BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY keeps the invariant.
(Imported from upstream's a38a159bfcbc94214dda00e0e6b1fc6454a23b78)
Change-Id: I4cb35615d76b77929915e370dbb7fec1455da069
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7214
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This change causes cipher_test to test the EVP cipher interfaces with
various chunk sizes and adds a couple of large tests of GCM. This is
sufficient to uncover the issue that would have been caused by a3d9528e,
had the AVX code been enabled.
Change-Id: I58d4924c0bcd11a0999c24a0fb77fc5eee71130f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7192
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(imported from upstream's 2b80d00e3ac652377ace84c51b53f51a1b7e1ba2)
Change-Id: Iee5a8d85d276033b6ac8bc9ac87e157916a1a29a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7212
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Calling SSL_shutdown while in init previously gave a "1" response,
meaning everything was successfully closed down (even though it
wasn't). Better is to send our close_notify, but fail when trying to
receive one.
The problem with doing a shutdown while in the middle of a handshake
is that once our close_notify is sent we shouldn't really do anything
else (including process handshake/CCS messages) until we've received a
close_notify back from the peer. However the peer might send a CCS
before acting on our close_notify - so we won't be able to read it
because we're not acting on CCS messages!
(Imported from upstream's f73c737c7ac908c5d6407c419769123392a3b0a9)
Change-Id: Iaad5c5e38983456d3697c955522a89919628024b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7207
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
- bugfix: should not treat '--' as invalid domain substring.
- '-' should not be the first letter of a domain
(Imported from upstream's 15debc128ac13420a4eec9b4a66d72f1dfd69126)
Change-Id: Ifd8ff7cef1aab69da5cade8ff8c76c3a723f3838
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7205
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This depends on https://codereview.chromium.org/1730823002/. The bit was only
ever targetted to one (rather old) CPU. Disable NEON on it uniformly, so we
don't have to worry about whether any new NEON code breaks it.
BUG=589200
Change-Id: Icc7d17d634735aca5425fe0a765ec2fba3329326
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7211
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This imports a fix to x86gas.pl from upstream's
a98c648e40ea5158c8ba29b5a70ccc239d426a20. It's needed to get poly1305-x86.pl
working.
Confirmed that this is a no-op for our current assembly files.
Change-Id: I28de1dbf421b29a06147d1aea3ff3659372a78b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7210
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change makes the AEAD and EVP code paths use the same code for
AES-GCM. When AVX instructions are enabled in the assembly this will
allow them to use the stitched AES-GCM implementation.
Note that the stitched implementations are no-ops for small inputs
(smaller than 288 bytes for encryption; smaller than 96 bytes for
decryption). This means that only a handful of test cases with longish
inputs actually test the stitched code.
Change-Id: Iece8003d90448dcac9e0bde1f42ff102ebe1a1c9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7173
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Otherwise we clobber things like -m32.
Change-Id: I9457e4b50dc3063643c31d19c7935276b8a312a1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7209
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See also upstream's 2966c2ec31e81187da3fbbe1499a6aa3acfd355f.
Change-Id: Iad0a0f11accb4fa2bd93667239dd7462f9fdbd7f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7180
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This removes chacha_vec_arm.S and chacha_vec.c in favor of unifying on
upstream's code. Upstream's is faster and this cuts down on the number of
distinct codepaths. Our old scheme also didn't give vectorized code on
Windows or aarch64.
BoringSSL-specific modifications made to the assembly:
- As usual, the shelling out to $CC is replaced with hardcoding $avx. I've
tested up to the AVX2 codepath, so enable it all.
- I've removed the AMD XOP code as I have not tested it.
- As usual, the ARM file need the arm_arch.h include tweaked.
Speed numbers follow. We can hope for further wins on these benchmarks after
importing the Poly1305 assembly.
x86
---
Old:
Did 1422000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000433us (1421384.5 ops/sec): 22.7 MB/s
Did 123000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1003803us (122534.0 ops/sec): 165.4 MB/s
Did 22000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1000282us (21993.8 ops/sec): 180.2 MB/s
Did 1428000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000214us (1427694.5 ops/sec): 22.8 MB/s
Did 124000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1006332us (123219.8 ops/sec): 166.3 MB/s
Did 22000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1020771us (21552.3 ops/sec): 176.6 MB/s
New:
Did 1520000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000567us (1519138.6 ops/sec): 24.3 MB/s
Did 152000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1004216us (151361.9 ops/sec): 204.3 MB/s
Did 31000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1009085us (30720.9 ops/sec): 251.7 MB/s
Did 1797000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000141us (1796746.7 ops/sec): 28.7 MB/s
Did 171000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1003204us (170453.9 ops/sec): 230.1 MB/s
Did 31000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1005349us (30835.1 ops/sec): 252.6 MB/s
x86_64, no AVX2
---
Old:
Did 1782000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000204us (1781636.5 ops/sec): 28.5 MB/s
Did 317000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001579us (316500.2 ops/sec): 427.3 MB/s
Did 62000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1012146us (61256.0 ops/sec): 501.8 MB/s
Did 1778000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000220us (1777608.9 ops/sec): 28.4 MB/s
Did 315000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1002886us (314093.5 ops/sec): 424.0 MB/s
Did 71000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1014606us (69977.9 ops/sec): 573.3 MB/s
New:
Did 1866000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000019us (1865964.5 ops/sec): 29.9 MB/s
Did 399000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001017us (398594.6 ops/sec): 538.1 MB/s
Did 84000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1005645us (83528.5 ops/sec): 684.3 MB/s
Did 1881000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000325us (1880388.9 ops/sec): 30.1 MB/s
Did 404000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000004us (403998.4 ops/sec): 545.4 MB/s
Did 85000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1010048us (84154.4 ops/sec): 689.4 MB/s
x86_64, AVX2
---
Old:
Did 2375000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000282us (2374330.4 ops/sec): 38.0 MB/s
Did 448000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001865us (447166.0 ops/sec): 603.7 MB/s
Did 88000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1005217us (87543.3 ops/sec): 717.2 MB/s
Did 2409000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000188us (2408547.2 ops/sec): 38.5 MB/s
Did 446000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001003us (445553.1 ops/sec): 601.5 MB/s
Did 90000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1006722us (89399.1 ops/sec): 732.4 MB/s
New:
Did 2622000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000266us (2621302.7 ops/sec): 41.9 MB/s
Did 794000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000783us (793378.8 ops/sec): 1071.1 MB/s
Did 173000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1000176us (172969.6 ops/sec): 1417.0 MB/s
Did 2623000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000330us (2622134.7 ops/sec): 42.0 MB/s
Did 783000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000531us (782584.4 ops/sec): 1056.5 MB/s
Did 174000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1000840us (173854.0 ops/sec): 1424.2 MB/s
arm, Nexus 4
---
Old:
Did 388550 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000580us (388324.8 ops/sec): 6.2 MB/s
Did 90000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1003816us (89657.9 ops/sec): 121.0 MB/s
Did 19000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1045750us (18168.8 ops/sec): 148.8 MB/s
Did 398500 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000305us (398378.5 ops/sec): 6.4 MB/s
Did 90500 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000305us (90472.4 ops/sec): 122.1 MB/s
Did 19000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1043278us (18211.8 ops/sec): 149.2 MB/s
New:
Did 424788 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000641us (424515.9 ops/sec): 6.8 MB/s
Did 115000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001526us (114824.8 ops/sec): 155.0 MB/s
Did 27000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1033023us (26136.9 ops/sec): 214.1 MB/s
Did 447750 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000549us (447504.3 ops/sec): 7.2 MB/s
Did 117500 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001923us (117274.5 ops/sec): 158.3 MB/s
Did 27000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1025118us (26338.4 ops/sec): 215.8 MB/s
aarch64, Nexus 6p
(Note we didn't have aarch64 assembly before at all, and still don't have it
for Poly1305. Hopefully once that's added this will be faster than the arm
numbers...)
