/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "../crypto/internal.h" #include "internal.h" int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) { /* The ex_data index to go from |X509_STORE_CTX| to |SSL| always uses the * reserved app_data slot. Before ex_data was introduced, app_data was used. * Avoid breaking any software which assumes |X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data| * works. */ return 0; } CERT *ssl_cert_new(const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method) { CERT *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT)); if (ret == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT)); ret->x509_method = x509_method; return ret; } static CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer_up_ref(CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer) { CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(buffer); return buffer; } CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) { CERT *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT)); if (ret == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT)); ret->chain = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_deep_copy(cert->chain, buffer_up_ref, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); if (cert->privatekey != NULL) { EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cert->privatekey); ret->privatekey = cert->privatekey; } ret->key_method = cert->key_method; ret->x509_method = cert->x509_method; if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) { ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp); if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } } ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb; if (cert->sigalgs != NULL) { ret->sigalgs = BUF_memdup(cert->sigalgs, cert->num_sigalgs * sizeof(cert->sigalgs[0])); if (ret->sigalgs == NULL) { goto err; } } ret->num_sigalgs = cert->num_sigalgs; ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb; ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg; if (cert->verify_store != NULL) { X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->verify_store); ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store; } if (cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list != NULL) { CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list); ret->signed_cert_timestamp_list = cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list; } if (cert->ocsp_response != NULL) { CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(cert->ocsp_response); ret->ocsp_response = cert->ocsp_response; } ret->sid_ctx_length = cert->sid_ctx_length; OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->sid_ctx, cert->sid_ctx, sizeof(ret->sid_ctx)); return ret; err: ssl_cert_free(ret); return NULL; } /* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */ void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *cert) { if (cert == NULL) { return; } cert->x509_method->cert_clear(cert); sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(cert->chain, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); cert->chain = NULL; EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey); cert->privatekey = NULL; cert->key_method = NULL; } void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) { if (c == NULL) { return; } DH_free(c->dh_tmp); ssl_cert_clear_certs(c); OPENSSL_free(c->sigalgs); X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store); CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(c->signed_cert_timestamp_list); CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(c->ocsp_response); OPENSSL_free(c); } static void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { c->cert_cb = cb; c->cert_cb_arg = arg; } int ssl_set_cert(CERT *cert, CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer) { CBS cert_cbs; CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(buffer, &cert_cbs); EVP_PKEY *pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&cert_cbs); if (pubkey == NULL) { return 0; } if (!ssl_is_key_type_supported(pubkey->type)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); return 0; } /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH or ECDSA. We only support ECDSA * certificates, so sanity-check the key usage extension. */ if (pubkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC && !ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(&cert_cbs)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); return 0; } if (cert->privatekey != NULL) { /* Sanity-check that the private key and the certificate match, unless the * key is opaque (in case of, say, a smartcard). */ if (!EVP_PKEY_is_opaque(cert->privatekey) && !ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(pubkey, cert->privatekey)) { /* don't fail for a cert/key mismatch, just free current private key * (when switching to a different cert & key, first this function should * be used, then ssl_set_pkey */ EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey); cert->privatekey = NULL; /* clear error queue */ ERR_clear_error(); } } EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); cert->x509_method->cert_flush_cached_leaf(cert); if (cert->chain != NULL) { CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0)); sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_set(cert->chain, 0, buffer); CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(buffer); return 1; } cert->chain = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null(); if (cert->chain == NULL) { return 0; } if (!