Update TLS 1.3 citations for the final RFC.

Change-Id: I2d1671a4f21a602191fd0c9b932244a376ac5713
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31104
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Benjamin 2018-08-14 22:26:39 -05:00 committed by CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org
parent c4131a4a23
commit a130ce0b71
13 changed files with 56 additions and 61 deletions

View File

@ -1201,8 +1201,8 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_tls13_seal_scatter(
}
// The given nonces must be strictly monotonically increasing. See
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28#section-5.3 for details
// of the TLS 1.3 nonce construction.
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-5.3 for details of the TLS 1.3
// nonce construction.
uint64_t given_counter;
OPENSSL_memcpy(&given_counter, nonce + nonce_len - sizeof(given_counter),
sizeof(given_counter));

View File

@ -1696,8 +1696,8 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *session,
//
// If this function returns one, clients retain multiple sessions and use each
// only once. This prevents passive observers from correlating connections with
// tickets. See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18, appendix B.5. If it returns zero,
// |session| cannot be used without leaking a correlator.
// tickets. See RFC 8446, appendix C.4. If it returns zero, |session| cannot be
// used without leaking a correlator.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_should_be_single_use(const SSL_SESSION *session);
// SSL_SESSION_is_resumable returns one if |session| is resumable and zero
@ -3048,8 +3048,8 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_get_peer_quic_transport_params(const SSL *ssl,
// WARNING: A 0-RTT handshake has different security properties from normal
// handshake, so it is off by default unless opted in. In particular, early data
// is replayable by a network attacker. Callers must account for this when
// sending or processing data before the handshake is confirmed. See
// draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18 for more information.
// sending or processing data before the handshake is confirmed. See RFC 8446
// for more information.
//
// As a server, if early data is accepted, |SSL_do_handshake| will complete as
// soon as the ClientHello is processed and server flight sent. |SSL_write| may
@ -3084,9 +3084,9 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_get_peer_quic_transport_params(const SSL *ssl,
// properties. The caller must disregard any values from before the reset and
// query again.
//
// Finally, to implement the fallback described in draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18
// appendix C.3, retry on a fresh connection without 0-RTT if the handshake
// fails with |SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA|.
// Finally, to implement the fallback described in RFC 8446 appendix D.3, retry
// on a fresh connection without 0-RTT if the handshake fails with
// |SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA|.
// SSL_CTX_set_early_data_enabled sets whether early data is allowed to be used
// with resumptions using |ctx|.

View File

@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ extern "C" {
// ExtensionType value from RFC4507
#define TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket 35
// ExtensionType values from draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18
// ExtensionType values from RFC8446
#define TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups 10
#define TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key 41
#define TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data 42
@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ extern "C" {
#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0x0300CCA9
#define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0x0300CCAC
// TLS 1.3 ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16
// TLS 1.3 ciphersuites from RFC 8446.
#define TLS1_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x03001301
#define TLS1_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x03001302
#define TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0x03001303
@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ extern "C" {
#define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 \
"ECDHE-PSK-CHACHA20-POLY1305"
// TLS 1.3 ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16
// TLS 1.3 ciphersuites from RFC 8446.
#define TLS1_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "AEAD-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
#define TLS1_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "AEAD-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
#define TLS1_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 "AEAD-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256"

View File

@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
// A TLS 1.2 server would not know to skip the early data we offered. Report
// an error code sooner. The caller may use this error code to implement the
// fallback described in draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18 appendix C.3.
// fallback described in RFC 8446 appendix D.3.
if (hs->early_data_offered) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA);
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);

View File

@ -2462,11 +2462,10 @@ struct SSL_CONFIG {
bool shed_handshake_config : 1;
};
// From draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18, used in determining PSK modes.
// From RFC 8446, used in determining PSK modes.
#define SSL_PSK_DHE_KE 0x1
// From draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16, used in determining whether to respond with a
// KeyUpdate.
// From RFC 8446, used in determining whether to respond with a KeyUpdate.
#define SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED 0
#define SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED 1

