Use EC_RAW_POINT in ECDSA.

Now the only allocations in ECDSA are the ECDSA_SIG input and output.

Change-Id: If1fcde6dc2ee2c53f5adc16a7f692e22e9c238de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/33069
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
David Benjamin 2018-11-09 17:06:51 -06:00 committed by CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org
parent 8618f2bfe0
commit 9f152adfcf
8 changed files with 57 additions and 62 deletions

View File

@ -159,8 +159,8 @@ EC_KEY *EC_KEY_parse_private_key(CBS *cbs, const EC_GROUP *group) {
(point_conversion_form_t)(CBS_data(&public_key)[0] & ~0x01);
} else {
// Compute the public key instead.
if (!ec_point_mul_scalar(group, ret->pub_key, &ret->priv_key->scalar, NULL,
NULL)) {
if (!ec_point_mul_scalar(group, &ret->pub_key->raw, &ret->priv_key->scalar,
NULL, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
// Remember the original private-key-only encoding.

View File

@ -87,6 +87,11 @@ int ECDH_compute_key(void *out, size_t outlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key,
return -1;
}
const EC_SCALAR *const priv = &priv_key->priv_key->scalar;
const EC_GROUP *const group = EC_KEY_get0_group(priv_key);
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, pub_key->group, NULL) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return -1;
}
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
@ -98,14 +103,13 @@ int ECDH_compute_key(void *out, size_t outlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key,
size_t buflen = 0;
uint8_t *buf = NULL;
const EC_GROUP *const group = EC_KEY_get0_group(priv_key);
EC_POINT *tmp = EC_POINT_new(group);
if (tmp == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!ec_point_mul_scalar(group, tmp, NULL, pub_key, priv)) {
if (!ec_point_mul_scalar(group, &tmp->raw, NULL, &pub_key->raw, priv)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDH, ECDH_R_POINT_ARITHMETIC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}

View File

@ -865,6 +865,12 @@ int EC_POINT_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *g_scalar,
return 0;
}
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, r->group, NULL) != 0 ||
(p != NULL && EC_GROUP_cmp(group, p->group, NULL) != 0)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
int ret = 0;
EC_SCALAR g_scalar_storage, p_scalar_storage;
EC_SCALAR *g_scalar_arg = NULL, *p_scalar_arg = NULL;
@ -891,7 +897,8 @@ int EC_POINT_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *g_scalar,
p_scalar_arg = &p_scalar_storage;
}
ret = ec_point_mul_scalar(group, r, g_scalar_arg, p, p_scalar_arg);
ret = ec_point_mul_scalar(group, &r->raw, g_scalar_arg,
p == NULL ? NULL : &p->raw, p_scalar_arg);
err:
BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
@ -900,8 +907,8 @@ err:
return ret;
}
int ec_point_mul_scalar_public(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar, const EC_POINT *p,
int ec_point_mul_scalar_public(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar, const EC_RAW_POINT *p,
const EC_SCALAR *p_scalar) {
if ((g_scalar == NULL && p_scalar == NULL) ||
(p == NULL) != (p_scalar == NULL)) {
@ -909,18 +916,12 @@ int ec_point_mul_scalar_public(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
return 0;
}
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, r->group, NULL) != 0 ||
(p != NULL && EC_GROUP_cmp(group, p->group, NULL) != 0)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
group->meth->mul_public(group, &r->raw, g_scalar, &p->raw, p_scalar);
group->meth->mul_public(group, r, g_scalar, p, p_scalar);
return 1;
}
int ec_point_mul_scalar(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar, const EC_POINT *p,
int ec_point_mul_scalar(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar, const EC_RAW_POINT *p,
const EC_SCALAR *p_scalar) {
if ((g_scalar == NULL && p_scalar == NULL) ||
(p == NULL) != (p_scalar == NULL)) {
@ -928,14 +929,7 @@ int ec_point_mul_scalar(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
return 0;
}
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, r->group, NULL) != 0 ||
(p != NULL && EC_GROUP_cmp(group, p->group, NULL) != 0)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
group->meth->mul(group, &r->raw, g_scalar, (p == NULL) ? NULL : &p->raw,
p_scalar);
group->meth->mul(group, r, g_scalar, p, p_scalar);
return 1;
}

View File

@ -322,8 +322,8 @@ int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey) {
if (eckey->priv_key != NULL) {
point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
if (point == NULL ||
!ec_point_mul_scalar(eckey->group, point, &eckey->priv_key->scalar,
NULL, NULL)) {
!ec_point_mul_scalar(eckey->group, &point->raw,
&eckey->priv_key->scalar, NULL, NULL)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *key) {
// Generate the private key by testing candidates (FIPS 186-4 B.4.2).
!ec_random_nonzero_scalar(key->group, &priv_key->scalar,
kDefaultAdditionalData) ||
!ec_point_mul_scalar(key->group, pub_key, &priv_key->scalar, NULL,
!ec_point_mul_scalar(key->group, &pub_key->raw, &priv_key->scalar, NULL,
NULL)) {
EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
ec_wrapped_scalar_free(priv_key);

