Mostly in comments, but there is one special-case around renegotiation_info
that can now be removed.
Change-Id: I2a9114cbff05e0cfff95fe93270fe42379728012
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Previously we used thread-local state objects in rand.c. However, for
applications with large numbers of threads, this can lead to excessive
memory usage.
This change causes us to maintain a mutex-protected pool of state
objects where the size of the pool equals the maximum concurrency of
|RAND_bytes|. This might lead to state objects bouncing between CPUs
more often, but should help the memory usage problem.
Change-Id: Ie83763d3bc139e64ac17bf7e015ad082b2f8a81a
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lh_FOO_retrieve is often called with a dummy instance of FOO that has
only a few fields filled in. This works fine for C, but a C++
SSL_SESSION with destructors is a bit more of a nuisance here.
Instead, teach LHASH to allow queries by some external key type. This
avoids stack-allocating SSL_SESSION. Along the way, fix the
make_macros.sh script.
Change-Id: Ie0b482d4ffe1027049d49db63274c7c17f9398fa
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bssl::UniquePtr and FOO_up_ref do not play well together. Add a helper
to simplify this. This allows us to write things like:
foo->cert = UpRef(bar->cert);
instead of:
if (bar->cert) {
X509_up_ref(bar->cert.get());
}
foo->cert.reset(bar->cert.get());
This also plays well with PushToStack. To append something to a stack
while taking a reference, it's just:
PushToStack(certs, UpRef(cert))
Change-Id: I99ae8de22b837588a2d8ffb58f86edc1d03ed46a
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alignas in C++11 is a bit more flexible than
__attribute__((aligned(x))), and we already require C++11 in tests.
Change-Id: If61c35daa5fcaaca5119dcc6808a3e746befc170
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This change moves to the final version of zx_cprng_draw, which cannot
fail. If the syscall would fail, either the operating system terminates
or the kernel kills the userspace process (depending on where the error
comes from).
Change-Id: Iea9563c9f63ea5802e2cde741879fa58c19028f4
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Update-Note: SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(SSL3_VERSION) now fails.
SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 is now zero. Internal SSL3-specific "AEAD"s are gone.
Change-Id: I34edb160be40a5eea3e2e0fdea562c6e2adda229
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The full library is a bit much, but this is enough to appease most of
cryptography.io.
Change-Id: I1bb0d83744c4550d5fe23c5c98cfd7e36b17fcc9
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Right now we're inconsistent about it. If the OPTIONAL container is
missing, we report an error, but if the container is empty, we happily
return nothing. The latter behavior is more convenient for emulating
OpenSSL's PKCS#7 functions.
These are our own functions, so we have some leeway here. Looking
through callers, they appear to handle this fine.
Update-Note: This is a behavior change.
Change-Id: I1321025a64df3054d380003c90e57d9eb95e610f
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CBS_asn1_ber_to_der was a little cumbersome to use. While it, in theory,
allowed callers to consistently advance past the element, no caller
actually did so consistently. Instead they would advance if conversion
happened, and not if it was already DER. For the PKCS7_* functions, this
was even caller-exposed.
Change-Id: I658d265df899bace9ba6616cb465f19c9e6c3534
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Copy of OpenSSL change
80770da39e.
This additionally fixes some bugs which causes time validation to
fail when the current time and certificate timestamp are near the
2050 UTCTime/GeneralizedTime cut-off.
Update-Note: Some invalid X.509 timestamps will be newly rejected.
Change-Id: Ie131c61b6840c85bed974101f0a3188e7649059b
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Previously, delocate.go couldn't handle GOT references and so |stderr|
was a problematic symbol. We can cope with them now, so write FIPS
power-on test and urandom errors to stderr rather than stdout.
Change-Id: If6d7c19ee5f22dcbd74fb01c231500c2e130e6f7
Update-note: resolves internal bug 110102292.
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This change adds an AES-GCM AEAD that enforces nonce uniqueness inside
the FIPS module, like we have for TLS 1.2. While TLS 1.3 has not yet
been mentioned in the FIPS 140 IG, we expect it to be in the next ~12
months and so are preparing for that.
Change-Id: I65a7d8196b08dc0033bdde5c844a73059da13d9e
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I forgot about this file.
Change-Id: Icb98ffe3ed682a80d7a809a4585a5537fed0ba1c
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cryptography.io gets offended if the library supports some OFB sizes but
not others.
