tag2nbyte had -1 at 18th position, but underlying ASN1_mbstring_copy
supports NumericString. tag2nbyte is also used in do_print_ex which will
not be broken by setting 1 at 18th position of tag2nbyte
(Imported from upstream's bd598cc405e981de259a07558e600b5a9ef64bd6.)
Change-Id: Ie063afcaac8a7d5046cdb385059b991b92cd6659
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8946
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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WebRTC want to be able to send a random alert. Add an API for this.
Change-Id: Id3113d68f25748729fd9e9a91dbbfa93eead12c3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8950
Reviewed-by: Taylor Brandstetter <deadbeef@webrtc.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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The selector field could be omitted because it has a DEFAULT value.
In this case *sfld == NULL (sfld can never be NULL). This was not
noticed because this was never used in existing ASN.1 modules.
(Imported from upstream's c4210673313482edacede58d92e92c213d7a181a.)
svaldez and I stared at this for a while and we believe this change is
correct. It's also irrelevant because our only remaining ADB (ANY
DEFINED BY) table is POLICYQUALINFO which does not allow its selector to
be omitted. Also, if it did, it would be a slight change in behavior.
We'd switch from using POLICYQUALINFO's default_tt (filling in an
ASN1_ANY) to its null_tt (which doesn't exist, so error).
Change-Id: If6a929e3dafca18431775b01958d0dae1c09f3b4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8943
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This imports upstream's b62e9bf5cbbe278b7e0017c9234999dae68ee867 and
c3bc7f498815b355533d96b54b9a09e030d4130c. This is a no-op since we don't
use the XTS bits though keep the files in sync so long as we have them.
Comparing to master, we're now up-to-date on that file except for
a285992763f3961f69a8d86bf7dfff020a08cef9. (I've left that alone since
that touches lots of files and we should probably get better test
configuration before importing something scary like #undef __thumb2__.)
Change-Id: Ie0556757c954ef559e03a6d62c940d5901ca704a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8945
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
All other CBB_add_u<N> functions take a narrowed type, but not every
uint32_t may fit in a u24. Check for this rather than silently truncate.
Change-Id: I23879ad0f4d2934f257e39e795cf93c6e3e878bf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8940
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This can be reverted, once the test runner on Android devices is
fixed.
BUG=chromium:631462
Change-Id: I1f9e38b4104f18c15bb942207c87e3b4b27472d2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8931
Reviewed-by: Andrii Shyshkalov <tandrii@google.com>
It's only called in one place. The comment about stack-allocated BIOs no
longer applies.
Change-Id: I5a3cec30bcb46bf1ee2bffd6117485383520b314
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8902
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Ridiculous as it is, the protocol does not forbid packing HelloRequest
and Finished into the same record. Add a test for this case.
Change-Id: I8e1455b261f56169309070bf44d14d40a63eae50
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8901
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Change-Id: I5afb917ff151a1cd19cb03152348b5e2eb774e55
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8884
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This doesn't do anything since they're for DTLS, but we ought to satisfy
the API nonetheless. expect_flight is easy with
ssl_hs_flush_and_read_message. received_flight I think basically needs
to get sprinkled into the state machine.
Change-Id: I406c7f776ad8e5e3cbcafcac6b26a688c6d3caf1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8883
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
It used to give a sensible answer ("no") before version negotiation.
Change-Id: I85b778a48cca7a4b66a81384eb18c447982875d1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8900
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Alas, we will need a version fallback for TLS 1.3 again.
This deprecates SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV. Rather than supplying a
boolean, have BoringSSL be aware of the real maximum version so we can
change the TLS 1.3 anti-downgrade logic to kick in, even when
max_version is set to 1.2.
The fallback version replaces the maximum version when it is set for
almost all purposes, except for downgrade protection purposes.
BUG=chromium:630165
Change-Id: I4c841dcbc6e55a282b223dfe169ac89c83c8a01f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8882
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BN_mod_mul_montgomery has a problem where the modulus is much smaller
than one of the arguments. While bn_test.cc knows this and reduces the
inputs before testing |BN_mod_mul_montgomery|, none of the previous test
vectors actually failed without this. (Except those that passed negative
vaules.)