---
Old:
Did 145040 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1003065us (144596.8 ops/sec): 2.3 MB/s
Did 14000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1042605us (13427.9 ops/sec): 18.1 MB/s
Did 2618 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1093241us (2394.7 ops/sec): 19.6 MB/s
Did 148000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000709us (147895.1 ops/sec): 2.4 MB/s
Did 14000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1047294us (13367.8 ops/sec): 18.0 MB/s
Did 2607 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1090745us (2390.1 ops/sec): 19.6 MB/s
New:
Did 358000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000769us (357724.9 ops/sec): 5.7 MB/s
Did 45000 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1021267us (44062.9 ops/sec): 59.5 MB/s
Did 8591 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1047136us (8204.3 ops/sec): 67.2 MB/s
Did 343000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000489us (342832.4 ops/sec): 5.5 MB/s
Did 44000 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1008326us (43636.7 ops/sec): 58.9 MB/s
Did 8866 ChaCha20-Poly1305-Old (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1083341us (8183.9 ops/sec): 67.0 MB/s
Change-Id: I629fe195d072f2c99e8f947578fad6d70823c4c8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7202
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Most of the OPENSSL_armcap_P accesses in assembly use named constants from
arm_arch.h, but some don't. Consistently use the constants. The dispatch really
should be in C, but in the meantime, make it easier to tell what's going on.
I'll send this patch upstream so we won't be carrying a diff here.
Change-Id: I63c68d2351ea5ce11005813314988e32b6459526
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7203
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They won't be used as-is. This is just to make the diffs easier to see. Taken
from upstream's 4f16039efe3589aa4d63a6f1fab799d0cd9338ca.
Change-Id: I34d8be409f9c8f15b8a6da4b2d98ba3e60aa2210
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7200
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Thanks to Gisle Vanem for pointing out that this code was broken and
could never have compiled. Since it has never worked, and thus has never
been used, remove it.
Change-Id: Ic274eaf187928765a809690eda8d790b79f939a5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7190
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
See OpenSSL df057ea6c8a20e4babc047689507dfafde59ffd6.
Change-Id: Ife10dc13ca335cd51434d7769ff85c6929f10226
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7172
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Currently, we correctly refuse to parse version 0 multi-prime keys, but we
still parse version 1 two-prime keys. Both should be rejected.
I missed an additional clause in the spec originally. It seems otherPrimeInfos
is marked OPTIONAL not because it is actually optional, but because they wanted
the two RSAPrivateKey forms to share one definition. The prose rules following
the definition imply that otherPrimeInfos' presence is entirely determined by
the version:
* version is the version number, for compatibility with future
revisions of this document. It shall be 0 for this version of the
document, unless multi-prime is used, in which case it shall be 1.
Version ::= INTEGER { two-prime(0), multi(1) }
(CONSTRAINED BY
{-- version must be multi if otherPrimeInfos present --})
and:
* otherPrimeInfos contains the information for the additional primes
r_3, ..., r_u, in order. It shall be omitted if version is 0 and
shall contain at least one instance of OtherPrimeInfo if version
is 1.
Change-Id: I458232a2e20ed68fddcc39c4c45333f33441f70b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7143
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
That was probably more complexity than we needed. Nothing uses it
anymore, now that getting to the PKCS#8 logic isn't especially tedious.
Change-Id: I4f0393b1bd75e71664f65e3722c14c483c13c5cf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6867
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
As with SPKI parsers, the intent is make EVP_PKEY capture the key's
constraints in full fidelity, so we'd have to add new types or store the
information in the underlying key object if people introduce variant key
types with weird constraints on them.
Note that because PKCS#8 has a space for arbitrary attributes, this
parser must admit a hole. I'm assuming for now that we don't need an API
that enforces no attributes and just ignore trailing data in the
structure for simplicity.
BUG=499653
Change-Id: I6fc641355e87136c7220f5d7693566d1144a68e8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6866
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Previously, OpenSSL supported many different DSA PKCS#8 encodings. Only
support the standard format. One of the workaround formats (SEQUENCE of
private key and public key) seems to be a workaround for an old Netscape
bug. From inspection, NSS seems to have fixed this from the first open
source commit.
Change-Id: I1e097b675145954b4d7a0bed8733e5a25c25fd8e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7074
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There are all the type-specific serializations rather than something
tagged with a type. i2d_PrivateKey's PKCS#8 codepath was unreachable
because every EVP_PKEY type has an old_priv_encode function.
To prune EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD further, replace i2d_PrivateKey into a
switch case so we don't need to keep old_priv_encode around. This cuts
down on a case of outside modules reaching into crypto/evp method
tables.
Change-Id: I30db2eed836d560056ba9d1425b960d0602c3cf2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6865
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They're only used by a pair of PEM functions, which are never used.
BUG=499653
Change-Id: I89731485c66ca328c634efbdb7e182a917f2a963
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6863
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Many consumers need SPKI support (X.509, TLS, QUIC, WebCrypto), each
with different ways to set signature parameters. SPKIs themselves can
get complex with id-RSASSA-PSS keys which come with various constraints
in the key parameters. This suggests we want a common in-library
representation of an SPKI.
This adds two new functions EVP_parse_public_key and
EVP_marshal_public_key which converts EVP_PKEY to and from SPKI and
implements X509_PUBKEY functions with them. EVP_PKEY seems to have been
intended to be able to express the supported SPKI types with
full-fidelity, so these APIs will continue this.
This means future support for id-RSASSA-PSS would *not* repurpose
EVP_PKEY_RSA. I'm worried about code assuming EVP_PKEY_RSA implies
acting on the RSA* is legal. Instead, it'd add an EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS and
the data pointer would be some (exposed, so the caller may still check
key size, etc.) RSA_PSS_KEY struct. Internally, the EVP_PKEY_CTX
implementation would enforce the key constraints. If RSA_PSS_KEY would
later need its own API, that code would move there, but that seems
unlikely.
Ideally we'd have a 1:1 correspondence with key OID, although we may
have to fudge things if mistakes happen in standardization. (Whether or
not X.509 reuses id-ecPublicKey for Ed25519, we'll give it a separate
EVP_PKEY type.)
DSA parsing hooks are still implemented, missing parameters and all for
now. This isn't any worse than before.
Decoupling from the giant crypto/obj OID table will be a later task.
BUG=522228
Change-Id: I0e3964edf20cb795a18b0991d17e5ca8bce3e28c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6861
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This imports upstream's ea6b07b54c1f8fc2275a121cdda071e2df7bd6c1 along
with a bugfix in 987157f6f63fa70dbeffca3c8bc62f26e9767ff2.
In an SPKI, a DSA key is only an INTEGER, with the group information in
the AlgorithmIdentifier. But a standalone DSAPublicKey is more complex
(and apparently made up by OpenSSL). OpenSSL implemented this with a
write_params boolean and making DSAPublicKey a CHOICE.
Instead, have p_dsa_asn1.c encode an INTEGER directly. d2i_DSAPublicKey
only parses the standalone form. (That code will be replaced later, but
first do this in preparation for rewriting the DSA ASN.1 code.)
