567 lines
20 KiB
C++
567 lines
20 KiB
C++
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
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* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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namespace bssl {
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SSL_HANDSHAKE::SSL_HANDSHAKE(SSL *ssl_arg)
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: ssl(ssl_arg),
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scts_requested(0),
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needs_psk_binder(0),
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received_hello_retry_request(0),
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received_custom_extension(0),
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accept_psk_mode(0),
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cert_request(0),
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certificate_status_expected(0),
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ocsp_stapling_requested(0),
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should_ack_sni(0),
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in_false_start(0),
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in_early_data(0),
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early_data_offered(0),
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can_early_read(0),
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can_early_write(0),
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next_proto_neg_seen(0),
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ticket_expected(0),
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extended_master_secret(0),
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pending_private_key_op(0) {
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}
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SSL_HANDSHAKE::~SSL_HANDSHAKE() {
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OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
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OPENSSL_cleanse(early_traffic_secret, sizeof(early_traffic_secret));
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OPENSSL_cleanse(client_handshake_secret, sizeof(client_handshake_secret));
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OPENSSL_cleanse(server_handshake_secret, sizeof(server_handshake_secret));
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OPENSSL_cleanse(client_traffic_secret_0, sizeof(client_traffic_secret_0));
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OPENSSL_cleanse(server_traffic_secret_0, sizeof(server_traffic_secret_0));
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OPENSSL_free(cookie);
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OPENSSL_free(key_share_bytes);
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OPENSSL_free(ecdh_public_key);
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OPENSSL_free(peer_sigalgs);
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OPENSSL_free(peer_supported_group_list);
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OPENSSL_free(peer_key);
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OPENSSL_free(server_params);
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ssl->ctx->x509_method->hs_flush_cached_ca_names(this);
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OPENSSL_free(certificate_types);
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if (key_block != NULL) {
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OPENSSL_cleanse(key_block, key_block_len);
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OPENSSL_free(key_block);
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}
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}
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SSL_HANDSHAKE *ssl_handshake_new(SSL *ssl) {
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UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> hs = MakeUnique<SSL_HANDSHAKE>(ssl);
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if (!hs ||
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!hs->transcript.Init()) {
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return nullptr;
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}
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return hs.release();
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}
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void ssl_handshake_free(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { Delete(hs); }
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int ssl_check_message_type(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg, int type) {
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if (msg.type != type) {
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ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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ERR_add_error_dataf("got type %d, wanted type %d", msg.type, type);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int ssl_add_message_cbb(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
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uint8_t *msg;
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size_t len;
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if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb, &msg, &len) ||
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!ssl->method->add_message(ssl, msg, len)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl) {
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/* kMaxMessageLen is the default maximum message size for handshakes which do
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* not accept peer certificate chains. */
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static const size_t kMaxMessageLen = 16384;
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if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
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if ((!ssl->server || (ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) &&
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kMaxMessageLen < ssl->max_cert_list) {
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return ssl->max_cert_list;
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}
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return kMaxMessageLen;
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}
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if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
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/* In TLS 1.2 and below, the largest acceptable post-handshake message is
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* a HelloRequest. */
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return 0;
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}
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if (ssl->server) {
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/* The largest acceptable post-handshake message for a server is a
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* KeyUpdate. We will never initiate post-handshake auth. */
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return 1;
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}
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/* Clients must accept NewSessionTicket and CertificateRequest, so allow the
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* default size. */
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return kMaxMessageLen;
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}
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bool ssl_hash_message(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg) {
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/* V2ClientHello messages are pre-hashed. */
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if (msg.is_v2_hello) {
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return true;
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}
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return hs->transcript.Update(CBS_data(&msg.raw), CBS_len(&msg.raw));
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}
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int ssl_parse_extensions(const CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out_alert,
