/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal.h" extern const RSA_METHOD RSA_default_method; RSA *RSA_new(void) { return RSA_new_method(NULL); } RSA *RSA_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) { RSA *rsa = (RSA *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA)); if (rsa == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_new_method, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } memset(rsa, 0, sizeof(RSA)); if (engine) { rsa->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA_method(engine); } if (rsa->meth == NULL) { rsa->meth = (RSA_METHOD*) &RSA_default_method; } METHOD_ref(rsa->meth); rsa->references = 1; rsa->flags = rsa->meth->flags; if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, rsa, &rsa->ex_data)) { METHOD_unref(rsa->meth); OPENSSL_free(rsa); return NULL; } if (rsa->meth->init && !rsa->meth->init(rsa)) { CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, rsa, &rsa->ex_data); METHOD_unref(rsa->meth); OPENSSL_free(rsa); return NULL; } return rsa; } void RSA_free(RSA *rsa) { unsigned u; if (rsa == NULL) { return; } if (CRYPTO_add(&rsa->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA) > 0) { return; } if (rsa->meth->finish) { rsa->meth->finish(rsa); } METHOD_unref(rsa->meth); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, rsa, &rsa->ex_data); if (rsa->n != NULL) { BN_clear_free(rsa->n); } if (rsa->e != NULL) { BN_clear_free(rsa->e); } if (rsa->d != NULL) { BN_clear_free(rsa->d); } if (rsa->p != NULL) { BN_clear_free(rsa->p); } if (rsa->q != NULL) { BN_clear_free(rsa->q); } if (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) { BN_clear_free(rsa->dmp1); } if (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) { BN_clear_free(rsa->dmq1); } if (rsa->iqmp != NULL) { BN_clear_free(rsa->iqmp); } for (u = 0; u < rsa->num_blindings; u++) { BN_BLINDING_free(rsa->blindings[u]); } if (rsa->blindings != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings); } if (rsa->blindings_inuse != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(rsa->blindings_inuse); } OPENSSL_free(rsa); } int RSA_up_ref(RSA *rsa) { CRYPTO_add(&rsa->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); return 1; } int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) { if (rsa->meth->keygen) { return rsa->meth->keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); } return RSA_default_method.keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); } int RSA_encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) { if (rsa->meth->encrypt) { return rsa->meth->encrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding); } return RSA_default_method.encrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding); } int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { size_t out_len; if (!RSA_encrypt(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) { return -1; } return out_len; } int RSA_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) { if (rsa->meth->sign_raw) { return rsa->meth->sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding); } return RSA_default_method.sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding); } int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { size_t out_len; if (!RSA_sign_raw(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) { return -1; } return out_len; } int RSA_decrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) { if (rsa->meth->decrypt) { return rsa->meth->decrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding); } return RSA_default_method.decrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding); } int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { size_t out_len; if (!RSA_decrypt(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) { return -1; } return out_len; } int RSA_verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) { if (rsa->meth->verify_raw) { return rsa->meth->verify_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding); } return RSA_default_method.verify_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding); } int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const uint8_t *from, uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { size_t out_len; if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &out_len, to, RSA_size(rsa), from, flen, padding)) { return -1; } return out_len; } unsigned RSA_size(const RSA *rsa) { if (rsa->meth->size) { return rsa->meth->size(rsa); } return RSA_default_method.size(rsa); } int RSA_is_opaque(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->meth && (rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_OPAQUE); } int RSA_supports_digest(const RSA *rsa, const EVP_MD *md) { if (rsa->meth && rsa->meth->supports_digest) { return rsa->meth->supports_digest(rsa, md); } return 1; } int RSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *d, int idx, void *arg) { return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg); } void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *d, int idx) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx); } /* SSL_SIG_LENGTH is the size of an SSL/TLS (prior to TLS 1.2) signature: it's * the length of an MD5 and SHA1 hash. */ static const unsigned SSL_SIG_LENGTH = 36; /* pkcs1_sig_prefix contains the ASN.1, DER encoded prefix for a hash that is * to be signed with PKCS#1. */ struct pkcs1_sig_prefix { /* nid identifies the hash function. */ int nid; /* len is the number of bytes of |bytes| which are valid. */ uint8_t len; /* bytes contains the DER bytes. */ uint8_t bytes[19]; }; /* kPKCS1SigPrefixes contains the ASN.1 prefixes for PKCS#1 signatures with * different hash functions. */ static const struct pkcs1_sig_prefix kPKCS1SigPrefixes[] = { { NID_md5, 18, {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10}, }, { NID_sha1, 15, {0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14}, }, { NID_sha224, 19, {0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c}, }, { NID_sha256, 19, {0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20}, }, { NID_sha384, 19, {0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30}, }, { NID_sha512, 19, {0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40}, }, { NID_undef, 0, {0}, }, }; /* TODO(fork): mostly new code, needs careful review. */ /* pkcs1_prefixed_msg builds a PKCS#1, prefixed version of |msg| for the given * hash function and sets |out_msg| to point to it. On successful return, * |*out_msg| may be allocated memory and, if so, |*is_alloced| will be 1. */ static int pkcs1_prefixed_msg(uint8_t **out_msg, size_t *out_msg_len, int *is_alloced, int hash_nid, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) { unsigned i; const uint8_t* prefix = NULL; unsigned prefix_len; uint8_t *signed_msg; unsigned signed_msg_len; if (hash_nid == NID_md5_sha1) { /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length. */ if (msg_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_sign, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); return 0; } *out_msg = (uint8_t*) msg; *out_msg_len = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; *is_alloced = 0; return 1; } for (i = 0; kPKCS1SigPrefixes[i].nid != NID_undef; i++) { const struct pkcs1_sig_prefix *sig_prefix = &kPKCS1SigPrefixes[i]; if (sig_prefix->nid == hash_nid) { prefix = sig_prefix->bytes; prefix_len = sig_prefix->len; break; } } if (prefix == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_sign, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); return 0; } signed_msg_len = prefix_len + msg_len; if (signed_msg_len < prefix_len) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_sign, RSA_R_TOO_LONG); return 0; } signed_msg = OPENSSL_malloc(signed_msg_len); if (!signed_msg) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_sign, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } memcpy(signed_msg, prefix, prefix_len); memcpy(signed_msg + prefix_len, msg, msg_len); *out_msg = signed_msg; *out_msg_len = signed_msg_len; *is_alloced = 1; return 1; } int RSA_sign(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len, uint8_t *out, unsigned *out_len, RSA *rsa) { const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa); int ret = 0; uint8_t *signed_msg; size_t signed_msg_len; int signed_msg_is_alloced = 0; size_t size_t_out_len; if (rsa->meth->sign) { return rsa->meth->sign(hash_nid, in, in_len, out, out_len, rsa); } if (!pkcs1_prefixed_msg(&signed_msg, &signed_msg_len, &signed_msg_is_alloced, hash_nid, in, in_len)) { return 0; } if (rsa_size < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE || signed_msg_len > rsa_size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_sign, RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY); goto finish; } if (RSA_sign_raw(rsa, &size_t_out_len, out, rsa_size, signed_msg, signed_msg_len, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) { *out_len = size_t_out_len; ret = 1; } finish: if (signed_msg_is_alloced) { OPENSSL_free(signed_msg); } return ret; } int RSA_verify(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len, RSA *rsa) { const size_t rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa); uint8_t *buf = NULL; int ret = 0; uint8_t *signed_msg = NULL; size_t signed_msg_len, len; int signed_msg_is_alloced = 0; if (rsa->meth->verify) { return rsa->meth->verify(hash_nid, msg, msg_len, sig, sig_len, rsa); } if (sig_len != rsa_size) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_verify, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); return 0; } if (hash_nid == NID_md5_sha1 && msg_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_verify, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); return 0; } buf = OPENSSL_malloc(rsa_size); if (!buf) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_verify, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!RSA_verify_raw(rsa, &len, buf, rsa_size, sig, sig_len, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) { goto out; } if (!pkcs1_prefixed_msg(&signed_msg, &signed_msg_len, &signed_msg_is_alloced, hash_nid, msg, msg_len)) { goto out; } if (len != signed_msg_len || CRYPTO_memcmp(buf, signed_msg, len) != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_verify, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto out; } ret = 1; out: if (buf != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(buf); } if (signed_msg_is_alloced) { OPENSSL_free(signed_msg); } return ret; } static void bn_free_and_null(BIGNUM **bn) { if (*bn == NULL) { return; } BN_free(*bn); *bn = NULL; } int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key) { BIGNUM n, pm1, qm1, lcm, gcd, de, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp; BN_CTX *ctx; int ok = 0, has_crt_values; if (RSA_is_opaque(key)) { /* Opaque keys can't be checked. */ return 1; } if ((key->p != NULL) != (key->q != NULL)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_check_key, RSA_R_ONLY_ONE_OF_P_Q_GIVEN); return 0; } if (!key->n || !key->e) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_check_key, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING); return 0; } if (!key->d || !key->p) { /* For a public key, or without p and q, there's nothing that can be * checked. */ return 1; } ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_check_key, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } BN_init(&n); BN_init(&pm1); BN_init(&qm1); BN_init(&lcm); BN_init(&gcd); BN_init(&de); BN_init(&dmp1); BN_init(&dmq1); BN_init(&iqmp); if (/* n = pq */ !BN_mul(&n, key->p, key->q, ctx) || /* lcm = lcm(p-1, q-1) */ !BN_sub(&pm1, key->p, BN_value_one()) || !BN_sub(&qm1, key->q, BN_value_one()) || !BN_mul(&lcm, &pm1, &qm1, ctx) || !BN_gcd(&gcd, &pm1, &qm1, ctx) || !BN_div(&lcm, NULL, &lcm, &gcd, ctx) || /* de = d*e mod lcm(p-1, q-1) */ !BN_mod_mul(&de, key->d, key->e, &lcm, ctx)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_check_key, ERR_LIB_BN); goto out; } if (BN_cmp(&n, key->n) != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_check_key, RSA_R_N_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q); goto out; } if (!BN_is_one(&de)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_check_key, RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1); goto out; } has_crt_values = key->dmp1 != NULL; if (has_crt_values != (key->dmq1 != NULL) || has_crt_values != (key->iqmp != NULL)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_check_key, RSA_R_INCONSISTENT_SET_OF_CRT_VALUES); goto out; } if (has_crt_values) { if (/* dmp1 = d mod (p-1) */ !BN_mod(&dmp1, key->d, &pm1, ctx) || /* dmq1 = d mod (q-1) */ !BN_mod(&dmq1, key->d, &qm1, ctx) || /* iqmp = q^-1 mod p */ !BN_mod_inverse(&iqmp, key->q, key->p, ctx)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_check_key, ERR_LIB_BN); goto out; } if (BN_cmp(&dmp1, key->dmp1) != 0 || BN_cmp(&dmq1, key->dmq1) != 0 || BN_cmp(&iqmp, key->iqmp) != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_check_key, RSA_R_CRT_VALUES_INCORRECT); goto out; } } ok = 1; out: BN_free(&n); BN_free(&pm1); BN_free(&qm1); BN_free(&lcm); BN_free(&gcd); BN_free(&de); BN_free(&dmp1); BN_free(&dmq1); BN_free(&iqmp); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return ok; } int RSA_recover_crt_params(RSA *rsa) { BN_CTX *ctx; BIGNUM *totient, *rem, *multiple, *p_plus_q, *p_minus_q; int ok = 0; if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL || rsa->d == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, RSA_R_EMPTY_PUBLIC_KEY); return 0; } if (rsa->p || rsa->q || rsa->dmp1 || rsa->dmq1 || rsa->iqmp) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, RSA_R_CRT_PARAMS_ALREADY_GIVEN); return 0; } /* This uses the algorithm from section 9B of the RSA paper: * http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Rsapaper.pdf */ ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); totient = BN_CTX_get(ctx); rem = BN_CTX_get(ctx); multiple = BN_CTX_get(ctx); p_plus_q = BN_CTX_get(ctx); p_minus_q = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (totient == NULL || rem == NULL || multiple == NULL || p_plus_q == NULL || p_minus_q == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* ed-1 is a small multiple of φ(n). */ if (!BN_mul(totient, rsa->e, rsa->d, ctx) || !BN_sub_word(totient, 1) || /* φ(n) = * pq - p - q + 1 = * n - (p + q) + 1 * * Thus n is a reasonable estimate for φ(n). So, (ed-1)/n will be very * close. But, when we calculate the quotient, we'll be truncating it * because we discard the remainder. Thus (ed-1)/multiple will be >= n, * which the totient cannot be. So we add one to the estimate. * * Consider ed-1 as: * * multiple * (n - (p+q) + 1) = * multiple*n - multiple*(p+q) + multiple * * When we divide by n, the first term becomes multiple and, since * multiple and p+q is tiny compared to n, the second and third terms can * be ignored. Thus I claim that subtracting one from the estimate is * sufficient. */ !BN_div(multiple, NULL, totient, rsa->n, ctx) || !BN_add_word(multiple, 1) || !BN_div(totient, rem, totient, multiple, ctx)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!BN_is_zero(rem)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, RSA_R_BAD_RSA_PARAMETERS); goto err; } rsa->p = BN_new(); rsa->q = BN_new(); rsa->dmp1 = BN_new(); rsa->dmq1 = BN_new(); rsa->iqmp = BN_new(); if (rsa->p == NULL || rsa->q == NULL || rsa->dmp1 == NULL || rsa->dmq1 == NULL || rsa->iqmp == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* φ(n) = n - (p + q) + 1 => * n - totient + 1 = p + q */ if (!BN_sub(p_plus_q, rsa->n, totient) || !BN_add_word(p_plus_q, 1) || /* p - q = sqrt((p+q)^2 - 4n) */ !BN_sqr(rem, p_plus_q, ctx) || !BN_lshift(multiple, rsa->n, 2) || !BN_sub(rem, rem, multiple) || !BN_sqrt(p_minus_q, rem, ctx) || /* q is 1/2 (p+q)-(p-q) */ !BN_sub(rsa->q, p_plus_q, p_minus_q) || !BN_rshift1(rsa->q, rsa->q) || !BN_div(rsa->p, NULL, rsa->n, rsa->q, ctx) || !BN_mul(multiple, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (BN_cmp(multiple, rsa->n) != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, RSA_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!BN_sub(rem, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) || !BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, rem, ctx) || !BN_sub(rem, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) || !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, rem, ctx) || !BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, rsa->p, ctx)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_recover_crt_params, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } ok = 1; err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); if (!ok) { bn_free_and_null(&rsa->p); bn_free_and_null(&rsa->q); bn_free_and_null(&rsa->dmp1); bn_free_and_null(&rsa->dmq1); bn_free_and_null(&rsa->iqmp); } return ok; } int RSA_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t len) { if (rsa->meth->private_transform) { return rsa->meth->private_transform(rsa, out, in, len); } return RSA_default_method.private_transform(rsa, out, in, len); }