The runner currently expects split handshake tests to work is GOOS is
"linux", but that includes Android, which the shim doesn't support.
Rather than try to align these two conditions, have the runner ask the
shim whether it supports split handshakes or not.
Change-Id: I7bea0d94142c4b6ee42b8f54c67b8611da93feb3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30204
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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The new binary, called |handshaker|, allows split-handshakes to be
tested using shim and handshaker binaries built at different
revisions.
The shim now proxies traffic to the handshaker during the split
handshake. The handoff and handback steps serialize additional state
about the test being performed, and its results.
The proxy and handshaker make heavy use of Unix-isms, and so
split-handshake tests are now restricted to Linux.
Change-Id: I048f0540c3978a31b3e573e00da17caf41a8059e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29348
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Callers who use SSL_get0_certificate_types today will find an empty list
in TLS 1.3, which removed it. To provide feature parity, add an accessor
for the signature algorithms list. SSL_get_signature_algorithm_key_type
can be used to map it to a key type.
"Peer signature algorithms" was already taken in the public API by
SSL_get_peer_signature_algorithm to refer to which the peer selected, so
I named this matching SSL_CTX_set_verify_algorithm_prefs.
Change-Id: I12d411d7350e744ed9f88c610df48e0d9fc13256
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29684
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
In f2bc5f4 davidben pointed out that this function seems unnecessary
in my desired end-state. In fact, I think it may have been
unnecessary since 56986f90. (This was easier to miss at the time,
since at the time the function was part of MoveExData(), having not
yet been factored out.)
Change-Id: Ia9b4a909c93cb595666bcf7356a9f9a085901455
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29604
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This makes |TestState| and |TestConfig| accessible outside
bssl_shim.cc, as well as the functions SetupCtx() and NewSSL(), which
become methods on |TestConfig|. A whole mess of callbacks move in
order to support this change.
Along the way, some bits of global state are moved (e.g. the global
test clock) and made self-initializing.
This helps with creating a separate binary to perform split
handshakes.
Change-Id: I39b00a1819074882353f5f04ed01312916f3cccb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29345
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We have generic -on-resume prefixes now. This avoids the global counter.
Change-Id: I7596ed3273e826b744d8545f7ed2bdd5e9190958
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29594
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Update-Note: SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(SSL3_VERSION) now fails.
SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 is now zero. Internal SSL3-specific "AEAD"s are gone.
Change-Id: I34edb160be40a5eea3e2e0fdea562c6e2adda229
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29444
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change adds server-side support for compressed certificates.
(Although some definitions for client-side support are included in the
headers, there's no code behind them yet.)
Change-Id: I0f98abf0b782b7337ddd014c58e19e6b8cc5a3c2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27964
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
If the callback returns an empty ALPN, we forget we negotiated ALPN at
all (bssl::Array does not distinguish null and empty). Empty ALPN
protocols are forbidden anyway, so reject these ahead of time.
Change-Id: I42f1fc4c843bc865e23fb2a2e5d57424b569ee99
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28546
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously, we'd omitted OpenSSL's OCSP APIs because they depend on a
complex OCSP mechanism and encourage the the unreliable server behavior
that hampers using OCSP stapling to fix revocation today. (OCSP
responses should not be fetched on-demand on a callback. They should be
managed like other server credentials and refreshed eagerly, so
temporary CA outage does not translate to loss of OCSP.)
But most of the APIs are byte-oriented anyway, so they're easy to
support. Intentionally omit the one that takes a bunch of OCSP_RESPIDs.
The callback is benign on the client (an artifact of OpenSSL reading
OCSP and verifying certificates in the wrong order). On the server, it
encourages unreliability, but pyOpenSSL/cryptography.io depends on this.
Dcument that this is only for compatibility with legacy software.
Also tweak a few things for compatilibility. cryptography.io expects
SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead to return something, SSL_get_server_tmp_key's
signature was wrong, and cryptography.io tries to redefine
SSL_get_server_tmp_key if SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY is missing.
Change-Id: I2f99711783456bfb7324e9ad972510be8a95e845
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28404
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Chrome needs to support renegotiation at TLS 1.2 + HTTP/1.1, but we're
free to shed the handshake configuration at TLS 1.3 or HTTP/2.
Rather than making config shedding implicitly disable renegotiation,
make the actual shedding dependent on a combination of the two settings.