Change-Id: I6fbe298d2723b9816806e9c196c724359b9ffd63
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7021
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Functions which lose object reuse and need auditing:
- d2i_ECParameters
- d2i_ECPrivateKey
This adds a handful of bytestring-based APIs to handle EC key
serialization. Deprecate all the old serialization APIs. Notes:
- An EC_KEY has additional state that controls its encoding, enc_flags
and conv_form. conv_form is left alone, but enc_flags in the new API
is an explicit parameter.
- d2i_ECPrivateKey interpreted its T** argument unlike nearly every
other d2i function. This is an explicit EC_GROUP parameter in the new
function.
- The new specified curve code is much stricter and should parse enough
to uniquely identify the curve.
- I've not bothered with a new version of i2d_ECParameters. It just
writes an OID. This may change later when decoupling from the giant
OID table.
- Likewise, I've not bothered with new APIs for the public key since the
EC_POINT APIs should suffice.
- Previously, d2i_ECPrivateKey would not call EC_KEY_check_key and it
was possible for the imported public and private key to mismatch. It
now calls it.
BUG=499653
Change-Id: I30b4dd2841ae76c56ab0e1808360b2628dee0615
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6859
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In c0d9484902, we had to add support for
recognizing specified versions of named curves. I believe the motivation
was an ECPrivateKey encoded by OpenSSL without the EC_KEY's asn1_flag
set to OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE. Annoyingly, it appears OpenSSL's API
defaulted to the specified form while the tool defaulted to the named
form.
Add tests for this at the ECPrivateKey and the PKCS#8 level. The latter
was taken from Chromium's ec_private_key_unittest.cc which was the
original impetus for this.
Change-Id: I53a80c842c3fc9598f2e0ee7bf2d86b2add9e6c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7072
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The function |ge_frombytes_negate_vartime|, as the name suggests,
negates its output. This change converts it to |ge_frombytes_vartime|
and, instead, does the negation explicitly when verifying signatures.
The latter function is more generally useful.
Change-Id: I465f8bdf5edb101a80ab1835909ae0ff41d3e295
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7142
Reviewed-by: Arnar Birgisson <arnarb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
An i2d compatibility function is rather long, so add CBB_finish_i2d for
part of it. It takes a CBB as input so only a 'marshal' function is
needed, rather than a 'to_bytes' one.
Also replace the *inp d2i update pattern with a slightly shorter one.
Change-Id: Ibb41059c9532f6a8ce33460890cc1afe26adc97c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6868
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CBS_asn1_ber_to_der currently uses heuristics because implicitly-tagged
constructed strings in BER are ambiguous with implicitly-tagged sequences. It's
not possible to convert BER to DER without knowing the schema.
Fortunately, implicitly tagged strings don't appear often so instead split the
job up: CBS_asn1_ber_to_der fixes indefinite-length elements and constructed
strings it can see. Implicitly-tagged strings it leaves uncoverted, but they
will only nest one level down (because BER kindly allows one to nest
constructed strings arbitrarily!).
CBS_get_asn1_implicit_string then performs the final concatenation at parse
time. This isn't much more complex and lets us parse BER more accurately and
also reject a number of mis-encoded values (e.g. constructed INTEGERs are not a
thing) we'd previously let through. The downside is the post-conversion parsing
code must be aware of this limitation of CBS_asn1_ber_to_der. Fortunately,
there's only one implicitly-tagged string in our PKCS#12 code.
(In the category of things that really really don't matter, but I had spare
cycles and the old BER converter is weird.)
Change-Id: Iebdd13b08559fa158b308ef83a5bb07bfdf80ae8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7052
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
C has implicit conversion of |void *| to other pointer types so these
casts are unnecessary. Clean them up to make the code easier to read
and to make it easier to find dangerous casts.
Change-Id: I26988a672e8ed4d69c75cfbb284413999b475464
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7102
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
I guess the comment "just a reference" was intended to mean that the
|mod| member is a weak reference to a |BIGNUM| owned by something else.
However, it is actually owned by the |bn_blinding_st|, as one can see
by reading |BN_BLINDING_new| and |BN_BLINDING_free|.
Change-Id: If2a681fc9d9db536170e0efb11fdab93e4f0baba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7112
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
We'd manually marked some of them hidden, but missed some. Do it in the perlasm
driver instead since we will never expose an asm symbol directly. This reduces
some of our divergence from upstream on these files (and indeed we'd
accidentally lose some .hiddens at one point).
BUG=586141
Change-Id: Ie1bfc6f38ba73d33f5c56a8a40c2bf1668562e7e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7140
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The |_ex| versions of these functions are unnecessary because when they
are used, they are always passed |NULL| for |r|, which is what the
non-|_ex| versions do. Just use the non-|_ex| versions instead and
remove the |_ex| versions.
Also, drop the unused flags mechanism.
Change-Id: Ida4cb5a2d4c89d9cd318e06f71867aea98408d0d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7110
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
It is always the case that either |BN_ULLONG| is defined or
|BN_UMULT_LOHI| is defined because |BN_ULLONG| is defined everywhere
except 64-bit MSVC, and BN_UMULT_LOHI is defined for 64-bit MSVC.
Change-Id: I85e5d621458562501af1af65d587c0b8d937ba3b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7044
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
|a_is_minus_3| is calculated in |ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve|, so
the custom |group_init| functions are unnecessary. Just as in
commit 9f1f04f313, it is never the case
that custom parameters are passed to the |group_set_curve| method for
these curves.
Change-Id: I18a38b104bc332e44cc2053c465cf234f4c5163b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7090
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
mul.c is the only file that uses these values.
Change-Id: I50a685cbff0f26357229e742f42e014434e9cebe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7061
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
It is always the case that |BN_ULLONG| is defined or we're building for
64-bit MSVC. Lots of code is trying to handle impossible cases where
neither of those is true.
Change-Id: Ie337adda1dfb453843c6e0999807dfa1afb1ed89
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7043
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This allows much code to be subsequently simplified and removed.
Change-Id: I0ac256957c6eae9f35a70508bd454cb44f3f8653
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7042
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
On failure, CBB_finish doesn't call CBB_cleanup. Also chain more of the ||s
together now that CBB_cleanup after failed CBB_init is legal.
(I don't think this is actually reachable because the CBB is guaranteed to be
flushed by this point.)
Change-Id: Ib16a0a185f15e13675ac2550c5e8e0926ceb7957
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7051
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There was a test for 512 bit orders but not one for 521-bit orders.
Test 521-bit orders instead.
Change-Id: I61a76d02637ca55d8ae21834085311dd84fd870f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7011
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
node.js uses a memory BIO in the wrong mode which, for now, we work
around. It also passes in NULL (rather than empty) strings and a
non-NULL out-arg for |d2i_PKCS12_bio|.
Change-Id: Ib565b4a202775bb32fdcb76db8a4e8c54268c052
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7012
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This slightly simplifies the SSL_ECDH code and will be useful later on
in reimplementing the key parsing logic.
Change-Id: Ie41ea5fd3a9a734b3879b715fbf57bd991e23799
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6858
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change acb24518 renamed some functions, but there were some dangling
references in bn_test.c. Thanks to Brian Smith for noticing.
This change has no semantic effect.
Change-Id: Id149505090566583834be3abce2cee28b8c248e2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7040
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is CVE-2016-0701 for OpenSSL, reported by Antonio Sanso. It is a no-op for
us as we'd long removed SSL_OP_DH_SINGLE_USE and static DH cipher suites. (We
also do not parse or generate X9.42 DH parameters.)
However, we do still have the APIs which return RFC 5114 groups, so we should
perform the necessary checks in case later consumers reuse keys.