This change adds tests where M ≪ A and B.
Change-Id: I53b5188ea5fb5e48d0d197718ed33c644cde8477
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8890
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The Android build system uses "blueprint" files now which are
represented by "Android.bp" instead of "Android.mk" files.
Some of the old sources.mk entries still exist, since they're still
being used by the Trusty build system.
Change-Id: I0b04100ace8599c8734bee77f656aab04c06cce9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8891
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
It seems risky in the context of cross-signed certificates when the
same certificate might have multiple potential issuers. Also rarely
used, since chains in OpenSSL typically only employ self-signed
trust-anchors, whose self-signatures are not checked, while untrusted
certificates are generally ephemeral.
(Imported from upstream's 0e76014e584ba78ef1d6ecb4572391ef61c4fb51.)
This is in master and not 1.0.2, but having a per-certificate signature
cache when this is a function of signature and issuer seems dubious at
best. Thanks to Viktor Dukhovni for pointing this change out to me.
(And for making the original change upstream, of course.)
Change-Id: Ie692d651726f14aeba6eaab03ac918fcaedb4eeb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8880
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We try to keep the deprecated values hidden, but if we do that, we won't
be able to allocate new constants without knowing which collide.
Change-Id: I3f249639bdf8869b2c83f3efdadd98b63ed839be
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8881
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It really should take a few more parameters and save a bit of
long-winded initialization work.
Change-Id: I2823f0aa82be39914a156323f6f32b470b6d6a3b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8876
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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[Tests added by davidben.]
Change-Id: I0d54a4f8b8fe91b348ff22658d95340cdb48b089
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8850
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Change-Id: I92425d7c72111623ddfbe8391f2d2fa88f101ef3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8818
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Share a bit more of it between TLS 1.2 and 1.3.
Change-Id: I43c9dbf785a3d33db1793cffb0fdbd3af075cc89
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8849
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This reverts commit 69f40dff83. I'm not
sure why the CQ didn't catch it while the bots didn't, but I'll look
into it after the QUIC BoF.
Change-Id: Ia187787c86aab082b9cffe0c86c828805dfc212d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8870
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We'll need to update it on occasion, but we should not update our
default ClientHello without noticing.
Change-Id: Id9c4734f8e3f8c66b757a82ca123ce949bbcd02e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8845
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Change-Id: Ibde837040d2332bc8570589ba5be9b32e774bfcf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8811
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Revert 3f3358ac15. Add documentation
clarifying the misunderstanding that lead to the mistake, and make use
of the recently-added |bn_set_words|.
Change-Id: I58814bace3db3b0b44e2dfe09c44918a4710c621
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8831
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Our CBB patterns do not make it safe to use a CBB after any operation
failed. Suppose one does:
int add_to_cbb(CBB *cbb) {
CBB child;
return CBB_add_u8(cbb, 1) &&
CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &child) &&
CBB_add_u8(&child, 2) &&
/* Flush |cbb| before |child| goes out of scoped. */
CBB_flush(cbb);
}
If one of the earlier operations fails, any attempt to use |cbb| (except
CBB_cleanup) would hit a memory error. Doing this would be a bug anyway,
since the CBB would be in an undefined state anyway (wrote only half my
object), but the memory error is bad manners.
Officially document that using a CBB after failure is illegal and, to
avoid the memory error, set a poison bit on the cbb_buffer_st to prevent
all future operations. In theory we could make failure +
CBB_discard_child work, but this is not very useful and would require a
more complex CBB pattern.
Change-Id: I4303ee1c326785849ce12b5f7aa8bbde6b95d2ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8840
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Change-Id: I55ab20c3add6e504522f3bb7e75aeed7daa0aad7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8851
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This adds three more formats to the SSLKEYLOGFILE format to support TLS
1.3:
EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET <client_random> <early_traffic_secret>
HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET <client_random> <handshake_traffic_secret>
TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 <client_random> <traffic_secret_0>
(We don't implement 0-RTT yet, so only the second two are implemented.)
Motivations:
1. If emitted the non-traffic secrets (early, handshake, and master) or
the IKMs, Wireshark needs to maintain a handshake hash. I don't
believe they need to do this today.
