diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c b/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c
index 4a779718..11e60ac3 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_enum.c
@@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ long ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a)
     else if (i != V_ASN1_ENUMERATED)
         return -1;
 
-    OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(uint64_t) >= sizeof(long),
-                           long_larger_than_uint64_t);
+    OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(uint64_t) >= sizeof(long),
+                          "long larger than uint64_t");
 
     if (a->length > (int)sizeof(uint64_t)) {
         /* hmm... a bit ugly */
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
index dd74550b..6dc18bad 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
@@ -400,8 +400,8 @@ long ASN1_INTEGER_get(const ASN1_INTEGER *a)
     else if (i != V_ASN1_INTEGER)
         return -1;
 
-    OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(uint64_t) >= sizeof(long),
-                           long_larger_than_uint64_t);
+    OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(uint64_t) >= sizeof(long),
+                          "long larger than uint64_t");
 
     if (a->length > (int)sizeof(uint64_t)) {
         /* hmm... a bit ugly, return all ones */
diff --git a/crypto/base64/base64.c b/crypto/base64/base64.c
index b701b0d1..349452dd 100644
--- a/crypto/base64/base64.c
+++ b/crypto/base64/base64.c
@@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ static uint8_t conv_bin2ascii(uint8_t a) {
   return ret;
 }
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_ENCODE_CTX *)(NULL))->data) % 3 == 0,
-                       data_length_must_be_multiple_of_base64_chunk_size);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_ENCODE_CTX *)(NULL))->data) % 3 == 0,
+                      "data length must be a multiple of base64 chunk size");
 
 int EVP_EncodedLength(size_t *out_len, size_t len) {
   if (len + 2 < len) {
diff --git a/crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesccm.c b/crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesccm.c
index 37a9add2..3e186593 100644
--- a/crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesccm.c
+++ b/crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesccm.c
@@ -33,13 +33,13 @@ struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx {
   CCM128_CONTEXT ccm;
 };
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
-                           sizeof(struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx),
-                       AEAD_state_too_small);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
+                          sizeof(struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state is too small");
 #if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
-                           alignof(struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx),
-                       AEAD_state_insufficient_alignment);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
+                          alignof(struct aead_aes_ccm_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
 #endif
 
 static int aead_aes_ccm_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
diff --git a/crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesctrhmac.c b/crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesctrhmac.c
index 54a50ec5..8c45c811 100644
--- a/crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesctrhmac.c
+++ b/crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesctrhmac.c
@@ -35,13 +35,13 @@ struct aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_ctx {
   SHA256_CTX outer_init_state;
 };
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
-                           sizeof(struct aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_ctx),
-                       AEAD_state_too_small);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
+                          sizeof(struct aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state is too small");
 #if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
-                           alignof(struct aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_ctx),
-                       AEAD_state_insufficient_alignment);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
+                          alignof(struct aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
 #endif
 
 static void hmac_init(SHA256_CTX *out_inner, SHA256_CTX *out_outer,
diff --git a/crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesgcmsiv.c b/crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesgcmsiv.c
index bf6c5301..1deb9181 100644
--- a/crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesgcmsiv.c
+++ b/crypto/cipher_extra/e_aesgcmsiv.c
@@ -38,12 +38,12 @@ struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx {
 
 // The assembly code assumes 8-byte alignment of the EVP_AEAD_CTX's state, and
 // aligns to 16 bytes itself.
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) + 8 >=
-                           sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx),
-                       AEAD_state_too_small_opt);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) + 8 >=
+                          sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_asm_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state is too small");
 #if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >= 8,
-                       AEAD_state_insufficient_alignment_opt);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >= 8,
+                      "AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
 #endif
 
 // asm_ctx_from_ctx returns a 16-byte aligned context pointer from |ctx|.
@@ -560,13 +560,13 @@ struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_ctx {
   unsigned is_256:1;
 };
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
-                       sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_ctx),
-                       AEAD_state_too_small);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
+                          sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state is too small");
 #if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
-                       alignof(struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_ctx),
-                       AEAD_state_insufficient_alignment);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
+                          alignof(struct aead_aes_gcm_siv_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
 #endif
 
 static int aead_aes_gcm_siv_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
diff --git a/crypto/cipher_extra/e_chacha20poly1305.c b/crypto/cipher_extra/e_chacha20poly1305.c
index 5aee4aea..1c175e9a 100644
--- a/crypto/cipher_extra/e_chacha20poly1305.c
+++ b/crypto/cipher_extra/e_chacha20poly1305.c
@@ -35,13 +35,13 @@ struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx {
   uint8_t key[32];
 };
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
-                       sizeof(struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx),
-                       AEAD_state_too_small);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
+                          sizeof(struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state is too small");
 #if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
-                           alignof(struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx),
-                       AEAD_state_insufficient_alignment);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
+                          alignof(struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
 #endif
 
