2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
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#include <openssl/base64.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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2014-07-31 23:23:51 +01:00
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#include <limits.h>
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2015-01-31 01:08:37 +00:00
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#include <string.h>
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
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#include <openssl/type_check.h>
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2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
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#include "../internal.h"
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2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// constant_time_lt_args_8 behaves like |constant_time_lt_8| but takes |uint8_t|
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// arguments for a slightly simpler implementation.
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2017-05-17 20:02:31 +01:00
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static inline uint8_t constant_time_lt_args_8(uint8_t a, uint8_t b) {
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crypto_word_t aw = a;
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crypto_word_t bw = b;
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// |crypto_word_t| is larger than |uint8_t|, so |aw| and |bw| have the same
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// MSB. |aw| < |bw| iff MSB(|aw| - |bw|) is 1.
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2017-05-17 20:02:31 +01:00
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return constant_time_msb_w(aw - bw);
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// constant_time_in_range_8 returns |CONSTTIME_TRUE_8| if |min| <= |a| <= |max|
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// and |CONSTTIME_FALSE_8| otherwise.
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2017-05-17 20:02:31 +01:00
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static inline uint8_t constant_time_in_range_8(uint8_t a, uint8_t min,
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uint8_t max) {
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a -= min;
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return constant_time_lt_args_8(a, max - min + 1);
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// Encoding.
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2017-04-14 01:50:15 +01:00
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static uint8_t conv_bin2ascii(uint8_t a) {
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// Since PEM is sometimes used to carry private keys, we encode base64 data
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// itself in constant-time.
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2017-04-14 01:50:15 +01:00
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a &= 0x3f;
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uint8_t ret = constant_time_select_8(constant_time_eq_8(a, 62), '+', '/');
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2017-05-17 20:02:31 +01:00
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ret =
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constant_time_select_8(constant_time_lt_args_8(a, 62), a - 52 + '0', ret);
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ret =
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constant_time_select_8(constant_time_lt_args_8(a, 52), a - 26 + 'a', ret);
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ret = constant_time_select_8(constant_time_lt_args_8(a, 26), a + 'A', ret);
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2017-04-14 01:50:15 +01:00
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return ret;
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}
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
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OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_ENCODE_CTX *)(NULL))->data) % 3 == 0,
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data_length_must_be_multiple_of_base64_chunk_size);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
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int EVP_EncodedLength(size_t *out_len, size_t len) {
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if (len + 2 < len) {
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return 0;
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}
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len += 2;
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len /= 3;
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if (((len << 2) >> 2) != len) {
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return 0;
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}
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len <<= 2;
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if (len + 1 < len) {
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return 0;
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2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
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}
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2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
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len++;
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*out_len = len;
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return 1;
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2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
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}
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx) {
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2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
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OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(EVP_ENCODE_CTX));
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len,
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const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
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Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
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size_t total = 0;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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*out_len = 0;
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if (in_len == 0) {
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return;
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}
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2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
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assert(ctx->data_used < sizeof(ctx->data));
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
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if (sizeof(ctx->data) - ctx->data_used > in_len) {
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2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
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OPENSSL_memcpy(&ctx->data[ctx->data_used], in, in_len);
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2016-08-04 22:38:40 +01:00
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ctx->data_used += (unsigned)in_len;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return;
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}
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
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2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
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if (ctx->data_used != 0) {
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const size_t todo = sizeof(ctx->data) - ctx->data_used;
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2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
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OPENSSL_memcpy(&ctx->data[ctx->data_used], in, todo);
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
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in += todo;
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in_len -= todo;
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2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
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size_t encoded = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, ctx->data, sizeof(ctx->data));
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ctx->data_used = 0;
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|
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
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out += encoded;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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*(out++) = '\n';
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*out = '\0';
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2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
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total = encoded + 1;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
|
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2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
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while (in_len >= sizeof(ctx->data)) {
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size_t encoded = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, in, sizeof(ctx->data));
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in += sizeof(ctx->data);
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in_len -= sizeof(ctx->data);
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|
|
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
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out += encoded;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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*(out++) = '\n';
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*out = '\0';
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
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if (total + encoded + 1 < total) {
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*out_len = 0;
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return;
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}
|
|
|
|
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
|
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|
total += encoded + 1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
|
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|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
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|
if (in_len != 0) {
|
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
|
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|
OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->data, in, in_len);
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
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|
}
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|
2016-08-04 22:38:40 +01:00
|
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|
ctx->data_used = (unsigned)in_len;
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
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if (total > INT_MAX) {
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// We cannot signal an error, but we can at least avoid making *out_len
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// negative.