Unlike groups we generate, RFC 5114 groups do not use "safe primes" and have
many small subgroups. In those cases, the subprime q is available. Before using
a public key, ensure its order is q by checking y^q = 1 (mod p). (q is assumed
to be prime and the existing range checks ensure y is not 1.)
(Imported from upstream's 878e2c5b13010329c203f309ed0c8f2113f85648 and
75374adf8a6ff69d6718952121875a491ed2cd29, but with some bugs fixed. See
RT4278.)
Change-Id: Ib18c3e84819002fa36a127ac12ca00ee33ea018a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7001
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Add guards for the architecture and OPENSSL_NO_ASM to
the assembly-language files in crypto/curve25519/asm.
The Dart compilation of BoringSSL includes all files,
because the architecture is not known when gyp is run.
Change-Id: I66f5ae525266b63b0fe3a929012b771d545779b5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7030
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The |inline| must appear before the type.
Change-Id: Iecebbcc50024a846d7804228a858acfc33d68efd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7010
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Finally, we can stick ScopedFOO in containers.
Change-Id: I3ed166575822af9f182e8be8f4db723e1f08ea31
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6553
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Although RFC 3279 allows both, per RFC 5912, keys must use a named curve
rather than spelling out the curve parameters. Although we do not allow
arbitrary curves, we do have to (pretty hackishly) recognize built-in
curves in ECPrivateKeys.
It seems the cause of this was that OpenSSL, unless you set asn1_flag on
the EC_GROUP, likes to encode keys by spelling out the parameters. This
is in violation of RFC 5915, though probably not in violation of one of
the other redundant ECC specifications. For more fun, it appears
asn1_flag defaults to *off* in the API and *on* in the command-line
tools.
I think the original cause was these defaults meant the pre-BoringSSL
Android/OpenSSL Chromium port wrote out Channel ID keys in this format.
By now this should no longer by an issue, but it'll warrant a bit more
investigation to be sure we can drop it.
For now, keep this logic out of SPKIs by not calling d2i_ECParameters.
d2i_ECParameters is a fairly pointless function when only named curves
are allowed. In testing other implementations, none of Firefox, Safari,
or IE11/Win will parse such certificates (i.e. the error is fatal and
unbypassable). Likewise, because Mac and Windows' underlying libraries
reject this, Chrome on Mac and Windows already rejects such things. Thus
this change should be compatible.
The following is the certificate and key I constructed to test with:
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIICwjCCAmqgAwIBAgIJANlMBNpJfb/rMAkGByqGSM49BAEwRTELMAkGA1UEBhMC
QVUxEzARBgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdpZGdp
dHMgUHR5IEx0ZDAeFw0xNDA0MjMyMzIxNTdaFw0xNDA1MjMyMzIxNTdaMEUxCzAJ
BgNVBAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5l
dCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQwggFLMIIBAwYHKoZIzj0CATCB9wIBATAsBgcqhkjO
PQEBAiEA/////wAAAAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAD///////////////8wWwQg/////wAA
AAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAD///////////////wEIFrGNdiqOpPns+u9VXaYhrxlHQaw
zFOw9jvOPD4n0mBLAxUAxJ02CIbnBJNqZnjhE50mt4GffpAEQQRrF9Hy4SxCR/i8
5uVjpEDydwN9gS3rM6D0oTlF2JjClk/jQuL+Gn+bjufrSnwPnhYrzjNXazFezsu2
QGg3v1H1AiEA/////wAAAAD//////////7zm+q2nF56E87nKwvxjJVECAQEDQgAE
5itp4r9ln5e+Lx4NlIpM1Zdrt6keDUb73ampHp3culoB59aXqAoY+cPEox5W4nyD
SNsWGhz1HX7xlC1Lz3IiwaNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFKuE0qyrlfCCThZ4B1VXX+Qm
jYLRMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFKuE0qyrlfCCThZ4B1VXX+QmjYLRMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMB
Af8wCQYHKoZIzj0EAQNHADBEAiBATB6aVJxDD6YAxEM4vf6Sbg2Ty334ldXpkNwc
TF+SngIgZ/f59kgDLf6YA04iLw1fUv5Wf1nLYJWwgrRFON5+zvw=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN EC PARAMETERS-----
MIH3AgEBMCwGByqGSM49AQECIQD/////AAAAAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAP//////////
/////zBbBCD/////AAAAAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAP///////////////AQgWsY12Ko6
k+ez671VdpiGvGUdBrDMU7D2O848PifSYEsDFQDEnTYIhucEk2pmeOETnSa3gZ9+
kARBBGsX0fLhLEJH+Lzm5WOkQPJ3A32BLeszoPShOUXYmMKWT+NC4v4af5uO5+tK
fA+eFivOM1drMV7Oy7ZAaDe/UfUCIQD/////AAAAAP//////////vOb6racXnoTz
ucrC/GMlUQIBAQ==
-----END EC PARAMETERS-----
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIAcPCHJ61KBKnN1ZyU2JaHcItW/JXTB3DujRyc4Ki7RqoAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAE5itp4r9ln5e+Lx4NlIpM1Zdrt6keDUb73ampHp3culoB59aXqAoY
+cPEox5W4nyDSNsWGhz1HX7xlC1Lz3IiwQ==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
BUG=522228
Change-Id: I3723411a633dc07c4640027de07500293f8f7913
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6853
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
OpenSSL accepts both OID 2.5.8.1.1 and OID 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 for RSA
public keys. The latter comes from RFC 3279 and is widely implemented.
The former comes from the ITU-T version of X.509. Interestingly,
2.5.8.1.1 actually has a parameter, which OpenSSL ignores:
rsa ALGORITHM ::= {
KeySize
IDENTIFIED BY id-ea-rsa
}
KeySize ::= INTEGER
Remove support for 2.5.8.1.1 completely. In tests with a self-signed
certificate and code inspection:
- IE11 on Win8 does not accept the certificate in a TLS handshake at
all. Such a certificate is fatal and unbypassable. However Microsoft's
libraries do seem to parse it, so Chrome on Windows allows one to
click through the error. I'm guessing either the X.509 stack accepts
it while the TLS stack doesn't recognize it as RSA or the X.509 stack
is able to lightly parse it but not actually understand the key. (The
system certificate UI didn't display it as an RSA key, so probably the
latter?)
- Apple's certificate library on 10.11.2 does not parse the certificate
at all. Both Safari and Chrome on Mac treat it as a fatal and
unbypassable error.
- mozilla::pkix, from code inspection, does not accept such
certificates. However, Firefox does allow clicking through the error.
This is likely a consequence of mozilla::pkix and NSS having different
ASN.1 stacks. I did not test this, but I expect this means Chrome on
Linux also accepts it.
Given IE and Safari's results, it should be safe to simply remove this.
Firefox's data point is weak (perhaps someone is relying on being able
to click-through a self-signed 2.5.8.1.1 certificate), but it does
further ensure no valid certificate could be doing this.
The following is the 2.5.8.1.1 certificate I constructed to test with.
The private key is key.pem from ssl/test/runner:
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
BUG=522228
Change-Id: I031d03c0f53a16cbc749c4a5d8be6efca50dc863
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6852
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Normally this would be pretty scary:
if (...) {
} if (...) {
}
But it's an early return anyway.
Change-Id: I0a8965b5e294d3aaa803be47f4006ea0311c431d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6851
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
It takes ownership of the buffer, so it's not actually const. The
const-ness gets dropped once it transits through EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.
Also compare against INT_MAX explicitly for the overflow check. I'm not sure
whether the casting version is undefined, but comparing against INT_MAX matches
the rest of the codebase when transiting in and out of signed ints.
