Channel ID for TLS 1.3 uses the same digest construction as
CertificateVerify. This message is signed with the Channel ID key and
put in the same handshake message (with the same format) as in TLS 1.2.
BUG=103
Change-Id: Ia5b2dffe5a39c39db0cecb0aa6bdc328e53accc2
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{sha1, ecdsa} is virtually nonexistent. {sha512, ecdsa} is pointless
when we only accept P-256 and P-384. See Chromium Intent thread here:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/kWwLfeIQIBM/9chGZ40TCQAJ
This tweaks the signature algorithm logic slightly so that sign and
verify preferences are separate.
BUG=chromium:655318
Change-Id: I1097332600dcaa38e62e4dffa0194fb734c6df3f
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This should land in the same group of revisions as the two parent
commits.
Change-Id: Id9d769b890b3308ea70b705e7241c73cb1930ede
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We'll never send cookies, but we'll echo them on request. Implement it
in runner as well and test.
BUG=98
Change-Id: Idd3799f1eaccd52ac42f5e2e5ae07c209318c270
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This was a remnant of the old cipher suite setup.
Change-Id: Ibc79b81200a52d45fbd69b9c04060c38ad4707f5
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We only save them at TLS 1.0 through 1.2. This saves 104 bytes of
per-connection memory.
Change-Id: If397bdc10e40f0194cba01024e0e9857d6b812f0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11571
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Now not only the pointers but also the list itself is released after the
handshake completes.
Change-Id: I8b568147d2d4949b3b0efe58a93905f77a5a4481
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It's weird and makes things more confusing. Only use it for local
preferences as there is a default. Peer preferences can be read
directly. Also simplify the logic for requiring a non-empty peer group
list for ECDHE. The normal logic will give us this for free.
Change-Id: I1916155fe246be988f20cbf0b1728380ec90ff3d
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This function is now only ever called as a client, so there are no peer
preferences to check against. It is also now only called on peer curves,
so it only needs to be compared against local preferences.
Change-Id: I87f5b10cf4fe5fef9a9d60aff36010634192e90c
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These functions are only called once. It ends up being not much code if
just done inline.
Change-Id: Ic432b313a6f7994ff9f51436cffbe0c3686a6c7c
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This releases memory associated with them after the handshake. Note this
changes the behavior of |SSL_get0_certificate_types| and
|SSL_get_client_CA_list| slightly. Both functions now return NULL
outside of the handshake. But they were already documented to return
something undefined when not called at the CertificateRequest.
A survey of callers finds none that would care. (Note
SSL_get_client_CA_list is used both as a getter for the corresponding
server config setter and to report client handshake properties. Only the
latter is affected.) It's also pretty difficult to imagine why a caller
would wish to query this stuff at any other time, and there are clear
benefits to dropping the CA list after the handshake (some servers send
ABSURDLY large lists).
Change-Id: I3ac3b601ff0cfa601881ce77ae33d99bb5327004
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The server acknowledging a non-existent session is a particularly
interesting case since getting it wrong means a NULL crash.
Change-Id: Iabde4955de883595239cfd8e9d84a7711e60a886
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BUG=77
Change-Id: If568412655aae240b072c29d763a5b17bb5ca3f7
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BUG=77
Change-Id: Id8c45e98c4c22cdd437cbba1e9375239e123b261
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This is another case where the specification failed to hammer things
down and OpenSSL messed it up as a result. Also fix the SCT test in TLS
1.3.
Change-Id: I47541670447d1929869e1a39b2d9671a127bfba0
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This function is used by NGINX to enable specific curves for ECDH from a
configuration file. However when building with BoringSSL, since it's not
implmeneted, it falls back to using EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name() wich doesn't
support X25519.
Change-Id: I533df4ef302592c1a9f9fc8880bd85f796ce0ef3
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BUG=106
Change-Id: Iaa12aeb67627f3c22fe4a917c89c646cb3dc1843
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Change-Id: I73f9fd64b46f26978b897409d817b34ec9d93afd
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This GREASEs cipher suites, groups, and extensions. For now, we'll
always place them in a hard-coded position. We can experiment with more
interesting strategies later.
If we add new ciphers and curves, presumably we prefer them over current
ones, so place GREASE values at the front. This prevents implementations
from parsing only the first value and ignoring the rest.
Add two new extensions, one empty and one non-empty. Place the empty one
in front (IBM WebSphere can't handle trailing empty extensions) and the
non-empty one at the end.
