Check for buffered handshake messages on cipher change in DTLS.
This is the equivalent of FragmentAcrossChangeCipherSuite for DTLS. It is possible for us to, while receiving pre-CCS handshake messages, to buffer up a message with sequence number meant for a post-CCS Finished. When we then get to the new epoch and attempt to read the Finished, we will process the buffered Finished although it was sent with the wrong encryption. Move ssl_set_{read,write}_state to SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD hooks as this is a property of the transport. Notably, read_state may fail. In DTLS check the handshake buffer size. We could place this check in read_change_cipher_spec, but TLS 1.3 has no ChangeCipherSpec message, so we will need to implement this at the cipher change point anyway. (For now, there is only an assert on the TLS side. This will be replaced with a proper check in TLS 1.3.) Change-Id: Ia52b0b81e7db53e9ed2d4f6d334a1cce13e93297 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8790 Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
cea0ab4361
commit
61672818ef
@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ SSL,117,BAD_SSL_FILETYPE
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SSL,118,BAD_WRITE_RETRY
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SSL,119,BIO_NOT_SET
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SSL,120,BN_LIB
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SSL,255,BUFFERED_MESSAGES_ON_CIPHER_CHANGE
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SSL,121,BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
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SSL,122,CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
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SSL,123,CA_DN_TOO_LONG
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@ -4714,6 +4714,7 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method);
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#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FOR_CUSTOM_KEY 252
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#define SSL_R_NO_COMMON_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS 253
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#define SSL_R_DOWNGRADE_DETECTED 254
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#define SSL_R_BUFFERED_MESSAGES_ON_CIPHER_CHANGE 255
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#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CLOSE_NOTIFY 1000
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#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 1010
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#define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC 1020
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@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static void dtls1_hm_fragment_mark(hm_fragment *frag, size_t start,
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/* dtls1_is_current_message_complete returns one if the current handshake
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* message is complete and zero otherwise. */
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static int dtls1_is_current_message_complete(SSL *ssl) {
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static int dtls1_is_current_message_complete(const SSL *ssl) {
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hm_fragment *frag = ssl->d1->incoming_messages[ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq %
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SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT];
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return frag != NULL && frag->reassembly == NULL;
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@ -457,13 +457,26 @@ int dtls1_hash_current_message(SSL *ssl) {
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}
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void dtls_clear_incoming_messages(SSL *ssl) {
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size_t i;
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for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT; i++) {
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for (size_t i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT; i++) {
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dtls1_hm_fragment_free(ssl->d1->incoming_messages[i]);
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ssl->d1->incoming_messages[i] = NULL;
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}
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}
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int dtls_has_incoming_messages(const SSL *ssl) {
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/* This function may not be called if there is a pending |dtls1_get_message|
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* operation. */
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assert(dtls1_is_current_message_complete(ssl));
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size_t current = ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq % SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT;
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for (size_t i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT; i++) {
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if (i != current && ssl->d1->incoming_messages[i] != NULL) {
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return 1;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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int dtls1_parse_fragment(CBS *cbs, struct hm_header_st *out_hdr,
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CBS *out_body) {
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memset(out_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
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@ -57,8 +57,10 @@
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/buf.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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@ -100,6 +102,35 @@ static void dtls1_finish_handshake(SSL *ssl) {
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dtls_clear_incoming_messages(ssl);
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}
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static int dtls1_set_read_state(SSL *ssl, SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx) {
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/* Cipher changes are illegal when there are buffered incoming messages. */
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if (dtls_has_incoming_messages(ssl)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFERED_MESSAGES_ON_CIPHER_CHANGE);
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ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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SSL_AEAD_CTX_free(aead_ctx);
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return 0;
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}
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ssl->d1->r_epoch++;
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memset(&ssl->d1->bitmap, 0, sizeof(ssl->d1->bitmap));
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memset(ssl->s3->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(ssl->s3->read_sequence));
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SSL_AEAD_CTX_free(ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx);
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ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx = aead_ctx;
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return 1;
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}
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static int dtls1_set_write_state(SSL *ssl, SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx) {
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ssl->d1->w_epoch++;
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memcpy(ssl->d1->last_write_sequence, ssl->s3->write_sequence,
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sizeof(ssl->s3->write_sequence));
