10f97f3bfc
This reverts commit 09feb0f3d9
.
(In order to make WebRTC happy this also needs to be reverted.)
364 lines
12 KiB
C++
364 lines
12 KiB
C++
/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
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#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
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#include <vector>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/ec.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/nid.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "../test/scoped_types.h"
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enum Api {
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kEncodedApi,
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kRawApi,
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};
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// VerifyECDSASig returns true on success, false on failure.
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static bool VerifyECDSASig(Api api, const uint8_t *digest,
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size_t digest_len, const ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sig,
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EC_KEY *eckey, int expected_result) {
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int actual_result;
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switch (api) {
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case kEncodedApi: {
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uint8_t *der;
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size_t der_len;
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if (!ECDSA_SIG_to_bytes(&der, &der_len, ecdsa_sig)) {
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return false;
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}
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ScopedOpenSSLBytes delete_der(der);
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actual_result = ECDSA_verify(0, digest, digest_len, der, der_len, eckey);
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break;
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}
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case kRawApi:
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actual_result = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, digest_len, ecdsa_sig, eckey);
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break;
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default:
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return false;
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}
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return expected_result == actual_result;
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}
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// TestTamperedSig verifies that signature verification fails when a valid
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// signature is tampered with. |ecdsa_sig| must be a valid signature, which will
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// be modified. TestTamperedSig returns true on success, false on failure.
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static bool TestTamperedSig(FILE *out, Api api, const uint8_t *digest,
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size_t digest_len, ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_sig,
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EC_KEY *eckey, const BIGNUM *order) {
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// Modify a single byte of the signature: to ensure we don't
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// garble the ASN1 structure, we read the raw signature and
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// modify a byte in one of the bignums directly.
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// Store the two BIGNUMs in raw_buf.
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size_t r_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->r);
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size_t s_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->s);
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size_t bn_len = BN_num_bytes(order);
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if (r_len > bn_len || s_len > bn_len) {
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return false;
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}
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size_t buf_len = 2 * bn_len;
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std::vector<uint8_t> raw_buf(buf_len);
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// Pad the bignums with leading zeroes.
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if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(raw_buf.data(), bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) ||
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!BN_bn2bin_padded(raw_buf.data() + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s)) {
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return false;
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}
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// Modify a single byte in the buffer.
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size_t offset = raw_buf[10] % buf_len;
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uint8_t dirt = raw_buf[11] ? raw_buf[11] : 1;
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raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
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// Now read the BIGNUMs back in from raw_buf.
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if (BN_bin2bn(raw_buf.data(), bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL ||
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BN_bin2bn(raw_buf.data() + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL ||
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!VerifyECDSASig(api, digest, digest_len, ecdsa_sig, eckey, 0)) {
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return false;
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}
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// Sanity check: Undo the modification and verify signature.
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raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
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if (BN_bin2bn(raw_buf.data(), bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL ||
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BN_bin2bn(raw_buf.data() + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL ||
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!VerifyECDSASig(api, digest, digest_len, ecdsa_sig, eckey, 1)) {
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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static bool TestBuiltin(FILE *out) {
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// Fill digest values with some random data.
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uint8_t digest[20], wrong_digest[20];
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if (!RAND_bytes(digest, 20) || !RAND_bytes(wrong_digest, 20)) {
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fprintf(out, "ERROR: unable to get random data\n");
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return false;
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}
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static const struct {
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int nid;
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const char *name;
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} kCurves[] = {
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{ NID_secp224r1, "secp224r1" },
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{ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, "secp256r1" },
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{ NID_secp384r1, "secp384r1" },
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{ NID_secp521r1, "secp521r1" },
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{ NID_undef, NULL }
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};
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// Create and verify ECDSA signatures with every available curve.
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fputs("\ntesting ECDSA_sign(), ECDSA_verify(), ECDSA_do_sign(), and "
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"ECDSA_do_verify() with some internal curves:\n", out);
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for (size_t n = 0; kCurves[n].nid != NID_undef; n++) {
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fprintf(out, "%s: ", kCurves[n].name);
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int nid = kCurves[n].nid;
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ScopedEC_GROUP group(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid));
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if (!group) {
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fprintf(out, " failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group.get());
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if (BN_num_bits(order) < 160) {
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// Too small to test.
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fprintf(out, " skipped\n");
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continue;
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}
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// Create a new ECDSA key.
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ScopedEC_KEY eckey(EC_KEY_new());
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if (!eckey || !EC_KEY_set_group(eckey.get(), group.get()) ||
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!EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey.get())) {
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fprintf(out, " failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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// Create a second key.
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ScopedEC_KEY wrong_eckey(EC_KEY_new());
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if (!wrong_eckey || !EC_KEY_set_group(wrong_eckey.get(), group.get()) ||
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!EC_KEY_generate_key(wrong_eckey.get())) {
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fprintf(out, " failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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fprintf(out, ".");
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fflush(out);
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// Check the key.