Change-Id: If2e009936bc298cedf2a7a593ce7d5d5ddbb841a
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This allows the fuzzer to discover server-side resumption paths by
simply supplying what we'd like the ticket to decrypt to in the clear.
We also have a natural way to get transcripts out of runner. We record
the runner-side transcripts, so all resumption handshakes will replay
the shim-created unencrypted tickets.
BUG=104
Change-Id: Icf9cbf4af520077d38e2c8c2766b6f8bfa3c9ab5
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We'd previously been assuming we'd want to predict P-256 and X25519 but,
on reflection, that's nonsense. Although, today, P-256 is widespread and
X25519 is less so, that's not the right question to ask. Those servers
are all 1.2.
The right question is whether we believe enough servers will get to TLS
1.3 before X25519 to justify wasting 64 bytes on all other connections.
Given that OpenSSL has already shipped X25519 and Microsoft was doing
interop testing on X25519 around when we were shipping it, I think the
answer is no.
Moreover, if we are wrong, it will be easier to go from predicting one
group to two rather than the inverse (provided we send a fake one with
GREASE). I anticipate prediction-miss HelloRetryRequest logic across the
TLS/TCP ecosystem will be largely untested (no one wants to pay an RTT),
so taking a group out of the predicted set will likely be a risky
operation.
Only predicting one group also makes things a bit simpler. I haven't
done this here, but we'll be able to fold the 1.2 and 1.3 ecdh_ctx's
together, even.
Change-Id: Ie7e42d3105aca48eb9d97e2e05a16c5379aa66a3
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Found by libFuzzer and then one more mistake caught by valgrind. Add a
test for this case.
Change-Id: I92773bc1231bafe5fc069e8568d93ac0df4c8acb
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This is in preparation for using the supported_versions extension to
experiment with draft TLS 1.3 versions, since we don't wish to restore
the fallback. With versions begin opaque values, we will want
version_from_wire to reject unknown values, not attempt to preserve
order in some way.
This means ClientHello.version processing needs to be separate code.
That's just written out fully in negotiate_version now. It also means
SSL_set_{min,max}_version will notice invalid inputs which aligns us
better with upstream's versions of those APIs.
This CL doesn't replace ssl->version with an internal-representation
version, though follow work should do it once a couple of changes land
in consumers.
BUG=90
Change-Id: Id2f5e1fa72847c823ee7f082e9e69f55e51ce9da
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This isn't hugely important since the hs object will actually be
released at the end of the handshake, but no sense in holding on to them
longer than needed.
Also release |public_key| when we no longer need it and document what
the fields mean.
Change-Id: If677cb4a915c75405dabe7135205630527afd8bc
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Reason for revert: Right now in TLS 1.3, certificate_auth is exactly
the same as whether we're doing resumption. With the weird reauth
stuff punted to later in the spec, having extra state is just more
room for bugs to creep in.
Original issue's description:
> Determining certificate_auth and key_exchange based on SSL.
>
> This allows us to switch TLS 1.3 to use non-cipher based negotiation
> without needing to use separate functions between 1.3 and below.
>
> BUG=77
>
> Change-Id: I9207e7a6793cb69e8300e2c15afe3548cbf82af2
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>
Change-Id: I240e3ee959ffd1f2481a06eabece3af554d20ffa
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This was done just by grepping for 'size_t i;' and 'size_t j;'. I left
everything in crypto/x509 and friends alone.
There's some instances in gcm.c that are non-trivial and pulled into a
separate CL for ease of review.
Change-Id: I6515804e3097f7e90855f1e7610868ee87117223
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This allows us to switch TLS 1.3 to use non-cipher based negotiation
without needing to use separate functions between 1.3 and below.
BUG=77
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Add a test that RSA-PSS is available in TLS 1.2 by default, both for
signing and verifying. Note that if a custom SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD is
used and it sets signing preferences, it won't use RSA-PSS if it doesn't
know about it. (See *-Sign-Negotiate-* tests.)
Change-Id: I3776a0c95480188a135795f7ebf31f2b0e0626cc
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Changing parameters on renegotiation makes all our APIs confusing. This
one has no reason to change, so lock it down. In particular, our
preference to forbid Token Binding + renego may be overridden at the
IETF, even though it's insane. Loosening it will be a bit less of a
headache if EMS can't change.
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/unbearable/current/msg00690.html
claims that this is already in the specification and enforced by NSS. I
can't find anything to this effect in the specification. It just says
the client MUST disable renegotiation when EMS is missing, which is
wishful thinking. At a glance, NSS doesn't seem to check, though I could
be misunderstanding the code.