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
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total = 0;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
|
2016-08-04 22:38:40 +01:00
|
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*out_len = (int)total;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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|
}
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void EVP_EncodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len) {
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->data_used == 0) {
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*out_len = 0;
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return;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
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|
}
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
size_t encoded = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, ctx->data, ctx->data_used);
|
|
|
|
out[encoded++] = '\n';
|
|
|
|
out[encoded] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
ctx->data_used = 0;
|
2016-08-04 22:38:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// ctx->data_used is bounded by sizeof(ctx->data), so this does not
|
|
|
|
// overflow.
|
2016-08-04 22:38:40 +01:00
|
|
|
assert(encoded <= INT_MAX);
|
|
|
|
*out_len = (int)encoded;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
size_t EVP_EncodeBlock(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src, size_t src_len) {
|
2014-07-16 18:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
uint32_t l;
|
|
|
|
size_t remaining = src_len, ret = 0;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-16 18:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
while (remaining) {
|
|
|
|
if (remaining >= 3) {
|
|
|
|
l = (((uint32_t)src[0]) << 16L) | (((uint32_t)src[1]) << 8L) | src[2];
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
*(dst++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 18L);
|
|
|
|
*(dst++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 12L);
|
|
|
|
*(dst++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 6L);
|
|
|
|
*(dst++) = conv_bin2ascii(l);
|
2014-07-16 18:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
remaining -= 3;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2014-07-16 18:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
l = ((uint32_t)src[0]) << 16L;
|
|
|
|
if (remaining == 2) {
|
|
|
|
l |= ((uint32_t)src[1] << 8L);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*(dst++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 18L);
|
|
|
|
*(dst++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 12L);
|
2014-07-16 18:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
*(dst++) = (remaining == 1) ? '=' : conv_bin2ascii(l >> 6L);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
*(dst++) = '=';
|
2014-07-16 18:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
remaining = 0;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret += 4;
|
|
|
|
src += 3;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*dst = '\0';
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// Decoding.
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
int EVP_DecodedLength(size_t *out_len, size_t len) {
|
|
|
|
if (len % 4 != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
*out_len = (len / 4) * 3;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx) {
|
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(EVP_ENCODE_CTX));
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static uint8_t base64_ascii_to_bin(uint8_t a) {
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// Since PEM is sometimes used to carry private keys, we decode base64 data
|
|
|
|
// itself in constant-time.
|
2017-05-17 20:02:31 +01:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t is_upper = constant_time_in_range_8(a, 'A', 'Z');
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t is_lower = constant_time_in_range_8(a, 'a', 'z');
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t is_digit = constant_time_in_range_8(a, '0', '9');
|
2017-04-14 01:50:15 +01:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t is_plus = constant_time_eq_8(a, '+');
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t is_slash = constant_time_eq_8(a, '/');
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t is_equals = constant_time_eq_8(a, '=');
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
uint8_t ret = 0xff; // 0xff signals invalid.
|
|
|
|
ret = constant_time_select_8(is_upper, a - 'A', ret); // [0,26)
|
|
|
|
ret = constant_time_select_8(is_lower, a - 'a' + 26, ret); // [26,52)
|
|
|
|
ret = constant_time_select_8(is_digit, a - '0' + 52, ret); // [52,62)
|
2017-04-14 01:50:15 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = constant_time_select_8(is_plus, 62, ret);
|
|
|
|
ret = constant_time_select_8(is_slash, 63, ret);
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// Padding maps to zero, to be further handled by the caller.
|
2017-04-14 01:50:15 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = constant_time_select_8(is_equals, 0, ret);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// base64_decode_quad decodes a single “quad” (i.e. four characters) of base64
|
|
|
|
// data and writes up to three bytes to |out|. It sets |*out_num_bytes| to the
|
|
|
|
// number of bytes written, which will be less than three if the quad ended
|
|
|
|
// with padding. It returns one on success or zero on error.