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if (!EC_KEY_check_key(eckey.get())) {
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fprintf(out, " failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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fprintf(out, ".");
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fflush(out);
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// Test ASN.1-encoded signatures.
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// Create a signature.
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unsigned sig_len = ECDSA_size(eckey.get());
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std::vector<uint8_t> signature(sig_len);
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if (!ECDSA_sign(0, digest, 20, signature.data(), &sig_len, eckey.get())) {
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fprintf(out, " failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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signature.resize(sig_len);
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fprintf(out, ".");
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fflush(out);
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// Verify the signature.
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if (!ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature.data(), signature.size(),
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eckey.get())) {
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fprintf(out, " failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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fprintf(out, ".");
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fflush(out);
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// Verify the signature with the wrong key.
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if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature.data(), signature.size(),
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wrong_eckey.get())) {
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fprintf(out, " failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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fprintf(out, ".");
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fflush(out);
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// Verify the signature using the wrong digest.
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if (ECDSA_verify(0, wrong_digest, 20, signature.data(), signature.size(),
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eckey.get())) {
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fprintf(out, " failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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fprintf(out, ".");
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fflush(out);
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// Verify a truncated signature.
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if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature.data(), signature.size() - 1,
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eckey.get())) {
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fprintf(out, " failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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fprintf(out, ".");
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fflush(out);
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// Verify a tampered signature.
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ScopedECDSA_SIG ecdsa_sig(ECDSA_SIG_from_bytes(
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signature.data(), signature.size()));
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if (!ecdsa_sig ||
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!TestTamperedSig(out, kEncodedApi, digest, 20, ecdsa_sig.get(),
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eckey.get(), order)) {
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fprintf(out, " failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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fprintf(out, ".");
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fflush(out);
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// Test ECDSA_SIG signing and verification.
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// Create a signature.
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ecdsa_sig.reset(ECDSA_do_sign(digest, 20, eckey.get()));
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if (!ecdsa_sig) {
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fprintf(out, " failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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fprintf(out, ".");
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fflush(out);
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// Verify the signature using the correct key.
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if (!ECDSA_do_verify(digest, 20, ecdsa_sig.get(), eckey.get())) {
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fprintf(out, " failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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fprintf(out, ".");
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fflush(out);
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// Verify the signature with the wrong key.
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if (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, 20, ecdsa_sig.get(), wrong_eckey.get())) {
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fprintf(out, " failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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fprintf(out, ".");
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fflush(out);
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// Verify the signature using the wrong digest.
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if (ECDSA_do_verify(wrong_digest, 20, ecdsa_sig.get(), eckey.get())) {
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fprintf(out, " failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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fprintf(out, ".");
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fflush(out);
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// Verify a tampered signature.
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if (!TestTamperedSig(out, kRawApi, digest, 20, ecdsa_sig.get(), eckey.get(),
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order)) {
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fprintf(out, " failed\n");
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return false;
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}
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fprintf(out, ".");
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fflush(out);
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fprintf(out, " ok\n");
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// Clear bogus errors.
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ERR_clear_error();
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}
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return true;
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}
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static bool TestECDSA_SIG_max_len(size_t order_len) {
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/* Create the largest possible |ECDSA_SIG| of the given constraints. */
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ScopedECDSA_SIG sig(ECDSA_SIG_new());
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if (!sig) {
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return false;
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}
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std::vector<uint8_t> bytes(order_len, 0xff);
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if (!BN_bin2bn(bytes.data(), bytes.size(), sig->r) ||
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!BN_bin2bn(bytes.data(), bytes.size(), sig->s)) {
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return false;
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}
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/* Serialize it. */
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uint8_t *der;
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size_t der_len;
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if (!ECDSA_SIG_to_bytes(&der, &der_len, sig.get())) {
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return false;
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}
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ScopedOpenSSLBytes delete_der(der);
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size_t max_len = ECDSA_SIG_max_len(order_len);
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if (max_len != der_len) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ECDSA_SIG_max_len(%u) returned %u, wanted %u\n",
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static_cast<unsigned>(order_len), static_cast<unsigned>(max_len),
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static_cast<unsigned>(der_len));
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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static size_t BitsToBytes(size_t bits) {
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return (bits / 8) + (7 + (bits % 8)) / 8;
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}
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int main(void) {
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CRYPTO_library_init();
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if (!TestBuiltin(stdout) ||
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!TestECDSA_SIG_max_len(BitsToBytes(224)) ||
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!TestECDSA_SIG_max_len(BitsToBytes(256)) ||
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!TestECDSA_SIG_max_len(BitsToBytes(384)) ||
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!TestECDSA_SIG_max_len(BitsToBytes(521)) ||
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!TestECDSA_SIG_max_len(BitsToBytes(10000))) {
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printf("\nECDSA test failed\n");
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ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
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return 1;
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}
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printf("\nPASS\n");
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return 0;
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}
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