Change-Id: I131165a4b5f0ebe02c6db3e7e3e0d1af5b771710
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6850
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
It's never used. It's not clear why one would want such a thing.
EVP_PKEY_CTX has no way for callers to register callbacks, which means
there shouldn't be a way for the library to present you an EVP_PKEY_CTX
out-of-context. (Whereas app_data/ex_data makes sense on SSL because of
its numerous callbacks or RSA because of RSA_METHOD.)
Change-Id: I55af537ab101682677af34f6ac1f2c27b5899a89
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6849
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
This removes the last caller of EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters within the
library.
Change-Id: I6af138d364973b18f52baf55c36c50a24a56bd44
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6848
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
foo_init hooks are never implemented. Even upstream never uses them. The
flags member is also never used. We also don't expose paramgen, so
remove it.
Change-Id: I51d9439316c5163520ab7168693c457f33e59417
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6846
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
These are never called. Group parameters are not secret anyway. This is
a remnant of upstream's EC_GROUP_clear_free.
Change-Id: I23a4076eae8e4561abddbe74d0ba72641532f229
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6823
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
There's many ways to serialize a BIGNUM, so not including asn1 in the name is
confusing (and collides with BN_bn2cbb_padded). Since BN_asn12bn looks
ridiculous, match the parse/marshal naming scheme of other modules instead.
Change-Id: I53d22ae0537a98e223ed943e943c48cb0743cf51
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6822
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
The code was using `#define INLINE` instead, but we have `inline` so
use it.
Change-Id: Id05eaec4720061c5d9a7278e20127c2bebcb2495
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6976
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit 75a64c08fc missed one case where
the GCC syntax should have been replaced with |alignas|.
Change-Id: Iebdaa9c9a2c0aff171f0b5d4daac607e351a4b7e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6974
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
The uses of |memcpy| to cast pointer-to-function to pointer-to-data and
back again did not have well-defined semantics. Use a union instead to
avoid the need for such a conversion get well-defined semantics.
Change-Id: I8ee54a83ba75440f7bc78c194eb55e2cf09b05d8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6972
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Casting a pointer-to-non-volatile to pointer-to-volatile can be a no-op
as the compiler only requires volatile semantics when the pointed-to
object is a volatile object and there are no pointers-to-non-volatile
involved. This probably doesn't matter unless building with the MSVC
-volatile:iso flag, and maybe not even then, but it is good practice
anyway.
Change-Id: I94900d3dc61de3b8ce2ddecab2811907a9a7adbf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6973
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Division isn't constant-time on Intel chips so the code was adding a
large multiple of md_size to try and force the operation to always take
the maximum amount of time.
I'm less convinced, these days, that compilers aren't going to get smart
enough to optimise that away so use Barrett reduction instead.
Change-Id: Ib8c514192682a2fcb4b1fb7e7c6dd1301d9888d0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6906
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
node.js is, effectively, another bindings library. However, it's better
written than most and, with these changes, only a couple of tiny fixes
are needed in node.js. Some of these changes are a little depressing
however so we'll need to push node.js to use APIs where possible.
Changes:
∙ Support verify_recover. This is very obscure and the motivation
appears to be https://github.com/nodejs/node/issues/477 – where it's
not clear that anyone understands what it means :(
∙ Add a few, no-op #defines
∙ Add some members to |SSL_CTX| and |SSL| – node.js needs to not
reach into these structs in the future.
∙ Add EC_get_builtin_curves.
∙ Add EVP_[CIPHER|MD]_do_all_sorted – these functions are limited to
decrepit.
Change-Id: I9a3566054260d6c4db9d430beb7c46cc970a9d46
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6952
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Apparently OpenSSL's API is made entirely of initialization functions.
Some external libraries like to initialize with OPENSSL_config instead.
Change-Id: I28efe97fc5eb21309f560c84112b80e947f8bb17
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6981
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
With these stubs, cURL should not need any BoringSSL #ifdefs at all,
except for their OCSP #ifdefs (which can switch to the more generally
useful OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) and the workaround for wincrypt.h macro
collisions. That we intentionally leave to the consumer rather than add
a partial hack that makes the build sensitive to include order.
(I'll send them a patch upstream once this cycles in.)
Change-Id: I815fe67e51e80e9aafa9b91ae68867ca1ff1d623
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6980
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Since the error string logic was rewritten, this hasn't done anything.
Change-Id: Icb73dca65e852bb3c7d04c260d591906ec72c15f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6961
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
MSVC doesn't have stdalign.h and so doesn't support |alignas| in C
code. Define |alignas(x)| as a synonym for |__decltype(align(x))|
instead for it.
This also fixes -Wcast-qual warnings in rsaz_exp.c.
Change-Id: Ifce9031724cb93f5a4aa1f567e7af61b272df9d5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6924
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
After its initial assignment, |e| is immediately reassigned another
value and so the initial assignment from |BN_CTX_get| is useless. If
that were not the case, then the |BN_free(e)| at the end of the
function would be very bad.
Change-Id: Id63a172073501c8ac157db9188a22f55ee36b205
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6951
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This is only for Conscrypt which always calls the pair in succession. (Indeed
it wouldn't make any sense to not call it.) Remove those two APIs and replace
with a single merged API. This way incomplete EC_GROUPs never escape outside
our API boundary and EC_GROUPs may *finally* be made immutable.
Also add a test for this to make sure I didn't mess it up.
Add a temporary BORINGSSL_201512 define to ease the transition for Conscrypt.
Conscrypt requires https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/187801/ before
picking up this change.
Change-Id: I3706c2ceac31ed2313175ba5ee724bd5c74ef6e1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6550
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Fix casts from const to non-const where dropping the constness is
completely unnecessary. The changes to chacha_vec.c don't result in any
changes to chacha_vec_arm.S.
Change-Id: I2f10081fd0e73ff5db746347c5971f263a5221a6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6923
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Fix the signness of the format flag in the |sscanf| call in cpu-intel.c.
Change-Id: I31251d79aa146bf9c78be47020ee83d30864a3d2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6921
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This centralizes the conditional logic into openssl/base.h so that it
doesn't have to be repeated. The name |OPENSSL_PRINTF_FORMAT_FUNC| was
chosen in anticipation of eventually defining an
|OPENSSL_PRINTF_FORMAT_ARG| for MSVC-style parameter annotations.
Change-Id: I273e6eddd209e696dc9f82099008c35b6d477cdb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6909
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Some combination of Chromium's copy of clang and Chromium's Linux sysroot
doesn't like syntax. It complains that "chosen constructor is explicit in
copy-initialization".
Change-Id: Ied6bc17b19421998f926483742510c81f732566b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6930
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change imports the following changes from upstream:
6281abc79623419eae6a64768c478272d5d3a426
dfd3322d72a2d49f597b86dab6f37a8cf0f26dbf
f34b095fab1569d093b639bfcc9a77d6020148ff
21376d8ae310cf0455ca2b73c8e9f77cafeb28dd
25efcb44ac88ab34f60047e16a96c9462fad39c1
56353962e7da7e385c3d577581ccc3015ed6d1dc
39c76ceb2d3e51eaff95e04d6e4448f685718f8d
a3d74afcae435c549de8dbaa219fcb30491c1bfb
These contain the “altchains” functionality which allows OpenSSL to
backtrack when chain building.
Change-Id: I8d4bc2ac67b90091f9d46e7355cae878b4ccf37d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6905
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OpenSSL upstream did a bulk reformat. We still have some files that have
the old OpenSSL style and this makes applying patches to them more
manual, and thus more error-prone, than it should be.
