Update TLS 1.3 citations for the final RFC.
Change-Id: I2d1671a4f21a602191fd0c9b932244a376ac5713 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31104 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
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@ -1201,8 +1201,8 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_tls13_seal_scatter(
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}
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// The given nonces must be strictly monotonically increasing. See
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28#section-5.3 for details
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// of the TLS 1.3 nonce construction.
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-5.3 for details of the TLS 1.3
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// nonce construction.
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uint64_t given_counter;
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OPENSSL_memcpy(&given_counter, nonce + nonce_len - sizeof(given_counter),
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sizeof(given_counter));
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@ -1696,8 +1696,8 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *session,
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//
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// If this function returns one, clients retain multiple sessions and use each
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// only once. This prevents passive observers from correlating connections with
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// tickets. See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18, appendix B.5. If it returns zero,
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// |session| cannot be used without leaking a correlator.
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// tickets. See RFC 8446, appendix C.4. If it returns zero, |session| cannot be
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// used without leaking a correlator.
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OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_should_be_single_use(const SSL_SESSION *session);
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// SSL_SESSION_is_resumable returns one if |session| is resumable and zero
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@ -3048,8 +3048,8 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_get_peer_quic_transport_params(const SSL *ssl,
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// WARNING: A 0-RTT handshake has different security properties from normal
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// handshake, so it is off by default unless opted in. In particular, early data
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// is replayable by a network attacker. Callers must account for this when
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// sending or processing data before the handshake is confirmed. See
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// draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18 for more information.
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// sending or processing data before the handshake is confirmed. See RFC 8446
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// for more information.
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//
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// As a server, if early data is accepted, |SSL_do_handshake| will complete as
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// soon as the ClientHello is processed and server flight sent. |SSL_write| may
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@ -3084,9 +3084,9 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_get_peer_quic_transport_params(const SSL *ssl,
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// properties. The caller must disregard any values from before the reset and
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// query again.
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//
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// Finally, to implement the fallback described in draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18
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// appendix C.3, retry on a fresh connection without 0-RTT if the handshake
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// fails with |SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA|.
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// Finally, to implement the fallback described in RFC 8446 appendix D.3, retry
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// on a fresh connection without 0-RTT if the handshake fails with
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// |SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA|.
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// SSL_CTX_set_early_data_enabled sets whether early data is allowed to be used
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// with resumptions using |ctx|.
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@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ extern "C" {
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// ExtensionType value from RFC4507
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#define TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket 35
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// ExtensionType values from draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18
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// ExtensionType values from RFC8446
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#define TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups 10
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#define TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key 41
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#define TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data 42
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@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ extern "C" {
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#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0x0300CCA9
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#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0x0300CCAC
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// TLS 1.3 ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16
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// TLS 1.3 ciphersuites from RFC 8446.
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#define TLS1_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x03001301
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#define TLS1_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x03001302
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#define TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0x03001303
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@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ extern "C" {
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#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 \
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"ECDHE-PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305"
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// TLS 1.3 ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16
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// TLS 1.3 ciphersuites from RFC 8446.
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#define TLS1_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "AEAD-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
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#define TLS1_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "AEAD-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
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#define TLS1_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 "AEAD-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256"
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@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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// A TLS 1.2 server would not know to skip the early data we offered. Report
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// an error code sooner. The caller may use this error code to implement the
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// fallback described in draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18 appendix C.3.
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// fallback described in RFC 8446 appendix D.3.
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if (hs->early_data_offered) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA);
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ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
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@ -2462,11 +2462,10 @@ struct SSL_CONFIG {
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bool shed_handshake_config : 1;
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};
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// From draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18, used in determining PSK modes.
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// From RFC 8446, used in determining PSK modes.
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#define SSL_PSK_DHE_KE 0x1
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// From draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16, used in determining whether to respond with a
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// KeyUpdate.
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// From RFC 8446, used in determining whether to respond with a KeyUpdate.
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#define SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED 0
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#define SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED 1
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@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@ static bool ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
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// Signature Algorithms for Certificates.
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//
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23#section-4.2.3
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.3
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static bool ext_sigalgs_cert_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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@ -1846,7 +1846,7 @@ static bool ext_ec_point_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
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// Pre Shared Key
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//
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.6
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.11
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static size_t ext_pre_shared_key_clienthello_length(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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@ -1867,9 +1867,9 @@ static bool ext_pre_shared_key_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
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return true;
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}
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// Per draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21 section 4.1.4, skip offering the session if the
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// selected cipher in HelloRetryRequest does not match. This avoids performing
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// the transcript hash transformation for multiple hashes.
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// Per RFC 8446 section 4.1.4, skip offering the session if the selected
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// cipher in HelloRetryRequest does not match. This avoids performing the
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// transcript hash transformation for multiple hashes.
