/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "../crypto/dh/internal.h" #include "../crypto/directory.h" #include "ssl_locl.h" int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) { static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1; int got_write_lock = 0; CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) { CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); got_write_lock = 1; if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) { ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index( 0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL); } } if (got_write_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); else CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx; } void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert) { /* Set digest values to defaults */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); #endif } CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) { CERT *ret; ret=(CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT)); if (ret == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return(NULL); } memset(ret,0,sizeof(CERT)); ret->key= &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); ret->references=1; ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret); return(ret); } CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) { CERT *ret; int i; ret = (CERT *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT)); if (ret == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return(NULL); } memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT)); ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - &cert->pkeys[0]]; /* or ret->key = ret->pkeys + (cert->key - cert->pkeys), * if you find that more readable */ ret->valid = cert->valid; ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k; ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a; ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k; ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL) { RSA_up_ref(cert->rsa_tmp); ret->rsa_tmp = cert->rsa_tmp; } ret->rsa_tmp_cb = cert->rsa_tmp_cb; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) { ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp); if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } if (cert->dh_tmp->priv_key) { BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->priv_key); if (!b) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } ret->dh_tmp->priv_key = b; } if (cert->dh_tmp->pub_key) { BIGNUM *b = BN_dup(cert->dh_tmp->pub_key); if (!b) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } ret->dh_tmp->pub_key = b; } } ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (cert->ecdh_tmp) { ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp); if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb; ret->ecdh_tmp_auto = cert->ecdh_tmp_auto; #endif for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i; CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i; if (cpk->x509 != NULL) { rpk->x509 = cpk->x509; CRYPTO_add(&rpk->x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); } if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) { rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey; CRYPTO_add(&cpk->privatekey->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY); switch(i) { /* If there was anything special to do for * certain types of keys, we'd do it here. * (Nothing at the moment, I think.) */ case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC: case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN: /* We have an RSA key. */ break; case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: /* We have a DSA key. */ break; case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA: case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA: /* We have a DH key. */ break; case SSL_PKEY_ECC: /* We have an ECC key */ break; default: /* Can't happen. */ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); } } if (cpk->chain) { rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain); if (!rpk->chain) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } rpk->valid_flags = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (cert->pkeys[i].authz != NULL) { /* Just copy everything. */ ret->pkeys[i].authz_length = cert->pkeys[i].authz_length; ret->pkeys[i].authz = OPENSSL_malloc(ret->pkeys[i].authz_length); if (ret->pkeys[i].authz == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].authz, cert->pkeys[i].authz, cert->pkeys[i].authz_length); } if (cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo != NULL) { /* Just copy everything. */ ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length); if (ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_dup, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length = cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length; memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo, cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo, cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length); } #endif } ret->references=1; /* Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they * will be set during handshake. */ ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret); /* Peer sigalgs set to NULL as we get these from handshake too */ ret->peer_sigalgs = NULL; ret->peer_sigalgslen = 0; /* Configured sigalgs however we copy across */ if (cert->conf_sigalgs) { ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen); if (!ret->conf_sigalgs) goto err; memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgslen); ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen; } else ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL; if (cert->client_sigalgs) { ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen); if (!ret->client_sigalgs) goto err; memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgslen); ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen; } else ret->client_sigalgs = NULL; /* Shared sigalgs also NULL */ ret->shared_sigalgs = NULL; /* Copy any custom client certificate types */ if (cert->ctypes) { ret->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->ctype_num); if (!ret->ctypes) goto err; memcpy(ret->ctypes, cert->ctypes, cert->ctype_num); ret->ctype_num = cert->ctype_num; } ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags; ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb; ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg; if (cert->verify_store) { CRYPTO_add(&cert->verify_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store; } if (cert->chain_store) { CRYPTO_add(&cert->chain_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store; } ret->ciphers_raw = NULL; return(ret); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) err: #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (ret->rsa_tmp != NULL) RSA_free(ret->rsa_tmp); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL) DH_free(ret->dh_tmp); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (ret->ecdh_tmp != NULL) EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp); #endif ssl_cert_clear_certs(ret); return NULL; } /* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */ void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c) { int i; if (c == NULL) return; for (i = 0; ipkeys + i; if (cpk->x509) { X509_free(cpk->x509); cpk->x509 = NULL; } if (cpk->privatekey) { EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey); cpk->privatekey = NULL; } if (cpk->chain) { sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); cpk->chain = NULL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (cpk->authz) { OPENSSL_free(cpk->authz); cpk->authz = NULL; } if (cpk->serverinfo) { OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo); cpk->serverinfo = NULL; cpk->serverinfo_length = 0; } #endif /* Clear all flags apart from explicit sign */ cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; } } void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) { int i; if(c == NULL) return; i=CRYPTO_add(&c->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT); #ifdef REF_PRINT REF_PRINT("CERT",c); #endif if (i > 0) return; #ifdef REF_CHECK if (i < 0) { fprintf(stderr,"ssl_cert_free, bad reference count\n"); abort(); /* ok */ } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (c->rsa_tmp) RSA_free(c->rsa_tmp); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (c->dh_tmp) DH_free(c->dh_tmp); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (c->ecdh_tmp) EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp); #endif ssl_cert_clear_certs(c); if (c->peer_sigalgs) OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs); if (c->conf_sigalgs) OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); if (c->client_sigalgs) OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); if (c->shared_sigalgs) OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); if (c->ctypes) OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes); if (c->verify_store) X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store); if (c->chain_store) X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store); if (c->ciphers_raw) OPENSSL_free(c->ciphers_raw); OPENSSL_free(c); } int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o) { /* Create a CERT if there isn't already one * (which cannot really happen, as it is initially created in * SSL_CTX_new; but the earlier code usually allows for that one * being non-existant, so we follow that behaviour, as it might * turn out that there actually is a reason for it -- but I'm * not sure that *all* of the existing code could cope with * s->cert being NULL, otherwise we could do without the * initialization in SSL_CTX_new). */ if (o == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_inst, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return(0); } if (*o == NULL) { if ((*o = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cert_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return(0); } } return(1); } int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key; if (!cpk) return 0; if (cpk->chain) sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); cpk->chain = chain; return 1; } int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { STACK_OF(X509) *dchain; if (!chain) return ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, NULL); dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain); if (!dchain) return 0; if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, dchain)) { sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free); return 0; } return 1; } int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key; if (!cpk) return 0; if (!cpk->chain) cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null(); if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x)) return 0; return 1; } int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x) { if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(c, x)) return 0; CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); return 1; } int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x) { int i; if (x == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == x) { c->key = &c->pkeys[i]; return 1; } } for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { if (c->pkeys[i].x509 && !X509_cmp(c->pkeys[i].x509, x)) { c->key = &c->pkeys[i]; return 1; } } return 0; } void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { c->cert_cb = cb; c->cert_cb_arg = arg; } SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void) { SESS_CERT *ret; ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ret); if (ret == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_sess_cert_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } memset(ret, 0 ,sizeof *ret); ret->peer_key = &(ret->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); ret->references = 1; return ret; } void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc) { int i; if (sc == NULL) return; i = CRYPTO_add(&sc->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESS_CERT); #ifdef REF_PRINT REF_PRINT("SESS_CERT", sc); #endif if (i > 0) return; #ifdef REF_CHECK if (i < 0) { fprintf(stderr,"ssl_sess_cert_free, bad reference count\n"); abort(); /* ok */ } #endif /* i == 0 */ if (sc->cert_chain != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sc->cert_chain, X509_free); for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509); #if 0 /* We don't have the peer's private key. These lines are just * here as a reminder that we're still using a not-quite-appropriate * data structure. */ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].privatekey); #endif } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (sc->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) RSA_free(sc->peer_rsa_tmp); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp); #endif OPENSSL_free(sc); } int ssl_set_peer_cert_type(SESS_CERT *sc,int type) { sc->peer_cert_type = type; return(1); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE /* * return value: * -1: format or digest error * 0: match * 1: no match */ int tlsa_cmp(const X509 *cert, const unsigned char *tlsa_record, unsigned int reclen) { const EVP_MD *md; unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int len, selector, matching_type; int ret; if (reclen<3) return -1; selector = tlsa_record[1]; matching_type = tlsa_record[2]; tlsa_record += 3; reclen -= 3; switch (matching_type) { case 0: /* exact match */ if (selector==0) { /* full certificate */ ret = EVP_Digest(tlsa_record,reclen,digest,&len,EVP_sha1(),NULL); return ret ? memcmp(cert->sha1_hash,digest,len)!