View File

@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@ static bool ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
// Signature Algorithms for Certificates.
//
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23#section-4.2.3
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.3
static bool ext_sigalgs_cert_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
@ -1846,7 +1846,7 @@ static bool ext_ec_point_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
// Pre Shared Key
//
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.6
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.11
static size_t ext_pre_shared_key_clienthello_length(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
@ -1867,9 +1867,9 @@ static bool ext_pre_shared_key_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
return true;
}
// Per draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21 section 4.1.4, skip offering the session if the
// selected cipher in HelloRetryRequest does not match. This avoids performing
// the transcript hash transformation for multiple hashes.
// Per RFC 8446 section 4.1.4, skip offering the session if the selected
// cipher in HelloRetryRequest does not match. This avoids performing the
// transcript hash transformation for multiple hashes.
if (hs->received_hello_retry_request &&
ssl->session->cipher->algorithm_prf != hs->new_cipher->algorithm_prf) {
return true;
@ -2000,7 +2000,7 @@ bool ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
// Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes
//
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.7
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.9
static bool ext_psk_key_exchange_modes_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
CBB *out) {
@ -2044,7 +2044,7 @@ static bool ext_psk_key_exchange_modes_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
// Early Data Indication
//
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.8
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.10
static bool ext_early_data_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
@ -2129,7 +2129,7 @@ static bool ext_early_data_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
// Key Share
//
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16#section-4.2.5
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.8
static bool ext_key_share_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
@ -2314,7 +2314,7 @@ bool ssl_ext_key_share_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
// Supported Versions
//
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16#section-4.2.1
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.1
static bool ext_supported_versions_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
@ -2346,7 +2346,7 @@ static bool ext_supported_versions_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out)
// Cookie
//
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16#section-4.2.2
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.2
static bool ext_cookie_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
if (hs->cookie.empty()) {
@ -2368,10 +2368,10 @@ static bool ext_cookie_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
}
// Negotiated Groups
// Supported Groups
//
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16#section-4.2.4
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.1
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.7
static bool ext_supported_groups_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;

View File

@ -89,9 +89,9 @@ const (
typeServerHello uint8 = 2
typeHelloVerifyRequest uint8 = 3
typeNewSessionTicket uint8 = 4
typeEndOfEarlyData uint8 = 5 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21
typeHelloRetryRequest uint8 = 6 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16
typeEncryptedExtensions uint8 = 8 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16
typeEndOfEarlyData uint8 = 5
typeHelloRetryRequest uint8 = 6
typeEncryptedExtensions uint8 = 8
typeCertificate uint8 = 11
typeServerKeyExchange uint8 = 12
typeCertificateRequest uint8 = 13
@ -100,11 +100,11 @@ const (
typeClientKeyExchange uint8 = 16
typeFinished uint8 = 20
typeCertificateStatus uint8 = 22
typeKeyUpdate uint8 = 24 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16
typeKeyUpdate uint8 = 24
typeCompressedCertificate uint8 = 25 // Not IANA assigned
typeNextProtocol uint8 = 67 // Not IANA assigned
typeChannelID uint8 = 203 // Not IANA assigned
typeMessageHash uint8 = 254 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21
typeMessageHash uint8 = 254
)
// TLS compression types.
@ -127,14 +127,14 @@ const (
extensionTokenBinding uint16 = 24
extensionCompressedCertAlgs uint16 = 27
extensionSessionTicket uint16 = 35
extensionPreSharedKey uint16 = 41 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23
extensionEarlyData uint16 = 42 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23
extensionSupportedVersions uint16 = 43 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23
extensionCookie uint16 = 44 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23
extensionPSKKeyExchangeModes uint16 = 45 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23
extensionCertificateAuthorities uint16 = 47 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23
extensionSignatureAlgorithmsCert uint16 = 50 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23
extensionKeyShare uint16 = 51 // draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23
extensionPreSharedKey uint16 = 41
extensionEarlyData uint16 = 42
extensionSupportedVersions uint16 = 43
extensionCookie uint16 = 44
extensionPSKKeyExchangeModes uint16 = 45
extensionCertificateAuthorities uint16 = 47
extensionSignatureAlgorithmsCert uint16 = 50
extensionKeyShare uint16 = 51
extensionCustom uint16 = 1234 // not IANA assigned
extensionNextProtoNeg uint16 = 13172 // not IANA assigned
extensionRenegotiationInfo uint16 = 0xff01
@ -239,13 +239,13 @@ const (
SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 = 0x0002
)
// PskKeyExchangeMode values (see draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16)
// PskKeyExchangeMode values (see RFC 8446, section 4.2.9)
const (
pskKEMode = 0
pskDHEKEMode = 1
)
// KeyUpdateRequest values (see draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16, section 4.5.3)
// KeyUpdateRequest values (see RFC 8446, section 4.6.3)
const (
keyUpdateNotRequested = 0
keyUpdateRequested = 1
@ -2064,7 +2064,7 @@ func isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(sigAlg signatureAlgorithm, sigAlgs []signatur
}
var (
// See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16, section 6.3.1.2.
// See RFC 8446, section 4.1.3.
downgradeTLS13 = []byte{0x44, 0x4f, 0x57, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x01}
downgradeTLS12 = []byte{0x44, 0x4f, 0x57, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x00}
)

