C++ the ticket keys a bit.
While I'm here, remove the silly "tlsext_" prefix. At this point it's no longer novel that a feature is encoded in an extension. Change-Id: Ib5fbd2121333a213bdda0332885a8c90036ebc4d Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29592 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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@ -2032,17 +2032,17 @@ extern const SSL_X509_METHOD ssl_crypto_x509_method;
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// crypto/x509.
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extern const SSL_X509_METHOD ssl_noop_x509_method;
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struct tlsext_ticket_key {
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struct TicketKey {
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static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
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uint8_t name[SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN];
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uint8_t hmac_key[16];
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uint8_t aes_key[16];
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uint8_t name[SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN] = {0};
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uint8_t hmac_key[16] = {0};
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uint8_t aes_key[16] = {0};
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// next_rotation_tv_sec is the time (in seconds from the epoch) when the
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// current key should be superseded by a new key, or the time when a previous
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// key should be dropped. If zero, then the key should not be automatically
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// rotated.
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uint64_t next_rotation_tv_sec;
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uint64_t next_rotation_tv_sec = 0;
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};
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} // namespace bssl
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@ -2952,17 +2952,16 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st {
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int (*tlsext_servername_callback)(SSL *, int *, void *) = nullptr;
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void *tlsext_servername_arg = nullptr;
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// RFC 4507 session ticket keys. |tlsext_ticket_key_current| may be NULL
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// before the first handshake and |tlsext_ticket_key_prev| may be NULL at any
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// time. Automatically generated ticket keys are rotated as needed at
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// handshake time. Hence, all access must be synchronized through |lock|.
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bssl::tlsext_ticket_key *tlsext_ticket_key_current = nullptr;
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bssl::tlsext_ticket_key *tlsext_ticket_key_prev = nullptr;
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// RFC 4507 session ticket keys. |ticket_key_current| may be NULL before the
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// first handshake and |ticket_key_prev| may be NULL at any time.
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// Automatically generated ticket keys are rotated as needed at handshake
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// time. Hence, all access must be synchronized through |lock|.
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bssl::UniquePtr<bssl::TicketKey> ticket_key_current;
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bssl::UniquePtr<bssl::TicketKey> ticket_key_prev;
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// Callback to support customisation of ticket key setting
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int (*tlsext_ticket_key_cb)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *name, uint8_t *iv,
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx, HMAC_CTX *hctx,
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int enc) = nullptr;
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int (*ticket_key_cb)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *name, uint8_t *iv,
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc) = nullptr;
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// Server-only: psk_identity_hint is the default identity hint to send in
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// PSK-based key exchanges.
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@ -569,8 +569,6 @@ ssl_ctx_st::~ssl_ctx_st() {
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x509_method->ssl_ctx_free(this);
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sk_CertCompressionAlg_pop_free(cert_compression_algs,
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Delete<CertCompressionAlg>);
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OPENSSL_free(tlsext_ticket_key_current);
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OPENSSL_free(tlsext_ticket_key_prev);
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}
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SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *method) {
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@ -1675,9 +1673,9 @@ int SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *out, size_t len) {
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uint8_t *out_bytes = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(out);
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MutexReadLock lock(&ctx->lock);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(out_bytes, ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->name, 16);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(out_bytes + 16, ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->hmac_key, 16);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(out_bytes + 32, ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->aes_key, 16);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(out_bytes, ctx->ticket_key_current->name, 16);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(out_bytes + 16, ctx->ticket_key_current->hmac_key, 16);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(out_bytes + 32, ctx->ticket_key_current->aes_key, 16);
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return 1;
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}
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@ -1689,22 +1687,19 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, const void *in, size_t len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current) {
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ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current =
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(tlsext_ticket_key *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(tlsext_ticket_key));
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if (!ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current) {
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auto key = MakeUnique<TicketKey>();
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if (!key) {
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return 0;
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}
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}
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OPENSSL_memset(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current, 0, sizeof(tlsext_ticket_key));
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const uint8_t *in_bytes = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(in);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->name, in_bytes, 16);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->hmac_key, in_bytes + 16, 16);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->aes_key, in_bytes + 32, 16);
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OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev);
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ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev = nullptr;
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// Disable automatic key rotation.
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ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec = 0;
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OPENSSL_memcpy(key->name, in_bytes, 16);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(key->hmac_key, in_bytes + 16, 16);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(key->aes_key, in_bytes + 32, 16);
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// Disable automatic key rotation for manually-configured keys. This is now
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// the caller's responsibility.
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key->next_rotation_tv_sec = 0;
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ctx->ticket_key_current = std::move(key);
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ctx->ticket_key_prev.reset();
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return 1;
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}
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@ -1712,7 +1707,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(
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SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *key_name, uint8_t *iv,
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx,
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int encrypt)) {
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ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb = callback;
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ctx->ticket_key_cb = callback;
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return 1;
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}
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@ -414,47 +414,44 @@ int ssl_ctx_rotate_ticket_encryption_key(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
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// Avoid acquiring a write lock in the common case (i.e. a non-default key
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// is used or the default keys have not expired yet).
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MutexReadLock lock(&ctx->lock);
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if (ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current &&
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(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec == 0 ||
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ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec > now.tv_sec) &&
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(!ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev ||
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ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev->next_rotation_tv_sec > now.tv_sec)) {
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if (ctx->ticket_key_current &&
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(ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec == 0 ||
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ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec > now.tv_sec) &&
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(!ctx->ticket_key_prev ||
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ctx->ticket_key_prev->next_rotation_tv_sec > now.tv_sec)) {
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return 1;
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}
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}
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MutexWriteLock lock(&ctx->lock);
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if (!ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current ||
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(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec != 0 &&
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ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec <= now.tv_sec)) {
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if (!ctx->ticket_key_current ||
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(ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec != 0 &&
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ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec <= now.tv_sec)) {
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// The current key has not been initialized or it is expired.
