Due to non-compliant middleboxes, it is possible we'll need to do some
surgery to this mechanism. Making it per-SSL is a little more flexible
and also eases some tests in Chromium until we get its SSL_CTX usage
fixed up.
Also fix up BoringSSL tests. We forgot to test it at TLS 1.0 and use the
-expect-tls13-downgrade flag.
Bug: 226
Change-Id: Ib39227e74e2d6f5e1fbc1ebcc091e751471b3cdc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/32424
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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We no longer need to fork them. This is in preparation for pulling it
via Go modules, but probably need to figure out the network issue first.
Slightly bad manners for CI to do that.
Change-Id: Ic258264f3c3559817d5e4921e4ad3282e94d05fe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31904
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This should make it easier for us to reuse Go code properly.
util/fipstools is kind of a mess. runner has been using relative
imports, but Go seems to prefer this mechanism these days.
Update-Note: The import spelling in ssl/test/runner changes. Also we now
require Go 1.11. Or you could clone us into GOPATH, but no one does
that.
Change-Id: I8bf91e1e0345b3d0b3d17f5c642fe78b415b7dde
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31884
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Historically, OpenSSL filled in a fake session ID for ticket-only
client sessions. Conscrypt relies on this to implement some weird Java
API where every session has an ID and may be queried out of the client
session cache and, e.g., revoked that way.
(Note that a correct client session cache is not keyed by session ID and
indeed this allows one server to knock out another server's sessions by
matching session IDs. But existing APIs are existing APIs.)
For consistency between TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, as well as matching
OpenSSL's TLS 1.3 implementation, do the same in TLS 1.3. Note this
smooths over our cross-version resumption tests by allowing for
something odd: it is now syntactically possible to resume a TLS 1.3
session at TLS 1.2. It doesn't matter either way, but now a different
codepath rejects certain cases.
Change-Id: I9caf4f0c3b2e2e24ae25752826d47bce77e65616
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31525
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Update-Note: If not explicitly configured to use tls13_all, callers that enable
TLS 1.3 will now only enable the final standard version.
Change-Id: Ifcfc65a9d8782c983df6e002925e8f77f45b6e53
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31384
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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The client downgrade detection tests were not asserting on the error (would
have caught the missing error string). Additionally, Downgrade-FalseStart-Draft
isn't testing what it's supposed to; it doesn't actually configure a draft
version or anything. Fix that and have it use ALPN rather than NPN, to match
the test above.
Change-Id: I0b759385641aa00994a912303a6f5bd65522b4bb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31204
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I2d1671a4f21a602191fd0c9b932244a376ac5713
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31104
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The anti-downgrade signal is being implemented in a follow-up change.
Change-Id: I5ea3ff429ed1389a3577026588fef3660d2d0615
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30904
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Works in the 1.3 and 1.2 client handshakes, not implemented on the
server for now.
Creates an SSL_CTX option to reverify the server certificate on session
resumption. Reverification only runs the client's certificate verify callback.
Adds new states to the client handshakes: state_reverify_server_certificate in
TLS 1.2, and state_server_certificate_reverify in TLS 1.3.
Adds a negative test to make sure that by default we don't verify the
certificate on resumption, and positive tests that make sure we do when the
new option is set.
Change-Id: I3a47ff3eacb3099df4db4c5bc57f7c801ceea8f1
Bug: chromium:347402
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29984
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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The runner currently expects split handshake tests to work is GOOS is
"linux", but that includes Android, which the shim doesn't support.
Rather than try to align these two conditions, have the runner ask the
shim whether it supports split handshakes or not.
Change-Id: I7bea0d94142c4b6ee42b8f54c67b8611da93feb3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30204
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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The new binary, called |handshaker|, allows split-handshakes to be
tested using shim and handshaker binaries built at different
revisions.
The shim now proxies traffic to the handshaker during the split
handshake. The handoff and handback steps serialize additional state
about the test being performed, and its results.
The proxy and handshaker make heavy use of Unix-isms, and so
split-handshake tests are now restricted to Linux.
Change-Id: I048f0540c3978a31b3e573e00da17caf41a8059e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29348
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Callers who use SSL_get0_certificate_types today will find an empty list
in TLS 1.3, which removed it. To provide feature parity, add an accessor
for the signature algorithms list. SSL_get_signature_algorithm_key_type
can be used to map it to a key type.
"Peer signature algorithms" was already taken in the public API by
SSL_get_peer_signature_algorithm to refer to which the peer selected, so
I named this matching SSL_CTX_set_verify_algorithm_prefs.