This change is the result of running
util/openssl-format-source -v -c .
in the enumerated directories. A few files were in BoringSSL style and
have not been touched.
This change should be formatting only; no semantic difference.
Change-Id: I75ced2970ae22b9facb930a79798350a09c5111e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6904
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Comment-only change; no functional difference.)
Some code was broken by the |d2i_ECDSA_SIG| change in 87897a8c. It was
passing in a pointer to an existing |ECDSA_SIG| as the first argument
and then simply assuming that the structure would be updated in place.
The comments on the function suggested that this was reasonable.
This change updates the comments that use similar wording to either note
that the function will never update in-place, or else to note that
depending on that is a bad idea for the future.
I've also audited all the uses of these functions that I can find and,
in addition to the one case with |d2i_ECDSA_SIG|, there are several
users of |d2i_PrivateKey| that could become a problem in the future.
I'll try to fix them before it does become an issue.
Change-Id: I769f7b2e0b5308d09ea07dd447e02fc161795071
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6902
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These symbols can show up in lists of large symbols but, so I
understand, these lists might not include the filename path. Thus |base|
as a symbol name is rather unhelpful.
This change renames the two precomputated tables to have slightly more
greppable names.
Change-Id: I77059250cfce4fa9eceb64e260b45db552b63255
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6813
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
rsa_default_encrypt allowed an RSA modulus 8 times larger than the
intended maximum size due to bits vs. bytes confusion.
Further, as |rsa_default_encrypt| got this wrong while
|rsa_default_verify_raw| got it right, factor out the duplicated logic
so that such inconsistencies are less likely to occur.
BUG=576856
Change-Id: Ic842fadcbb3b140d2ba4295793457af2b62d9444
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6900
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Some build systems don't like two targets with the same base name and
the curve25519 code had x25519-x86_64.[Sc].
Change-Id: If8382eb84996d7e75b34b28def57829d93019cff
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6878
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit 2b0180c37fa6ffc48ee40caa831ca398b828e680 attempted to do this but
only hit one of many BN_mod_exp codepaths. Fix remaining variants and
add a test for each method.
Thanks to Hanno Boeck for reporting this issue.
(Imported from upstream's 44e4f5b04b43054571e278381662cebd3f3555e6.)
Change-Id: Ic691b354101c3e9c3565300836fb6d55c6f253ba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6820
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There is some messiness around saving and restoring the CBB, but this is
still significantly clearer.
Note that the BUF_MEM_grow line is gone in favor of a fixed CBB like the
other functions ported thus far. This line was never necessary as
init_buf is initialized to 16k and none of our key exchanges get that
large. (The largest one can get is DHE_RSA. Even so, it'd take a roughly
30k-bit DH group with a 30k-bit RSA key.)
Having such limits and tight assumptions on init_buf's initial size is
poor (but on par for the old code which usually just blindly assumed the
message would not get too large) and the size of the certificate chain
is much less obviously bounded, so those BUF_MEM_grows can't easily go.
My current plan is convert everything but those which legitimately need
BUF_MEM_grow to CBB, then atomically convert the rest, remove init_buf,
and switch everything to non-fixed CBBs. This will hopefully also
simplify async resumption. In the meantime, having a story for
resumption means the future atomic change is smaller and, more
importantly, relieves some complexity budget in the ServerKeyExchange
code for adding Curve25519.
Change-Id: I1de6af9856caaed353453d92a502ba461a938fbd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6770
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This relieves some complexity budget for adding Curve25519 to this
code.
This also adds a BN_bn2cbb_padded helper function since this seems to be a
fairly common need.
Change-Id: Ied0066fdaec9d02659abd6eb1a13f33502c9e198
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6767
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This assembly is in gas syntax so is not built on Windows nor when
OPENSSL_SMALL is defined.
Change-Id: I1050cf1b16350fd4b758e4c463261b30a1b65390
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6782
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These will be needed when we start writing variable-length things to a
CBB.
Change-Id: Ie7b9b140f5f875b43adedc8203ce9d3f4068dfea
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6764
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
A lot of commented-out code we haven't had to put them back, so these
can go now. Also remove the TODO about OAEP having a weird API. The API
is wrong, but upstream's shipped it with the wrong API, so that's what
it is now.
Change-Id: I7da607cf2d877cbede41ccdada31380f812f6dfa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6763
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There was a TODO to remove it once asn1_mac.h was trimmed. This has now
happened. Remove it and reset error codes for crypto/asn1.
Change-Id: Iaf2f3e75741914415372939471b135618910f95d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6761
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx->chain| at the
beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value
of |ctx->untrusted|. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first
call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call
X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets
|ctx->chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase where
|ctx->chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in
X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx->chain| could be
non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs:
1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising
in between.
2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes
the value of |ctx->chain| directly.
With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should
not be supported to allow this.
With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly
crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call
X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail
to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined.
Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx->chain| set to a non NULL value is
likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit
changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if
|ctx->chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we
have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated
documentation.
(Imported from upstream's 692f07c3e0c04180b56febc2feb57cd94395a7a2.)
Change-Id: I971f1a305f12bbf9f4ae955313d5557368f0d374
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6760
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This check was fixed a while ago, but it could have been much simpler.
In the RSA key exchange, the expected size of the output is known, making the
padding check much simpler. There isn't any use in exporting the more general
RSA_message_index_PKCS1_type_2. (Without knowing the expected size, any
integrity check or swap to randomness or other mitigation is basically doomed
to fail.)
Verified with the valgrind uninitialized memory trick that we're still
constant-time.
Also update rsa.h to recommend against using the PKCS#1 v1.5 schemes.
Thanks to Ryan Sleevi for the suggestion.
Change-Id: I4328076b1d2e5e06617dd8907cdaa702635c2651
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6613
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We should reject RSA public keys with exponents of less than 3.
This change also rejects even exponents, although the usefulness
of such a public key is somewhat questionable.
BUG=chromium:541257
Change-Id: I1499e9762ba40a7cf69155d21d55bc210cd6d273
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6710
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OPENSSL_SMALL will still cause the smaller base-point table to be used
and so won't be as fast at signing as the full version, but Ed25519 will
now work in those builds.
Without OPENSSL_SMALL:
Did 20000 Ed25519 key generation operations in 1008347us (19834.4 ops/sec)
Did 20000 Ed25519 signing operations in 1025594us (19500.9 ops/sec)
Did 6138 Ed25519 verify operations in 1001712us (6127.5 ops/sec)
Did 21000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 1019237us (20603.6 ops/sec)
Did 7095 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 1065986us (6655.8 ops/sec)
With (on the same machine):
Did 8415 Ed25519 key generation operations in 1020958us (8242.3 ops/sec)
Did 8952 Ed25519 signing operations in 1077635us (8307.1 ops/sec)
Did 6358 Ed25519 verify operations in 1047533us (6069.5 ops/sec)
Did 6620 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 1008922us (6561.5 ops/sec)
Did 7183 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 1096285us (6552.1 ops/sec)
Change-Id: Ib443c0e2bdfd11e044087e66efd55b651a5667e7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6772
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This removes 16k from a release-mode build of the bssl tool. Now that we've
finished the AEAD refactor, there's no use in keeping this around as a
prototype for "stateful AEADs".
