/* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "../crypto/internal.h" #include "internal.h" namespace bssl { // kMaxKeyUpdates is the number of consecutive KeyUpdates that will be // processed. Without this limit an attacker could force unbounded processing // without being able to return application data. static const uint8_t kMaxKeyUpdates = 32; const uint8_t kHelloRetryRequest[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE] = { 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c, }; // This value was selected by truncating the SHA-256 hash of "Draft TLS 1.3 // Downgrade" to 8 bytes: // // echo -n 'Draft TLS 1.3 Downgrade' | sha256sum | head -c 16 const uint8_t kDraftDowngradeRandom[8] = {0x95, 0xb9, 0x9f, 0x87, 0x22, 0xfe, 0x9b, 0x64}; bool tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input( SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Array *out, enum ssl_cert_verify_context_t cert_verify_context) { ScopedCBB cbb; if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 64 + 33 + 1 + 2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return false; } for (size_t i = 0; i < 64; i++) { if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb.get(), 0x20)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return false; } } Span context; if (cert_verify_context == ssl_cert_verify_server) { static const char kContext[] = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; context = kContext; } else if (cert_verify_context == ssl_cert_verify_client) { static const char kContext[] = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; context = kContext; } else if (cert_verify_context == ssl_cert_verify_channel_id) { static const char kContext[] = "TLS 1.3, Channel ID"; context = kContext; } else { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return false; } // Note |context| includes the NUL byte separator. if (!CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), reinterpret_cast(context.data()), context.size())) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return false; } uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; size_t context_hash_len; if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(context_hash, &context_hash_len) || !CBB_add_bytes(cbb.get(), context_hash, context_hash_len) || !CBBFinishArray(cbb.get(), out)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return false; } return true; } int tls13_process_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg, int allow_anonymous) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; CBS body = msg.body, context, certificate_list; if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &context) || CBS_len(&context) != 0 || !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&body, &certificate_list) || CBS_len(&body) != 0) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return 0; } UniquePtr certs(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null()); if (!certs) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } const bool retain_sha256 = ssl->server && hs->config->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs; UniquePtr pkey; while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) { CBS certificate, extensions; if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate) || !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &extensions) || CBS_len(&certificate) == 0) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs.get()) == 0) { pkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&certificate); if (!pkey) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return 0; } // TLS 1.3 always uses certificate keys for signing thus the correct // keyUsage is enforced. if (!ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(&certificate)) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (retain_sha256) { // Retain the hash of the leaf certificate if requested. SHA256(CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate), hs->new_session->peer_sha256); } } UniquePtr buf( CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&certificate, ssl->ctx->pool)); if (!buf || !PushToStack(certs.get(), std::move(buf))) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } // Parse out the extensions. bool have_status_request = false, have_sct = false; CBS status_request, sct; const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE ext_types[] = { {TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, &have_status_request, &status_request}, {TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp, &have_sct, &sct}, }; uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, ext_types, OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(ext_types), 0 /* reject unknown */)) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); return 0; } // All Certificate extensions are parsed, but only the leaf extensions are // stored. if (have_status_request) { if (ssl->server || !hs->config->ocsp_stapling_enabled) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); return 0; } uint8_t status_type; CBS ocsp_response; if (!CBS_get_u8(&status_request, &status_type) || status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp || !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&status_request, &ocsp_response) || CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 || CBS_len(&status_request) != 0) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); return 0; } if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs.get()) == 1) { CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(hs->new_session->ocsp_response); hs->new_session->ocsp_response = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&ocsp_response, ssl->ctx->pool); if (hs->new_session->ocsp_response == nullptr) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } } if (have_sct) { if (ssl->server || !hs->config->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!ssl_is_sct_list_valid(&sct)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); return 0; } if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs.get()) == 1) { CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list); hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&sct, ssl->ctx->pool); if (hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list == nullptr) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } } } // Store a null certificate list rather than an empty one if the peer didn't // send certificates. if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs.get()) == 0) { certs.reset(); } hs->peer_pubkey = std::move(pkey); sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); hs->new_session->certs = certs.release(); if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_cache_objects(hs->new_session.get())) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); return 0; } if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs) == 0) { if (!allow_anonymous) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED); return 0; } // OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are requested. This is // classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX. hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; // No certificate, so nothing more to do. return 1; } hs->new_session->peer_sha256_valid = retain_sha256; return 1; } int tls13_process_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; if (hs->peer_pubkey == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } CBS body = msg.body, signature; uint16_t signature_algorithm; if (!CBS_get_u16(&body, &signature_algorithm) || !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &signature) || CBS_len(&body) != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); return 0; } uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &alert, signature_algorithm)) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); return 0; } hs->new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm; Array input; if (!tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input( hs, &input, ssl->server ? ssl_cert_verify_client : ssl_cert_verify_server)) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } bool sig_ok = ssl_public_key_verify(ssl, signature, signature_algorithm, hs->peer_pubkey.get(), input); #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) sig_ok = true; ERR_clear_error(); #endif if (!sig_ok) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } int tls13_process_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg, int use_saved_value) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; uint8_t verify_data_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; const uint8_t *verify_data; size_t verify_data_len; if (use_saved_value) { assert(ssl->server); verify_data = hs->expected_client_finished; verify_data_len = hs->hash_len; } else { if (!tls13_finished_mac(hs, verify_data_buf, &verify_data_len, !ssl->server)) { return 0; } verify_data = verify_data_buf; } int finished_ok = CBS_mem_equal(&msg.body, verify_data, verify_data_len); #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) finished_ok = 1; #endif if (!finished_ok) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); return 0; } return 1; } int tls13_add_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; ScopedCBB cbb; CBB body, certificate_list; if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) || // The request context is always empty in the handshake. !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0) || !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&body, &certificate_list)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!ssl_has_certificate(hs->config)) { return ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get()); } CERT *cert = hs->config->cert; CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf_buf = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain.get(), 0); CBB leaf, extensions; if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &leaf) || !CBB_add_bytes(&leaf, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(leaf_buf), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(leaf_buf)) || !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &extensions)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (hs->scts_requested && hs->config->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list != nullptr) { CBB contents; if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) || !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &contents) || !CBB_add_bytes( &contents, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data( hs->config->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list.get()), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len( hs->config->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list.get())) || !CBB_flush(&extensions)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } if (hs->ocsp_stapling_requested && hs->config->cert->ocsp_response != NULL) { CBB contents, ocsp_response; if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) || !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &contents) || !CBB_add_u8(&contents, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) || !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&contents, &ocsp_response) || !CBB_add_bytes( &ocsp_response, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(hs->config->cert->ocsp_response.get()), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(hs->config->cert->ocsp_response.get())) || !CBB_flush(&extensions)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } for (size_t i = 1; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(cert->chain.get()); i++) { CRYPTO_BUFFER *cert_buf = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain.get(), i); CBB child; if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &child) || !CBB_add_bytes(&child, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert_buf), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert_buf)) || !CBB_add_u16(&certificate_list, 0 /* no extensions */)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } return ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get()); } enum ssl_private_key_result_t tls13_add_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; uint16_t signature_algorithm; if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) { return ssl_private_key_failure; } ScopedCBB cbb; CBB body; if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) || !CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return ssl_private_key_failure; } // Sign the digest. CBB child; const size_t max_sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey.get()); uint8_t *sig; size_t sig_len; if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || !CBB_reserve(&child, &sig, max_sig_len)) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); return ssl_private_key_failure; } Array msg; if (!tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input( hs, &msg, ssl->server ? ssl_cert_verify_server : ssl_cert_verify_client)) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); return ssl_private_key_failure; } enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign( hs, sig, &sig_len, max_sig_len, signature_algorithm, msg); if (sign_result != ssl_private_key_success) { return sign_result; } if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len) || !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) { return ssl_private_key_failure; } return ssl_private_key_success; } int tls13_add_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; size_t verify_data_len; uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; if (!tls13_finished_mac(hs, verify_data, &verify_data_len, ssl->server)) { ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); return 0; } ScopedCBB cbb; CBB body; if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) || !CBB_add_bytes(&body, verify_data, verify_data_len) || !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) { return 0; } return 1; } static int tls13_receive_key_update(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg) { CBS body = msg.body; uint8_t key_update_request; if (!CBS_get_u8(&body, &key_update_request) || CBS_len(&body) != 0 || (key_update_request != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED && key_update_request != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); return 0; } if (!tls13_rotate_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_open)) { return 0; } // Acknowledge the KeyUpdate if (key_update_request == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED && !ssl->s3->key_update_pending) { ScopedCBB cbb; CBB body_cbb; if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body_cbb, SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) || !CBB_add_u8(&body_cbb, SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED) || !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get()) || !tls13_rotate_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal)) { return 0; } // Suppress KeyUpdate acknowledgments until this change is written to the // wire. This prevents us from accumulating write obligations when read and // write progress at different rates. See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18, section // 4.5.3. ssl->s3->key_update_pending = true; } return 1; } int tls13_post_handshake(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg) { if (msg.type == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { ssl->s3->key_update_count++; if (ssl->s3->key_update_count > kMaxKeyUpdates) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); return 0; } return tls13_receive_key_update(ssl, msg); } ssl->s3->key_update_count = 0; if (msg.type == SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET && !ssl->server) { return tls13_process_new_session_ticket(ssl, msg); } ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); return 0; } } // namespace bssl