/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "../crypto/internal.h" #include "internal.h" /* An SSL_SESSION is serialized as the following ASN.1 structure: * * SSLSession ::= SEQUENCE { * version INTEGER (1), -- session structure version * sslVersion INTEGER, -- protocol version number * cipher OCTET STRING, -- two bytes long * sessionID OCTET STRING, * masterKey OCTET STRING, * time [1] INTEGER, -- seconds since UNIX epoch * timeout [2] INTEGER, -- in seconds * peer [3] Certificate OPTIONAL, * sessionIDContext [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, * verifyResult [5] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- one of X509_V_* codes * hostName [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, * -- from server_name extension * pskIdentity [8] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, * ticketLifetimeHint [9] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- client-only * ticket [10] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- client-only * peerSHA256 [13] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, * originalHandshakeHash [14] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, * signedCertTimestampList [15] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, * -- contents of SCT extension * ocspResponse [16] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, * -- stapled OCSP response from the server * extendedMasterSecret [17] BOOLEAN OPTIONAL, * groupID [18] INTEGER OPTIONAL, * -- For historical reasons, for static RSA -- ciphers, this field contains another -- value to be discarded. * certChain [19] SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL, * ticketAgeAdd [21] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, * isServer [22] BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE, * peerSignatureAlgorithm [23] INTEGER OPTIONAL, * ticketMaxEarlyData [24] INTEGER OPTIONAL, * authTimeout [25] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- defaults to timeout * earlyALPN [26] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, * } * * Note: historically this serialization has included other optional * fields. Their presence is currently treated as a parse error: * * keyArg [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, * pskIdentityHint [7] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, * compressionMethod [11] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, * srpUsername [12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, * ticketFlags [20] INTEGER OPTIONAL, */ static const unsigned kVersion = 1; static const int kTimeTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 1; static const int kTimeoutTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2; static const int kPeerTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 3; static const int kSessionIDContextTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 4; static const int kVerifyResultTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 5; static const int kHostNameTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 6; static const int kPSKIdentityTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 8; static const int kTicketLifetimeHintTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 9; static const int kTicketTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 10; static const int kPeerSHA256Tag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 13; static const int kOriginalHandshakeHashTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 14; static const int kSignedCertTimestampListTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 15; static const int kOCSPResponseTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 16; static const int kExtendedMasterSecretTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 17; static const int kGroupIDTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 18; static const int kCertChainTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 19; static const int kTicketAgeAddTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 21; static const int kIsServerTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 22; static const int kPeerSignatureAlgorithmTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 23; static const int kTicketMaxEarlyDataTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 24; static const int kAuthTimeoutTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 25; static const int kEarlyALPNTag = CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 26; static int SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_full(const SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **out_data, size_t *out_len, int for_ticket) { CBB cbb, session, child, child2; if (in == NULL || in->cipher == NULL) { return 0; } CBB_zero(&cbb); if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) || !CBB_add_asn1(&cbb, &session, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&session, kVersion) || !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&session, in->ssl_version) || !CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || !CBB_add_u16(&child, (uint16_t)(in->cipher->id & 0xffff)) || !CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || /* The session ID is irrelevant for a session ticket. */ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, in->session_id, for_ticket ? 0 : in->session_id_length) || !CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || !CBB_add_bytes(&child, in->master_key, in->master_key_length) || !CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTimeTag) || !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->time) || !CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTimeoutTag) || !