Before:
Did 2264000 RC4-MD5 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000430us (2263026.9 ops/sec): 36.2 MB/s
Did 266000 RC4-MD5 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000984us (265738.5 ops/sec): 358.7 MB/s
Did 50000 RC4-MD5 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1014209us (49299.5 ops/sec): 403.9 MB/s
After:
Did 1895000 RC4-MD5 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000239us (1894547.2 ops/sec): 30.3 MB/s
Did 199000 RC4-MD5 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001361us (198729.5 ops/sec): 268.3 MB/s
Did 39000 RC4-MD5 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1014832us (38430.0 ops/sec): 314.8 MB/s
There is a non-trivial performance hit, but this cipher doesn't matter much and
the stitched mode code reaches into MD5_CTX and RC4_KEY in somewhat unfortunate
ways.
Change-Id: I9ecd28d6afb54e90ce61baecc641742af2ae6269
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6752
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We can reuse the HMAC_CTX that stores the key. The API is kind of unfortunate
as, in principle, it should be possible to do an allocation-averse HMAC with a
shared key on multiple threads at once (EVP_AEAD_CTX is normally logically
const). At some point it may be worth rethinking those APIs somewhat. But
these "stateful AEADs" are already stateful in their EVP_CIPHER_CTX, so this is
fine.
Each cipher was run individually to minimize the effect of other ciphers doing
their mallocs. (Although the cost of a malloc is presumably going to depend a
lot on the malloc implementation and what's happened before in the process, so
take these numbers with a bucket of salt. They vary widely even with the same
arguments.)
Taking malloc out of seal/open also helps with the malloc tests. DTLS currently
cannot distinguish a malloc failure (should be fatal) from a decryption failure
(not fatal), so the malloc tests get stuck. But this doesn't completely get us
there since tls_cbc.c mallocs. This also assumes EVP_CIPHER_CTX, EVP_MD_CTX,
and HMAC_CTX are all clever about reusing their allocations when reset (which
they are).
Before:
Did 1315000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000087us (1314885.6 ops/sec): 21.0 MB/s
Did 181000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1004918us (180114.2 ops/sec): 243.2 MB/s
Did 34000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1024250us (33195.0 ops/sec): 271.9 MB/s
After:
Did 1766000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000319us (1765436.8 ops/sec): 28.2 MB/s
Did 187000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1004002us (186254.6 ops/sec): 251.4 MB/s
Did 35000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1014885us (34486.7 ops/sec): 282.5 MB/s
Before:
Did 391000 DES-EDE3-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000038us (390985.1 ops/sec): 6.3 MB/s
Did 16000 DES-EDE3-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1060226us (15091.1 ops/sec): 20.4 MB/s
Did 2827 DES-EDE3-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1035971us (2728.8 ops/sec): 22.4 MB/s
After:
Did 444000 DES-EDE3-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1001814us (443196.0 ops/sec): 7.1 MB/s
Did 17000 DES-EDE3-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1042535us (16306.4 ops/sec): 22.0 MB/s
Did 2590 DES-EDE3-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1012378us (2558.3 ops/sec): 21.0 MB/s
Before:
Did 1316000 AES-256-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000510us (1315329.2 ops/sec): 21.0 MB/s
Did 157000 AES-256-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1002944us (156539.1 ops/sec): 211.3 MB/s
Did 29000 AES-256-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1030284us (28147.6 ops/sec): 230.6 MB/s
After:
Did 1645000 AES-256-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000313us (1644485.3 ops/sec): 26.3 MB/s
Did 162000 AES-256-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1003060us (161505.8 ops/sec): 218.0 MB/s
Did 36000 AES-256-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1014819us (35474.3 ops/sec): 290.6 MB/s
Before:
Did 1435000 RC4-SHA1 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000245us (1434648.5 ops/sec): 23.0 MB/s
Did 207000 RC4-SHA1 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1004675us (206036.8 ops/sec): 278.1 MB/s
Did 38000 RC4-SHA1 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1022712us (37156.1 ops/sec): 304.4 MB/s
After:
Did 1853000 RC4-SHA1 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000433us (1852198.0 ops/sec): 29.6 MB/s
Did 206000 RC4-SHA1 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1002370us (205512.9 ops/sec): 277.4 MB/s
Did 42000 RC4-SHA1 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1024209us (41007.3 ops/sec): 335.9 MB/s
Change-Id: I0edb89bddf146cf91a8e7a99c56b2278c8f38094
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6751
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There were a couple more asm lines to turn into __asm__ when the patches got
reordered slightly.
Change-Id: I44be5caee6d09bb3db5dea4791592b12d175822c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6741
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The consumers have all been updated, so we can move EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305
to its final state. Unfortunately, the _rfc7539-suffixed version will need to
stick around for just a hair longer. Also the tls1.h macros, but the remaining
consumers are okay with that changing underneath them.
Change-Id: Ibbb70ec1860d6ac6a7e1d7b45e70fe692bf5ebe5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6600
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6101 was mismerged from *ring* and
lost some tests. Also add the corresponding tag truncation tests for the new
construction. So long as we have that feature, we should have tests for it.
(Although, do we actually need to support it?)
Change-Id: I70784cbac345e0ad11b496102856c53932b7362e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6682
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
clang scan-build is annoyed it's not obvious the sizeof line matches the
pointer type. This is easy to fix and makes it be quiet.
Change-Id: Iec80d2a087f81179c88cae300f56d3f76b32b347
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6701
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than the length of the top-level CBB, which is kind of odd when ASN.1
length prefixes are not yet determined, return the number of bytes written to
the CBB so far. This can be computed without increasing the size of CBB at all.
Have offset and pending_*.
This means functions which take in a CBB as argument will not be sensitive to
whether the CBB is a top-level or child CBB. The extensions logic had to be
careful to only ever compare differences of lengths, which was awkward.
The reversal will also allow for the following pattern in the future, once
CBB_add_space is split into, say, CBB_reserve and CBB_did_write and we add a
CBB_data:
uint8_t *signature;
size_t signature_len = 0;
if (!CBB_add_asn1(out, &cert, CBB_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
/* Emit the TBSCertificate. */
!CBB_add_asn1(&cert, &tbs_cert, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBB_add_tbs_cert_stuff(&tbs_cert, stuff) ||
!CBB_flush(&cert) ||
/* Feed it into md_ctx. */
!EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) ||
!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, CBB_data(&cert), CBB_len(&cert)) ||
/* Emit the signature algorithm. */
!CBB_add_asn1(&cert, &sig_alg, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBB_add_sigalg_stuff(&sig_alg, other_stuff) ||
/* Emit the signature. */
!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, NULL, &signature_len) ||
!CBB_reserve(&cert, &signature, signature_len) ||
!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, signature, &signature_len) ||
!CBB_did_write(&cert, signature_len)) {
goto err;
}
(Were TBSCertificate not the first field, we'd still have to sample
CBB_len(&cert), but at least that's reasonable straight-forward. The
alternative would be if CBB_data and CBB_len somehow worked on
recently-invalidated CBBs, but that would go wrong once the invalidated CBB's
parent flushed and possibly shifts everything.)
And similar for signing ServerKeyExchange.
Change-Id: I7761e492ae472d7632875b5666b6088970261b14
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6681
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I skipped a patch when landing and so 793c21e2 caused a build failure
when platform-specific versions of these macros were used.
Change-Id: I8ed6dbb92a511ef306d45087c3eb87781fdfed31
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6740
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is a remnant from when the headers in include/ where still
symlinks.
Change-Id: Ice27c412c0cdcc43312f5297119678091dcd5d38
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6670
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's only used in one file. No sense in polluting the namespace here.
Change-Id: Iaf3870a4be2d2cad950f4d080e25fe7f0d3929c7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6660
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Nothing ever uses the return value. It'd be better off discarding it rather
than make callers stick (void) everywhere.