Change-Id: I12d411d7350e744ed9f88c610df48e0d9fc13256
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29684
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Vartanian <flooey@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Change-Id: Id7f5ef9932c4c491bd15085e3c604ebfcf259b7c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29665
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This partitions the session ID space of the internal cache by version,
which is nominally something we want, but we must check the version
externally anyway for both tickets and external session cache. That
makes this measure redundant. (Servers generate session IDs and 2^256 is
huge, so there would never accidentally be a collision.)
This cuts down on the "key" in the internal session cache, which will
simplify adding something like an lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve_key function.
(LHASH is currently lax about keys because it can freely stack-allocate
partially-initialized structs. C++ is a bit more finicky about this.)
Change-Id: I656fd9dbf023dccb163d2e8049eff8f1f9a0e21b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29585
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We have generic -on-resume prefixes now. This avoids the global counter.
Change-Id: I7596ed3273e826b744d8545f7ed2bdd5e9190958
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29594
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
This was changed in draft-ietf-quic-tls-13 to use a codepoint from the
reserved range.
Change-Id: Ia3cda249a3f37bc244d5c8a7765ec34a5708c9ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29464
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Update-Note: SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(SSL3_VERSION) now fails.
SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 is now zero. Internal SSL3-specific "AEAD"s are gone.
Change-Id: I34edb160be40a5eea3e2e0fdea562c6e2adda229
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29444
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Update-Note: This tweaks the SSL_shutdown behavior. OpenSSL's original
SSL_shutdown behavior was an incoherent mix of discarding the record and
rejecting it (it would return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL but retrying the
operation would discard it). SSLeay appears to have intended to discard
it, so we previously "fixed" it actually discard.
However, this behavior is somewhat bizarre and means we skip over
unbounded data, which we typically try to avoid. If you are trying to
cleanly shutdown the TLS portion of your protocol, surely it is at a
point where additional data is a syntax error. I suspect I originally
did not realize that, because the discarded record did not properly
continue the loop, SSL_shutdown would appear as if it rejected the data,
and so it's unlikely anyone was relying on that behavior.
Discussion in https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6340 suggests
(some of) upstream also prefers rejecting.
Change-Id: Icde419049306ed17eb06ce1a7e1ff587901166f3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28864
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
This change adds server-side support for compressed certificates.
(Although some definitions for client-side support are included in the
headers, there's no code behind them yet.)
Change-Id: I0f98abf0b782b7337ddd014c58e19e6b8cc5a3c2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27964
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We have a successful TLS 1.3 deployment, in spite of non-compliant
middleboxes everywhere, so now let's get this optimization in. It would
have been nice to test with this from the beginning, but sadly we forgot
about it. Ah well. This shaves 63 bytes off the server's first flight,
and then another 21 bytes off the pair of NewSessionTickets.
So we'll more easily notice in case of anything catastrophic, tie this
behavior to draft 28.
Update-Note: This slightly tweaks our draft-28 behavior.
Change-Id: I4f176a919bf7181239d6ebb31e7870f12364e0f9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28744
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Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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If the callback returns an empty ALPN, we forget we negotiated ALPN at
all (bssl::Array does not distinguish null and empty). Empty ALPN
protocols are forbidden anyway, so reject these ahead of time.
Change-Id: I42f1fc4c843bc865e23fb2a2e5d57424b569ee99
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28546
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's conditioned in OpenSSL on client offer, not server accept.
Change-Id: Iae5483a33d9365258446ce0ae34132aeb4a92c66
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28545
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously, we'd omitted OpenSSL's OCSP APIs because they depend on a
complex OCSP mechanism and encourage the the unreliable server behavior
that hampers using OCSP stapling to fix revocation today. (OCSP
responses should not be fetched on-demand on a callback. They should be
managed like other server credentials and refreshed eagerly, so
temporary CA outage does not translate to loss of OCSP.)
But most of the APIs are byte-oriented anyway, so they're easy to
support. Intentionally omit the one that takes a bunch of OCSP_RESPIDs.
The callback is benign on the client (an artifact of OpenSSL reading
OCSP and verifying certificates in the wrong order). On the server, it
encourages unreliability, but pyOpenSSL/cryptography.io depends on this.
Dcument that this is only for compatibility with legacy software.
Also tweak a few things for compatilibility. cryptography.io expects
SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead to return something, SSL_get_server_tmp_key's
signature was wrong, and cryptography.io tries to redefine
SSL_get_server_tmp_key if SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY is missing.