Change-Id: I7fc7b12e7820547a82aae84d9418457389a482fe
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The DSA code is deprecated and will, hopefully, be removed in the future.
Nonetheless, this is easy enough to fix. It's the analog of the work we'd
already done for ECDSA.
- Document more clearly that we don't care about the DSA code.
- Use the existing constant-time modular addition function rather than
the ad-hoc code.
- Reduce the digest to satisfy modular operations' invariants. (The
underlying algorithms could accept looser bounds, but we reduce for
simplicity.) There's no particular reason to do this in constant time,
but we have the code for it, so we may as well.
- This additionally adds a missing check that num_bits(q) is a multiple
of 8. We otherwise don't compute the right answer. Verification
already rejected all 160-, 224-, and 256-bit keys, and we only
generate DSA parameters where the length of q matches some hash
function's length, so this is unlikely to cause anyone trouble.
- Use Montgomery reduction to perform the modular multiplication. This
could be optimized to save a couple Montgomery reductions as in ECDSA,
but DSA is deprecated, so I haven't bothered optimizing this.
- The reduction from g^k (mod p) to r = g^k (mod p) (mod q) is left
in variable time, but reversing it would require a discrete log
anyway. (The corresponding ECDSA operation is much easier to make
constant-time due to Hasse's theorem, though that's actually still a
TODO. I need to finish lifting EC_FELEM up the stack.)
Thanks to Keegan Ryan from NCC Group for reporting the modular addition issue
(CVE-2018-0495). The remainder is stuff I noticed along the way.
Update-Note: See the num_bits(q) change.
Change-Id: I4f032b041e2aeb09f9737a39f178c24e6a7fa1cb
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Although the original value of tmp does not matter, the selects
ultimately do bit operations on the uninitialized values and thus depend
on them behaving like *some* consistent concrete value. The C spec
appears to allow uninitialized values to resolve to trap
representations, which means this isn't quite valid..
(If I'm reading it wrong and the compiler must behave as if there were a
consistent value in there, it's probably fine, but there's no sense in
risking compiler bugs on a subtle corner of things.)
Change-Id: Id4547b0ec702414b387e906c4de55595e6214ddb
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This version doesn't have short reads. We'll eventually rename the
syscall back to zx_cprng_draw once all the clients have migrated to the
new semantics.
Change-Id: I7a7f6751e4d85dcc9b0a03a533dd93f3cbee277f
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This is so they're exposed out of cryptography.io.
Change-Id: I225a35605ae8f3da091e95241ce072eeeabcd855
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(This upstreams a change that was landed internally.)
Change-Id: Ic32793f8b1ae2d03e8ccbb0a9ac5f62add4c295b
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Update-Note: This tweaks the SSL_shutdown behavior. OpenSSL's original
SSL_shutdown behavior was an incoherent mix of discarding the record and
rejecting it (it would return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL but retrying the
operation would discard it). SSLeay appears to have intended to discard
it, so we previously "fixed" it actually discard.
However, this behavior is somewhat bizarre and means we skip over
unbounded data, which we typically try to avoid. If you are trying to
cleanly shutdown the TLS portion of your protocol, surely it is at a
point where additional data is a syntax error. I suspect I originally
did not realize that, because the discarded record did not properly
continue the loop, SSL_shutdown would appear as if it rejected the data,
and so it's unlikely anyone was relying on that behavior.
Discussion in https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6340 suggests
(some of) upstream also prefers rejecting.
Change-Id: Icde419049306ed17eb06ce1a7e1ff587901166f3
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The STL already came up with a threading abstraction for us. If this
sticks, that also means we can more easily write tests elsewhere that
use threads. (A test that makes a bunch of TLS connections on a shared
SSL_CTX run under TSan would be nice. Likewise with some of the messy
RSA locking.)
Update-Note: This adds a dependency from crypto_test to C++11 threads.
Hopefully it doesn't cause issues.
Change-Id: I26f89f6b3b79240e516017877d06fd9a815fc315
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When building files separately, omitting this causes some #defines to be
missing.
Change-Id: I235231467d3f51ee0a53325698356aefa72c6a67
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This matches the OpenSSL 1.1.0 spelling. I'd thought we could hide
SSL_SESSION this pass, but I missed one test that messed with session
IDs!