Change-Id: Ia28c970a1e5a27db441e4511249589d74408849b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6653
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The uint32_t likely dates to them using HASH_LONG everywhere. Nothing ever
touches c->data as a uint32_t, only bytes. (Which makes sense seeing as it
stores the partial block.)
Change-Id: I634cb7f2b6306523aa663f8697b7dc92aa491320
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6651
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I would hope any sensible compiler would recognize the rotation. (If
not, we should at least pull this into crypto/internal.h.) Confirmed
that clang at least produces the exact same instructions for
sha256_block_data_order for release + NO_ASM. This is also mostly moot
as SHA-1 and SHA-256 both have assembly versions on x86 that sidestep
most of this.
For the digests, take it out of md32_common.h since it doesn't use the
macro. md32_common.h isn't sure whether it's a multiply-included header
or not. It should be, but it has an #include guard (doesn't quite do
what you'd want) and will get HOST_c2l, etc., confused if one tries to
include it twice.
Change-Id: I1632801de6473ffd2c6557f3412521ec5d6b305c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6650
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Manual tweaks and then clang-formatted again.
Change-Id: I809fdb71b2135343e5c1264dd659b464780fc54a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6649
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We've tweaked it already and upstream's using a different indentation
style now anyway. This is the first of two commits. For verifiability,
this is the output of clang-format with no modifications.
Change-Id: Ia30f20bee0cc8046aedf9ac7106cc4630e8d93e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6648
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
38 error codes have fallen off the list since the last time we did this.
Change-Id: Id7ee30889a5da2f6ab66957fd8e49e97640c8489
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6643
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See also upstream's 06cf881a3a10d5af3c1255c08cfd0c6ddb5f1cc3,
9f040d6decca7930e978784c917f731e5c45e8f0, and
9f6795e7d2d1e35668ad70ba0afc480062be4e2e.
Change-Id: I27d90e382867a5fe988d152b31f8494e001a6a9f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6628
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Avoids bouncing on the lock, but it doesn't really matter since it's all
taking read locks. If we're declaring that callbacks don't get to see
every object being created, they shouldn't see every object being
destroyed.
CRYPTO_dup_ex_data also already had this optimization, though it wasn't
documented.
BUG=391192
Change-Id: I5b8282335112bca3850a7c0168f8bd7f7d4a2d57
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6626
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This callback is never used. The one caller I've ever seen is in Android
code which isn't built with BoringSSL and it was a no-op.
It also doesn't actually make much sense. A callback cannot reasonably
assume that it sees every, say, SSL_CTX created because the index may be
registered after the first SSL_CTX is created. Nor is there any point in
an EX_DATA consumer in one file knowing about an SSL_CTX created in
completely unrelated code.
Replace all the pointers with a typedef to int*. This will ensure code
which passes NULL or 0 continues to compile while breaking code which
passes an actual function.
This simplifies some object creation functions which now needn't worry
about CRYPTO_new_ex_data failing. (Also avoids bouncing on the lock, but
it's taking a read lock, so this doesn't really matter.)
BUG=391192
Change-Id: I02893883c6fa8693682075b7b130aa538a0a1437
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6625
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Remove the custom copy of those helpers.
Change-Id: I810c3ae8dbf7bc0654d3e9fb9900c425d36f64aa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6611
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(Imported from upstream's d88ef40a1e5c81d0d32b4a431e55f5456e678dd2 and
943c4ca62b3f5a160340d57aecb9413407a06e15.)
Change-Id: Idd52aebae6839695be0f3a8a7659adeec6650b98
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6556
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In some cases it would be good to restrict the input range of scalars
given to |EC_METHOD::mul| to be [0, order-1]. This is a first step
towards that goal.
Change-Id: I58a25db06f6c7a68a0ac1fe79794b04f7a173b23
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6562
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
|EC_GROUP_get0_order| doesn't require any heap allocations and never
fails, so it is much more convenient and more efficient for callers to
call.
Change-Id: Ic60f768875e7bc8e74362dacdb5cbbc6957b05a6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6532
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Native Client doesn't support fcntl natively and its default
implemention just returns ENOSYS.
Change-Id: Id8615e2f6f0a75a1140f8efd75afde471ccdf466
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6721
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I messed up and missed that we were carrying a diff on x86_64-mont5.pl. This
was accidentally dropped in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6616.
To confirm the merge is good now, check out at this revision and run:
git diff e701f16bd69b6f251ed537e40364c281e85a63b2^ crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl > /tmp/A
Then in OpenSSL's repository:
git diff d73cc256c8e256c32ed959456101b73ba9842f72^ d73cc256c8e256c32ed959456101b73ba9842f72 crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl > /tmp/B
And confirm the diffs vary in only metadata:
diff -u /tmp/A /tmp/B
--- /tmp/A 2015-12-03 11:53:23.127034998 -0500
+++ /tmp/B 2015-12-03 11:53:53.099314287 -0500
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
-index 38def07..3c5a8fc 100644
+index 388e3c6..64e668f 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
-@@ -1770,6 +1770,15 @@ sqr8x_reduction:
+@@ -1784,6 +1784,15 @@ sqr8x_reduction:
.align 32
.L8x_tail_done:
add (%rdx),%r8 # can this overflow?
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
xor %rax,%rax
neg $carry
-@@ -3116,6 +3125,15 @@ sqrx8x_reduction:
+@@ -3130,6 +3139,15 @@ sqrx8x_reduction:
.align 32
.Lsqrx8x_tail_done:
add 24+8(%rsp),%r8 # can this overflow?
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
mov $carry,%rax # xor %rax,%rax
sub 16+8(%rsp),$carry # mov 16(%rsp),%cf
-@@ -3159,13 +3177,11 @@ my ($rptr,$nptr)=("%rdx","%rbp");
+@@ -3173,13 +3191,11 @@ my ($rptr,$nptr)=("%rdx","%rbp");
my @ri=map("%r$_",(10..13));
my @ni=map("%r$_",(14..15));
$code.=<<___;
Change-Id: I3fb5253783ed82e4831f5bffde75273bd9609c23
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6618
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Avoid seg fault by checking mgf1 parameter is not NULL. This can be
triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack
against a client or a server enabling client authentication.
Thanks to Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG) for discovering this bug.
CVE-2015-3194
(Imported from upstream's c394a488942387246653833359a5c94b5832674e and test
data from 00456fded43eadd4bb94bf675ae4ea5d158a764f.)
Change-Id: Ic97059d42722fd810973ccb0c26c415c4eaae79a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6617
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
When parsing a combined structure pass a flag to the decode routine
so on error a pointer to the parent structure is not zeroed as
this will leak any additional components in the parent.
This can leak memory in any application parsing PKCS#7 or CMS structures.
CVE-2015-3195.
Thanks to Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) for discovering this bug using
libFuzzer.
PR#4131
(Imported from upstream's cc598f321fbac9c04da5766243ed55d55948637d, with test
from our original report. Verified ASan trips up on the test without the fix.)
Change-Id: I007d93f172b2f16bf6845d685d72717ed840276c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6615
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Right now your options are:
- Bounce on a reference and deal with cleanup needlessly.
- Manually check the type tag and peek into the union.
We probably have no hope of opaquifying this struct, but for new code, let's
recommend using this function rather than the more error-prone thing.
Change-Id: I9b39ff95fe4264a3f7d1e0d2894db337aa968f6c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6551
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Some strange toolchains can have an implicit (or explicit) fcntl.h include,
so let's avoid using the name 'open' for local functions. This should not
cause any trouble.
Change-Id: Ie131b5920ac23938013c2c03302b97a7418c7180
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6540
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