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auto new_key = bssl::MakeUnique<struct tlsext_ticket_key>();
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auto new_key = bssl::MakeUnique<TicketKey>();
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if (!new_key) {
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return 0;
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}
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OPENSSL_memset(new_key.get(), 0, sizeof(struct tlsext_ticket_key));
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if (ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current) {
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RAND_bytes(new_key->name, 16);
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RAND_bytes(new_key->hmac_key, 16);
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RAND_bytes(new_key->aes_key, 16);
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new_key->next_rotation_tv_sec =
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now.tv_sec + SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_KEY_ROTATION_INTERVAL;
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if (ctx->ticket_key_current) {
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// The current key expired. Rotate it to prev and bump up its rotation
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// timestamp. Note that even with the new rotation time it may still be
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// expired and get droppped below.
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ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec +=
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// expired and get dropped below.
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ctx->ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec +=
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SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_KEY_ROTATION_INTERVAL;
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OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev);
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ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev = ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current;
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ctx->ticket_key_prev = std::move(ctx->ticket_key_current);
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}
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ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current = new_key.release();
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RAND_bytes(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->name, 16);
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RAND_bytes(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->hmac_key, 16);
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RAND_bytes(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->aes_key, 16);
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ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->next_rotation_tv_sec =
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now.tv_sec + SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_KEY_ROTATION_INTERVAL;
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ctx->ticket_key_current = std::move(new_key);
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}
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// Drop an expired prev key.
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if (ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev &&
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ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev->next_rotation_tv_sec <= now.tv_sec) {
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OPENSSL_free(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev);
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ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev = nullptr;
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if (ctx->ticket_key_prev &&
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ctx->ticket_key_prev->next_rotation_tv_sec <= now.tv_sec) {
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ctx->ticket_key_prev.reset();
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}
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return 1;
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@ -481,8 +478,8 @@ static int ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out,
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SSL_CTX *tctx = hs->ssl->session_ctx.get();
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uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
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uint8_t key_name[16];
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if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
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if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(hs->ssl, key_name, iv, ctx.get(), hctx.get(),
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if (tctx->ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
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if (tctx->ticket_key_cb(hs->ssl, key_name, iv, ctx.get(), hctx.get(),
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1 /* encrypt */) < 0) {
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return 0;
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}
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@ -494,12 +491,12 @@ static int ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out,
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MutexReadLock lock(&tctx->lock);
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if (!RAND_bytes(iv, 16) ||
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!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
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tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->aes_key, iv) ||
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!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx.get(), tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->hmac_key, 16,
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tctx->ticket_key_current->aes_key, iv) ||
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!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx.get(), tctx->ticket_key_current->hmac_key, 16,
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tlsext_tick_md(), NULL)) {
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return 0;
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}
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OPENSSL_memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->name, 16);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(key_name, tctx->ticket_key_current->name, 16);
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}
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uint8_t *ptr;
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@ -3490,7 +3490,7 @@ static enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t ssl_decrypt_ticket_with_cb(
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ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx;
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ScopedHMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
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const uint8_t *iv = ticket + SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN;
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int cb_ret = hs->ssl->session_ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(
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int cb_ret = hs->ssl->session_ctx->ticket_key_cb(
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hs->ssl, (uint8_t *)ticket /* name */, (uint8_t *)iv, cipher_ctx.get(),
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hmac_ctx.get(), 0 /* decrypt */);
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if (cb_ret < 0) {
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@ -3522,15 +3522,15 @@ static enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t ssl_decrypt_ticket_with_ticket_keys(
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ScopedHMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
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{
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MutexReadLock lock(&ctx->lock);
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const tlsext_ticket_key *key;
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if (ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current &&
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!OPENSSL_memcmp(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current->name, ticket,
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const TicketKey *key;
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if (ctx->ticket_key_current &&
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!OPENSSL_memcmp(ctx->ticket_key_current->name, ticket,
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SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN)) {
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key = ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_current;
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} else if (ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev &&
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!OPENSSL_memcmp(ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev->name, ticket,
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key = ctx->ticket_key_current.get();
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} else if (ctx->ticket_key_prev &&
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!OPENSSL_memcmp(ctx->ticket_key_prev->name, ticket,
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SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN)) {
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key = ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_prev;
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key = ctx->ticket_key_prev.get();
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} else {
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return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
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}
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@ -3589,14 +3589,14 @@ enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t ssl_process_ticket(
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result = ssl_decrypt_ticket_with_method(
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hs, &plaintext, &plaintext_len, out_renew_ticket, ticket, ticket_len);
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} else {
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// Ensure there is room for the key name and the largest IV
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// |tlsext_ticket_key_cb| may try to consume. The real limit may be lower,
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// but the maximum IV length should be well under the minimum size for the
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// session material and HMAC.
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// Ensure there is room for the key name and the largest IV |ticket_key_cb|
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// may try to consume. The real limit may be lower, but the maximum IV
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// length should be well under the minimum size for the session material and
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// HMAC.
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if (ticket_len < SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
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return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
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}
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if (hs->ssl->session_ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
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if (hs->ssl->session_ctx->ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
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result = ssl_decrypt_ticket_with_cb(hs, &plaintext, &plaintext_len,
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out_renew_ticket, ticket, ticket_len);
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} else {
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