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->timeout)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* The peer certificate is only serialized if the SHA-256 isn't * serialized instead. */ if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(in->certs) > 0 && !in->peer_sha256_valid) { const CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(in->certs, 0); if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kPeerTag) || !CBB_add_bytes(&child, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer))) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } /* Although it is OPTIONAL and usually empty, OpenSSL has * historically always encoded the sid_ctx. */ if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kSessionIDContextTag) || !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->sid_ctx, in->sid_ctx_length)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (in->verify_result != X509_V_OK) { if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kVerifyResultTag) || !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->verify_result)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (in->tlsext_hostname) { if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kHostNameTag) || !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, (const uint8_t *)in->tlsext_hostname, strlen(in->tlsext_hostname))) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (in->psk_identity) { if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kPSKIdentityTag) || !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, (const uint8_t *)in->psk_identity, strlen(in->psk_identity))) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint > 0) { if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTicketLifetimeHintTag) || !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (in->tlsext_tick && !for_ticket) { if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTicketTag) || !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->tlsext_tick, in->tlsext_ticklen)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (in->peer_sha256_valid) { if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kPeerSHA256Tag) || !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->peer_sha256, sizeof(in->peer_sha256))) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (in->original_handshake_hash_len > 0) { if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kOriginalHandshakeHashTag) || !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->original_handshake_hash, in->original_handshake_hash_len)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (in->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length > 0) { if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kSignedCertTimestampListTag) || !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list, in->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (in->ocsp_response_length > 0) { if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kOCSPResponseTag) || !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, in->ocsp_response, in->ocsp_response_length)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (in->extended_master_secret) { if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kExtendedMasterSecretTag) || !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) || !CBB_add_u8(&child2, 0xff)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (in->group_id > 0 && (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kGroupIDTag) || !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->group_id))) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* The certificate chain is only serialized if the leaf's SHA-256 isn't * serialized instead. */ if (in->certs != NULL && !in->peer_sha256_valid && sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(in->certs) >= 2) { if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kCertChainTag)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } for (size_t i = 1; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(in->certs); i++) { const CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(in->certs, i); if (!CBB_add_bytes(&child, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer))) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } } if (in->ticket_age_add_valid) { if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTicketAgeAddTag) || !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || !CBB_add_u32(&child2, in->ticket_age_add)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (!in->is_server) { if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kIsServerTag) || !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) || !CBB_add_u8(&child2, 0x00)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (in->peer_signature_algorithm != 0 && (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kPeerSignatureAlgorithmTag) || !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->peer_signature_algorithm))) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (in->ticket_max_early_data != 0 && (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kTicketMaxEarlyDataTag) || !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->ticket_max_early_data))) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (in->timeout != in->auth_timeout && (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kAuthTimeoutTag) || !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&child, in->auth_timeout))) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (in->early_alpn) { if (!CBB_add_asn1(&session, &child, kEarlyALPNTag) || !CBB_add_asn1(&child, &child2, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || !CBB_add_bytes(&child2, (const uint8_t *)in->early_alpn, in->early_alpn_len)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, out_data, out_len)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } return 1; err: CBB_cleanup(&cbb); return 0; } int SSL_SESSION_to_bytes(const SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **out_data, size_t *out_len) { if (in->not_resumable) { /* If the caller has an unresumable session, e.g. if |SSL_get_session| were * called on a TLS 1.3 or False Started connection, serialize with a * placeholder value so it is not accidentally deserialized into a resumable * one. */ static const char kNotResumableSession[] = "NOT RESUMABLE"; *out_len = strlen(kNotResumableSession); *out_data = BUF_memdup(kNotResumableSession, *out_len); if (*out_data == NULL) { return 0; } return 1; } return SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_full(in, out_data, out_len, 0); } int SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(const SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **out_data, size_t *out_len) { return SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_full(in, out_data, out_len, 1); } int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **pp) { uint8_t *out; size_t len; if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes(in, &out, &len)) { return -1; } if (len > INT_MAX) { OPENSSL_free(out); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); return -1; } if (pp) { OPENSSL_memcpy(*pp, out, len); *pp += len; } OPENSSL_free(out); return len; } /* SSL_SESSION_parse_string gets an optional ASN.1 OCTET STRING * explicitly tagged with |tag| from |cbs| and saves it in |*out|. On * entry, if |*out| is not NULL, it frees the existing contents. If * the element was not found, it sets |*out| to NULL. It returns one * on success, whether or not the element was found, and zero on * decode error. */ static int SSL_SESSION_parse_string(CBS *cbs, char **out, unsigned tag) { CBS value; int present; if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(cbs, &value, &present, tag)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); return 0; } if (present) { if (CBS_contains_zero_byte(&value)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); return 0; } if (!CBS_strdup(&value, out)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } else { OPENSSL_free(*out); *out = NULL; } return 1; } /* SSL_SESSION_parse_string gets an optional ASN.1 OCTET STRING * explicitly tagged with |tag| from |cbs| and stows it in |*out_ptr| * and |*out_len|. If |*out_ptr| is not NULL, it frees the existing * contents. On entry, if the element was not found, it sets * |*out_ptr| to NULL. It returns one on success, whether or not the * element was found, and zero on decode error. */ static int SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(CBS *cbs, uint8_t **out_ptr, size_t *out_len, unsigned tag) { CBS value; if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(cbs, &value, NULL, tag)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); return 0; } if (!CBS_stow(&value, out_ptr, out_len)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; } /* SSL_SESSION_parse_bounded_octet_string parses an optional ASN.1 OCTET STRING * explicitly tagged with |tag| of size at most |max_out|. */ static int SSL_SESSION_parse_bounded_octet_string( CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_len, uint8_t max_out, unsigned tag) { CBS value; if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(cbs, &value, NULL, tag) || CBS_len(&value) > max_out) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); return 0; } OPENSSL_memcpy(out, CBS_data(&value), CBS_len(&value)); *out_len = (uint8_t)CBS_len(&value); return 1; } static int SSL_SESSION_parse_long(CBS *cbs, long *out, unsigned tag, long default_value) { uint64_t value; if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_uint64(cbs, &value, tag, (uint64_t)default_value) || value > LONG_MAX) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); return 0; } *out = (long)value; return 1; } static int SSL_SESSION_parse_u32(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out, unsigned tag, uint32_t default_value) { uint64_t value; if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_uint64(cbs, &value, tag, (uint64_t)default_value) || value > 0xffffffff) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); return 0; } *out = (uint32_t)value; return 1; } static int SSL_SESSION_parse_u16(CBS *cbs, uint16_t *out, unsigned tag, uint16_t default_value) { uint64_t value; if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_uint64(cbs, &value, tag, (uint64_t)default_value) || value > 0xffff) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); return 0; } *out = (uint16_t)value; return 1; } SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_parse(CBS *cbs, const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method, CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool) { SSL_SESSION *ret = ssl_session_new(x509_method); if (ret == NULL) { goto err; } CBS session; uint64_t version, ssl_version; if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &session, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&session, &version) || version != kVersion || !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&session, &ssl_version)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); goto err; } ret->ssl_version = ssl_version; CBS cipher; uint16_t cipher_value; if (!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &cipher, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || !CBS_get_u16(&cipher, &cipher_value) || CBS_len(&cipher) != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); goto err; } ret->cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_value); if (ret->cipher == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); goto err; } CBS session_id, master_key; if (!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &session_id, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH || !CBS_get_asn1(&session, &master_key, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || CBS_len(&master_key) > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); goto err; } OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id), CBS_len(&session_id)); ret->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id); OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->master_key, CBS_data(&master_key), CBS_len(&master_key)); ret->master_key_length = CBS_len(&master_key); CBS child; uint64_t timeout; if (!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &child, kTimeTag) || !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&child, &ret->time) || !CBS_get_asn1(&session, &child, kTimeoutTag) || !