If config shedding is enabled, but so is renegotiation (including
whether we are a client, etc.), leave the config around. If the
renegotiation setting gets disabled again after the handshake,
re-evaluate and shed the config then.
Bug: 123
Change-Id: Ie833f413b3f15b8f0ede617991e3fef239d4a323
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27904
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
|SSL_CONFIG| is a container for bits of configuration that are
unneeded after the handshake completes. By default it is retained for
the life of the |SSL|, but it may be shed at the caller's option by
calling SSL_set_shed_handshake_config(). This is incompatible with
renegotiation, and with SSL_clear().
|SSL_CONFIG| is reachable by |ssl->config| and by |hs->config|. The
latter is always non-NULL. To avoid null checks, I've changed the
signature of a number of functions from |SSL*| arguments to
|SSL_HANDSHAKE*| arguments.
When configuration has been shed, setters that touch |SSL_CONFIG|
return an error value if that is possible. Setters that return |void|
do nothing.
Getters that request |SSL_CONFIG| values will fail with an |assert| if
the configuration has been shed. When asserts are compiled out, they
will return an error value.
The aim of this commit is to simplify analysis of split-handshakes by
making it obvious that some bits of state have no effects beyond the
handshake. It also cuts down on memory usage.
Of note: |SSL_CTX| is still reachable after the configuration has been
shed, and a couple things need to be retained only for the sake of
post-handshake hooks. Perhaps these can be fixed in time.
Change-Id: Idf09642e0518945b81a1e9fcd7331cc9cf7cc2d6
Bug: 123
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27644
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Chrome uses the platform certificate verifier and thus cannot reliably
expect PSS signatures to work in all configurations. Add an API for the
consumer to inform BoringSSL of this ability. We will then adjust our
advertisements accordingly.
Note that, because TLS 1.2 does not have the signature_algorithms_cert
extension, turning off TLS 1.3 and using this API will stop advertising
RSA-PSS. I believe this is the correct behavior given the semantics of
that code point.
The tests check the various combinations here, as well as checking that
the peer never sends signature_algorithms_cert identical to
signature_algorithms.
Bug: 229
Change-Id: I8c33a93efdc9252097e3899425b49548fc42a93a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27488
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
On reflection, I think we'll need to note whether dummy PQ padding was
echoed on a given connection. Otherwise measurements in Chrome will be
mixed with cases where people have MITM proxies that ignored the
extension, or possibly Google frontends that haven't been updated.
Therefore this change will be used to filter latency measurements in
Chrome to only include those where the extension was echoed and we'll
measure at levels of 1 byte (for control), 400 bytes, and 1100 bytes.
This also makes it an error if the server didn't echo an extension of
the same length as was sent.
Change-Id: Ib2a0b29cfb8719a75a28f3cf96710c57d88eaa68
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26284
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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This change adds a couple of focused tests to ssl_test.cc, but also
programmically duplicates many runner tests in a split-handshake mode.
Change-Id: I9dafc8a394581e5daf1318722e1015de82117fd9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25388
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This adds support for sending the quic_transport_parameters
(draft-ietf-quic-tls) in ClientHello and EncryptedExtensions, as well as
reading the value sent by the peer.
Bug: boringssl:224
Change-Id: Ied633f557cb13ac87454d634f2bd81ab156f5399
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24464
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Update-Note: Token Binding can no longer be configured with the custom
extensions API. Instead, use the new built-in implementation. (The
internal repository should be all set.)
Bug: 183
Change-Id: I007523a638dc99582ebd1d177c38619fa7e1ac38
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20645
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This extension will be used to measure the latency impact of potentially
sending a post-quantum key share by default. At this time it's purely
measuring the impact of the client sending the key share, not the server
replying with a ciphertext.
We could use the existing padding extension for this but that extension
doesn't allow the server to echo it, so we would need a different
extension in the future anyway. Thus we just create one now.
We can assume that modern clients will be using TLS 1.3 by the time that
PQ key-exchange is established and thus the key share will be sent in
all ClientHello messages. However, since TLS 1.3 isn't quite here yet,
this extension is also sent for TLS 1.0–1.2 ClientHellos. The latency
impact should be the same either way.