Nonetheless, locking this down is a good idea anyway. Accurate or not,
take the email as an implicit endorsement of this from Mozilla.
Change-Id: I236b05991d28bed199763dcf2f47bbfb9d0322d7
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peer_sigalgs should live on SSL_HANDSHAKE. This both releases a little
bit of memory after the handshake is over and also avoids the bug where
the sigalgs get dropped if SSL_set_SSL_CTX is called at a bad time. See
also upstream's 14e14bf6964965d02ce89805d9de867f000095aa.
This only affects consumers using the old SNI callback and not
select_certificate_cb.
Add a test that the SNI callback works as expected. In doing so, add an
SSL_CTX version of the signing preferences API. This is a property of
the cert/key pair (really just the key) and should be tied to that. This
makes it a bit easier to have the regression test work with TLS 1.2 too.
I thought we'd fixed this already, but apparently not... :-/
BUG=95
Change-Id: I75b02fad4059e6aa46c3b05183a07d72880711b3
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None of these extensions may be negotiated in TLS 1.3 and are otherwise
on by default. Make the future QUIC/TLS1.3 ClientHello a hair smaller.
Change-Id: I613c339d95470676c78f21fd29e888b7701692c6
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Apparently we forgot to do this.
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Change-Id: Ie60744761f5aa434a71a998f5ca98a8f8b1c25d5
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However, for now, we will only enable it if TLS 1.3 is offered.
BUG=85
Change-Id: I958ae0adeafee553dbffb966a6fa41f8a81cef96
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Also fix up those tests as they were a little confused. It is always the
shim that signs and has a configured certificate in these tests.
BUG=95
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BUG=75
Change-Id: Ied864cfccbc0e68d71c55c5ab563da27b7253463
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In TLS 1.2 and below, the server is not supposed to echo it, but I just
came across a BigIP server which does. Document this so we know to take
care before trying to flip it in the future.
(It's actually kind of odd that it wasn't allowed to be sent given TLS
1.2 makes supported_groups interact with ECDSA client certificates. Ah
well.)
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The server should not be allowed select a protocol that wasn't
advertised. Callers tend to not really notice and act as if some default
were chosen which is unlikely to work very well.
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It's odd that a function like ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list secretly has side
effects all over the place. This removes the need for the TLS 1.3 code
to re-query the version range, and it removes the requirement that the
RI extension be first.
Change-Id: Ic9af549db3aaa8880f3c591b8a13ba9ae91d6a46
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Between TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3, and the early callback, we've got a lot of
ClientHello parsers. Unify everything on the early callback's parser. As
a side effect, this means we can parse a ClientHello fairly succinctly
from any function which will let us split up ClientHello states where
appropriate.
Change-Id: I2359b75f80926cc7d827570cf33f93029b39e525
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Save a little bit of typing at the call site.
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Change-Id: I057e19a9547a14b3950395db4318eaf0da01ec13
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OpenSSL 1.1.0 added a function to tell if an SSL* is DTLS or not. This
is probably a good idea, especially since SSL_version returns
non-normalized versions.
BUG=91
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We were sending decode_error, but the spec explicitly says (RFC 5246):
unsupported_extension
sent by clients that receive an extended server hello containing
an extension that they did not put in the corresponding client
hello. This message is always fatal.
Also add a test for this when it's a known but unoffered extension. We
actually end up putting these in different codepaths now due to the
custom extensions stuff.
Thanks to Eric Rescorla for pointing this out.
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To prevent configuration/established session confusion, the handshake
session state is separated into the configured session (ssl->session)
and the newly created session (ssl->s3->new_session). Upon conclusion of
the handshake, the finalized session is stored
in (ssl->s3->established_session). During the handshake, any requests
for the session (SSL_get_session) return a non-resumable session, to
prevent resumption of a partially filled session. Sessions should only
be cached upon the completion of the full handshake, using the resulting
established_session. The semantics of accessors on the session are
maintained mid-renego.
Change-Id: I4358aecb71fce4fe14a6746c5af1416a69935078
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8612
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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It really should take a few more parameters and save a bit of
long-winded initialization work.
Change-Id: I2823f0aa82be39914a156323f6f32b470b6d6a3b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8876
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
[Tests added by davidben.]
Change-Id: I0d54a4f8b8fe91b348ff22658d95340cdb48b089
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/8850
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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