(Imports upstream's 384e6de4c7e35e37fb3d6fbeb32ddcb5eb0d3d3f. Changes to
P-256 assembly dropped because we're so different there.)
- harmonize handlers with guidelines and themselves;
- fix some bugs in handlers;
Change-Id: Ic0b6a37bed6baedc50448c72fab088327f12898d
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TEST_P didn't work without fixing the suppression, so I went ahead and
fixed it across the entire project.
BUG=129
Change-Id: I5fe417f720040b627acfb3ed2063afdc85dfa908
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This reduces us from seven different configuration patterns to six (see
comment #2 of linked bug). I do not believe there is any behavior change
here as SSL_set_SSL_CTX already manually copied the field. It now gives
us a nice invariant: SSL_set_SSL_CTX overrides all and only the
dual-SSL/SSL_CTX options hanging off of CERT.
BUG=123
Change-Id: I1ae06b791fb869917a6503cee41afb2d9be53d89
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(Imported from upstream's 7e12cdb52e3f4beff050caeecf3634870bb9a7c4.)
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I'm not sure why the SSL versions of these functions return int while
the SSL_CTX version returns void. It looks like this dates to
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/1491/, of which the initial
upload was an SSL_ctrl macro. I guess one of the ints got accidentally
preserved in conversion.
(No existing caller, aside from bssl_shim, checks the result.)
Change-Id: Id54309c1aa03462d520b9a45cdfdefdd2cdd1298
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0-RTT requires matching the selected ALPN parameters against those in
the session. Stash the ALPN value in the session in TLS 1.3, so we can
recover it.
BUG=76
Change-Id: I8668b287651ae4deb0bf540c0885a02d189adee0
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Change-Id: I02e33a89345eaa935c06e3e6d88f7611049f1387
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BUG=129
Change-Id: Ibbd6d0804a75cb17ff33f64d4cdf9ae80b26e9df
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We've already converted err_test and forgot. Instead, recognize GTest
vs. normal tests by their contents. This hack can be removed later once
all the tests are converted.
BUG=129
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Recent changes added SSL-level setters to these APIs. Unfortunately,
this has the side effect of breaking SSL_set_SSL_CTX, which is how SNI
is typically handled. SSL_set_SSL_CTX is kind of a weird function in
that it's very sensitive to which of the hodge-podge of config styles is
in use. I previously listed out all the config styles here, but it was
long and unhelpful. (I counted up to 7.)
Of the various SSL_set_SSL_CTX-visible config styles, the sanest seems
to be to move it to CERT. In this case, it's actually quite reasonable
since they're very certificate-related.
Later we may wish to think about whether we can cut down all 7 kinds of
config styles because this is kinda nuts. I'm wondering we should do
CERT => SSL_CONFIG, move everything there, and make that be the same
structure that is dropped post-handshake (supposing the caller has
disavowed SSL_clear and renego). Fruit for later thought. (Note though
that comes with a behavior change for all the existing config.)
Change-Id: I9aa47d8bd37bf2847869e0b577739d4d579ee4ae
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(Imports upstream's 3c274a6e2016b6724fbfe3ff1487efa2a536ece4.)
Change-Id: I2f0c0abff04decd347d4770e6d1d190f1e08afa0
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(Imports upstream's a30b0522cb937be54e172c68b0e9f5fa6ec30bf3.)
Change-Id: I6b9e67f97de935ecaaa9524943c6bdbe3540c0d0
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(Imports upstream's abb8c44fbaf6b88f4f4879b89b32e423aa75617b.)
Note that the AVX512 code is disabled for now. This just reduces the
diff with upstream.
Change-Id: I61da414e53747ecc869f27883e6ab12c1f8513ff
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(Imports upstream's d89773d659129368a341df746476da445d47ad31.)
In order to minimize dependency on assembler version a number of
post-SSE2 instructions are encoded manually. But in order to simplify
the procedure only register operands are considered. Non-register
operands are passed down to assembler. Module in question uses pshufb
with memory operands, and old [GNU] assembler can't handle it.
Fortunately in this case it's possible skip just the problematic
segment without skipping SSSE3 support altogether.
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We do pass -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2 on the command line, so this just had the
effect of setting both values to 1 anyway.
Change-Id: Ia34714bb2fe51cc79d51ef9ee3ffe0354049ed0c
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This reverts commit 75b833cc81.
Sadly this needs to be redone because upstream never took this change.
Perhaps, once redone, we can try upstreaming it again.
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(Imports upstream's 3ba1ef829cf3dd36eaa5e819258d90291c6a1027.)
Original strategy for page-walking was adjust stack pointer and then
touch pages in order. This kind of asks for double-fault, because
if touch fails, then signal will be delivered to frame above adjusted
stack pointer. But touching pages prior adjusting stack pointer would
upset valgrind. As compromise let's adjust stack pointer in pages,
touching top of the stack. This still asks for double-fault, but at
least prevents corruption of neighbour stack if allocation is to
overstep the guard page.
Also omit predict-non-taken hints as they reportedly trigger illegal
instructions in some VM setups.
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(Imports upstream's ace05265d2d599e350cf84ed60955b7f2b173bc9.)
Change-Id: I151a03d662f7effe87f22fd9db7e0265368798b8
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(Imports upstream's 6025001707fd65679d758c877200469d4e72ea88.)
Change-Id: I2f237d675b029cfc7ba3640aa9ce7248cc230013
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(Imports upstream's b7f5503fa6e1feebec2ac12b8ddcb5b5672452a6.)
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Upstream did this in 609b0852e4d50251857dbbac3141ba042e35a9ae and it's
easier to apply patches if we do also.