Bug: 6
Change-Id: I84ea113353eb0eaa2b06b68dec71cb9061c047ca
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In neither OpenSSL nor BoringSSL can this function actually fail, but
OpenSSL makes it return one anyway. Match them for compatibility.
Change-Id: I497437321ad9ccc5da738f06cd5b19c467167575
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It appears Chromium still gets upset when two files in a target share a
base name.
Change-Id: I9e6f182d97405e7e70b2bcf8ced7c80ba23edca1
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|alloca| is dangerous and poorly specified, according to any
description of |alloca|. It's also hard for some analysis tools to
reason about.
The code here assumed |alloca| is a macro, which isn't a valid
assumption. Depending on what which headers are included and what
toolchain is being used, |alloca| may or may not be defined as a macro,
and this might change over time if/when toolchains are updated. Or, we
might be doing static analysis and/or dynamic analysis with a different
configuration w.r.t. the availability of |alloca| than production
builds use.
Regardless, the |alloca| code path only kicked in when the inputs are
840 bits or smaller. Since the multi-prime RSA support was removed, for
interesting RSA key sizes the input will be at least 1024 bits and this
code path won't be triggered since powerbufLen will be larger than 3072
bytes in those cases. ECC inversion via Fermat's Little Theorem has its
own constant-time exponentiation so there are no cases where smaller
inputs need to be fast.
The RSAZ code avoids the |OPENSSL_malloc| for 2048-bit RSA keys.
Increasingly the RSAZ code won't be used though, since it will be
skipped over on Broadwell+ CPUs. Generalize the RSAZ stack allocation
to work for non-RSAZ code paths. In order to ensure this doesn't cause
too much stack usage on platforms where RSAZ wasn't already being used,
only do so on x86-64, which already has this large stack size
requirement due to RSAZ.
This change will make it easier to refactor |BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime|
to do that more safely and in a way that's more compatible with various
analysis tools.
This is also a step towards eliminating the |uintptr_t|-based alignment
hack.
Since this change increases the number of times |OPENSSL_free| is
skipped, I've added an explicit |OPENSSL_cleanse| to ensure the
zeroization is done. This should be done regardless of the other changes
here.
Change-Id: I8a161ce2720a26127e85fff7513f394883e50b2e
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Thanks to Brian Smith for pointing this out.
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cryptography.io wants things exposed out of EVP_get_cipherby* including,
sadly, ECB mode.
Change-Id: I9bac46f8ffad1a79d190cee3b0c0686bf540298e
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OpenSSL staples each certificate's friendly name to the X509 with
X509_alias_set1. Mimic this. pyOpenSSL expects to find it there.
Update-Note: We actually parse some attributes now. PKCS#12 files with
malformed ones may not parse.
Change-Id: I3b78958eedf195509cd222ea4f0c884be3753770
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PKCS#12 encodes passwords as NUL-terminated UCS-2, so the empty password
is encoded as {0, 0}. Some implementations use the empty byte array for
"no password". OpenSSL considers a non-NULL password as {0, 0} and a
NULL password as {}. It then, in high-level PKCS#12 parsing code, tries
both options.
Match this behavior to appease pyOpenSSL's tests.
Change-Id: I07ef91d54454b6f2647f86b7eb9b13509b2876d3
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These are tied to OPENSSL_NO_OCSP in upstream but do not actually depend
on most of the OCSP machinery. The CRL invdate extension, in particular,
isn't associated with OCSP at all. cryptography.io gets upset if these
two extensions aren't parseable, and they're tiny.
I do not believe this actually affects anything beyond functions like
X509_get_ext_d2i. In particular, the list of NIDs for the criticality
check is elsewhere.
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Change-Id: Ia24aae31296772e2ddccf78f10a6640da459adf7
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Rather than have plain-C functions, asm functions, and accelerated
functions, just have accelerated and non-accelerated, where the latter
are either provided by assembly or by C code.
Pertinently, this allows Aarch64 to use hardware accel for the basic
|AES_*| functions.
Change-Id: I0003c0c7a43d85a3eee8c8f37697f61a3070dd40
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cryptography.io wants RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02, only used by the
ancient RSA_padding_check_SSLv23 function. Define it but never emit it.
Additionally, it's rather finicky about RSA_R_TOO_LARGE* errors. We
merged them in BoringSSL because having RSA_R_TOO_LARGE,
RSA_R_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, and RSA_R_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE is a
little silly. But since we don't expect well-behaved code to condition
on error codes anyway, perhaps that wasn't worth it. Split them back
up.