View File

@ -603,8 +603,7 @@ NextCipherSuite:
}
_, supportsTLS13 := c.config.isSupportedVersion(VersionTLS13, false)
// Check for downgrade signals in the server random, per
// draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16, section 4.1.3.
// Check for downgrade signals in the server random, per RFC 8446, section 4.1.3.
if (supportsTLS13 || c.config.Bugs.CheckTLS13DowngradeRandom) && !c.config.Bugs.IgnoreTLS13DowngradeRandom {
if c.vers <= VersionTLS12 && c.config.maxVersion(c.isDTLS) >= VersionTLS13 {
if bytes.Equal(serverHello.random[len(serverHello.random)-8:], downgradeTLS13) {

View File

@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ func (m *clientHelloMsg) marshal() []byte {
algIDs.addU16(v)
}
}
// The PSK extension must be last (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18 section 4.2.6).
// The PSK extension must be last. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.11
if len(m.pskIdentities) > 0 && !m.pskBinderFirst {
extensions.addU16(extensionPreSharedKey)
pskExtension := extensions.addU16LengthPrefixed()
@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ func (m *clientHelloMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
m.ticketSupported = true
m.sessionTicket = []byte(body)
case extensionKeyShare:
// draft-ietf-tls-tls13 section 6.3.2.3
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.8
var keyShares byteReader
if !body.readU16LengthPrefixed(&keyShares) || len(body) != 0 {
return false
@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ func (m *clientHelloMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
m.keyShares = append(m.keyShares, entry)
}
case extensionPreSharedKey:
// draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18 section 4.2.6
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.11
var psks, binders byteReader
if !body.readU16LengthPrefixed(&psks) ||
!body.readU16LengthPrefixed(&binders) ||
@ -807,12 +807,12 @@ func (m *clientHelloMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
return false
}
case extensionPSKKeyExchangeModes:
// draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18 section 4.2.7
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.9
if !body.readU8LengthPrefixedBytes(&m.pskKEModes) || len(body) != 0 {
return false
}
case extensionEarlyData:
// draft-ietf-tls-tls13 section 6.3.2.5
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.10
if len(body) != 0 {
return false
}
@ -1299,7 +1299,7 @@ func (m *serverExtensions) marshal(extensions *byteBuilder) {
supportedPoints.addBytes(m.supportedPoints)
}
if len(m.supportedCurves) > 0 {
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.4
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.7
extensions.addU16(extensionSupportedCurves)
supportedCurvesList := extensions.addU16LengthPrefixed()
supportedCurves := supportedCurvesList.addU16LengthPrefixed()

View File

@ -1173,8 +1173,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processClientHello() (isResume bool, err error)
_, supportsTLS13 := c.config.isSupportedVersion(VersionTLS13, false)
// Signal downgrades in the server random, per draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16,
// section 4.1.3.
// Signal downgrades in the server random, per RFC 8446, section 4.1.3.
if supportsTLS13 || config.Bugs.SendTLS13DowngradeRandom {
if c.vers <= VersionTLS12 && config.maxVersion(c.isDTLS) >= VersionTLS13 {
copy(hs.hello.random[len(hs.hello.random)-8:], downgradeTLS13)

View File

@ -384,8 +384,7 @@ func (h *finishedHash) discardHandshakeBuffer() {
}
// zeroSecretTLS13 returns the default all zeros secret for TLS 1.3, used when a
// given secret is not available in the handshake. See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16,
// section 7.1.
// given secret is not available in the handshake. See RFC 8446, section 7.1.
func (h *finishedHash) zeroSecret() []byte {
return make([]byte, h.hash.Size())
}
@ -400,7 +399,7 @@ func (h *finishedHash) nextSecret() {
}
// hkdfExpandLabel implements TLS 1.3's HKDF-Expand-Label function, as defined
// in section 7.1 of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-16.
// in section 7.1 of RFC 8446.
func hkdfExpandLabel(hash crypto.Hash, secret, label, hashValue []byte, length int) []byte {
if len(label) > 255 || len(hashValue) > 255 {
panic("hkdfExpandLabel: label or hashValue too long")

View File

@ -635,8 +635,7 @@ static int tls13_receive_key_update(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg) {
// Suppress KeyUpdate acknowledgments until this change is written to the
// wire. This prevents us from accumulating write obligations when read and
// write progress at different rates. See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18, section
// 4.5.3.
// write progress at different rates. See RFC 8446, section 4.6.3.
ssl->s3->key_update_pending = true;
}

View File

@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
// If accepting 0-RTT, we send tickets half-RTT. This gets the tickets on
// the wire sooner and also avoids triggering a write on |SSL_read| when
// processing the client Finished. This requires computing the client
// Finished early. See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18, section 4.5.1.
// Finished early. See RFC 8446, section 4.6.1.
static const uint8_t kEndOfEarlyData[4] = {SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 0,
0, 0};
if (!hs->transcript.Update(kEndOfEarlyData)) {