 // For convenience (the x86_64 calling convention allows only six parameters in
@@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ static int asm_capable(void) {
   return sse41_capable;
 }
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(union open_data) == 48, wrong_open_data_size);
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(union seal_data) == 48 + 8 + 8,
-                       wrong_seal_data_size);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(union open_data) == 48, "wrong open_data size");
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(union seal_data) == 48 + 8 + 8,
+                      "wrong seal_data size");
 
 // chacha20_poly1305_open is defined in chacha20_poly1305_x86_64.pl. It decrypts
 // |plaintext_len| bytes from |ciphertext| and writes them to |out_plaintext|.
diff --git a/crypto/cipher_extra/e_tls.c b/crypto/cipher_extra/e_tls.c
index 1f1fc3a7..ff41989c 100644
--- a/crypto/cipher_extra/e_tls.c
+++ b/crypto/cipher_extra/e_tls.c
@@ -42,15 +42,16 @@ typedef struct {
   char implicit_iv;
 } AEAD_TLS_CTX;
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE < 256, mac_key_len_fits_in_uint8_t);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE < 256,
+                      "mac_key_len does not fit in uint8_t");
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
-                           sizeof(AEAD_TLS_CTX),
-                       AEAD_state_too_small);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
+                          sizeof(AEAD_TLS_CTX),
+                      "AEAD state is too small");
 #if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
-                           alignof(AEAD_TLS_CTX),
-                       AEAD_state_insufficient_alignment);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
+                          alignof(AEAD_TLS_CTX),
+                      "AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
 #endif
 
 static void aead_tls_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {
diff --git a/crypto/err/err_data_generate.go b/crypto/err/err_data_generate.go
index 893ebffe..da965dfa 100644
--- a/crypto/err/err_data_generate.go
+++ b/crypto/err/err_data_generate.go
@@ -275,9 +275,9 @@ func main() {
 `)
 
 	for i, name := range libraryNames {
-		fmt.Fprintf(out, "OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(ERR_LIB_%s == %d, library_values_changed_%d);\n", name, i+1, i+1)
+		fmt.Fprintf(out, "OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(ERR_LIB_%s == %d, \"library value changed\");\n", name, i+1)
 	}
-	fmt.Fprintf(out, "OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(ERR_NUM_LIBS == %d, library_values_changed_num);\n", len(libraryNames)+1)
+	fmt.Fprintf(out, "OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(ERR_NUM_LIBS == %d, \"number of libraries changed\");\n", len(libraryNames)+1)
 	out.WriteString("\n")
 
 	e.reasons.WriteTo(out, "Reason")
diff --git a/crypto/evp/scrypt.c b/crypto/evp/scrypt.c
index 53a45542..2feb6504 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/scrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/scrypt.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 // A block_t is a Salsa20 block.
 typedef struct { uint32_t words[16]; } block_t;
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(block_t) == 64, block_t_has_padding);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(block_t) == 64, "block_t has padding");
 
 #define R(a, b) (((a) << (b)) | ((a) >> (32 - (b))))
 
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ int EVP_PBE_scrypt(const char *password, size_t password_len,
 
   // Allocate and divide up the scratch space. |max_mem| fits in a size_t, which
   // is no bigger than uint64_t, so none of these operations may overflow.
-  OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(UINT64_MAX >= ((size_t)-1), size_t_exceeds_u64);
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(UINT64_MAX >= ((size_t)-1), "size_t exceeds uint64_t");
   size_t B_blocks = p * 2 * r;
   size_t B_bytes = B_blocks * sizeof(block_t);
   size_t T_blocks = 2 * r;
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/bn.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/bn.c
index c020d964..51b828aa 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/bn.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/bn.c
@@ -406,8 +406,8 @@ int bn_resize_words(BIGNUM *bn, size_t words) {
 void bn_select_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG mask, const BN_ULONG *a,
                      const BN_ULONG *b, size_t num) {
   for (size_t i = 0; i < num; i++) {
-    OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
-                           crypto_word_t_too_small);
+    OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
+                          "crypto_word_t is too small");
     r[i] = constant_time_select_w(mask, a[i], b[i]);
   }
 }
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/cmp.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/cmp.c
index 692adb5a..fe478b60 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/cmp.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/cmp.c
@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@
 