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(cert->chain, buffer)) { sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(cert->chain); cert->chain = NULL; return 0; } CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(buffer); return 1; } int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t der_len, const uint8_t *der) { CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(der, der_len, NULL); if (buffer == NULL) { return 0; } const int ok = ssl_set_cert(ctx->cert, buffer); CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer); return ok; } int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der, size_t der_len) { CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(der, der_len, NULL); if (buffer == NULL) { return 0; } const int ok = ssl_set_cert(ssl->cert, buffer); CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer); return ok; } int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, long *out_verify_result, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain) { if (cert_chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(cert_chain) == 0) { return 0; } X509_STORE *verify_store = ssl->ctx->cert_store; if (ssl->cert->verify_store != NULL) { verify_store = ssl->cert->verify_store; } X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(cert_chain, 0); int ret = 0; X509_STORE_CTX ctx; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, verify_store, leaf, cert_chain)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB); return 0; } if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), ssl)) { goto err; } /* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by the * context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or vice * versa. */ X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, ssl->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server"); /* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the ctx. */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), ssl->param); if (ssl->verify_callback) { X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, ssl->verify_callback); } int verify_ret; if (ssl->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) { verify_ret = ssl->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, ssl->ctx->app_verify_arg); } else { verify_ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx); } *out_verify_result = ctx.error; /* If |SSL_VERIFY_NONE|, the error is non-fatal, but we keep the result. */ if (verify_ret <= 0 && ssl->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, ssl_verify_alarm_type(ctx.error)); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); goto err; } ERR_clear_error(); ret = 1; err: X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return ret; } static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free); *ca_list = name_list; } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); if (ret == NULL) { return NULL; } for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(list); i++) { X509_NAME *name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(list, i)); if (name == NULL || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) { X509_NAME_free(name); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); return NULL; } } return ret; } void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { set_client_CA_list(&ssl->client_CA, name_list); } void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { set_client_CA_list(&ctx->client_CA, name_list); } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->client_CA; } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *ssl) { /* For historical reasons, this function is used both to query configuration * state on a server as well as handshake state on a client. However, whether * |ssl| is a client or server is not known until explicitly configured with * |SSL_set_connect_state|. If |handshake_func| is NULL, |ssl| is in an * indeterminate mode and |ssl->server| is unset. */ if (ssl->handshake_func != NULL && !ssl->server) { if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL) { return ssl->s3->hs->ca_names; } return NULL; } if (ssl->client_CA != NULL) { return ssl->client_CA; } return ssl->ctx->client_CA; } static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, X509 *x509) { X509_NAME *name; if (x509 == NULL) { return 0; } if (*sk == NULL) { *sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); if (*sk == NULL) { return 0; } } name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x509)); if (name == NULL) { return 0; } if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) { X509_NAME_free(name); return 0; } return 1; } int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) { return add_client_CA(&ssl->client_CA, x509); } int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) { return add_client_CA(&ctx->client_CA, x509); } int ssl_has_certificate(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->cert->chain != NULL && sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(ssl->cert->chain, 0) != NULL && ssl_has_private_key(ssl); } STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *ssl_parse_cert_chain(uint8_t *out_alert, EVP_PKEY **out_pubkey, uint8_t *out_leaf_sha256, CBS *cbs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool) { *out_pubkey = NULL; STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *ret = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null(); if (ret == NULL) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } CBS certificate_list; if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(cbs, &certificate_list)) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) { CBS certificate; if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate) || CBS_len(&certificate) == 0) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(ret) == 0) { *out_pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&certificate); if (*out_pubkey == NULL) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto err; } /* Retain the hash of the leaf certificate if requested. */ if (out_leaf_sha256 != NULL) { SHA256(CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate), out_leaf_sha256); } } CRYPTO_BUFFER *buf = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&certificate, pool); if (buf == NULL) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto err; } if (!