Change-Id: I5142693ed1e26640987ff16f5ea510e81bba200e
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(Imports upstream's 0a86f668212acfa6b48abacbc17b99c234eedf33.)
Change-Id: Ie31d99f8cc3e93b6a9c7c5daa066de96941b3f7c
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(Imports upstream's 1bf80d93024e72628d4351c7ad19c0dfe635aa95.)
Change-Id: If1d61336edc7f63cdfd8ac14157376bde2651a31
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(Imports upstream's adc4f1fc25b2cac90076f1e1695b05b7aeeae501.)
Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to
physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can
be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...
Change-Id: Ie1e278eb5982f26e596783b3d7820a71295688ec
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This imports the changes to x86_64-xlate from upstream's
9c940446f614d1294fa197ffd4128206296b04da. It looks like it's a fix,
although it doesn't alter our generated asm at all. Either way, no point
in diverging from upstream on this point.
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This aligns us better with upstream's version of this file.
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(Imports upstream's a3b5684fc1d4f3aabdf68dcf6c577f6dd24d2b2d.)
CFI directives annotate instructions that are significant for stack
unwinding procedure. In addition to directives recognized by GNU
assembler this module implements three synthetic ones:
- .cfi_push annotates push instructions in prologue and translates to
.cfi_adjust_cfa_offset (if needed) and .cfi_offset;
- .cfi_pop annotates pop instructions in epilogue and translates to
.cfi_adjust_cfs_offset (if needed) and .cfi_restore;
- .cfi_cfa_expression encodes DW_CFA_def_cfa_expression and passes it
to .cfi_escape as byte vector;
CFA expression syntax is made up mix of DWARF operator suffixes [subset
of] and references to registers with optional bias. Following example
describes offloaded original stack pointer at specific offset from
current stack pointer:
.cfi_cfa_expression %rsp+40,deref,+8
Final +8 has everything to do with the fact that CFA, Canonical Frame
Address, is reference to top of caller's stack, and on x86_64 call to
subroutine pushes 8-byte return address.
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All the business with rewinding hs->state back or skipping states based
on reuse_message or a skip parameter isn't really worth the trouble for
a debugging callback. With SSL_state no longer exposed, we don't have to
worry about breaking things.
BUG=177
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The split was there out of paranoia that some caller may notice the
change in initial state. Now that SSL_state is neutered, simplify.
BUG=177
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I doubt this matters, but this seems a little odd. In particular, this
avoids info_callback seeing the SSL_ST_OK once we stop switching
hs->state back and forth.
BUG=177
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Code which manages to constrain itself on this will limit our ability to
rework the handshake. I believe, at this point, we only need to expose
one bit of information (there's some code that compares SSL_state to
SSL_ST_OK), if even that.
BUG=177
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This makes sense to do if we are a client and initiate a renegotiation
at the same time as the server requesting one. Since we will never
initiate a renegotiation, this should not be necessary.
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Change-Id: I4b586dce37f4db0770e516888c2eeeae3ecffd97
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We compare pointer/length pairs constantly. To avoid needing to type it
everywhere and get GTest's output, add a StringPiece-alike for byte
slices which supports ==, !=, and std::ostream.
BUG=129
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(Imports upstream's 9d301cfea7181766b79ba31ed257d30fb84b1b0f.)
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(Imports upstream's e09b6216a5423555271509acf5112da5484ec15d.)
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(Imported from upstream's e1dbf7f431b996010844e220d3200cbf2122dbb3)
Change-Id: I71933922f597358790e8a4222e9d69c4b121bc19
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(Imported from upstream's 526ab896459a58748af198f6703108b79c917f08.)
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|SSL_SESSION_from_bytes| now takes an |SSL_CTX*|, from which it uses the
|X509_METHOD| and buffer pool. This is our API so we can do this.
This also requires adding an |SSL_CTX*| argument to |SSL_SESSION_new|
for the same reason. However, |SSL_SESSION_new| already has very few
callers (and none in third-party code that I can see) so I think we can
get away with this.
Change-Id: I1337cd2bd8cff03d4b9405ea3146b3b59584aa72
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We sized the post-handshake message limit for the older zero-length
KeyUpdate and forgot to update it when it got larger.
Thanks to Matt Caswell for catching this.
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BUG=129
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Change-Id: I98903df561bbf8c5739f892d2ad5e89ac0eb8e6f
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In honor of CVE-2016-9244. Although that particular bug BoGo was already
testing since it uses 16 bytes here.
The empty session ID case is particularly worth testing to make sure we
don't get confused somewhere. RFC 5077 allows clients to offer tickets
with no session ID. This is absurd since the client then has no way of
detecting resumption except by lookahead. We'll never do this as a
client, but should handle it correctly as a server.
Change-Id: I49695d19f03c4efdef43749c07372d590a010cda
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These are meant to make Android libcore's usage of BIGNUMs for java
BigIntegers faster and nicer (specifically, so that it doesn't need
to malloc a bunch of temporary BIGNUMs).
BUG=97
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ssl_rsa.c now basically deals with private-key functions, so rename to
reflect that.
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
I even made a note to update my change in light of this but still
managed to forget. With this, grep tells me that all |alert| values have
the correct default value now.
Change-Id: If37c4f2f6b36cf69e53303a3924a8eda4cfffed8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13721
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
We already have some cases where the default is DECODE_ERROR and, rather
than have two defaults, just harmonise on that. (INTERNAL_ERROR might
make more sense in some cases, but we don't want to have to remember
what the default is in each case and nobody really cares what the actual
value is anyway.)
Change-Id: I28007898e8d6e7415219145eb9f43ea875028ab2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13720
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