=0 : -1; } else if (selector==1) { /* SubjectPublicKeyInfo */ ASN1_BIT_STRING *key = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(cert); if (key == NULL) return -1; if (key->length != reclen) return 1; return memcmp(key->data,tlsa_record,reclen)!=0; } return -1; case 1: /* SHA256 */ case 2: /* SHA512 */ md = matching_type==1 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha512(); if (reclen!=EVP_MD_size(md)) return -1; if (selector==0) { /* full certificate */ ret = X509_digest(cert,md,digest,&len); } else if (selector==1) { /* SubjectPublicKeyInfo */ ret = X509_pubkey_digest(cert,md,digest,&len); } else return -1; return ret ? memcmp(tlsa_record,digest,len)!=0 : -1; default: return -1; } } int dane_verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { SSL *s = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); int depth=X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,depth); unsigned int reclen, certificate_usage; const unsigned char *tlsa_record = s->tlsa_record; int tlsa_ret = -1; if (s->verify_callback) ok = s->verify_callback(ok,ctx); if (tlsa_record == NULL) return ok; if (tlsa_record == (void*)-1) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; /* temporary code? */ return 0; } while ((reclen = *(unsigned int *)tlsa_record)) { tlsa_record += sizeof(unsigned int); /* * tlsa_record[0] Certificate Usage field * tlsa_record[1] Selector field * tlsa_record[2] Matching Type Field * tlsa_record+3 Certificate Association data */ certificate_usage = tlsa_record[0]; if (depth==0 || certificate_usage==0 || certificate_usage==2) { tlsa_ret = tlsa_cmp(cert,tlsa_record,reclen); if (tlsa_ret==0) { s->tlsa_witness = depth<<8|certificate_usage; break; } else if (tlsa_ret==-1) s->tlsa_witness = -1; /* something phishy? */ } tlsa_record += reclen; } if (depth==0) { switch (s->tlsa_witness&0xff) { /* witnessed usage */ case 0: /* CA constraint */ if (s->tlsa_witness<0 && ctx->error==X509_V_OK) ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; return 0; case 1: /* service certificate constraint */ if (tlsa_ret!=0 && ctx->error==X509_V_OK) ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; return 0; case 2: /* trust anchor assertion */ if ((s->tlsa_witness>>8)>0 && ctx->error==X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY) ctx->error = X509_V_OK; break; case 3: /* domain-issued certificate */ if (tlsa_ret==0) ctx->error = X509_V_OK; /* override all errors? */ break; default:/* there were TLSA records, but something phishy happened */ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; return ok; } } /* * returning 1 makes verify procedure traverse the whole chain, * not actually approve it... */ return 1; } #endif int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { X509 *x; int i; X509_STORE *verify_store; X509_STORE_CTX ctx; if (s->cert->verify_store) verify_store = s->cert->verify_store; else verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store; if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0)) return(0); x=sk_X509_value(sk,0); if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,verify_store,x,sk)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_verify_cert_chain, ERR_R_X509_LIB); return(0); } /* Set suite B flags if needed */ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s)); #if 0 if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0) X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s)); #endif X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),s); /* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates * or vice versa. */ X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server"); /* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the * ctx. */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, dane_verify_callback); s->tlsa_witness = -1; #else if (s->verify_callback) X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback); #endif if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) #if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */ i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg); #else i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */ #endif else { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY i=X509_verify_cert(&ctx); #else i=0; ctx.error=X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_verify_cert_chain, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK); #endif } s->verify_result=ctx.error; X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return(i); } static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { if (*ca_list != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free); *ca_list=name_list; } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk) { int i; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret; X509_NAME *name; ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); for (i=0; iclient_CA),name_list); } void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),name_list); } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(ctx->client_CA); } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s) { if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) { /* we are in the client */ if (((s->version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) && (s->s3 != NULL)) return(s->s3->tmp.ca_names); else return(NULL); } else { if (s->client_CA != NULL) return(s->client_CA); else return(s->ctx->client_CA); } } static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk,X509 *x) { X509_NAME *name; if (x == NULL) return(0); if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)) return(0); if ((name=X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL) return(0); if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk,name)) { X509_NAME_free(name); return(0); } return(1); } int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl,X509 *x) { return(add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA),x)); } int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509 *x) { return(add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA),x)); } static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) { return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO /*! * Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed; * it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use * for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have * much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert. * \param file the file containing one or more certs. * \return a ::STACK containing the certs. */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) { BIO *in; X509 *x=NULL; X509_NAME *xn=NULL; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL,*sk; sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp); in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_load_client_CA_file, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file)) goto err; for (;;) { if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL) break; if (ret == NULL) { ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); if (ret == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_load_client_CA_file, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err; /* check for duplicates */ xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn); if (xn == NULL) goto err; if (sk_X509_NAME_find(sk, NULL, xn)) X509_NAME_free(xn); else { sk_X509_NAME_push(sk,xn); sk_X509_NAME_push(ret,xn); } } if (0) { err: if (ret != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret,X509_NAME_free); ret=NULL; } if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_free(sk); if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in); if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); if (ret != NULL) ERR_clear_error(); return(ret); } #endif /*! * Add a file of certs to a stack. * \param stack the stack to add to. * \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not * already in the stack will be added. * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some * certs may have been added to \c stack. */ int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, const char *file) { BIO *in; X509 *x=NULL; X509_NAME *xn=NULL; int ret=1; int (*oldcmp)(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b); oldcmp=sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,xname_cmp); in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (in == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!BIO_read_filename(in,file)) goto err; for (;;) { if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL) break; if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err; xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn); if (xn == NULL) goto err; if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, NULL, xn)) X509_NAME_free(xn); else sk_X509_NAME_push(stack,xn); } ERR_clear_error(); if (0) { err: ret=0; } if(in != NULL) BIO_free(in); if(x != NULL) X509_free(x); (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp); return ret; } /*! * Add a directory of certs to a stack. * \param stack the stack to append to. * \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be * examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to * SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be * included. * \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some * certs may have been added to \c stack. */ int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, const char *dir) { OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL; const char *filename; int ret = 0; CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR); /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */ while((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) { char buf[1024]; int r; if(strlen(dir)+strlen(filename)+2 > sizeof buf) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack, SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s%s",dir,filename); #else r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,filename); #endif if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf)) goto err; if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf)) goto err; } if (errno) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')"); goto err; } ret = 1; err: if (d) OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR); return ret; } /* Add a certificate to a BUF_MEM structure */ static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x) { int n; unsigned char *p; n=i2d_X509(x,NULL); if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3))) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_cert_to_buf, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]); l2n3(n,p); i2d_X509(x,&p); *l+=n+3; return 1; } /* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM strcuture */ int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l) { BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf; int no_chain; int i; X509 *x; STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; X509_STORE *chain_store; if (cpk) x = cpk->x509; else x = NULL; if (s->cert->chain_store) chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; else chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; /* If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use * parent ctx. */ if (cpk && cpk->chain) extra_certs = cpk->chain; else extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) no_chain = 1; else no_chain = 0; /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_cert_chain, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } if (x != NULL) { if (no_chain) { if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) return 0; } else { X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,chain_store,x,NULL)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_cert_chain, ERR_R_X509_LIB); return(0); } X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ ERR_clear_error(); for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i); if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) { X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); return 0; } } X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); } } for (i=0; ikey; X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL; X509 *x; int i; if (!cpk->x509) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_build_cert_chain, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); return 0; } if (c->chain_store) chain_store = c->chain_store; if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED) untrusted = cpk->chain; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_build_cert_chain, ERR_R_X509_LIB); return 0; } /* Set suite B flags if needed */ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&xs_ctx, c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS); i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); if (i > 0) chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&xs_ctx); X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); if (i <= 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_build_cert_chain, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); return 0; } if (cpk->chain) sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); /* Remove EE certificate from chain */ x = sk_X509_shift(chain); X509_free(x); if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT) { x = sk_X509_pop(chain); X509_free(x); } cpk->chain = chain; return 1; } int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref) { X509_STORE **pstore; if (chain) pstore = &c->chain_store; else pstore = &c->verify_store; if (*pstore) X509_STORE_free(*pstore); *pstore = store; if (ref && store) CRYPTO_add(&store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); return 1; }