Change-Id: I2f99711783456bfb7324e9ad972510be8a95e845
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28404
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Update-Note: Enabling TLS 1.3 now enables both draft-23 and draft-28
by default, in preparation for cycling all to draft-28.
Change-Id: I9405f39081f2e5f7049aaae8a9c85399f21df047
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28304
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We forgot to do this in our original implementation on general ecosystem
grounds. It's also mandated starting draft-26.
Just to avoid unnecessary turbulence, since draft-23 is doomed to die
anyway, condition this on our draft-28 implementation. (We don't support
24 through 27.)
We'd actually checked this already on the Go side, but the spec wants a
different alert.
Change-Id: I0014cda03d7129df0b48de077e45f8ae9fd16976
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28124
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
All CBC ciphers in TLS are broken and insecure. TLS 1.2 introduced
AEAD-based ciphers which avoid their many problems. It also introduced
new CBC ciphers based on HMAC-SHA256 and HMAC-SHA384 that share the same
flaws as the original HMAC-SHA1 ones. These serve no purpose. Old
clients don't support them, they have the highest overhead of all TLS
ciphers, and new clients can use AEADs anyway.
Remove them from libssl. This is the smaller, more easily reverted
portion of the removal. If it survives a week or so, we can unwind a lot
more code elsewhere in libcrypto. This removal will allow us to clear
some indirect calls from crypto/cipher_extra/tls_cbc.c, aligning with
the recommendations here:
https://github.com/HACS-workshop/spectre-mitigations/blob/master/crypto_guidelines.md#2-avoid-indirect-branches-in-constant-time-code
Update-Note: The following cipher suites are removed:
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
Change-Id: I7ade0fc1fa2464626560d156659893899aab6f77
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27944
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Chrome needs to support renegotiation at TLS 1.2 + HTTP/1.1, but we're
free to shed the handshake configuration at TLS 1.3 or HTTP/2.
Rather than making config shedding implicitly disable renegotiation,
make the actual shedding dependent on a combination of the two settings.
If config shedding is enabled, but so is renegotiation (including
whether we are a client, etc.), leave the config around. If the
renegotiation setting gets disabled again after the handshake,
re-evaluate and shed the config then.
Bug: 123
Change-Id: Ie833f413b3f15b8f0ede617991e3fef239d4a323
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27904
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
|SSL_CONFIG| is a container for bits of configuration that are
unneeded after the handshake completes. By default it is retained for
the life of the |SSL|, but it may be shed at the caller's option by
calling SSL_set_shed_handshake_config(). This is incompatible with
renegotiation, and with SSL_clear().
|SSL_CONFIG| is reachable by |ssl->config| and by |hs->config|. The
latter is always non-NULL. To avoid null checks, I've changed the
signature of a number of functions from |SSL*| arguments to
|SSL_HANDSHAKE*| arguments.
When configuration has been shed, setters that touch |SSL_CONFIG|
return an error value if that is possible. Setters that return |void|
do nothing.
Getters that request |SSL_CONFIG| values will fail with an |assert| if
the configuration has been shed. When asserts are compiled out, they
will return an error value.
The aim of this commit is to simplify analysis of split-handshakes by
making it obvious that some bits of state have no effects beyond the
handshake. It also cuts down on memory usage.
Of note: |SSL_CTX| is still reachable after the configuration has been
shed, and a couple things need to be retained only for the sake of
post-handshake hooks. Perhaps these can be fixed in time.
Change-Id: Idf09642e0518945b81a1e9fcd7331cc9cf7cc2d6
Bug: 123
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27644
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This is prefactoring for a coming change to the shim that will write
handoff and handback messages (which are serialized SSLConnection
objects) to the transcript.
This breaks the slightly tenuous ordering between the runner and the
shim. Fix the runner to wait until the shim has exited before
appending the transcript.
Change-Id: Iae34d28ec1addfe3ec4f3c77008248fe5530687c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27184
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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I don't think this lock is actually needed. If the process exited by the
time we call shim.Process.Kill(), then the test ultimately finished. If
not, wait() will return that the process died by a signal.
Change-Id: I668a86583aba16fd00e0cd05071acc13059a2c42
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27325
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This schism came up in passing again, and I realized we never added a
TLS-level test for this. Fix that.
Change-Id: I10f910bb5a975d6b3b73d99e7412ade35654fddb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27224
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Chrome uses the platform certificate verifier and thus cannot reliably
expect PSS signatures to work in all configurations. Add an API for the
consumer to inform BoringSSL of this ability. We will then adjust our
advertisements accordingly.