 static int bn_cmp_words_consttime(const BN_ULONG *a, size_t a_len,
                                   const BN_ULONG *b, size_t b_len) {
-  OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
-                         crypto_word_t_too_small);
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
+                        "crypto_word_t is too small");
   int ret = 0;
   // Process the common words in little-endian order.
   size_t min = a_len < b_len ? a_len : b_len;
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/montgomery.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/montgomery.c
index 851c0a07..006d2b2b 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/montgomery.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/montgomery.c
@@ -167,11 +167,6 @@ BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, const BN_MONT_CTX *from) {
   return to;
 }
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 1 || BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2,
-                       BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS_VALUE_INVALID);
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) * BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS ==
-                       sizeof(uint64_t), BN_MONT_CTX_set_64_bit_mismatch);
-
 static int bn_mont_ctx_set_N_and_n0(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod) {
   if (BN_is_zero(mod)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO);
@@ -202,6 +197,11 @@ static int bn_mont_ctx_set_N_and_n0(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod) {
   // others, we could use a shorter R value and use faster |BN_ULONG|-based
   // math instead of |uint64_t|-based math, which would be double-precision.
   // However, currently only the assembler files know which is which.
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 1 || BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2,
+                        "BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS value is invalid");
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(
+      sizeof(BN_ULONG) * BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == sizeof(uint64_t),
+      "uint64_t is insufficient precision for n0");
   uint64_t n0 = bn_mont_n0(&mont->N);
   mont->n0[0] = (BN_ULONG)n0;
 #if BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/montgomery_inv.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/montgomery_inv.c
index 94d99e83..c80873f5 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/montgomery_inv.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/montgomery_inv.c
@@ -22,11 +22,11 @@
 
 static uint64_t bn_neg_inv_mod_r_u64(uint64_t n);
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 1 || BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2,
-                       BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS_VALUE_INVALID_2);
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(uint64_t) ==
-                       BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG),
-                       BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS_DOES_NOT_MATCH_UINT64_T);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 1 || BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2,
+                      "BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS value is invalid");
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) * BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS ==
+                          sizeof(uint64_t),
+                      "uint64_t is insufficient precision for n0");
 
 // LG_LITTLE_R is log_2(r).
 #define LG_LITTLE_R (BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS * BN_BITS2)
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/mul.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/mul.c
index a1582a23..640d8cdb 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/mul.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/mul.c
@@ -409,8 +409,8 @@ static void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
   BN_ULONG c_neg = c - bn_sub_words(&t[n2 * 2], t, &t[n2], n2);
   BN_ULONG c_pos = c + bn_add_words(&t[n2], t, &t[n2], n2);
   bn_select_words(&t[n2], neg, &t[n2 * 2], &t[n2], n2);
-  OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
-                         crypto_word_t_too_small);
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
+                        "crypto_word_t is too small");
   c = constant_time_select_w(neg, c_neg, c_pos);
 
   // We now have our three components. Add them together.
@@ -523,8 +523,8 @@ static void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a,
   BN_ULONG c_neg = c - bn_sub_words(&t[n2 * 2], t, &t[n2], n2);
   BN_ULONG c_pos = c + bn_add_words(&t[n2], t, &t[n2], n2);
   bn_select_words(&t[n2], neg, &t[n2 * 2], &t[n2], n2);
-  OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
-                         crypto_word_t_too_small);
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
+                        "crypto_word_t is too small");
   c = constant_time_select_w(neg, c_neg, c_pos);
 
   // We now have our three components. Add them together.
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/random.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/random.c
index e41a0efd..f6812f12 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/random.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/random.c
@@ -195,8 +195,8 @@ static crypto_word_t bn_less_than_word_mask(const BN_ULONG *a, size_t len,
   }
 
