use, but ex_data never reserved index zero
for app_data. This causes some danger where, if the first ex_data
registration did not use NULL callbacks, the registration's callbacks
would collide with app_data.
Instead, add an option to the types with app_data to reserve index zero.
Also switch SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx to always return zero
rather than allocate a new one. It used to be that you used
X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data. I only found one consumer that we probably
don't care about, but, to be safe and since it's easy, go with the
conservative option. (Although SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx wasn't
guaranteed to alias app_data, in practice it always did. No consumer
ever calls X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index.)
Change-Id: Ie75b279d60aefd003ffef103f99021c5d696a5e9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5313
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-06-30 04:36:17 +01:00
|
|
|
func_pointer->dup_func(to, from, &ptr, i + ex_data_class->num_reserved,
|
|
|
|
func_pointer->argl, func_pointer->argp);
|
2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
Reserve ex_data index zero for app_data.
In the ancient times, before ex_data and OpenSSL, SSLeay supported a
single app_data slot in various types. Later app_data begat ex_data, and
app_data was replaced by compatibility macros to ex_data index zero.
Today, app_data is still in use, but ex_data never reserved index zero
for app_data. This causes some danger where, if the first ex_data
registration did not use NULL callbacks, the registration's callbacks
would collide with app_data.
Instead, add an option to the types with app_data to reserve index zero.
Also switch SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx to always return zero
rather than allocate a new one. It used to be that you used
X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data. I only found one consumer that we probably
don't care about, but, to be safe and since it's easy, go with the
conservative option. (Although SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx wasn't
guaranteed to alias app_data, in practice it always did. No consumer
ever calls X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index.)
Change-Id: Ie75b279d60aefd003ffef103f99021c5d696a5e9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5313
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-06-30 04:36:17 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_set_ex_data(to, i + ex_data_class->num_reserved, ptr);
|
2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_free(func_pointers);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
|
|
|
void CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS *ex_data_class, void *obj,
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad) {
|
2015-12-05 04:20:43 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ad->sk == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* Nothing to do. */
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-12-05 04:20:43 +00:00
|
|
|
STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *func_pointers;
|
2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!get_func_pointers(&func_pointers, ex_data_class)) {
|
2015-12-05 04:20:43 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TODO(davidben): This leaks memory on malloc error. */
|
2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-05 04:20:43 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_num(func_pointers); i++) {
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *func_pointer =
|
|
|
|
sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_value(func_pointers, i);
|
|
|
|
if (func_pointer->free_func) {
|
Reserve ex_data index zero for app_data.
In the ancient times, before ex_data and OpenSSL, SSLeay supported a
single app_data slot in various types. Later app_data begat ex_data, and
app_data was replaced by compatibility macros to ex_data index zero.
Today, app_data is still in use, but ex_data never reserved index zero
for app_data. This causes some danger where, if the first ex_data
registration did not use NULL callbacks, the registration's callbacks
would collide with app_data.
Instead, add an option to the types with app_data to reserve index zero.
Also switch SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx to always return zero
rather than allocate a new one. It used to be that you used
X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data. I only found one consumer that we probably
don't care about, but, to be safe and since it's easy, go with the
conservative option. (Although SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx wasn't
guaranteed to alias app_data, in practice it always did. No consumer
ever calls X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index.)
Change-Id: Ie75b279d60aefd003ffef103f99021c5d696a5e9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5313
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-06-30 04:36:17 +01:00
|
|
|
void *ptr = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(ad, i + ex_data_class->num_reserved);
|
|
|
|
func_pointer->free_func(obj, ptr, ad, i + ex_data_class->num_reserved,
|
|
|
|
func_pointer->argl, func_pointer->argp);
|
2015-04-15 20:28:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_free(func_pointers);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-22 20:49:27 +01:00
|
|
|
sk_void_free(ad->sk);
|
|
|
|
ad->sk = NULL;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
|
|
|
void CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(void) {}
|