boringssl/ssl/d1_lib.c

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/*
* DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
* (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/nid.h>
#include "internal.h"
/* DTLS1_MTU_TIMEOUTS is the maximum number of timeouts to expire
* before starting to decrease the MTU. */
#define DTLS1_MTU_TIMEOUTS 2
/* DTLS1_MAX_TIMEOUTS is the maximum number of timeouts to expire
* before failing the DTLS handshake. */
#define DTLS1_MAX_TIMEOUTS 12
int dtls1_new(SSL *ssl) {
DTLS1_STATE *d1;
if (!ssl3_new(ssl)) {
return 0;
}
d1 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *d1);
if (d1 == NULL) {
ssl3_free(ssl);
return 0;
}
memset(d1, 0, sizeof *d1);
ssl->d1 = d1;
/* Set the version to the highest supported version.
*
* TODO(davidben): Move this field into |s3|, have it store the normalized
* protocol version, and implement this pre-negotiation quirk in |SSL_version|
* at the API boundary rather than in internal state. */
ssl->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
return 1;
}
void dtls1_free(SSL *ssl) {
ssl3_free(ssl);
if (ssl == NULL || ssl->d1 == NULL) {
return;
}
dtls_clear_incoming_messages(ssl);
dtls_clear_outgoing_messages(ssl);
OPENSSL_free(ssl->d1);
ssl->d1 = NULL;
}
int dtls1_supports_cipher(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
/* DTLS does not support stream ciphers. The NULL cipher is rejected because
* it's not needed. */
return cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4 && cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_eNULL;
}
void DTLSv1_set_initial_timeout_duration(SSL *ssl, unsigned int duration_ms) {
ssl->initial_timeout_duration_ms = duration_ms;
}
void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *ssl) {
/* If timer is not set, initialize duration (by default, 1 second) */
if (ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms = ssl->initial_timeout_duration_ms;
}
/* Set timeout to current time */
ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &ssl->d1->next_timeout);
/* Add duration to current time */
ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec += ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms / 1000;
ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec += (ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms % 1000) * 1000;
if (ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec >= 1000000) {
ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec++;
ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec -= 1000000;
}
BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
&ssl->d1->next_timeout);
}
int DTLSv1_get_timeout(const SSL *ssl, struct timeval *out) {
if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
return 0;
}
/* If no timeout is set, just return NULL */
if (ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
return 0;
}
struct timeval timenow;
ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &timenow);
/* If timer already expired, set remaining time to 0 */
if (ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec ||
(ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == timenow.tv_sec &&
ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec <= timenow.tv_usec)) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
return 1;
}
/* Calculate time left until timer expires */
memcpy(out, &ssl->d1->next_timeout, sizeof(struct timeval));
out->tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
out->tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
if (out->tv_usec < 0) {
out->tv_sec--;
out->tv_usec += 1000000;
}
/* If remaining time is less than 15 ms, set it to 0 to prevent issues
* because of small devergences with socket timeouts. */
if (out->tv_sec == 0 && out->tv_usec < 15000) {
memset(out, 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
}
return 1;
}
int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *ssl) {
struct timeval timeleft;
/* Get time left until timeout, return false if no timer running */
if (!DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, &timeleft)) {
return 0;
}
/* Return false if timer is not expired yet */
if (timeleft.tv_sec > 0 || timeleft.tv_usec > 0) {
return 0;
}
/* Timer expired, so return true */
return 1;
}
void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *ssl) {
ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms *= 2;
if (ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms > 60000) {
ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms = 60000;
}
dtls1_start_timer(ssl);
}
void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *ssl) {
/* Reset everything */
ssl->d1->num_timeouts = 0;
memset(&ssl->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms = ssl->initial_timeout_duration_ms;
BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
