/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "../crypto/internal.h" #include "internal.h" int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) { /* The ex_data index to go from |X509_STORE_CTX| to |SSL| always uses the * reserved app_data slot. Before ex_data was introduced, app_data was used. * Avoid breaking any software which assumes |X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data| * works. */ return 0; } CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) { CERT *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT)); if (ret == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT)); return ret; } CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) { CERT *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT)); if (ret == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT)); if (cert->x509 != NULL) { X509_up_ref(cert->x509); ret->x509 = cert->x509; } if (cert->privatekey != NULL) { EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cert->privatekey); ret->privatekey = cert->privatekey; } if (cert->chain) { ret->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cert->chain); if (!ret->chain) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } ret->key_method = cert->key_method; ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k; ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a; if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) { ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp); if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } } ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb; if (cert->sigalgs != NULL) { ret->sigalgs = BUF_memdup(cert->sigalgs, cert->num_sigalgs * sizeof(cert->sigalgs[0])); if (ret->sigalgs == NULL) { goto err; } } ret->num_sigalgs = cert->num_sigalgs; ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb; ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg; if (cert->verify_store != NULL) { X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->verify_store); ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store; } return ret; err: ssl_cert_free(ret); return NULL; } /* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */ void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *cert) { if (cert == NULL) { return; } X509_free(cert->x509); cert->x509 = NULL; EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey); cert->privatekey = NULL; sk_X509_pop_free(cert->chain, X509_free); cert->chain = NULL; cert->key_method = NULL; } void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) { if (c == NULL) { return; } DH_free(c->dh_tmp); ssl_cert_clear_certs(c); OPENSSL_free(c->sigalgs); X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store); OPENSSL_free(c); } int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { sk_X509_pop_free(cert->chain, X509_free); cert->chain = chain; return 1; } int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { STACK_OF(X509) *dchain; if (chain == NULL) { return ssl_cert_set0_chain(cert, NULL); } dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain); if (dchain == NULL) { return 0; } if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(cert, dchain)) { sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free); return 0; } return 1; } int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *cert, X509 *x509) { if (cert->chain == NULL) { cert->chain = sk_X509_new_null(); } if (cert->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(cert->chain, x509)) { return 0; } return 1; } int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *cert, X509 *x509) { if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(cert, x509)) { return 0; } X509_up_ref(x509); return 1; } void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { c->cert_cb = cb; c->cert_cb_arg = arg; } int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, long *out_verify_result, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain) { if (cert_chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(cert_chain) == 0) { return 0; } X509_STORE *verify_store = ssl->ctx->cert_store; if (ssl->cert->verify_store != NULL) { verify_store = ssl->cert->verify_store; } X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(cert_chain, 0); int ret = 0; X509_STORE_CTX ctx; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, verify_store, leaf, cert_chain)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB); return 0; } if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), ssl)) { goto err; } /* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by the * context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or vice * versa. */ X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, ssl->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server"); /* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the ctx. */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), ssl->param); if (ssl->verify_callback) { X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, ssl->verify_callback); } int verify_ret; if (ssl->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) { verify_ret = ssl->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, ssl->ctx->app_verify_arg); } else { verify_ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx); } *out_verify_result = ctx.error; /* If |SSL_VERIFY_NONE|, the error is non-fatal, but we keep the result. */ if (verify_ret <= 0 && ssl->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, ssl_verify_alarm_type(ctx.error)); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); goto err; } ERR_clear_error(); ret = 1; err: X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return ret; } static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free); *ca_list = name_list; } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); if (ret == NULL) { return NULL; } for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(list); i++) { X509_NAME *name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(list, i)); if (name == NULL || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) { X509_NAME_free(name); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); return NULL; } } return ret; } void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { set_client_CA_list(&ssl->client_CA, name_list); } void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { set_client_CA_list(&ctx->client_CA, name_list); } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->client_CA; } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *ssl) { /* For historical reasons, this function is used both to query configuration * state on a server as well as handshake state on a client. However, whether * |ssl| is a client or server is not known until explicitly configured with * |SSL_set_connect_state|. If |handshake_func| is NULL, |ssl| is in an * indeterminate mode and |ssl->server| is unset. */ if (ssl->handshake_func != NULL && !ssl->server) { if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL) { return ssl->s3->hs->ca_names; } return NULL; } if (ssl->client_CA != NULL) { return ssl->client_CA; } return ssl->ctx->client_CA; } static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, X509 *x509) { X509_NAME *name; if (x509 == NULL) { return 0; } if (*sk == NULL) { *sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); if (*sk == NULL) { return 0; } } name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x509)); if (name == NULL) { return 0; } if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) { X509_NAME_free(name); return 0; } return 1; } int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) { return add_client_CA(&ssl->client_CA, x509); } int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) { return add_client_CA(&ctx->client_CA, x509); } int ssl_has_certificate(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->cert->x509 != NULL && ssl_has_private_key(ssl); } STACK_OF(X509) *ssl_parse_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, uint8_t *out_leaf_sha256, CBS *cbs) { STACK_OF(X509) *ret = sk_X509_new_null(); if (ret == NULL) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } X509 *x = NULL; CBS certificate_list; if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(cbs, &certificate_list)) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) { CBS certificate; if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* Retain the hash of the leaf certificate if requested. */ if (sk_X509_num(ret) == 0 && out_leaf_sha256 != NULL) { SHA256(CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate), out_leaf_sha256); } /* A u24 length cannot overflow a long. */ const uint8_t *data = CBS_data(&certificate); x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, (long)CBS_len(&certificate)); if (x == NULL || data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto err; } if (!sk_X509_push(ret, x)) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } x = NULL; } return ret; err: X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(ret, X509_free); return NULL; } int ssl_add_cert_to_cbb(CBB *cbb, X509 *x509) { int len = i2d_X509(x509, NULL); if (len < 0) { return 0; } uint8_t *buf; if (!CBB_add_space(cbb, &buf, len)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (buf != NULL && i2d_X509(x509, &buf) < 0) { return 0; } return 1; } static int ssl_add_cert_with_length(CBB *cbb, X509 *x509) { CBB child; return CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, &child) && ssl_add_cert_to_cbb(&child, x509) && CBB_flush(cbb); } int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) { if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) { return CBB_add_u24(cbb, 0); } CERT *cert = ssl->cert; X509 *x = cert->x509; CBB child; if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, &child)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } int no_chain = 0; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = cert->chain; if ((ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || chain != NULL) { no_chain = 1; } if (no_chain) { if (!ssl_add_cert_with_length(&child, x)) { return 0; } for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); if (!ssl_add_cert_with_length(&child, x)) { return 0; } } } else { X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, ssl->ctx->cert_store, x, NULL)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB); return 0; } X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ ERR_clear_error(); for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i); if (!ssl_add_cert_with_length(&child, x)) { X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); return 0; } } X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); } return CBB_flush(cbb); } static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) { return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * ssl_parse_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *cbs) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); X509_NAME *name = NULL; if (ret == NULL) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } CBS child; if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &child)) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) { CBS distinguished_name; if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &distinguished_name)) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); goto err; } const uint8_t *ptr = CBS_data(&distinguished_name); /* A u16 length cannot overflow a long. */ name = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &ptr, (long)CBS_len(&distinguished_name)); if (name == NULL || ptr != CBS_data(&distinguished_name) + CBS_len(&distinguished_name)) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } name = NULL; } return ret; err: X509_NAME_free(name); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); return NULL; } int ssl_add_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) { CBB child, name_cbb; if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &child)) { return 0; } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl); if (sk == NULL) { return CBB_flush(cbb); } for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); int len = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); if (len < 0) { return 0; } uint8_t *ptr; if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &name_cbb) || !CBB_add_space(&name_cbb, &ptr, (size_t)len) || (len > 0 && i2d_X509_NAME(name, &ptr) < 0)) { return 0; } } return CBB_flush(cbb); } int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, int *out_should_retry) { if (ssl_has_certificate(ssl) || ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb == NULL) { return 1; } X509 *x509 = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int ret = ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb(ssl, &x509, &pkey); if (ret < 0) { *out_should_retry = 1; return 0; } if (ret != 0) { if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey)) { ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); *out_should_retry = 0; return 0; } } X509_free(x509); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return 1; } static int set_cert_store(X509_STORE **store_ptr, X509_STORE *new_store, int take_ref) { X509_STORE_free(*store_ptr); *store_ptr = new_store; if (new_store != NULL && take_ref) { X509_STORE_up_ref(new_store); } return 1; } int SSL_CTX_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) { return set_cert_store(&ctx->cert->verify_store, store, 0); } int SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) { return set_cert_store(&ctx->cert->verify_store, store, 1); } int SSL_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL *ssl, X509_STORE *store) { return set_cert_store(&ssl->cert->verify_store, store, 0); } int SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL *ssl, X509_STORE *store) { return set_cert_store(&ssl->cert->verify_store, store, 1); } int SSL_CTX_set0_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { return ssl_cert_set0_chain(ctx->cert, chain); } int SSL_CTX_set1_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { return ssl_cert_set1_chain(ctx->cert, chain); } int SSL_set0_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { return ssl_cert_set0_chain(ssl->cert, chain); } int SSL_set1_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { return ssl_cert_set1_chain(ssl->cert, chain); } int SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) { return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(ctx->cert, x509); } int SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) { return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(ctx->cert, x509); } int SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) { return SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx, x509); } int SSL_add0_chain_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) { return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(ssl->cert, x509); } int SSL_add1_chain_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) { return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(ssl->cert, x509); } int SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return SSL_CTX_set0_chain(ctx, NULL); } int SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(ctx); } int SSL_clear_chain_certs(SSL *ssl) { return SSL_set0_chain(ssl, NULL); } int SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(const SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) { *out_chain = ctx->cert->chain; return 1; } int SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(const SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) { return SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(ctx, out_chain); } int SSL_get0_chain_certs(const SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) { *out_chain = ssl->cert->chain; return 1; } int ssl_check_leaf_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *leaf) { assert(ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION); int ret = 0; EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(leaf); if (pkey == NULL) { goto err; } /* Check the certificate's type matches the cipher. */ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher; int expected_type = ssl_cipher_get_key_type(cipher); assert(expected_type != EVP_PKEY_NONE); if (pkey->type != expected_type) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); goto err; } if (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) { /* TODO(davidben): This behavior is preserved from upstream. Should key * usages be checked in other cases as well? */ /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ X509_check_purpose(leaf, -1, 0); if ((leaf->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !(leaf->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); goto err; } EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey); if (ec_key == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); goto err; } /* Check the key's group and point format are acceptable. */ uint16_t group_id; if (!ssl_nid_to_group_id( &group_id, EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key))) || !tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id) || EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec_key) != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); goto err; } } ret = 1; err: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return ret; }