   // |a| < |b| iff a[1..len-1] are all zero and a[0] < b.
-  OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
-                         crypto_word_t_too_small);
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
+                        "crypto_word_t is too small");
   crypto_word_t mask = 0;
   for (size_t i = 1; i < len; i++) {
     mask |= a[i];
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/rsaz_exp.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/rsaz_exp.c
index 3f355b64..64dfff8a 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/rsaz_exp.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/rsaz_exp.c
@@ -45,11 +45,13 @@ alignas(64) static const BN_ULONG two80[40] = {
     0, 0, 0,       0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
 
 void RSAZ_1024_mod_exp_avx2(BN_ULONG result_norm[16],
-	const BN_ULONG base_norm[16], const BN_ULONG exponent[16],
-	const BN_ULONG m_norm[16], const BN_ULONG RR[16], BN_ULONG k0,
-	BN_ULONG storage_words[MOD_EXP_CTIME_STORAGE_LEN]) {
-  OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH % 64 == 0,
-      MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH_is_large_enough);
+                            const BN_ULONG base_norm[16],
+                            const BN_ULONG exponent[16],
+                            const BN_ULONG m_norm[16], const BN_ULONG RR[16],
+                            BN_ULONG k0,
+                            BN_ULONG storage_words[MOD_EXP_CTIME_STORAGE_LEN]) {
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH % 64 == 0,
+                        "MOD_EXP_CTIME_MIN_CACHE_LINE_WIDTH is too small");
   unsigned char *storage = (unsigned char *)storage_words;
   assert((uintptr_t)storage % 64 == 0);
 
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/shift.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/shift.c
index ccf7141a..523da674 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/shift.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/shift.c
@@ -296,15 +296,15 @@ int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n) {
 }
 
 static int bn_count_low_zero_bits_word(BN_ULONG l) {
-  OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
-                         crypto_word_t_too_small);
-  OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(int) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
-                         crypto_word_t_too_small_2);
-  OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(BN_BITS2 == sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8,
-                         bn_ulong_has_padding_bits);
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
+                        "crypto_word_t is too small");
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(int) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
+                        "crypto_word_t is too small");
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(BN_BITS2 == sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8,
+                        "BN_ULONG has padding bits");
   // C has very bizarre rules for types smaller than an int.
-  OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int),
-                         bn_ulong_is_promoted_to_int);
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int),
+                        "BN_ULONG gets promoted to int");
 
   crypto_word_t mask;
   int bits = 0;
@@ -342,10 +342,10 @@ static int bn_count_low_zero_bits_word(BN_ULONG l) {
 }
 
 int BN_count_low_zero_bits(const BIGNUM *bn) {
-  OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
-                         crypto_word_t_too_small);
-  OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(int) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
-                         crypto_word_t_too_small_2);
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(BN_ULONG) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
+                        "crypto_word_t is too small");
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(int) <= sizeof(crypto_word_t),
+                        "crypto_word_t is too small");
 
   int ret = 0;
   crypto_word_t saw_nonzero = 0;
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/e_aes.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/e_aes.c
index a24515ab..068465b3 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/e_aes.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/e_aes.c
@@ -906,13 +906,13 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_init_impl(struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx,
   return 1;
 }
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
-                           sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx),
-                       AEAD_state_too_small);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
+                          sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state is too small");
 #if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
-  OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(
-      alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >= alignof(struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx),
-      AEAD_state_insufficient_alignment);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
+                          alignof(struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
 #endif
 
 static int aead_aes_gcm_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
@@ -1079,13 +1079,13 @@ struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx {
   uint64_t min_next_nonce;
 };
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
-                           sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx),
-                       AEAD_state_too_small_tls12);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
+                          sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state is too small");
 #if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
-                           alignof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx),
-                       AEAD_state_insufficient_alignment_tls12);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
+                          alignof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
 #endif
 
 static int aead_aes_gcm_tls12_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
@@ -1173,13 +1173,13 @@ struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx {
   uint8_t first;
 };
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
-                           sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx),
-                       AEAD_state_too_small_tls13);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >=
+                          sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state is too small");
 #if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
-                           alignof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx),
-                       AEAD_state_insufficient_alignment_tls13);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >=
+                          alignof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx),
+                      "AEAD state has insufficient alignment");
 #endif
 
 static int aead_aes_gcm_tls13_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/ec/internal.h b/crypto/fipsmodule/ec/internal.h
index d78d719c..05175a56 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/ec/internal.h
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/ec/internal.h
@@ -88,8 +88,8 @@ extern "C" {
 #define EC_MAX_BYTES 66
 #define EC_MAX_WORDS ((EC_MAX_BYTES + BN_BYTES - 1) / BN_BYTES)
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(EC_MAX_WORDS <= BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS,
-                       bn_small_functions_applicable);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(EC_MAX_WORDS <= BN_SMALL_MAX_WORDS,
+                      "bn_*_small functions not usable");
 