&ssl->d1->next_timeout);
/* Clear retransmission buffer */
dtls_clear_outgoing_messages(ssl);
}
int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *ssl) {
ssl->d1->num_timeouts++;
/* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
if (ssl->d1->num_timeouts > DTLS1_MTU_TIMEOUTS &&
!(SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
long mtu = BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL);
if (mtu >= 0 && mtu <= (1 << 30) && (unsigned)mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()) {
ssl->d1->mtu = (unsigned)mtu;
}
}
if (ssl->d1->num_timeouts > DTLS1_MAX_TIMEOUTS) {
/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int DTLSv1_handle_timeout(SSL *ssl) {
Set rwstate consistently. We reset it to SSL_NOTHING at the start of ever SSL_get_error-using operation. Then we only set it to a non-NOTHING value in the rest of the stack on error paths. Currently, ssl->rwstate is set all over the place. Sometimes the pattern is: ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; if (BIO_write(...) <= 0) { goto err; } ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; Sometimes we only set it to the non-NOTHING value on error. if (BIO_write(...) <= 0) { ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; } ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; Sometimes we just set it to SSL_NOTHING far from any callback in random places. The third case is arbitrary and clearly should be removed. But, in the second case, we sometimes forget to undo it afterwards. This is largely harmless since an error in the error queue overrides rwstate, but we don't always put something in the error queue (falling back to SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL for "I'm not sure why it failed. Perhaps it was one of your callbacks? Check your errno equivalent."), but in that case a stray rwstate value will cause it to be wrong. We could fix the cases where we fail to set SSL_NOTHING on success cases, but this doesn't account for there being multiple SSL_get_error operations. The consumer may have an SSL_read and an SSL_write running concurrently. Instead, it seems the best option is to lift the SSL_NOTHING reset to the operations and set SSL_WRITING and friends as in the second case. (Someday hopefully we can fix this to just be an enum that is internally returned. It can convert to something stateful at the API layer.) Change-Id: I54665ec066a64eb0e48a06e2fcd0d2681a42df7f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7453 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-03-12 03:56:19 +00:00
ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
Clear the error queue on entry to core SSL operations. OpenSSL historically made some poor API decisions. Rather than returning a status enum in SSL_read, etc., these functions must be paired with SSL_get_error which determines the cause of the last error's failure. This requires SSL_read communicate with SSL_get_error with some stateful flag, rwstate. Further, probably as workarounds for bugs elsewhere, SSL_get_error does not trust rwstate. Among other quirks, if the error queue is non-empty, SSL_get_error overrides rwstate and returns a value based on that. This requires that SSL_read, etc., be called with an empty error queue. (Or we hit one of the spurious ERR_clear_error calls in the handshake state machine, likely added as further self-workarounds.) Since requiring callers consistently clear the error queue everywhere is unreasonable (crbug.com/567501), clear ERR_clear_error *once* at the entry point. Until/unless[*] we make SSL_get_error sane, this is the most reasonable way to get to the point that clearing the error queue on error is optional. With those in place, the calls in the handshake state machine are no longer needed. (I suspect all the ERR_clear_system_error calls can also go, but I'll investigate and think about that separately.) [*] I'm not even sure it's possible anymore, thanks to the possibility of BIO_write pushing to the error queue. BUG=567501,593963 Change-Id: I564ace199e5a4a74b2554ad3335e99cd17120741 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7455 Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-03-14 18:25:46 +00:00
/* Functions which use SSL_get_error must clear the error queue on entry. */
ERR_clear_error();
if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
return -1;
}
/* if no timer is expired, don't do anything */
if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(ssl)) {
return 0;
}
dtls1_double_timeout(ssl);
if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(ssl) < 0) {
return -1;
}
dtls1_start_timer(ssl);
return dtls1_retransmit_outgoing_messages(ssl);
}
void dtls1_expect_flight(SSL *ssl) {
dtls1_start_timer(ssl);
}
void dtls1_received_flight(SSL *ssl) {
dtls1_stop_timer(ssl);
}