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(ret, buf)) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buf); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } return ret; err: EVP_PKEY_free(*out_pubkey); *out_pubkey = NULL; sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ret, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free); return NULL; } int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) { if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) { return CBB_add_u24(cbb, 0); } CBB certs; if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, &certs)) { goto err; } STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *chain = ssl->cert->chain; for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(chain); i++) { CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(chain, i); CBB child; if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certs, &child) || !CBB_add_bytes(&child, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer)) || !CBB_flush(&certs)) { goto err; } } return CBB_flush(cbb); err: OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* ssl_cert_skip_to_spki parses a DER-encoded, X.509 certificate from |in| and * positions |*out_tbs_cert| to cover the TBSCertificate, starting at the * subjectPublicKeyInfo. */ static int ssl_cert_skip_to_spki(const CBS *in, CBS *out_tbs_cert) { /* From RFC 5280, section 4.1 * Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { * tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, * signatureValue BIT STRING } * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { * version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, * serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber, * signature AlgorithmIdentifier, * issuer Name, * validity Validity, * subject Name, * subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo, * ... } */ CBS buf = *in; CBS toplevel; if (!CBS_get_asn1(&buf, &toplevel, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || CBS_len(&buf) != 0 || !CBS_get_asn1(&toplevel, out_tbs_cert, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || /* version */ !CBS_get_optional_asn1( out_tbs_cert, NULL, NULL, CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) || /* serialNumber */ !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) || /* signature algorithm */ !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || /* issuer */ !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || /* validity */ !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || /* subject */ !CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { return 0; } return 1; } EVP_PKEY *ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(const CBS *in) { CBS buf = *in, tbs_cert; if (!ssl_cert_skip_to_spki(&buf, &tbs_cert)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT); return NULL; } return EVP_parse_public_key(&tbs_cert); } int ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(const EVP_PKEY *pubkey, const EVP_PKEY *privkey) { int ret = 0; switch (EVP_PKEY_cmp(pubkey, privkey)) { case 1: ret = 1; break; case 0: OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); break; case -1: OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); break; case -2: OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); default: assert(0); break; } return ret; } int ssl_cert_check_private_key(const CERT *cert, const EVP_PKEY *privkey) { if (privkey == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return 0; } if (cert->chain == NULL || sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0) == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return 0; } CBS cert_cbs; CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0), &cert_cbs); EVP_PKEY *pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&cert_cbs); if (!pubkey) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); return 0; } const int ok = ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(pubkey, privkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); return ok; } int ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(const CBS *in) { CBS buf = *in; CBS tbs_cert, outer_extensions; int has_extensions; if (!ssl_cert_skip_to_spki(&buf, &tbs_cert) || /* subjectPublicKeyInfo */ !CBS_get_asn1(&tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || /* issuerUniqueID */ !CBS_get_optional_asn1( &tbs_cert, NULL, NULL, CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 1) || /* subjectUniqueID */ !CBS_get_optional_asn1( &tbs_cert, NULL, NULL, CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2) || !CBS_get_optional_asn1( &tbs_cert, &outer_extensions, &has_extensions, CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 3)) { goto parse_err; } if (!has_extensions) { return 1; } CBS extensions; if (!CBS_get_asn1(&outer_extensions, &extensions, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { goto parse_err; } while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0) { CBS extension, oid, contents; if (!CBS_get_asn1(&extensions, &extension, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || !CBS_get_asn1(&extension, &oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) || (CBS_peek_asn1_tag(&extension, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) && !CBS_get_asn1(&extension, NULL, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) || !CBS_get_asn1(&extension, &contents, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || CBS_len(&extension) != 0) { goto parse_err; } static const uint8_t kKeyUsageOID[3] = {0x55, 0x1d, 0x0f}; if (CBS_len(&oid) != sizeof(kKeyUsageOID) || OPENSSL_memcmp(CBS_data(&oid), kKeyUsageOID, sizeof(kKeyUsageOID)) != 0) { continue; } CBS bit_string; if (!CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &bit_string, CBS_ASN1_BITSTRING) || CBS_len(&contents) != 0) { goto parse_err; } /* This is the KeyUsage extension. See * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3 */ if (!CBS_is_valid_asn1_bitstring(&bit_string)) { goto parse_err; } if (!CBS_asn1_bitstring_has_bit(&bit_string, 0)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); return 0; } return 1; } /* No KeyUsage extension found. */ return 1; parse_err: OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT); return 0; } static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) { return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * ssl_parse_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *cbs) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); X509_NAME *name = NULL; if (ret == NULL) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } CBS