 // An EC_SCALAR is an integer fully reduced modulo the order. Only the first
 // |order->width| words are used. An |EC_SCALAR| is specific to an |EC_GROUP|
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa.c
index e1395b72..010ee023 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa.c
@@ -211,8 +211,8 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(const EC_KEY *eckey, EC_SCALAR *out_kinv_mont,
     } else {
       // Pass a SHA512 hash of the private key and digest as additional data
       // into the RBG. This is a hardening measure against entropy failure.
-      OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH >= 32,
-                             additional_data_is_too_large_for_sha512);
+      OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH >= 32,
+                            "additional_data is too large for SHA-512");
       SHA512_CTX sha;
       uint8_t additional_data[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
       SHA512_Init(&sha);
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/modes/cfb.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/modes/cfb.c
index d3a38d6e..0a81f3b2 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/modes/cfb.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/modes/cfb.c
@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@
 #include "internal.h"
 
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT((16 % sizeof(size_t)) == 0, bad_size_t_size_cfb);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0,
+                      "block cannot be divided into size_t");
 
 void CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
                            const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t ivec[16], unsigned *num,
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/modes/ctr.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/modes/ctr.c
index 5093408c..b806b9a3 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/modes/ctr.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/modes/ctr.c
@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ static void ctr128_inc(uint8_t *counter) {
   } while (n);
 }
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT((16 % sizeof(size_t)) == 0, bad_size_t_size_ctr);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0,
+                      "block cannot be divided into size_t");
 
 // The input encrypted as though 128bit counter mode is being used.  The extra
 // state information to record how much of the 128bit block we have used is
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/modes/ofb.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/modes/ofb.c
index b1b4d875..4c70ce67 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/modes/ofb.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/modes/ofb.c
@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@
 #include "internal.h"
 
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT((16 % sizeof(size_t)) == 0, bad_size_t_size_ofb);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(16 % sizeof(size_t) == 0,
+                      "block cannot be divided into size_t");
 
 void CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
                            const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t ivec[16], unsigned *num,
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/ctrdrbg.c b/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/ctrdrbg.c
index f2fe8b34..b2fda1da 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/ctrdrbg.c
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/ctrdrbg.c
@@ -64,8 +64,8 @@ int CTR_DRBG_init(CTR_DRBG_STATE *drbg,
   return 1;
 }
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0,
-                       not_a_multiple_of_block_size);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN % AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 0,
+                      "not a multiple of AES block size");
 
 // ctr_inc adds |n| to the last four bytes of |drbg->counter|, treated as a
 // big-endian number.
diff --git a/crypto/refcount_lock.c b/crypto/refcount_lock.c
index 8b855d62..fb1c11f6 100644
--- a/crypto/refcount_lock.c
+++ b/crypto/refcount_lock.c
@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@
 
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_C11_ATOMIC)
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT((CRYPTO_refcount_t)-1 == CRYPTO_REFCOUNT_MAX,
-                       CRYPTO_REFCOUNT_MAX_is_incorrect);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT((CRYPTO_refcount_t)-1 == CRYPTO_REFCOUNT_MAX,
+                      "CRYPTO_REFCOUNT_MAX is incorrect");
 
 static struct CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX g_refcount_lock = CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_INIT;
 
diff --git a/crypto/thread_pthread.c b/crypto/thread_pthread.c
index f8bf5950..832e90e9 100644
--- a/crypto/thread_pthread.c
+++ b/crypto/thread_pthread.c
@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@
 #include <openssl/type_check.h>
 
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(CRYPTO_MUTEX) >= sizeof(pthread_rwlock_t),
-                       CRYPTO_MUTEX_too_small);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(CRYPTO_MUTEX) >= sizeof(pthread_rwlock_t),
+                      "CRYPTO_MUTEX is too small");
 
 void CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(CRYPTO_MUTEX *lock) {
   if (pthread_rwlock_init((pthread_rwlock_t *) lock, NULL) != 0) {
diff --git a/crypto/thread_win.c b/crypto/thread_win.c
index 248870aa..8b2b2da5 100644
--- a/crypto/thread_win.c
+++ b/crypto/thread_win.c
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(pop))
 #include <openssl/type_check.h>
 
