/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ /* Undefined in Google code. We've never enabled this workaround * #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG */ #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "../crypto/dh/internal.h" static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) { if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) return(SSLv3_server_method()); else return(NULL); } IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, ssl3_accept, ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method) int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) { BUF_MEM *buf; unsigned long alg_k; unsigned long alg_a; void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; int ret= -1; int new_state,state,skip=0; ERR_clear_error(); ERR_clear_system_error(); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->ctx->info_callback; /* init things to blank */ s->in_handshake++; if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); if (s->cert == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); return(-1); } for (;;) { state=s->state; switch (s->state) { case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: s->renegotiate=1; /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ case SSL_ST_BEFORE: case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: s->server=1; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); if ((s->version>>8) != 3) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { ret= -1; goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { ret= -1; goto end; } s->init_buf=buf; } if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } s->init_num=0; s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) */ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { /* Server attempting to renegotiate with * client that doesn't support secure * renegotiation. */ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); ret = -1; goto end; } else { /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, * we will just send a HelloRequest */ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: s->shutdown=0; ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->init_num=0; ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); break; case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: s->state=SSL_ST_OK; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D: s->shutdown=0; ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); if (ret == PENDING_SESSION) { s->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_SESSION; goto end; } if (ret == CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING) { s->rwstate = SSL_CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING; goto end; } if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->renegotiate = 2; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->hit) { if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; } else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ /* non-RSA PSK or SRP */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) /* Among PSK ciphersuites only RSA_PSK uses server certificate */ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA))) { ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->tlsext_status_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; } else { skip = 1; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; } s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; /* clear this, it may get reset by * send_server_key_exchange */ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) ) /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key * even when forbidden by protocol specs * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to * be able to handle this) */ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; else s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or * RSA but we have a sign only certificate * * PSK: may send PSK identity hints * * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange * message only if the cipher suite is either * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the * server certificate contains the server's * public key for key exchange. */ if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if either: * - PSK identity hint is provided, or * - the key exchange is kEECDH. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK || ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || s->session->psk_identity_hint)) #endif || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ) ) ) ) { ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; } else skip=1; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || /* Don't request a certificate if an obc was presented */ ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) || /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ ((s->session->peer != NULL) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts * and in RFC 2246): */ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && /* ... except when the application insists on verification * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || /* With normal PSK Certificates and * Certificate Requests are omitted */ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { /* no cert request */ skip=1; s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) return -1; } else { s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; #else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; #endif s->init_num=0; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: /* This code originally checked to see if * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO * and then flushed. This caused problems * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING * still exist. So instead we just flush * unconditionally. */ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; } s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (ret == 2) s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; else { if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; } s->init_num=0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; } break; case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (ret == 2) { /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when * the client sends its ECDH pub key in * a certificate, the CertificateVerify * message is not sent. */ s->init_num = 0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT; } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; s->init_num=0; if (!s->session->peer) break; /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer * at this point and digest cached records. */ if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) return -1; } else { int offset=0; int dgst_num; s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; s->init_num=0; /* We need to get hashes here so if there is * a client cert, it can be verified * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify * should be generalized. But it is next step */ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) return -1; for (dgst_num=0; dgst_nums3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) { int dgst_size; s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset])); dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); if (dgst_size < 0) { ret = -1; goto end; } offset+=dgst_size; } } break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; /* we should decide if we expected this one */ ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT: { char next_proto_neg = 0; char channel_id = 0; # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) next_proto_neg = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; # endif channel_id = s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid; s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; if (next_proto_neg) s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; else if (channel_id) s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; break; } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->init_num = 0; if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; break; #endif case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B: ret=ssl3_get_channel_id(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->init_num = 0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->hit) s->state=SSL_ST_OK; else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; /* If this is a full handshake with ChannelID then * record the hashshake hashes in |s->session| in case * we need them to verify a ChannelID signature on a * resumption of this session in the future. */ if (!s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) { ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; } s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; s->init_num=0; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { ret= -1; goto end; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; if (s->hit) s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_POST_CLIENT_CERT; else s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL_ST_OK: /* clean a few things up */ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf=NULL; /* remove buffering on output */ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); s->init_num=0; /* If we aren't retaining peer certificates then we can * discard it now. */ if (s->session->peer && s->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) { X509_free(s->session->peer); s->session->peer = NULL; } if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ { s->renegotiate=0; s->new_session=0; ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; /* s->server=1; */ s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); } ret = 1; goto end; /* break; */ default: OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_accept, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret= -1; goto end; /* break; */ } if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { if (s->debug) { if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) goto end; } if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { new_state=s->state; s->state=state; cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); s->state=new_state; } } skip=0; } end: /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ s->in_handshake--; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); return(ret); } int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) { if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0); s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); } int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) { int ok; long n; /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, * so permit appropriate message length */ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per * negotiation. */ if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_check_client_hello, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); return -1; } /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; } #endif s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; return 2; } return 1; } int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) { int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1; unsigned int cookie_len; long n; unsigned long id; unsigned char *p,*d; SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; struct ssl_early_callback_ctx early_ctx; CBS cbs; /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, * This down switching should be handled by a different method. * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with * TLSv1. */ switch (s->state) { case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; /* fallthrough */ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: s->first_packet=1; n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); s->first_packet=0; /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't * contain one, just return since we do not want to * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... */ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; p = (unsigned char *) s->init_msg; if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) return 1; session_length = *(p + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 + session_length) return 1; cookie_length = *(p + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 + session_length); if (cookie_length == 0) return 1; } s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; /* fallthrough */ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D: /* We have previously parsed the ClientHello message, * and can't call ssl_get_message again without hashing * the message into the Finished digest again. */ n = s->init_num; memset(&early_ctx, 0, sizeof(early_ctx)); early_ctx.ssl = s; early_ctx.client_hello = s->init_msg; early_ctx.client_hello_len = n; if (!ssl_early_callback_init(&early_ctx)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_PARSE_FAILED); goto f_err; } if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && s->ctx->select_certificate_cb != NULL) { int ret; s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D; ret = s->ctx->select_certificate_cb(&early_ctx); if (ret == 0) return CERTIFICATE_SELECTION_PENDING; else if (ret == -1) { /* Connection rejected. */ al = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED); goto f_err; } } s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D; break; default: OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); return -1; } d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; p+=2; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version && s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) : (s->client_version < s->version)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ s->version = s->client_version; } al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } /* load the client random */ memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* get the session-id */ j= *(p++); s->hit=0; /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation. * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security * won't even compile against older library versions). * * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers, * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION * setting will be ignored. */ if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) goto err; } else { i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, &early_ctx); if (i == 1) { /* previous session */ s->hit=1; } else if (i == -1) goto err; else if (i == PENDING_SESSION) { ret = PENDING_SESSION; goto err; } else /* i == 0 */ { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) goto err; } } p+=j; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* cookie stuff */ cookie_len = *(p++); /* * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it * does not cause an overflow. */ if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) { /* too much data */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) { memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* else cookie verification succeeded */ } else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */ { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */ ret = -2; } p += cookie_len; if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { /* Select version to use */ if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) { s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method(); } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); s->version = s->client_version; al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) { s->version = DTLS1_VERSION; s->method = DTLSv1_server_method(); } else { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); s->version = s->client_version; al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } s->session->ssl_version = s->version; } } n2s(p,i); if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) { /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); goto f_err; } if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) { /* not enough data */ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers)) == NULL)) { goto err; } p+=i; /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) { j=0; id=s->session->cipher->id; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers)); #endif for (i=0; iid == id) { j=1; break; } } /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade * attack: CVE-2010-4180. */ #if 0 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) { /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not * enabled, though. */ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) { s->session->cipher = c; j = 1; } } #endif if (j == 0) { /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher * list if we are asked to reuse it */ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); goto f_err; } } /* compression */ i= *(p++); if ((p+i) > (d+n)) { /* not enough data */ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } for (j=0; j= i) { /* no compress */ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); goto f_err; } CBS_init(&cbs, p, d + n - p); /* TLS extensions*/ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &cbs)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); goto err; } } /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */ if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { /* wrong packet length */ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); goto f_err; } /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */ { unsigned char *pos; pos=s->s3->server_random; if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { goto f_err; } } if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { s->hit=1; s->session->ciphers=ciphers; s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK; ciphers=NULL; /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(s)); if (pref_cipher == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } s->session->cipher=pref_cipher; if (s->cipher_list) ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(s->cipher_list); if (s->cipher_list_by_id) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); s->cipher_list = ssl_cipher_preference_list_from_ciphers(s->session->ciphers); s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); } } /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must * pick a cipher */ if (!s->hit) { if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); s->session->ciphers=ciphers; if (ciphers == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); goto f_err; } ciphers=NULL; /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ if (s->cert->cert_cb) { int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); if (rv == 0) { al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); goto f_err; } if (rv < 0) { s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return -1; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; } c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(s)); if (c == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; } else { /* Session-id reuse */ #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL; SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL; if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) { sk=s->session->ciphers; for (i=0; ialgorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) nc=c; if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) ec=c; } if (nc != NULL) s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc; else if (ec != NULL) s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec; else s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; } else #endif s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; } if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) goto f_err; } /* we now have the following setup. * client_random * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers * compression - basically ignored right now * ssl version is set - sslv3 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. * s->hit - session reuse flag * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. */ /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_hello, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } } if (ret < 0) ret=-ret; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); } err: if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); return ret; } int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p,*d; int i,sl; unsigned long l; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { /* We only accept ChannelIDs on connections with ECDHE in order * to avoid a known attack while we fix ChannelID itself. */ if (s->s3 && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kEECDH) == 0) s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; /* If this is a resumption and the original handshake didn't * support ChannelID then we didn't record the original * handshake hashes in the session and so cannot resume with * ChannelIDs. */ if (s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new && s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) { /* Free s->session->ciphers in order to release memory. This * breaks SSL_get_shared_ciphers(), but many servers will * prefer the memory savings. * * It also breaks REUSE_CIPHER_BUG, which is disabled * in our build. */ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); s->session->ciphers = NULL; } buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* Do the message type and length last */ d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s); *(p++)=s->version>>8; *(p++)=s->version&0xff; /* Random stuff */ memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* There are several cases for the session ID to send * back in the server hello: * - For session reuse from the session cache, * we send back the old session ID. * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" * (which doesn't actually identify the session). * - If it is a new session, we send back the new * session ID. * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, * we send back a 0-length session ID. * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed * to send back. */ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) && !s->hit) s->session->session_id_length=0; sl=s->session->session_id_length; if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } *(p++)=sl; memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); p+=sl; /* put the cipher */ i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); p+=i; /* put the compression method */ *(p++)=0; if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); return -1; } if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } /* do