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if (hs->received_hello_retry_request &&
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ssl->session->cipher->algorithm_prf != hs->new_cipher->algorithm_prf) {
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return true;
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@ -2000,7 +2000,7 @@ bool ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
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// Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes
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//
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.7
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.9
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static bool ext_psk_key_exchange_modes_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
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CBB *out) {
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@ -2044,7 +2044,7 @@ static bool ext_psk_key_exchange_modes_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
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// Early Data Indication
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//
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.8
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.10
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static bool ext_early_data_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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@ -2129,7 +2129,7 @@ static bool ext_early_data_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
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// Key Share
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//
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16#section-4.2.5
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.8
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static bool ext_key_share_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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@ -2314,7 +2314,7 @@ bool ssl_ext_key_share_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
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// Supported Versions
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//
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16#section-4.2.1
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.1
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static bool ext_supported_versions_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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@ -2346,7 +2346,7 @@ static bool ext_supported_versions_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out)
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// Cookie
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//
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16#section-4.2.2
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.2
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static bool ext_cookie_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
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if (hs->cookie.empty()) {
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@ -2368,10 +2368,10 @@ static bool ext_cookie_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
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}
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// Negotiated Groups
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// Supported Groups
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//
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16#section-4.2.4
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.1
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.7
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static bool ext_supported_groups_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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@ -89,9 +89,9 @@ const (
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typeServerHello uint8 = 2
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typeHelloVerifyRequest uint8 = 3
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typeNewSessionTicket uint8 = 4
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typeEndOfEarlyData uint8 = 5 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21
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typeHelloRetryRequest uint8 = 6 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16
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typeEncryptedExtensions uint8 = 8 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16
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typeEndOfEarlyData uint8 = 5
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typeHelloRetryRequest uint8 = 6
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typeEncryptedExtensions uint8 = 8
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typeCertificate uint8 = 11
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typeServerKeyExchange uint8 = 12
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typeCertificateRequest uint8 = 13
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@ -100,11 +100,11 @@ const (
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typeClientKeyExchange uint8 = 16
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typeFinished uint8 = 20
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typeCertificateStatus uint8 = 22
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typeKeyUpdate uint8 = 24 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16
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typeKeyUpdate uint8 = 24
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typeCompressedCertificate uint8 = 25 // Not IANA assigned
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typeNextProtocol uint8 = 67 // Not IANA assigned
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typeChannelID uint8 = 203 // Not IANA assigned
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typeMessageHash uint8 = 254 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21
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typeMessageHash uint8 = 254
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)
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// TLS compression types.
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@ -127,14 +127,14 @@ const (
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extensionTokenBinding uint16 = 24
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extensionCompressedCertAlgs uint16 = 27
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extensionSessionTicket uint16 = 35
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extensionPreSharedKey uint16 = 41 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23
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extensionEarlyData uint16 = 42 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23
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extensionSupportedVersions uint16 = 43 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23
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extensionCookie uint16 = 44 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23
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extensionPSKKeyExchangeModes uint16 = 45 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23
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extensionCertificateAuthorities uint16 = 47 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23
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extensionSignatureAlgorithmsCert uint16 = 50 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23
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extensionKeyShare uint16 = 51 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23
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extensionPreSharedKey uint16 = 41
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extensionEarlyData uint16 = 42
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extensionSupportedVersions uint16 = 43
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extensionCookie uint16 = 44
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extensionPSKKeyExchangeModes uint16 = 45
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extensionCertificateAuthorities uint16 = 47
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extensionSignatureAlgorithmsCert uint16 = 50
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extensionKeyShare uint16 = 51
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extensionCustom uint16 = 1234 // not IANA assigned
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extensionNextProtoNeg uint16 = 13172 // not IANA assigned
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extensionRenegotiationInfo uint16 = 0xff01
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@ -239,13 +239,13 @@ const (
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SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 = 0x0002
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)
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// PskKeyExchangeMode values (see draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16)
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// PskKeyExchangeMode values (see RFC 8446, section 4.2.9)
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const (
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pskKEMode = 0
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pskDHEKEMode = 1
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)
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// KeyUpdateRequest values (see draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16, section 4.5.3)
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// KeyUpdateRequest values (see RFC 8446, section 4.6.3)
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const (
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keyUpdateNotRequested = 0
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keyUpdateRequested = 1
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@ -2064,7 +2064,7 @@ func isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(sigAlg signatureAlgorithm, sigAlgs []signatur
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}
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var (
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// See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16, section 6.3.1.2.
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// See RFC 8446, section 4.1.3.
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downgradeTLS13 = []byte{0x44, 0x4f, 0x57, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x01}
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downgradeTLS12 = []byte{0x44, 0x4f, 0x57, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x00}
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)
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@ -603,8 +603,7 @@ NextCipherSuite:
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}
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_, supportsTLS13 := c.config.isSupportedVersion(VersionTLS13, false)
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// Check for downgrade signals in the server random, per
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// draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16, section 4.1.3.
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// Check for downgrade signals in the server random, per RFC 8446, section 4.1.3.