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&child, &timeout) || timeout > UINT32_MAX) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); goto err; } ret->timeout = (uint32_t)timeout; CBS peer; int has_peer; if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1(&session, &peer, &has_peer, kPeerTag) || (has_peer && CBS_len(&peer) == 0)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); goto err; } /* |peer| is processed with the certificate chain. */ if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_bounded_octet_string( &session, ret->sid_ctx, &ret->sid_ctx_length, sizeof(ret->sid_ctx), kSessionIDContextTag) || !SSL_SESSION_parse_long(&session, &ret->verify_result, kVerifyResultTag, X509_V_OK) || !SSL_SESSION_parse_string(&session, &ret->tlsext_hostname, kHostNameTag) || !SSL_SESSION_parse_string(&session, &ret->psk_identity, kPSKIdentityTag) || !SSL_SESSION_parse_u32(&session, &ret->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, kTicketLifetimeHintTag, 0) || !SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(&session, &ret->tlsext_tick, &ret->tlsext_ticklen, kTicketTag)) { goto err; } if (CBS_peek_asn1_tag(&session, kPeerSHA256Tag)) { CBS peer_sha256; if (!CBS_get_asn1(&session, &child, kPeerSHA256Tag) || !CBS_get_asn1(&child, &peer_sha256, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) || CBS_len(&peer_sha256) != sizeof(ret->peer_sha256) || CBS_len(&child) != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); goto err; } OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->peer_sha256, CBS_data(&peer_sha256), sizeof(ret->peer_sha256)); ret->peer_sha256_valid = 1; } else { ret->peer_sha256_valid = 0; } if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_bounded_octet_string( &session, ret->original_handshake_hash, &ret->original_handshake_hash_len, sizeof(ret->original_handshake_hash), kOriginalHandshakeHashTag) || !SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string( &session, &ret->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list, &ret->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length, kSignedCertTimestampListTag) || !SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string( &session, &ret->ocsp_response, &ret->ocsp_response_length, kOCSPResponseTag)) { goto err; } int extended_master_secret; if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_bool(&session, &extended_master_secret, kExtendedMasterSecretTag, 0 /* default to false */)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); goto err; } ret->extended_master_secret = !!extended_master_secret; uint32_t value; if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_u32(&session, &value, kGroupIDTag, 0)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); goto err; } /* Historically, the group_id field was used for key-exchange-specific * information. Discard all but the group ID. */ if (ret->cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) { value = 0; } if (value > 0xffff) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); goto err; } ret->group_id = (uint16_t)value; CBS cert_chain; CBS_init(&cert_chain, NULL, 0); int has_cert_chain; if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1(&session, &cert_chain, &has_cert_chain, kCertChainTag) || (has_cert_chain && CBS_len(&cert_chain) == 0)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); goto err; } if (has_cert_chain && !has_peer) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); goto err; } if (has_peer || has_cert_chain) { ret->certs = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null(); if (ret->certs == NULL) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (has_peer) { /* TODO(agl): this should use the |SSL_CTX|'s pool. */ CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&peer, pool); if (buffer == NULL || !sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(ret->certs, buffer)) { CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } while (CBS_len(&cert_chain) > 0) { CBS cert; if (!CBS_get_any_asn1_element(&cert_chain, &cert, NULL, NULL) || CBS_len(&cert) == 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); goto err; } /* TODO(agl): this should use the |SSL_CTX|'s pool. */ CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&cert, pool); if (buffer == NULL || !sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(ret->certs, buffer)) { CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer); OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } } if (!x509_method->session_cache_objects(ret)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); goto err; } CBS age_add; int age_add_present; if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string(&session, &age_add, &age_add_present, kTicketAgeAddTag) || (age_add_present && !CBS_get_u32(&age_add, &ret->ticket_age_add)) || CBS_len(&age_add) != 0) { goto err; } ret->ticket_age_add_valid = age_add_present; int is_server; if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1_bool(&session, &is_server, kIsServerTag, 1 /* default to true */)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); goto err; } /* TODO: in time we can include |is_server| for servers too, then we can enforce that client and server sessions are never mixed up. */ ret->is_server = is_server; if (!SSL_SESSION_parse_u16(&session, &ret->peer_signature_algorithm, kPeerSignatureAlgorithmTag, 0) || !SSL_SESSION_parse_u32(&session, &ret->ticket_max_early_data, kTicketMaxEarlyDataTag, 0) || !SSL_SESSION_parse_u32(&session, &ret->auth_timeout, kAuthTimeoutTag, ret->timeout) || !SSL_SESSION_parse_octet_string(&session, &ret->early_alpn, &ret->early_alpn_len, kEarlyALPNTag) || CBS_len(&session) != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); goto err; } return ret; err: SSL_SESSION_free(ret); return NULL; } SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const SSL_CTX *ctx) { CBS cbs; CBS_init(&cbs, in, in_len); SSL_SESSION *ret = SSL_SESSION_parse(&cbs, ctx->x509_method, ctx->pool); if (ret == NULL) { return NULL; } if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SSL_SESSION); SSL_SESSION_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; }