Looking through OpenSSL, there is a vague semantic difference:
RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY - Specifically emitted if a digest is
too big for PKCS#1 signing with this key.
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE - You asked me to sign or encrypt a
digest/plaintext, but it's too big for this key.
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS - You gave me an RSA ciphertext or
signature and it is not fully reduced modulo N.
-OR-
The padding functions produced something that isn't reduced, but I
believe this is unreachable outside of RSA_NO_PADDING.
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE - Some low-level padding function was told to copy
a digest/plaintext into some buffer, but the buffer was too small. I
think this is basically unreachable.
-OR-
You asked me to verify a PSS signature, but I didn't need to bother
because the digest/salt parameters you picked were too big.
Update-Note: This depends on cl/196566462.
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gcc-8 complains that struct Test shadows class Test from googletest.
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PyOpenSSL's tests expect all of the outputs to be distinct. OpenSSL also
tends to prefix the return values with strings like "compiler:", so do
something similar.
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cryptography.io depends on this. Specifically, it assumes that any time
a CBC-mode cipher is defined, CMAC is also defined. This is incorrect;
CMAC also requires an irreducible polynomial to represent GF(2^b).
However, one is indeed defined for 64-bit block ciphers such as 3DES.
Import tests from CAVP to test it. I've omitted the 65536-byte inputs
because they're huge and FileTest doesn't like lines that long.
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This was reverted a second time because it ended up always setting the
final argument to CRYPTO_gcm128_init to zero, which disabled some
acceleration of GCM on ≥Haswell. With this update, that argument will be
set to 1 if |aes_hw_*| functions are being used.
Probably this will need to be reverted too for some reason. I'm hoping
to fill the entire git short description with “Revert”.
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Previously, we'd omitted OpenSSL's OCSP APIs because they depend on a
complex OCSP mechanism and encourage the the unreliable server behavior
that hampers using OCSP stapling to fix revocation today. (OCSP
responses should not be fetched on-demand on a callback. They should be
managed like other server credentials and refreshed eagerly, so
temporary CA outage does not translate to loss of OCSP.)
But most of the APIs are byte-oriented anyway, so they're easy to
support. Intentionally omit the one that takes a bunch of OCSP_RESPIDs.
The callback is benign on the client (an artifact of OpenSSL reading
OCSP and verifying certificates in the wrong order). On the server, it
encourages unreliability, but pyOpenSSL/cryptography.io depends on this.
Dcument that this is only for compatibility with legacy software.
Also tweak a few things for compatilibility. cryptography.io expects
SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead to return something, SSL_get_server_tmp_key's
signature was wrong, and cryptography.io tries to redefine
SSL_get_server_tmp_key if SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY is missing.
Change-Id: I2f99711783456bfb7324e9ad972510be8a95e845
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28404
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
Change-Id: I261e0e0ccf82544883c4a2ef5c5dc4a651c0c756
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28329
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
PyOpenSSL calls this function these days. Tested by roundtripping with
ourselves and also manually confirming our output interoperates with
OpenSSL. (For anyone repeating this experiment, the OpenSSL
command-line tool has a bug and does not correctly output friendlyName
attributes with non-ASCII characters. I'll send them a PR to fix this
shortly.)
Between this and the UTF-8 logic earlier, the theme of this patch series
seems to be "implement in C something I last implemented in
JavaScript"...
Change-Id: I258d563498d82998c6bffc6789efeaba36fe3a5e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28328
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is not very useful without PKCS12_create, which a follow-up change
will implement.
Change-Id: I355ccd22a165830911ae189871ab90a6101f42ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28327
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This aligns with OpenSSL 1.1.0's behavior, which deviated from OpenSSL
1.0.2. OpenSSL 1.0.2 effectively assumed input passwords were always
Latin-1.
Update-Note: If anyone was using PKCS#12 passwords with non-ASCII
characters, this changes them from being encoding-confused to hopefully
interpretting "correctly". If this breaks anything, we can add a
fallback to PKCS12_get_key_and_certs/PKCS12_parse, but OpenSSL 1.1.0
does not have such behavior. It only implements a fallback in the
command-line tool, not the APIs.
Change-Id: I0aa92db26077b07a40f85b89f4d3e0f6b0d7be87
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28326
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