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memset(ssl->s3->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(ssl->s3->write_sequence));
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SSL_AEAD_CTX_free(ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx);
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ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx = aead_ctx;
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return 1;
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}
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static const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD kDTLSProtocolMethod = {
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1 /* is_dtls */,
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TLS1_1_VERSION,
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@ -124,6 +155,8 @@ static const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD kDTLSProtocolMethod = {
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dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec,
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dtls1_expect_flight,
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dtls1_received_flight,
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dtls1_set_read_state,
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dtls1_set_write_state,
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};
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const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_method(void) {
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@ -446,14 +446,6 @@ int dtls_seal_record(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
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uint8_t type, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
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enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch);
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/* ssl_set_read_state sets |ssl|'s read cipher state to |aead_ctx|. It takes
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* ownership of |aead_ctx|. */
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void ssl_set_read_state(SSL *ssl, SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx);
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/* ssl_set_write_state sets |ssl|'s write cipher state to |aead_ctx|. It takes
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* ownership of |aead_ctx|. */
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void ssl_set_write_state(SSL *ssl, SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx);
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/* ssl_process_alert processes |in| as an alert and updates |ssl|'s shutdown
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* state. It returns one of |ssl_open_record_discard|, |ssl_open_record_error|,
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* |ssl_open_record_close_notify|, or |ssl_open_record_fatal_alert| as
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@ -658,6 +650,10 @@ size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl);
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/* dtls_clear_incoming_messages releases all buffered incoming messages. */
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void dtls_clear_incoming_messages(SSL *ssl);
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/* dtls_has_incoming_messages returns one if there are buffered incoming
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* messages ahead of the current message and zero otherwise. */
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int dtls_has_incoming_messages(const SSL *ssl);
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typedef struct dtls_outgoing_message_st {
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uint8_t *data;
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uint32_t len;
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@ -913,6 +909,14 @@ struct ssl_protocol_method_st {
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/* received_flight is called when the handshake has received a flight of
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* messages from the peer. */
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void (*received_flight)(SSL *ssl);
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/* set_read_state sets |ssl|'s read cipher state to |aead_ctx|. It takes
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* ownership of |aead_ctx|. It returns one on success and zero if changing the
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* read state is forbidden at this point. */
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int (*set_read_state)(SSL *ssl, SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx);
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/* set_write_state sets |ssl|'s write cipher state to |aead_ctx|. It takes
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* ownership of |aead_ctx|. It returns one on success and zero if changing the
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* write state is forbidden at this point. */
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int (*set_write_state)(SSL *ssl, SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx);
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};
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/* This is for the SSLv3/TLSv1.0 differences in crypto/hash stuff It is a bit
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@ -313,11 +313,10 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *ssl, int which) {
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}
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if (is_read) {
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ssl_set_read_state(ssl, aead_ctx);
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} else {
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ssl_set_write_state(ssl, aead_ctx);
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return ssl->method->set_read_state(ssl, aead_ctx);
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}
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return 1;
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return ssl->method->set_write_state(ssl, aead_ctx);
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}
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size_t SSL_get_key_block_len(const SSL *ssl) {
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@ -512,6 +512,10 @@ type ProtocolBugs struct {
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// messages.
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FragmentAcrossChangeCipherSpec bool
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// SendUnencryptedFinished, if true, causes the Finished message to be
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// send unencrypted before ChangeCipherSpec rather than after it.
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SendUnencryptedFinished bool
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// SendV2ClientHello causes the client to send a V2ClientHello
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// instead of a normal ClientHello.
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SendV2ClientHello bool
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@ -709,6 +713,10 @@ type ProtocolBugs struct {
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// Finished and will trigger a spurious retransmit.)
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ReorderHandshakeFragments bool
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// ReverseHandshakeFragments, if true, causes handshake fragments in
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// DTLS to be reversed within a flight.
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ReverseHandshakeFragments bool
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// MixCompleteMessageWithFragments, if true, causes handshake
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// messages in DTLS to redundantly both fragment the message
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// and include a copy of the full one.
