Now that client.cc and server.cc run through application data, regenerate the
corpus.
Change-Id: I8278ebfe47fd2ba74f67db6f9b545aabf9fd1f84
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7301
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
As long as the HTTP/1.1 client auth hack forces use to support renego, having
it on seems much more useful than having it off for fuzzing purposes. Also read
app data to exercise that code and, on the client, trigger renegotiations as
needed.
Change-Id: I1941ded6ec9bd764abd199d1518420a1075ed1b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7291
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also pass set -e instead of chaining things with &&. (One line was missing the
&&.)
Change-Id: Ia04e7f40f46688c9664101efefef1d1ea069de71
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7300
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This results from running the fuzzers for a little while with both the
8bit-counters change and after taking the transcripts from the runner
tests as seeds for the `client` and `server` fuzzers.
Change-Id: I545a89d8dccd7ef69dd97546ed61610eea4a27a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7276
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
If running the stack through a fuzzer, we would like execution to be
completely deterministic. This is gated on a
BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE #ifdef.
For now, this just uses the zero ChaCha20 key and a global counter. As
needed, we can extend this to a thread-local counter and a separate
ChaCha20 stream and counter per input length.
Change-Id: Ic6c9d8a25e70d68e5dc6804e2c234faf48e51395
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7286
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
crypto/x509 parses the SPKI on-demand, so we weren't actually exercising the
SPKI code.
Change-Id: I2e16045bd35dbe04d4b8d8b45939c8885e09a550
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7161
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