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(CRYPTO_MUTEX) >= sizeof(SRWLOCK),
-                       CRYPTO_MUTEX_too_small);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(CRYPTO_MUTEX) >= sizeof(SRWLOCK),
+                      "CRYPTO_MUTEX is too small");
 
 static BOOL CALLBACK call_once_init(INIT_ONCE *once, void *arg, void **out) {
   void (**init)(void) = (void (**)(void))arg;
diff --git a/include/openssl/ssl3.h b/include/openssl/ssl3.h
index 67d06f43..e3910f00 100644
--- a/include/openssl/ssl3.h
+++ b/include/openssl/ssl3.h
@@ -251,9 +251,9 @@ extern "C" {
 #define SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
     (EVP_AEAD_MAX_OVERHEAD + EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH)
 
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(
-    SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD >= SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD,
-    max_overheads_are_consistent);
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD >=
+                          SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD,
+                      "max overheads are inconsistent");
 
 // SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH is an alias for
 // |SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH|. Compression is gone, so don't include the
diff --git a/include/openssl/stack.h b/include/openssl/stack.h
index c1bf520f..924228a5 100644
--- a/include/openssl/stack.h
+++ b/include/openssl/stack.h
@@ -416,9 +416,9 @@ BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
 
 // DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF defines |STACK_OF(type)| to be a stack whose elements
 // are |type|, where |type| must be a typedef for a pointer.
-#define DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF(type)                          \
-  OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(type) == sizeof(void *),       \
-                         special_stack_of_non_pointer_##type); \
+#define DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF(type)                   \
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(type) == sizeof(void *), \
+                        #type " is not a pointer");     \
   BORINGSSL_DEFINE_STACK_OF_IMPL(type, type, const type)
 
 
diff --git a/include/openssl/type_check.h b/include/openssl/type_check.h
index 90d81f7e..c267938c 100644
--- a/include/openssl/type_check.h
+++ b/include/openssl/type_check.h
@@ -64,19 +64,15 @@ extern "C" {
 #endif
 
 
-// TODO(davidben): |OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT| used to be implemented with a
-// typedef, so the |msg| parameter is a token. It now requires C11 or C++11
-// static asserts. If this change survives to 2018-11-05, switch the parameter
-// to a string. (Maybe rename to |OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT| while we're at it.)
 #if defined(__cplusplus) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(__clang__))
 // In C++ and non-clang MSVC, |static_assert| is a keyword.
-#define OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(cond, msg) static_assert(cond, #msg)
+#define OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(cond, msg) static_assert(cond, msg)
 #else
 // C11 defines the |_Static_assert| keyword and the |static_assert| macro in
 // assert.h. While the former is available at all versions in Clang and GCC, the
 // later depends on libc and, in glibc, depends on being built in C11 mode. We
 // do not require this, for now, so use |_Static_assert| directly.
-#define OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(cond, msg) _Static_assert(cond, #msg)
+#define OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(cond, msg) _Static_assert(cond, msg)
 #endif
 
 // CHECKED_CAST casts |p| from type |from| to type |to|.
diff --git a/third_party/fiat/curve25519.c b/third_party/fiat/curve25519.c
index 58a5ed04..15623c64 100644
--- a/third_party/fiat/curve25519.c
+++ b/third_party/fiat/curve25519.c
@@ -1396,8 +1396,8 @@ static void fe_copy(fe *h, const fe *f) {
 }
 
 static void fe_copy_lt(fe_loose *h, const fe *f) {
-  OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(fe_loose) == sizeof(fe),
-                         fe_and_fe_loose_mismatch);
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(fe_loose) == sizeof(fe),
+                        "fe and fe_loose mismatch");
   OPENSSL_memmove(h, f, sizeof(fe));
 }
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL)
diff --git a/third_party/fiat/p256.c b/third_party/fiat/p256.c
index 893c9d44..414b7e0c 100644
--- a/third_party/fiat/p256.c
+++ b/third_party/fiat/p256.c
@@ -903,9 +903,9 @@ static void fe_from_generic(fe out, const EC_FELEM *in) {
 static void fe_to_generic(EC_FELEM *out, const fe in) {
   // This works because 256 is a multiple of 64, so there are no excess bytes to
   // zero when rounding up to |BN_ULONG|s.
-  OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(
+  OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(
       256 / 8 == sizeof(BN_ULONG) * ((256 + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2),
-      bytes_left_over);
+      "fe_tobytes leaves bytes uninitialized");
   fe_tobytes(out->bytes, in);
 }