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const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE *ext_types,
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size_t num_ext_types, int ignore_unknown) {
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/* Reset everything. */
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for (size_t i = 0; i < num_ext_types; i++) {
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*ext_types[i].out_present = 0;
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CBS_init(ext_types[i].out_data, NULL, 0);
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}
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CBS copy = *cbs;
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while (CBS_len(©) != 0) {
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uint16_t type;
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CBS data;
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if (!CBS_get_u16(©, &type) ||
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!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(©, &data)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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return 0;
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}
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const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE *ext_type = NULL;
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for (size_t i = 0; i < num_ext_types; i++) {
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if (type == ext_types[i].type) {
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ext_type = &ext_types[i];
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break;
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}
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}
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if (ext_type == NULL) {
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if (ignore_unknown) {
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continue;
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}
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
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return 0;
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}
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/* Duplicate ext_types are forbidden. */
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if (*ext_type->out_present) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
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return 0;
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}
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*ext_type->out_present = 1;
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*ext_type->out_data = data;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static void set_crypto_buffer(CRYPTO_BUFFER **dest, CRYPTO_BUFFER *src) {
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/* TODO(davidben): Remove this helper once |SSL_SESSION| can use |UniquePtr|
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* and |UniquePtr| has up_ref helpers. */
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(*dest);
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*dest = src;
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if (src != nullptr) {
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(src);
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}
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}
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enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_verify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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const SSL_SESSION *prev_session = ssl->s3->established_session;
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if (prev_session != NULL) {
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/* If renegotiating, the server must not change the server certificate. See
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* https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE. We never resume on renegotiation,
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* so this check is sufficient to ensure the reported peer certificate never
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* changes on renegotiation. */
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assert(!ssl->server);
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if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(prev_session->certs) !=
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sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED);
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ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
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return ssl_verify_invalid;
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}
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for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs); i++) {
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const CRYPTO_BUFFER *old_cert =
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sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(prev_session->certs, i);
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const CRYPTO_BUFFER *new_cert =
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sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(hs->new_session->certs, i);
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if (CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert) != CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(new_cert) ||
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OPENSSL_memcmp(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(old_cert),
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(new_cert),
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(old_cert)) != 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED);
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ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
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return ssl_verify_invalid;
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}
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}
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/* The certificate is identical, so we may skip re-verifying the
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* certificate. Since we only authenticated the previous one, copy other
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* authentication from the established session and ignore what was newly
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* received. */
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set_crypto_buffer(&hs->new_session->ocsp_response,
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prev_session->ocsp_response);
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set_crypto_buffer(&hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list,
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prev_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
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hs->new_session->verify_result = prev_session->verify_result;
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return ssl_verify_ok;
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}
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||
|
|
|
||
|
|
uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
|
||
|
|
enum ssl_verify_result_t ret;
|
||
|
|
if (ssl->custom_verify_callback != nullptr) {
|
||
|
|
ret = ssl->custom_verify_callback(ssl, &alert);
|
||
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
||
|
|
case ssl_verify_ok:
|
||
|
|
hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
|
||
|
|
break;
|
||
|
|
case ssl_verify_invalid:
|
||
|
|
hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION;
|
||
|
|
break;
|
||
|
|
case ssl_verify_retry:
|
||
|
|
break;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
} else {
|
||
|
|
ret = ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_verify_cert_chain(
|
||
|
|
hs->new_session.get(), ssl, &alert)
|
||
|
|
? ssl_verify_ok
|
||
|
|
: ssl_verify_invalid;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
if (ret == ssl_verify_invalid) {
|
||
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