Note that, because TLS 1.2 does not have the signature_algorithms_cert
extension, turning off TLS 1.3 and using this API will stop advertising
RSA-PSS. I believe this is the correct behavior given the semantics of
that code point.
The tests check the various combinations here, as well as checking that
the peer never sends signature_algorithms_cert identical to
signature_algorithms.
Bug: 229
Change-Id: I8c33a93efdc9252097e3899425b49548fc42a93a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27488
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Change-Id: I7298c878bd2c8187dbd25903e397e8f0c2575aa4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26846
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
NSS only enables compatibility mode on the server if the client
requested it by way of the session ID. This is slightly off as a client
has no way not to request it when offering a TLS 1.2 session, but it is
in the spec.
So our tests are usable for other stacks, send a fake session ID in the
runner by default. The existing EmptySessionID-TLS13* test asserts that
BoringSSL behaves as we expect it to on empty session IDs too. The
intent is that NSS will disable that test but can otherwise leave the
rest enabled.
Change-Id: I370bf90aba1805c2f6970ceee0d29ecf199f437d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26504
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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On reflection, I think we'll need to note whether dummy PQ padding was
echoed on a given connection. Otherwise measurements in Chrome will be
mixed with cases where people have MITM proxies that ignored the
extension, or possibly Google frontends that haven't been updated.
Therefore this change will be used to filter latency measurements in
Chrome to only include those where the extension was echoed and we'll
measure at levels of 1 byte (for control), 400 bytes, and 1100 bytes.
This also makes it an error if the server didn't echo an extension of
the same length as was sent.
Change-Id: Ib2a0b29cfb8719a75a28f3cf96710c57d88eaa68
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26284
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
In this round, Google servers will echo the extension in order to test
the latency of both parties sending a PQ key-agreement message.
The extension is sent (and echoed) for both full and resumption
handshakes. This is intended to mirror the overhead of TLS 1.3 (even
when using TLS 1.2), as a resumption in TLS 1.3 still does a fresh key
agreement.
Change-Id: I9ad163afac4fd1d916f9c7359ec32994e283abeb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26185
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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We don't advertise compressed coordinates (and point format negotiation
was deprecated in TLS 1.3), so reject them. Both Internet Explorer and
Firefox appear to reject them already.
Later I hope to add an easier to use ECDH API that acts on bytes, not
EC_POINT. This clears the way for that API to only accept uncompressed
coordinates. Compressed coordinates never got deployed over NIST curves,
for better or worse. At this point, there is no sense in changing that
as new protocols should use curve25519.
Change-Id: Id2f1be791ddcf155d596f4eb0b79351766c5cdab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/26024
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
All the patterns need to account for a possible "-Split" version now.
Change-Id: Ie1b38ce10777d61d70a4d5a8bb2d44cdc98e4bfb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25504
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change adds a couple of focused tests to ssl_test.cc, but also
programmically duplicates many runner tests in a split-handshake mode.
Change-Id: I9dafc8a394581e5daf1318722e1015de82117fd9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25388
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I2486dc810ea842c534015fc04917712daa26cfde
Update-Note: Now that tls13_experiment2 is gone, the server should remove the set_tls13_variant call. To avoid further churn, we'll make the server default for future variants to be what we'd like to deploy.
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25104
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This adds support for sending the quic_transport_parameters
(draft-ietf-quic-tls) in ClientHello and EncryptedExtensions, as well as
reading the value sent by the peer.
Bug: boringssl:224
Change-Id: Ied633f557cb13ac87454d634f2bd81ab156f5399
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24464
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Mono's legacy TLS 1.0 stack, as a server, does not implement any form of
resumption, but blindly echos the ClientHello session ID in the
ServerHello for no particularly good reason.
This is invalid, but due to quirks of how our client checked session ID
equality, we only noticed on the second connection, rather than the
first. Flaky failures do no one any good, so break deterministically on
the first connection, when we realize something strange is going on.
Bug: chromium:796910
Change-Id: I1f255e915fcdffeafb80be481f6c0acb3c628846
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25424
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Running can spawn gdb in an xterm, but the default xterm is rather
small. We could have everyone set their .Xdefaults, I presume, to solve
this, but very few people are running the old xterm these days.
Change-Id: I46eb3ff22f292eb44ce8c5124e83f1ab8aef9547
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/24846
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Update-Note: Token Binding can no longer be configured with the custom
extensions API. Instead, use the new built-in implementation. (The
internal repository should be all set.)
Bug: 183
Change-Id: I007523a638dc99582ebd1d177c38619fa7e1ac38
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/20645
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