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
static int base64_decode_quad(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_num_bytes,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *in) {
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t a = base64_ascii_to_bin(in[0]);
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t b = base64_ascii_to_bin(in[1]);
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t c = base64_ascii_to_bin(in[2]);
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t d = base64_ascii_to_bin(in[3]);
|
|
|
|
if (a == 0xff || b == 0xff || c == 0xff || d == 0xff) {
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
const uint32_t v = ((uint32_t)a) << 18 | ((uint32_t)b) << 12 |
|
|
|
|
((uint32_t)c) << 6 | (uint32_t)d;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const unsigned padding_pattern = (in[0] == '=') << 3 |
|
|
|
|
(in[1] == '=') << 2 |
|
|
|
|
(in[2] == '=') << 1 |
|
|
|
|
(in[3] == '=');
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (padding_pattern) {
|
|
|
|
case 0:
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// The common case of no padding.
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
*out_num_bytes = 3;
|
|
|
|
out[0] = v >> 16;
|
|
|
|
out[1] = v >> 8;
|
|
|
|
out[2] = v;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
case 1: // xxx=
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
*out_num_bytes = 2;
|
|
|
|
out[0] = v >> 16;
|
|
|
|
out[1] = v >> 8;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
case 3: // xx==
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
*out_num_bytes = 1;
|
|
|
|
out[0] = v >> 16;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
*out_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->error_encountered) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t bytes_out = 0, i;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
const char c = in[i];
|
|
|
|
switch (c) {
|
|
|
|
case ' ':
|
|
|
|
case '\t':
|
|
|
|
case '\r':
|
|
|
|
case '\n':
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-17 19:35:27 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->eof_seen) {
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->error_encountered = 1;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->data[ctx->data_used++] = c;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->data_used == 4) {
|
|
|
|
size_t num_bytes_resulting;
|
|
|
|
if (!base64_decode_quad(out, &num_bytes_resulting, ctx->data)) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->error_encountered = 1;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->data_used = 0;
|
|
|
|
bytes_out += num_bytes_resulting;
|
|
|
|
out += num_bytes_resulting;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
if (num_bytes_resulting < 3) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->eof_seen = 1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
if (bytes_out > INT_MAX) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->error_encountered = 1;
|
|
|
|
*out_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-08-04 22:38:40 +01:00
|
|
|
*out_len = (int)bytes_out;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->eof_seen) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int EVP_DecodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len) {
|
|
|
|
*out_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->error_encountered || ctx->data_used != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
int EVP_DecodeBase64(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
|
|
|
|
*out_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (in_len % 4 != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t max_len;
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_DecodedLength(&max_len, in_len) ||
|
|
|
|
max_out < max_len) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
size_t i, bytes_out = 0;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < in_len; i += 4) {
|
|
|
|
size_t num_bytes_resulting;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!base64_decode_quad(out, &num_bytes_resulting, &in[i])) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bytes_out += num_bytes_resulting;
|
|
|
|
out += num_bytes_resulting;
|
|
|
|
if (num_bytes_resulting != 3 && i != in_len - 4) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*out_len = bytes_out;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-31 23:23:51 +01:00
|
|
|
int EVP_DecodeBlock(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src, size_t src_len) {
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// Trim spaces and tabs from the beginning of the input.
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
while (src_len > 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (src[0] != ' ' && src[0] != '\t') {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
src++;
|
|
|
|
src_len--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// Trim newlines, spaces and tabs from the end of the line.
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
while (src_len > 0) {
|
|
|
|
switch (src[src_len-1]) {
|
|
|
|
case ' ':
|
|
|
|
case '\t':
|
|
|
|
case '\r':
|
|
|
|
case '\n':
|
|
|
|
src_len--;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-05-20 18:51:48 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
size_t dst_len;
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_DecodedLength(&dst_len, src_len) ||
|
|
|
|
dst_len > INT_MAX ||
|
|
|
|
!EVP_DecodeBase64(dst, &dst_len, dst_len, src, src_len)) {
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// EVP_DecodeBlock does not take padding into account, so put the
|
|
|
|
// NULs back in... so the caller can strip them back out.
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
while (dst_len % 3 != 0) {
|
|
|
|
dst[dst_len++] = '\0';
|
2014-07-31 23:23:51 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
assert(dst_len <= INT_MAX);
|
2014-07-31 23:23:51 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-08-04 22:38:40 +01:00
|
|
|
return (int)dst_len;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|