||
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
return ret;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
uint16_t ssl_get_grease_value(const SSL *ssl, enum ssl_grease_index_t index) {
|
||
|
|
/* Use the client_random or server_random for entropy. This both avoids
|
||
|
|
* calling |RAND_bytes| on a single byte repeatedly and ensures the values are
|
||
|
|
* deterministic. This allows the same ClientHello be sent twice for a
|
||
|
|
* HelloRetryRequest or the same group be advertised in both supported_groups
|
||
|
|
* and key_shares. */
|
||
|
|
uint16_t ret = ssl->server ? ssl->s3->server_random[index]
|
||
|
|
: ssl->s3->client_random[index];
|
||
|
|
/* The first four bytes of server_random are a timestamp prior to TLS 1.3, but
|
||
|
|
* servers have no fields to GREASE until TLS 1.3. */
|
||
|
|
assert(!ssl->server || ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION);
|
||
|
|
/* This generates a random value of the form 0xωaωa, for all 0 ≤ ω < 16. */
|
||
|
|
ret = (ret & 0xf0) | 0x0a;
|
||
|
|
ret |= ret << 8;
|
||
|
|
return ret;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_get_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
|
||
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
||
|
|
SSLMessage msg;
|
||
|
|
if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
|
||
|
|
return ssl_hs_read_message;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) {
|
||
|
|
return ssl_hs_error;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
/* Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. */
|
||
|
|
uint8_t finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
||
|
|
size_t finished_len;
|
||
|
|
if (!hs->transcript.GetFinishedMAC(finished, &finished_len,
|
||
|
|
SSL_get_session(ssl), !ssl->server,
|
||
|
|
ssl3_protocol_version(ssl)) ||
|
||
|
|
!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
|
||
|
|
return ssl_hs_error;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
int finished_ok = CBS_mem_equal(&msg.body, finished, finished_len);
|
||
|
|
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
|
||
|
|
finished_ok = 1;
|
||
|
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
if (!finished_ok) {
|
||
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
|
||
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
|
||
|
|
return ssl_hs_error;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
/* Copy the Finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. */
|
||
|
|
if (ssl->version != SSL3_VERSION) {
|
||
|
|
if (finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished) ||
|
||
|
|
finished_len > sizeof(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished)) {
|
||
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
||
|
|
return ssl_hs_error;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
if (ssl->server) {
|
||
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, finished, finished_len);
|
||
|
|
ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
|
||
|
|
} else {
|
||
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, finished, finished_len);
|
||
|
|
ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
|
||
|
|
return ssl_hs_ok;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
int ssl_run_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, int *out_early_return) {
|
||
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
||
|
|
for (;;) {
|
||
|
|
/* Resolve the operation the handshake was waiting on. */
|
||
|
|
switch (hs->wait) {
|
||
|
|
case ssl_hs_error:
|
||
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
||
|
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
case ssl_hs_flush: {
|
||
|
|
int ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl);
|
||
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
||
|
|
return ret;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
break;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
case ssl_hs_read_server_hello:
|
||
|
|
case ssl_hs_read_message: {
|
||
|
|
int ret = ssl->method->read_message(ssl);
|
||
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
||
|
|
uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
|
||
|
|
if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_read_server_hello &&
|
||
|
|
ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL &&
|
||
|
|
ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) {
|
||
|
|
/* Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure
|
||
|
|
* alert in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client
|
||
|
|
* behavior and gives a better error on a (probable) failure to
|
||
|
|
* negotiate initial parameters. Note: this error code comes after
|
||
|
|
* the original one.
|
||
|
|
*
|
||
|
|
* See https://crbug.com/446505. */
|
||
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO);
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
return ret;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
break;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
case ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec: {
|
||
|
|
int ret = ssl->method->read_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
|
||
|
|
if (ret <= 0) {
|
||
|
|
return ret;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
break;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
case ssl_hs_read_end_of_early_data: {
|
||
|
|
if (ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read) {
|
||
|
|
/* While we are processing early data, the handshake returns early. */
|
||
|
|
*out_early_return = 1;
|
||
|
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
||
|
|
break;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
case ssl_hs_certificate_selection_pending:
|
||
|
|
ssl->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING;
|
||
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
||
|
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
case ssl_hs_x509_lookup:
|
||
|
|
ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
||
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
||
|
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
case ssl_hs_channel_id_lookup:
|
||
|
|
ssl->rwstate = SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
|
||
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
||
|
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
case ssl_hs_private_key_operation:
|
||
|
|
ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
|
||
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
||
|
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
case ssl_hs_pending_session:
|
||
|
|
ssl->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION;
|
||
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
||
|
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
case ssl_hs_pending_ticket:
|
||
|
|
ssl->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_TICKET;
|
||
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
||
|
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
case ssl_hs_certificate_verify:
|
||
|
|
ssl->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
|
||
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
||
|
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
case ssl_hs_early_data_rejected:
|
||
|
|
ssl->rwstate = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
|
||
|
|
/* Cause |SSL_write| to start failing immediately. */
|
||
|
|
hs->can_early_write = 0;
|
||
|
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
case ssl_hs_early_return:
|
||
|
|
*out_early_return = 1;
|
||
|
|
hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
|
||
|
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
case ssl_hs_ok:
|
||
|
|
break;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
/* Run the state machine again. */
|
||
|
|
hs->wait = ssl->do_handshake(hs);
|
||
|
|
if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_error) {
|
||
|
|
/* Don't loop around to avoid a stray |SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE| the
|
||
|
|
* first time around. */
|
||
|
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_ok) {
|
||
|
|
/* The handshake has completed. */
|
||
|
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
/* Otherwise, loop to the beginning and resolve what was blocking the
|
||
|
|
* handshake. */
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
} // namespace bssl
|