View File

@ -726,7 +726,8 @@ TEST_P(ECCurveTest, DoubleSpecialCase) {
EC_SCALAR one;
ASSERT_TRUE(ec_bignum_to_scalar(group(), &one, BN_value_one()));
ASSERT_TRUE(ec_point_mul_scalar_public(group(), p.get(), &one, g, &one));
ASSERT_TRUE(
ec_point_mul_scalar_public(group(), &p->raw, &one, &g->raw, &one));
EXPECT_EQ(0, EC_POINT_cmp(group(), p.get(), two_g.get(), nullptr));
}
@ -871,7 +872,7 @@ TEST(ECTest, ScalarBaseMultVectors) {
EC_SCALAR a_scalar, b_scalar;
ASSERT_TRUE(ec_bignum_to_scalar(group.get(), &a_scalar, a.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(ec_bignum_to_scalar(group.get(), &b_scalar, b.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(ec_point_mul_scalar_public(group.get(), p.get(), &a_scalar, g,
ASSERT_TRUE(ec_point_mul_scalar_public(group.get(), &p->raw, &a_scalar, &g->raw,
&b_scalar));
check_point(p.get());
}

View File

@ -239,6 +239,10 @@ struct ec_point_st {
// group is an owning reference to |group|, unless this is
// |group->generator|.
EC_GROUP *group;
// raw is the group-specific point data. Functions that take |EC_POINT|
// typically check consistency with |EC_GROUP| while functions that take
// |EC_RAW_POINT| do not. Thus accesses to this field should be externally
// checked for consistency.
EC_RAW_POINT raw;
} /* EC_POINT */;
@ -325,16 +329,18 @@ int ec_scalar_inv_montgomery_vartime(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *r,
// |p_scalar|. Unlike other functions which take |EC_SCALAR|, |g_scalar| and
// |p_scalar| need not be fully reduced. They need only contain as many bits as
// the order.
int ec_point_mul_scalar(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar, const EC_POINT *p,
int ec_point_mul_scalar(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_RAW_POINT *r,
const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar, const EC_RAW_POINT *p,
const EC_SCALAR *p_scalar);
// ec_point_mul_scalar_public performs the same computation as
// ec_point_mul_scalar. It further assumes that the inputs are public so
// there is no concern about leaking their values through timing.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int ec_point_mul_scalar_public(
const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar,
const EC_POINT *p, const EC_SCALAR *p_scalar);
OPENSSL_EXPORT int ec_point_mul_scalar_public(const EC_GROUP *group,
EC_RAW_POINT *r,
const EC_SCALAR *g_scalar,
const EC_RAW_POINT *p,
const EC_SCALAR *p_scalar);
// ec_cmp_x_coordinate compares the x (affine) coordinate of |p|, mod the group
// order, with |r|. It returns one if the values match and zero if |p| is the

View File

@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ int ECDH_compute_key_fips(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const EC_POINT *pub_key,
return 0;
}
const EC_SCALAR *const priv = &priv_key->priv_key->scalar;
const EC_GROUP *const group = EC_KEY_get0_group(priv_key);
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(group, pub_key->group, NULL) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
@ -97,14 +102,14 @@ int ECDH_compute_key_fips(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const EC_POINT *pub_key,
size_t buflen = 0;
uint8_t *buf = NULL;
const EC_GROUP *const group = EC_KEY_get0_group(priv_key);
EC_POINT *shared_point = EC_POINT_new(group);
if (shared_point == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!ec_point_mul_scalar(group, shared_point, NULL, pub_key, priv)) {
if (!ec_point_mul_scalar(group, &shared_point->raw, NULL, &pub_key->raw,
priv)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDH, ECDH_R_POINT_ARITHMETIC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}

View File

@ -173,27 +173,18 @@ int ECDSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
ec_scalar_mul_montgomery(group, &u1, &m, &s_inv_mont);
ec_scalar_mul_montgomery(group, &u2, &r, &s_inv_mont);
int ret = 0;
EC_POINT *point = EC_POINT_new(group);
if (point == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!ec_point_mul_scalar_public(group, point, &u1, pub_key, &u2)) {
EC_RAW_POINT point;
if (!ec_point_mul_scalar_public(group, &point, &u1, &pub_key->raw, &u2)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
return 0;
}
if (!ec_cmp_x_coordinate(group, &point->raw, &r)) {
if (!ec_cmp_x_coordinate(group, &point, &r)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto err;
return 0;
}
ret = 1;
err:
EC_POINT_free(point);
return ret;
return 1;
}
static int ecdsa_sign_setup(const EC_KEY *eckey, EC_SCALAR *out_kinv_mont,
@ -210,12 +201,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(const EC_KEY *eckey, EC_SCALAR *out_kinv_mont,
int ret = 0;
EC_SCALAR k;
EC_POINT *tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group);
if (tmp_point == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
EC_RAW_POINT tmp_point;
do {
// Include the private key and message digest in the k generation.
if (eckey->fixed_k != NULL) {
@ -246,8 +232,8 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(const EC_KEY *eckey, EC_SCALAR *out_kinv_mont,
ec_scalar_from_montgomery(group, out_kinv_mont, out_kinv_mont);
// Compute r, the x-coordinate of generator * k.
if (!ec_point_mul_scalar(group, tmp_point, &k, NULL, NULL) ||
!ec_get_x_coordinate_as_scalar(group, out_r, &tmp_point->raw)) {
if (!ec_point_mul_scalar(group, &tmp_point, &k, NULL, NULL) ||
!ec_get_x_coordinate_as_scalar(group, out_r, &tmp_point)) {
goto err;
}
} while (ec_scalar_is_zero(group, out_r));
@ -256,7 +242,6 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(const EC_KEY *eckey, EC_SCALAR *out_kinv_mont,
err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(&k, sizeof(k));
EC_POINT_free(tmp_point);
return ret;
}