the header */ l=(p-d); ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l); s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); } int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) { if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0); s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); } int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { unsigned char *q; int j,num; RSA *rsa; unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned int u; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; int encodedlen = 0; int curve_id = 0; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK const char* psk_identity_hint; size_t psk_identity_hint_len; #endif EVP_PKEY *pkey; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; unsigned char *p,*d; int al,i; unsigned long alg_k; unsigned long alg_a; int n; CERT *cert; BIGNUM *r[4]; int nr[4],kn; BUF_MEM *buf; EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; cert=s->cert; buf=s->init_buf; r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; n=0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { /* size for PSK identity hint */ psk_identity_hint = s->session->psk_identity_hint; if (psk_identity_hint) psk_identity_hint_len = strlen(psk_identity_hint); else psk_identity_hint_len = 0; n+=2+psk_identity_hint_len; } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); if(rsa == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; } RSA_up_ref(rsa); cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; } if (rsa == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; } r[0]=rsa->n; r[1]=rsa->e; s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) { dhp=cert->dh_tmp; if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); if (dhp == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || dhp->priv_key == NULL || (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) { if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } } else { dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } } r[0]=dh->p; r[1]=dh->g; r[2]=dh->pub_key; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { const EC_GROUP *group; ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2); if (nid != NID_undef) ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) { ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); } if (ecdhp == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ if (ecdhp == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) ecdh = ecdhp; else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } } if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); goto err; } /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH * keys over named (not generic) curves. For * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. */ if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) == 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); goto err; } /* Encode the public key. * First check the size of encoding and * allocate memory accordingly. */ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); if (encodedlen == 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. * In this situation, we need four additional bytes * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams * structure. */ n += 4 + encodedlen; /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs */ r[0]=NULL; r[1]=NULL; r[2]=NULL; r[3]=NULL; } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); n+=2+nr[i]; } if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) /* Among PSK ciphersuites only RSA uses a certificate */ && !((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && !(alg_k & SSL_kRSA))) { if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md)) == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); } else { pkey=NULL; kn=0; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_LIB_BUF); goto err; } d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { s2n(nr[i],p); BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); p+=nr[i]; } /* Note: ECDHE PSK ciphersuites use SSL_kEECDH and SSL_aPSK. * When one of them is used, the server key exchange record needs to have both * the psk_identity_hint and the ServerECDHParams. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { /* copy PSK identity hint (if provided) */ s2n(psk_identity_hint_len, p); if (psk_identity_hint_len > 0) { memcpy(p, psk_identity_hint, psk_identity_hint_len); p+=psk_identity_hint_len; } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by * the actual encoded point itself */ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; p += 1; *p = 0; p += 1; *p = curve_id; p += 1; *p = encodedlen; p += 1; memcpy((unsigned char*)p, (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); encodedPoint = NULL; p += encodedlen; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ /* not anonymous */ if (pkey != NULL) { /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) * and p points to the space at the end. */ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { q=md_buf; j=0; for (num=2; num > 0; num--) { EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, (unsigned int *)&i); q+=i; j+=i; } if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_LIB_RSA); goto err; } s2n(u,p); n+=u+2; } else if (md) { /* send signature algorithm */ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { /* Should never happen */ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } p+=2; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n); if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, ERR_LIB_EVP); goto err; } s2n(i,p); n+=i+2; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) n+= 2; } else { /* Is this error check actually needed? */ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); goto f_err; } } ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n); } s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return ssl_do_write(s); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); err: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); #endif EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return(-1); } int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p,*d; int i,j,nl,off,n; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; X509_NAME *name; BUF_MEM *buf; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { buf=s->init_buf; d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s); /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ p++; n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); d[0]=n; p+=n; n++; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { const unsigned char *psigs; nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs); s2n(nl, p); memcpy(p, psigs, nl); p += nl; n += nl + 2; } off=n; p+=2; n+=2; sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); nl=0; if (sk != NULL) { for (i=0; iinit_num + 4)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_certificate_request, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; /* do the header */ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=0; s->init_num += 4; } #endif s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); err: return(-1); } int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { int i,al,ok; long n; unsigned long alg_k; unsigned long alg_a; unsigned char *p; RSA *rsa=NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH BIGNUM *pub=NULL; DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK unsigned int psk_len = 0; unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #endif n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, /* ??? */ &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { unsigned char *t = NULL; unsigned char pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0; int psk_err = 1; char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; n2s(p, i); if (n != i+2 && !