2. We don't store more than one non-traffic secret at a time and don't
keep traffic secrets for longer than needed. That suggests three
separate lines logged at different times rather than one line.
3. If 0-RTT isn't used, we probably won't even compute the early traffic
secret, so that further suggests three different lines.
4. If the handshake didn't get far enough to complete, we won't have an
TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 to log at all. That seems like exactly when
Wireshark would be handy, which means we want to log secrets as they
are computed.
MT from NSS has ACK'd over email that this format would be acceptable
for them, so let's go with it.
Change-Id: I4d685a1355dff4d4bd200310029d502bb6c511f9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8841
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Every flush but the last is always immediately followed by a read. Add a
combined wait mode to make things simpler. Unfortunately, both flights
we have (the state machine doesn't write the first ClientHello) are
followed immediately by a state change, which means we still need some
state in between because we must run code after write_message but before
read_message.
(This way to fix that is to get rid of the buffer BIO, change
write_message to write_flight, and allow things like init_message /
finish_message / init_message / finish_message / set_write_state /
init_message / finish_message / write_flight.)
Change-Id: Iebaa388ccbe7fcad48c1b2256e1c0d3a7c9c8a2a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8828
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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We never had coverage for that codepath.
Change-Id: Iba1b0a3ddca743745773c663995acccda9fa6970
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8827
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Change-Id: I0fdd6db9ea229d394b14c76b6ba55f6165a6a806
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8826
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There is no longer need for the Go code to implement 'fake TLS 1.3'. We
now implement real incomplete TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: I8577100ef8c7c83ca540f37dadd451263f9f37e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8823
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This is basically the same as BadECDHECurve-TLS13. That the client picks
a share first but the server picks the curve type means there's less
redundancy to deal with.
Change-Id: Icd9a4ecefe8e0dfaeb8fd0b062ca28561b05df98
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8817
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Change-Id: Iad572f44448141c5e2be49bf25b42719c625a97a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8812
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This adds the machinery for doing TLS 1.3 1RTT.
Change-Id: I736921ffe9dc6f6e64a08a836df6bb166d20f504
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8720
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Change-Id: I1132103bd6c8b01c567b970694ed6b5e9248befb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8816
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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We already check for ciphers == NULL earlier in the function.
Change-Id: I0e676816d891e1d24cf45cab449c4d3915ec54ee
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8815
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Change-Id: Ifbfae883638b35bb274f2002bc53fbba77c7aa85
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8821
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Note that this is currently doing fake TLS 1.3 until the handshake is
in.
Change-Id: I3fbf0049e2a0f1d7464b94a69421e198e0bb768d
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Not only test that we can enforce the message type correctly (this is
currently in protocol-specific code though really should not be), but
also test that each individual message is checked correctly.
Change-Id: I5ed0f4033f011186f020ea46940160c7639f688b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8793
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This will be used for writing the equivalent test in TLS 1.3 to the
recent DTLS change and similar.
Change-Id: I280c3ca8f1d8e0981b6e7a499acb7eceebe43a0c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8792
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This is the equivalent of FragmentAcrossChangeCipherSuite for DTLS. It
is possible for us to, while receiving pre-CCS handshake messages, to
buffer up a message with sequence number meant for a post-CCS Finished.
When we then get to the new epoch and attempt to read the Finished, we
will process the buffered Finished although it was sent with the wrong
encryption.
Move ssl_set_{read,write}_state to SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD hooks as this is
a property of the transport. Notably, read_state may fail. In DTLS
check the handshake buffer size. We could place this check in
read_change_cipher_spec, but TLS 1.3 has no ChangeCipherSpec message, so
we will need to implement this at the cipher change point anyway. (For
now, there is only an assert on the TLS side. This will be replaced with
a proper check in TLS 1.3.)
Change-Id: Ia52b0b81e7db53e9ed2d4f6d334a1cce13e93297
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8790
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Keep our C implementation honest.
Change-Id: I9e9e686b7f730b61218362450971afdd82b0b640
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8782
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It tests the same thing right now with Fake TLS 1.3, but we'll need this
tested in real TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: Iacd32c2d4e56d341e5709a2ccd80fed5d556c94d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8783
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