Change-Id: Ie4a17551f6589b28505797e8c54cddbe3338dfe5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24585
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
TLS 1.3 includes a server-random-based anti-downgrade signal, as a
workaround for TLS 1.2's ServerKeyExchange signature failing to cover
the entire handshake. However, because TLS 1.3 draft versions are each
doomed to die, we cannot deploy it until the final RFC. (Suppose a
draft-TLS-1.3 client checked the signal and spoke to a final-TLS-1.3
server. The server would correctly negotiate TLS 1.2 and send the
signal. But the client would then break. An anologous situation exists
with reversed roles.)
However, it appears that Cisco devices have non-compliant TLS 1.2
implementations[1] and copy over another server's server-random when
acting as a TLS terminator (client and server back-to-back).
Hopefully they are the only ones doing this. Implement a
measurement-only version with a different value. This sentinel must not
be enforced, but it will tell us whether enforcing it will cause
problems.
[1] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg25168.html
Bug: 226
Change-Id: I976880bdb2ef26f51592b2f6b3b97664342679c8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24284
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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We can probably do this globally at this point since the cipher
requirements are much more restrict than they were in the beginning.
(Firefox, in particular, has done so far a while.) For now add a flag
since some consumer wanted this.
I'll see about connecting it to a Chrome field trial after our breakage
budget is no longer reserved for TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: Ib61dd5aae2dfd48b56e79873a7f3061a7631a5f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23725
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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After much procrastinating, we finally moved Chromium to the new stuff.
We can now delete this. This is a breaking change for
SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD consumers, but it should be trivial (remove some
unused fields in the struct). I've bumped BORINGSSL_API_VERSION to ease
any multi-sided changes that may be needed.
Change-Id: I9fe562590ad938bcb4fcf9af0fadeff1d48745fb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/23224
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Change-Id: I46686aea9b68105cfe70a11db0e88052781e179c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22164
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We enforce that servers don't send bogus ALPN values, so consumers may
assume that SSL_get0_alpn_selected won't have anything terribly weird.
To maintain that invariant in the face of folks whose ALPN preferences
change (consider a persisted session cache), we should decline to offer
0-RTT if early_alpn would have been rejected by the check anyway.
Change-Id: Ic3a9ba4041d5d4618742eb05e27033525d96ade1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22067
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
We have fancy -on-initial and -on-resume prefixes now that can apply to
every flag.
Change-Id: I6195a97f663ebc94db320ca35889c213c700a976
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19666
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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reuse_message and V2ClientHellos each caused messages to be
double-reported.
Change-Id: I8722a3761ede272408ac9cf8e1b2ce383911cc6f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/18764
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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This also serves as a certificate verification callback for
CRYPTO_BUFFER-based consumers. Remove the silly
SSL_CTX_i_promise_to_verify_certs_after_the_handshake placeholder.
Bug: 54, chromium:347402
Change-Id: I4c6b445cb9cd7204218acb2e5d1625e6f37aff6f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17964
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
TLS 1.3 deployment is currently blocked by buggy middleboxes
throughout the ecosystem. As an experiment to better understand these bugs
and the problems they are causing, implement TLS 1.3 variants with
alternate encodings. These are still the same protocol, only encoded
slightly differently. We will use what we learn from these experiments to
guide the TLS 1.3 deployment strategy and proposals to the IETF, if any.
These experiments only target the basic 1-RTT TLS 1.3 handshake. Based on
what we learn from this experiment, we may try future variations to
explore 0-RTT and HelloRetryRequest.
When enabled, the server supports all TLS 1.3 variants while the client
is configured to use a particular variant.
Change-Id: I532411d1abc41314dc76acce0246879b754b4c61
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17327
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Like other handshake properties, when in 0-RTT on the client,
SSL_version should report the predicted version. This used to work on
accident because of how ssl->version got set in handshake_client.c early
(and that TLS 1.4 does not exist), but we no longer do that.
Change-Id: Ifb63a22b795fe8964ac553844a46040acd5d7323
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17664
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Also mirror the structure of the TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 code a bit.
Change-Id: I7b34bf30de63fa0bd47a39a90570846fb2314ad5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17539
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This allows us to fill in holes in our fuzzer coverage, notably client
resumption (and thus early data) and server client certificates. The
corpora are not refreshed yet. This will be done in upcoming changes.
Also add an option for debugging fuzzers. It's very useful to test it on
transcripts and make sure that fuzzer mode successfully makes things
compatible.