child; if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &child)) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) { CBS distinguished_name; if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &distinguished_name)) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); goto err; } const uint8_t *ptr = CBS_data(&distinguished_name); /* A u16 length cannot overflow a long. */ name = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &ptr, (long)CBS_len(&distinguished_name)); if (name == NULL || ptr != CBS_data(&distinguished_name) + CBS_len(&distinguished_name)) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } name = NULL; } return ret; err: X509_NAME_free(name); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); return NULL; } int ssl_add_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) { CBB child, name_cbb; if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &child)) { return 0; } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl); if (sk == NULL) { return CBB_flush(cbb); } for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); int len = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); if (len < 0) { return 0; } uint8_t *ptr; if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &name_cbb) || !CBB_add_space(&name_cbb, &ptr, (size_t)len) || (len > 0 && i2d_X509_NAME(name, &ptr) < 0)) { return 0; } } return CBB_flush(cbb); } static int set_cert_store(X509_STORE **store_ptr, X509_STORE *new_store, int take_ref) { X509_STORE_free(*store_ptr); *store_ptr = new_store; if (new_store != NULL && take_ref) { X509_STORE_up_ref(new_store); } return 1; } int SSL_CTX_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) { return set_cert_store(&ctx->cert->verify_store, store, 0); } int SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) { return set_cert_store(&ctx->cert->verify_store, store, 1); } int SSL_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL *ssl, X509_STORE *store) { return set_cert_store(&ssl->cert->verify_store, store, 0); } int SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL *ssl, X509_STORE *store) { return set_cert_store(&ssl->cert->verify_store, store, 1); } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(ctx->cert, cb, arg); } void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(ssl->cert, cb, arg); } int ssl_check_leaf_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; assert(ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION); /* Check the certificate's type matches the cipher. */ int expected_type = ssl_cipher_get_key_type(hs->new_cipher); assert(expected_type != EVP_PKEY_NONE); if (pkey->type != expected_type) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); return 0; } if (hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) { CBS leaf_cbs; CBS_init(&leaf_cbs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(leaf), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(leaf)); /* ECDSA and ECDH certificates use the same public key format. Instead, * they are distinguished by the key usage extension in the certificate. */ if (!ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(&leaf_cbs)) { return 0; } EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey); if (ec_key == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); return 0; } /* Check the key's group and point format are acceptable. */ uint16_t group_id; if (!ssl_nid_to_group_id( &group_id, EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key))) || !tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id) || EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec_key) != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); return 0; } } return 1; } static int do_client_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, void *arg) { if (ssl_has_certificate(ssl) || ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb == NULL) { return 1; } X509 *x509 = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int ret = ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb(ssl, &x509, &pkey); if (ret < 0) { return -1; } if (ret != 0) { if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey)) { return 0; } } X509_free(x509); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return 1; } void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **out_x509, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey)) { /* Emulate the old client certificate callback with the new one. */ SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(ctx, do_client_cert_cb, NULL); ctx->client_cert_cb = cb; } static int set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(CERT *cert, const uint8_t *list, size_t list_len) { CBS sct_list; CBS_init(&sct_list, list, list_len); if (!ssl_is_sct_list_valid(&sct_list)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SCT_LIST); return 0; } CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list); cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(CBS_data(&sct_list), CBS_len(&sct_list), NULL); return cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list != NULL; } int SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *list, size_t list_len) { return set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(ctx->cert, list, list_len); } int SSL_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *list, size_t list_len) { return set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(ssl->cert, list, list_len); } int SSL_CTX_set_ocsp_response(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *response, size_t response_len) { CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(ctx->cert->ocsp_response); ctx->cert->ocsp_response = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(response, response_len, NULL); return ctx->cert->ocsp_response != NULL; } int SSL_set_ocsp_response(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *response, size_t response_len) { CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(ssl->cert->ocsp_response); ssl->cert->ocsp_response = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(response, response_len, NULL); return ssl->cert->ocsp_response != NULL; }