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@ -254,6 +254,12 @@ func (c *Conn) dtlsFlushHandshake() error {
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tmp[i] = fragments[perm[i]]
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}
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fragments = tmp
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} else if c.config.Bugs.ReverseHandshakeFragments {
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tmp := make([][]byte, len(fragments))
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for i := range tmp {
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tmp[i] = fragments[len(fragments)-i-1]
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}
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fragments = tmp
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}
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maxRecordLen := c.config.Bugs.PackHandshakeFragments
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@ -1206,6 +1206,9 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte, isResume bool) error {
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if c.config.Bugs.FragmentAcrossChangeCipherSpec {
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, postCCSBytes[:5])
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postCCSBytes = postCCSBytes[5:]
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} else if c.config.Bugs.SendUnencryptedFinished {
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, postCCSBytes)
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postCCSBytes = nil
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}
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c.flushHandshake()
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@ -1226,7 +1229,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte, isResume bool) error {
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return errors.New("tls: simulating post-CCS alert")
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}
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if !c.config.Bugs.SkipFinished {
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if !c.config.Bugs.SkipFinished && len(postCCSBytes) > 0 {
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, postCCSBytes)
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c.flushHandshake()
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}
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@ -1261,6 +1261,9 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
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if c.config.Bugs.FragmentAcrossChangeCipherSpec {
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, postCCSBytes[:5])
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postCCSBytes = postCCSBytes[5:]
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} else if c.config.Bugs.SendUnencryptedFinished {
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, postCCSBytes)
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postCCSBytes = nil
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}
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c.flushHandshake()
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@ -1280,7 +1283,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
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return errors.New("tls: simulating post-CCS alert")
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}
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if !c.config.Bugs.SkipFinished {
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if !c.config.Bugs.SkipFinished && len(postCCSBytes) > 0 {
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, postCCSBytes)
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c.flushHandshake()
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}
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@ -6175,8 +6175,6 @@ func addChangeCipherSpecTests() {
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// rejected. Test both with and without handshake packing to handle both
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// when the partial post-CCS message is in its own record and when it is
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// attached to the pre-CCS message.
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//
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// TODO(davidben): Fix and test DTLS as well.
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for _, packed := range []bool{false, true} {
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var suffix string
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if packed {
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@ -6260,6 +6258,25 @@ func addChangeCipherSpecTests() {
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})
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}
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// Test that, in DTLS, ChangeCipherSpec is not allowed when there are
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// messages in the handshake queue. Do this by testing the server
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// reading the client Finished, reversing the flight so Finished comes
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// first.
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testCases = append(testCases, testCase{
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protocol: dtls,
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testType: serverTest,
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name: "SendUnencryptedFinished-DTLS",
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config: Config{
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MaxVersion: VersionTLS12,
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Bugs: ProtocolBugs{
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SendUnencryptedFinished: true,
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ReverseHandshakeFragments: true,
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},
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},
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shouldFail: true,
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expectedError: ":BUFFERED_MESSAGES_ON_CIPHER_CHANGE:",
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})
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// Test that early ChangeCipherSpecs are handled correctly.
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testCases = append(testCases, testCase{
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testType: serverTest,
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@ -56,6 +56,9 @@
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/buf.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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@ -89,6 +92,26 @@ static void ssl3_finish_handshake(SSL *ssl) {
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ssl->init_num = 0;
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}
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static int ssl3_set_read_state(SSL *ssl, SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx) {
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/* TODO(davidben): In TLS 1.3, cipher changes are not always preceeded by a
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* ChangeCipherSpec, so this must become a runtime check. */
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assert(ssl->s3->rrec.length == 0);
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memset(ssl->s3->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(ssl->s3->read_sequence));
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SSL_AEAD_CTX_free(ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx);
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ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx = aead_ctx;
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return 1;
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}
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static int ssl3_set_write_state(SSL *ssl, SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx) {
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memset(ssl->s3->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(ssl->s3->write_sequence));
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SSL_AEAD_CTX_free(ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx);
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ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx = aead_ctx;
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return 1;
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}
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static const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD kTLSProtocolMethod = {
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0 /* is_dtls */,
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SSL3_VERSION,
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@ -113,6 +136,8 @@ static const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD kTLSProtocolMethod = {
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ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec,
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ssl3_expect_flight,
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ssl3_received_flight,
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ssl3_set_read_state,
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ssl3_set_write_state,
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};
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const SSL_METHOD *TLS_method(void) {
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@ -406,29 +406,6 @@ int tls_seal_record(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
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return 1;
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}
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void ssl_set_read_state(SSL *ssl, SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx) {
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
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ssl->d1->r_epoch++;
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memset(&ssl->d1->bitmap, 0, sizeof(ssl->d1->bitmap));
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}
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memset(ssl->s3->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(ssl->s3->read_sequence));
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SSL_AEAD_CTX_free(ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx);
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ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx = aead_ctx;
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}
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void ssl_set_write_state(SSL *ssl, SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx) {
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
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ssl->d1->w_epoch++;
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memcpy(ssl->d1->last_write_sequence, ssl->s3->write_sequence,
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sizeof(ssl->s3->write_sequence));
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}
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memset(ssl->s3->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(ssl->s3->write_sequence));
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SSL_AEAD_CTX_free(ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx);
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ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx = aead_ctx;
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}
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enum ssl_open_record_t ssl_process_alert(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
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const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
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/* Alerts records may not contain fragmented or multiple alerts. */
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|
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