(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto psk_err; } if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto psk_err; } if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); goto psk_err; } /* Create guaranteed NUL-terminated identity * string for the callback */ memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i); psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, psk, sizeof(psk)); if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto psk_err; } else if (psk_len == 0) { /* PSK related to the given identity not found */ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; goto psk_err; } if (!(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)) { /* Create the shared secret now if we're not using ECDHE-PSK.*/ pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len; t = pre_ms; s2n(psk_len, t); memset(t, 0, psk_len); t+=psk_len; s2n(psk_len, t); memcpy(t, psk, psk_len); s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, pre_ms, pre_ms_len); } if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(tmp_id); OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1); if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto psk_err; } p += i; n -= (i + 2); psk_err = 0; psk_err: OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, sizeof(pre_ms)); if (psk_err != 0) goto f_err; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ if (0) {} else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; int decrypt_len, decrypt_good_mask; unsigned char version_good; size_t j; /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) { if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp; /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should * be sent already */ if (rsa == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); goto f_err; } } else { pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; if ( (pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); goto f_err; } rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; } /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { n2s(p,i); if (n != i+2) { if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; } else p-=2; } else n=i; } /* Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be * sure that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the * entire size of a premaster secret * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The actual expected size is * larger due to RSA padding, but the bound is sufficient to be * safe. */ if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto f_err; } /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the * case that the decrypt fails. See * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) goto err; decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); ERR_clear_error(); /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. * decrypt_good_mask will be zero if so and non-zero otherwise. */ decrypt_good_mask = decrypt_len ^ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct * then version_good will be zero. The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa * extension of Bleichenbacher's attack * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks * are done in constant time and are treated like any other * decryption error. */ version_good = p[0] ^ (s->client_version>>8); version_good |= p[1] ^ (s->client_version&0xff); /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not * support the requested protocol version. If * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { unsigned char workaround_mask = version_good; unsigned char workaround; /* workaround_mask will be 0xff if version_good is * non-zero (i.e. the version match failed). Otherwise * it'll be 0x00. */ workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 4; workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 2; workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 1; workaround_mask = ~((workaround_mask & 1) - 1); workaround = p[0] ^ (s->version>>8); workaround |= p[1] ^ (s->version&0xff); /* If workaround_mask is 0xff (i.e. there was a version * mismatch) then we copy the value of workaround over * version_good. */ version_good = (workaround & workaround_mask) | (version_good & ~workaround_mask); } /* If any bits in version_good are set then they'll poision * decrypt_good_mask and cause rand_premaster_secret to be * used. */ decrypt_good_mask |= version_good; /* decrypt_good_mask will be zero iff decrypt_len == * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed. We * fold the bottom 32 bits of it with an OR so that the LSB * will be zero iff everything is good. This assumes that we'll * never decrypt a value > 2**31 bytes, which seems safe. */ decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 16; decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 8; decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 4; decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 2; decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 1; /* Now select only the LSB and subtract one. If decrypt_len == * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed then * decrypt_good_mask will be all ones. Otherwise it'll be all * zeros. */ decrypt_good_mask &= 1; decrypt_good_mask--; /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using * decrypt_good_mask. */ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { p[j] = (p[j] & decrypt_good_mask) | (rand_premaster_secret[j] & ~decrypt_good_mask); } s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); OPENSSL_cleanse(p,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) { int idx = -1; EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; if (n) n2s(p,i); else i = 0; if (n && n != i+2) { if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto err; } else { p-=2; i=(int)n; } } if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr) idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd) idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; if (idx >= 0) { skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey; if ((skey == NULL) || (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); goto f_err; } dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh; } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } else dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; if (n == 0L) { /* Get pubkey from cert */ EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); if (clkey) { if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1) dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey); } if (dh_clnt == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } EVP_PKEY_free(clkey); pub = dh_clnt->pub_key; } else pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL); if (pub == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr); if (i <= 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB); BN_clear_free(pub); goto err; } DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; if (dh_clnt) DH_free(dh_clnt); else BN_clear_free(pub); pub=NULL; s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key,p,i); OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); if (dh_clnt) return 2; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) { int ret = 1; int field_size = 0; const EC_KEY *tkey; const EC_GROUP *group; const BIGNUM *priv_key; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK unsigned char *pre_ms; unsigned int pre_ms_len; unsigned char *t; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Let's get server private key and group information */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) { /* use the certificate */ tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; } else { /* use the ephermeral values we saved when * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. */ tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; } group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* Let's get client's public key */ if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (n == 0L) { /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { /* XXX: For now, we do not support client * authentication using ECDH certificates * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is * never executed. When that support is * added, we ought to ensure the key * received in the certificate is * authorized for key agreement. * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that * the two ECDH shares are for the same * group. */ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); goto f_err; } if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ } else { /* Get client's public key from encoded point * in the ClientKeyExchange message. */ if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Get encoded point length */ i = *p; p += 1; if (n != 1 + i) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer * currently, so set it to the start */ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; } /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); if (field_size <= 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); if (i <= 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5489 */ if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && psk_len != 0) { pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+i; pre_ms = OPENSSL_malloc(pre_ms_len); if (pre_ms == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } memset(pre_ms, 0, pre_ms_len); t = pre_ms; s2n(psk_len, t); memcpy(t, psk, psk_len); t += psk_len; s2n(i, t); memcpy(t, p, i); s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \ -> generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, pre_ms, pre_ms_len); OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, pre_ms_len); OPENSSL_free(pre_ms); } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ if (!(alg_a & SSL_aPSK)) { /* Compute the master secret */ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \ -> generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i); } OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); return ret; } #endif else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_GOST_NOT_SUPPORTED); goto err; } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); goto f_err; } return(1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); err: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); #endif return(-1); } int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) { EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; unsigned char *p; int al,ok,ret=0; long n; int type=0,i,j; X509 *peer; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX mctx; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */ &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); if (s->session->peer != NULL) { peer=s->session->peer; pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); } else { peer=NULL; pkey=NULL; } if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } ret=1; goto end; } if (peer == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto f_err; } if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; goto f_err; } if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto f_err; } /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey); if (rv == -1) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } else if (rv == 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif p += 2; n -= 2; } n2s(p,i); n-=2; if (i > n) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { long hdatalen = 0; char *hdata; hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); if (hdatalen <= 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0) { al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.rsa); if (i < 0) { al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); goto f_err; } if (i == 0) { al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); if (j <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); if (j <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_verify, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; goto f_err; } ret=1; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); } end: if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; } EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return(ret); } int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) { int i,ok,al,ret= -1; X509 *x=NULL; unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; const unsigned char *p,*q; unsigned char *d; STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; SHA256_CTX sha256; n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; return(1); } if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } n2l3(p,llen); if (llen+3 != n) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } for (nc=0; nc llen) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (nc == 0 && s->ctx->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs) { /* If this is the first certificate, and we don't want * to keep peer certificates in memory, then we hash it * right away. */ SHA256_Init(&sha256); SHA256_Update(&sha256, p, l); SHA256_Final(s->session->peer_sha256, &sha256); s->session->peer_sha256_valid = 1; } q=p; x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l); if (x == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } if (p != (q+l)) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } x=NULL; nc+=l+3; } if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); goto f_err; } /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } } else { i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); if (i <= 0) { al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); goto f_err; } } if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ X509_free(s->session->peer); s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL * when we arrive here. */ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_client_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ sk=NULL; ret=1; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); } err: if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); return(ret); } int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) { CERT_PKEY *cpk; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); if (cpk == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_server_certificate, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(0); } ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk); s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); } /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) { if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; const unsigned char *const_p; int len, slen_full, slen; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned int hlen; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; HMAC_CTX hctx; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_name[16]; /* get session encoding length */ slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is * too long */ if (slen_full > 0xFF00) return -1; senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); if (!senc) return -1; p = senc; i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */ const_p = senc; sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); if (sess == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(senc); return -1; } sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */ { OPENSSL_free(senc); return -1; } p = senc; i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p); SSL_SESSION_free(sess); /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as * follows handshake_header_length + * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) return -1; p = ssl_handshake_start(s); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present * it does all the work otherwise use generated values * from parent ctx. */ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) { OPENSSL_free(senc); return -1; } } else { RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); } /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity), * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long * as their sessions. */ l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); /* Skip ticket length for now */ p += 2; /* Output key name */ macstart = p; memcpy(p, key_name, 16); p += 16; /* output IV */ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); /* Encrypt session data */ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); p += len; EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &len); p += len; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); p += hlen; /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ /* Total length */ len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s); ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len); /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */ p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4; s2n(len - 6, p); s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; OPENSSL_free(senc); } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ return ssl_do_write(s); } int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) { if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { unsigned char *p; /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) * + (ocsp response) */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) return -1; p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* do the header */ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; /* message length */ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); /* status type */ *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; /* length of OCSP response */ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); /* actual response */ memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; s->init_off = 0; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It * sets the next_proto member in s if found */ int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) { int ok; int proto_len, padding_len; long n; const unsigned char *p; /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the * extension in their ClientHello */ if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_next_proto, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); return -1; } n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, /* See the payload format below */ &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset * by ssl3_get_finished). */ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_next_proto, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); return -1; } if (n < 2) return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; /* The payload looks like: * uint8 proto_len; * uint8 proto[proto_len]; * uint8 padding_len; * uint8 padding[padding_len]; */ proto_len = p[0]; if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) return 0; padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) return 0; s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_next_proto, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; return 1; } # endif /* ssl3_get_channel_id reads and verifies a ClientID handshake message. */ int ssl3_get_channel_id(SSL *s) { int ret = -1, ok; long n; const unsigned char *p; unsigned short extension_type, extension_len; EC_GROUP* p256 = NULL; EC_KEY* key = NULL; EC_POINT* point = NULL; ECDSA_SIG sig; BIGNUM x, y; unsigned short expected_extension_type; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A && s->init_num == 0) { /* The first time that we're called we take the current * handshake hash and store it. */ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; unsigned int len; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL); if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s)) return -1; len = sizeof(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id); EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, &len); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); } n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANNEL_ID_B, SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char*)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4); /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset * by ssl3_get_finished). */ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_GOT_CHANNEL_ID_BEFORE_A_CCS); return -1; } if (n != 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE); return -1; } p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; /* The payload looks like: * uint16 extension_type * uint16 extension_len; * uint8 x[32]; * uint8 y[32]; * uint8 r[32]; * uint8 s[32]; */ n2s(p, extension_type); n2s(p, extension_len); expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id; if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) expected_extension_type = TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new; if (extension_type != expected_extension_type || extension_len != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_INVALID_MESSAGE); return -1; } p256 = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); if (!p256) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT); return -1; } BN_init(&x); BN_init(&y); sig.r = BN_new(); sig.s = BN_new(); if (BN_bin2bn(p + 0, 32, &x) == NULL || BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, &y) == NULL || BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig.r) == NULL || BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig.s) == NULL) goto err; point = EC_POINT_new(p256); if (!point || !EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256, point, &x, &y, NULL)) goto err; key = EC_KEY_new(); if (!key || !EC_KEY_set_group(key, p256) || !EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point)) goto err; /* We stored the handshake hash in |tlsext_channel_id| the first time * that we were called. */ switch (ECDSA_do_verify(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &sig, key)) { case 1: break; case 0: OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_channel_id, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID); s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; goto err; default: s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 0; goto err; } memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_channel_id, p, 64); ret = 1; err: BN_free(&x); BN_free(&y); BN_free(sig.r); BN_free(sig.s); if (key) EC_KEY_free(key); if (point) EC_POINT_free(point); if (p256) EC_GROUP_free(p256); return ret; }