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if (supportsTLS13 || c.config.Bugs.CheckTLS13DowngradeRandom) && !c.config.Bugs.IgnoreTLS13DowngradeRandom {
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if c.vers <= VersionTLS12 && c.config.maxVersion(c.isDTLS) >= VersionTLS13 {
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if bytes.Equal(serverHello.random[len(serverHello.random)-8:], downgradeTLS13) {
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@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ func (m *clientHelloMsg) marshal() []byte {
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algIDs.addU16(v)
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}
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}
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// The PSK extension must be last (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18 section 4.2.6).
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// The PSK extension must be last. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.11
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if len(m.pskIdentities) > 0 && !m.pskBinderFirst {
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extensions.addU16(extensionPreSharedKey)
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pskExtension := extensions.addU16LengthPrefixed()
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@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ func (m *clientHelloMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
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m.ticketSupported = true
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m.sessionTicket = []byte(body)
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case extensionKeyShare:
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// draft-ietf-tls-tls13 section 6.3.2.3
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.8
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var keyShares byteReader
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if !body.readU16LengthPrefixed(&keyShares) || len(body) != 0 {
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return false
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@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ func (m *clientHelloMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
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m.keyShares = append(m.keyShares, entry)
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}
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case extensionPreSharedKey:
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// draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18 section 4.2.6
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.11
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var psks, binders byteReader
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if !body.readU16LengthPrefixed(&psks) ||
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!body.readU16LengthPrefixed(&binders) ||
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@ -807,12 +807,12 @@ func (m *clientHelloMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
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return false
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}
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case extensionPSKKeyExchangeModes:
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// draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18 section 4.2.7
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.9
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if !body.readU8LengthPrefixedBytes(&m.pskKEModes) || len(body) != 0 {
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return false
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}
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case extensionEarlyData:
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// draft-ietf-tls-tls13 section 6.3.2.5
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.10
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if len(body) != 0 {
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return false
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}
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@ -1299,7 +1299,7 @@ func (m *serverExtensions) marshal(extensions *byteBuilder) {
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supportedPoints.addBytes(m.supportedPoints)
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}
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if len(m.supportedCurves) > 0 {
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.4
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.7
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extensions.addU16(extensionSupportedCurves)
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supportedCurvesList := extensions.addU16LengthPrefixed()
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supportedCurves := supportedCurvesList.addU16LengthPrefixed()
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@ -1173,8 +1173,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processClientHello() (isResume bool, err error)
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_, supportsTLS13 := c.config.isSupportedVersion(VersionTLS13, false)
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// Signal downgrades in the server random, per draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16,
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// section 4.1.3.
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// Signal downgrades in the server random, per RFC 8446, section 4.1.3.
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if supportsTLS13 || config.Bugs.SendTLS13DowngradeRandom {
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if c.vers <= VersionTLS12 && config.maxVersion(c.isDTLS) >= VersionTLS13 {
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copy(hs.hello.random[len(hs.hello.random)-8:], downgradeTLS13)
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@ -384,8 +384,7 @@ func (h *finishedHash) discardHandshakeBuffer() {
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}
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// zeroSecretTLS13 returns the default all zeros secret for TLS 1.3, used when a
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// given secret is not available in the handshake. See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16,
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// section 7.1.
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// given secret is not available in the handshake. See RFC 8446, section 7.1.
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func (h *finishedHash) zeroSecret() []byte {
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return make([]byte, h.hash.Size())
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}
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@ -400,7 +399,7 @@ func (h *finishedHash) nextSecret() {
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}
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// hkdfExpandLabel implements TLS 1.3's HKDF-Expand-Label function, as defined
|
||||
// in section 7.1 of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16.
|
||||
// in section 7.1 of RFC 8446.
|
||||
func hkdfExpandLabel(hash crypto.Hash, secret, label, hashValue []byte, length int) []byte {
|
||||
if len(label) > 255 || len(hashValue) > 255 {
|
||||
panic("hkdfExpandLabel: label or hashValue too long")
|
||||
|
@ -635,8 +635,7 @@ static int tls13_receive_key_update(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg) {
|
||||
|
||||
// Suppress KeyUpdate acknowledgments until this change is written to the
|
||||
// wire. This prevents us from accumulating write obligations when read and
|
||||
// write progress at different rates. See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18, section
|
||||
// 4.5.3.
|
||||
// write progress at different rates. See RFC 8446, section 4.6.3.
|
||||
ssl->s3->key_update_pending = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
|
||||
// If accepting 0-RTT, we send tickets half-RTT. This gets the tickets on
|
||||
// the wire sooner and also avoids triggering a write on |SSL_read| when
|
||||
// processing the client Finished. This requires computing the client
|
||||
// Finished early. See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18, section 4.5.1.
|
||||
// Finished early. See RFC 8446, section 4.6.1.
|
||||
static const uint8_t kEndOfEarlyData[4] = {SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 0,
|
||||
0, 0};
|
||||
if (!hs->transcript.Update(kEndOfEarlyData)) {
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user