Bug: 104
Change-Id: I02f0be4045d1baf68efc9a4157f573df1429575d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17531
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BUG=76
Change-Id: If58a73da38e46549fd55f84a9104e2dfebfda43f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14164
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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When writing tests and BoGo isn't available, it is useful to be able to
configure the set of signature algorithms accepted on the verify side.
Add an API for this.
Change-Id: Ic873189da7f8853e412acd68614df9d9a872a0c8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15125
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This follows up on cedc6f18 by removing support for the
-DBORINGSSL_ENABLE_DHE_TLS compile flag, and the code needed to
support it.
Change-Id: I53b6aa7a0eddd23ace8b770edb2a31b18ba2ce26
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14886
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This only works at TLS 1.2 and above as, before TLS 1.2, there is no way
to advertise support for Ed25519 or negotiate the correct signature
algorithm. Add tests for this accordingly.
For now, this is disabled by default on the verifying side but may be
enabled per SSL_CTX. Notably, projects like Chromium which use an
external verifier may need changes elsewhere before they can enable it.
(On the signing side, we can assume that if the caller gave us an
Ed25519 certificate, they mean for us to use it.)
BUG=187
Change-Id: Id25b0a677dcbe205ddd26d8dbba11c04bb520756
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14450
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We received an external request to add an option to undo the check added
in 3e51757de2.
Change-Id: Ifdd4b07705f2fa3d781d775d5cd139ea72d36734
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14644
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BUG=185
Change-Id: I4ce6735ca78cd687538a8c0fdbd78ee97b93585c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14382
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This adds support on the server and client to accept data-less early
data. The server will still fail to parse early data with any
contents, so this should remain disabled.
BUG=76
Change-Id: Id85d192d8e0360b8de4b6971511b5e8a0e8012f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12921
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We'll measure this value to guide what tolerance to use in the 0-RTT
anti-replay mechanism. This also fixes a bug where we were previously
minting ticket_age_add-less tickets on the server. Add a check to reject
all those tickets.
BUG=113
Change-Id: I68e690c0794234234e0d0500b4b9a7f79aea641e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14068
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Due to middlebox and ecosystem intolerance, short record headers are going to
be unsustainable to deploy.
BUG=119
Change-Id: I20fee79dd85bff229eafc6aeb72e4f33cac96d82
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14044
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Fix this and add a test. Otherwise enabling TLS 1.3 will cause a server
to blow through its session cache.
Change-Id: I67edbc468faedfd94a6c30cf842af085a6543b50
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13501
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This gives coverage over needing to fragment something over multiple
records.
Change-Id: I2373613608ef669358d48f4e12f68577fa5a40dc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13101
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
TLS 1.3 doesn't support renegotiation in the first place, but so callers
don't report TLS 1.3 servers as missing it, always report it as
(vacuously) protected against this bug.
BUG=chromium:680281
Change-Id: Ibfec03102b2aec7eaa773c331d6844292e7bb685
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13046
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
This adds support for setting 0-RTT mode on tickets minted by
BoringSSL, allowing for testing of the initial handshake knowledge.
BUG=76
Change-Id: Ic199842c03b5401ef122a537fdb7ed9e9a5c635a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12740
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
The write path for TLS is going to need some work. There are some fiddly
cases when there is a write in progress. Start adding tests to cover
this logic.
Later I'm hoping we can extend this flag so it drains the unfinished
write and thus test the interaction of read/write paths in 0-RTT. (We
may discover 1-RTT keys while we're in the middle of writing data.)
Change-Id: Iac2c417e4b5e84794fb699dd7cbba26a883b64ef
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13049
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This extension will be used to test whether
https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/762 is deployable against
middleboxes. For simplicity, it is mutually exclusive with 0-RTT. If
client and server agree on the extension, TLS 1.3 records will use the
format in the PR rather than what is in draft 18.
BUG=119
Change-Id: I1372ddf7b328ddf73d496df54ac03a95ede961e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12684
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
There are no longer any consumers of these APIs.
These were useful back when the CBC vs. RC4 tradeoff varied by version
and it was worth carefully tuning this cutoff. Nowadays RC4 is
completely gone and there's no use in configuring these anymore.
To avoid invalidating the existing ssl_ctx_api corpus and requiring it
regenerated, I've left the entries in there. It's probably reasonable
for new API fuzzers to reuse those slots.
Change-Id: I02bf950e3828062341e4e45c8871a44597ae93d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12880
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
