6fb174e564
These ASN.1 macros are the last references to the old-style OpenSSL locks that remain. The ASN.1 reference count handling was changed in a previous commit to use |CRYPTO_refcount_*| so these lock references were unused anyway. Change-Id: I1b27eef140723050a8e6878a1bea11da3409d0eb Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4776 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
561 lines
15 KiB
C
561 lines
15 KiB
C
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
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#include <openssl/asn1.h>
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#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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#include <openssl/digest.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/obj.h>
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#include <openssl/stack.h>
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#include <openssl/thread.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include "../internal.h"
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/* Method to handle CRL access.
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* In general a CRL could be very large (several Mb) and can consume large
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* amounts of resources if stored in memory by multiple processes.
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* This method allows general CRL operations to be redirected to more
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* efficient callbacks: for example a CRL entry database.
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*/
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#define X509_CRL_METHOD_DYNAMIC 1
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struct x509_crl_method_st
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{
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int flags;
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int (*crl_init)(X509_CRL *crl);
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int (*crl_free)(X509_CRL *crl);
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int (*crl_lookup)(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret,
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ASN1_INTEGER *ser, X509_NAME *issuer);
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int (*crl_verify)(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk);
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};
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static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED **a,
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const X509_REVOKED **b);
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static void setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp);
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ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_REVOKED) = {
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ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REVOKED,serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
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ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REVOKED,revocationDate, ASN1_TIME),
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ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_REVOKED,extensions, X509_EXTENSION)
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} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_REVOKED)
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static int def_crl_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r);
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static int def_crl_lookup(X509_CRL *crl,
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X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial, X509_NAME *issuer);
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static const X509_CRL_METHOD int_crl_meth =
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{
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0,
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0,0,
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def_crl_lookup,
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def_crl_verify
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};
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static const X509_CRL_METHOD *default_crl_method = &int_crl_meth;
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/* The X509_CRL_INFO structure needs a bit of customisation.
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* Since we cache the original encoding the signature wont be affected by
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* reordering of the revoked field.
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*/
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static int crl_inf_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
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void *exarg)
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{
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X509_CRL_INFO *a = (X509_CRL_INFO *)*pval;
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if(!a || !a->revoked) return 1;
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switch(operation) {
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/* Just set cmp function here. We don't sort because that
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* would affect the output of X509_CRL_print().
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*/
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case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST:
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(void)sk_X509_REVOKED_set_cmp_func(a->revoked,X509_REVOKED_cmp);
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break;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CRL_INFO, enc, crl_inf_cb) = {
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ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
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ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
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ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, issuer, X509_NAME),
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ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, lastUpdate, ASN1_TIME),
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ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, nextUpdate, ASN1_TIME),
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ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, revoked, X509_REVOKED),
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ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 0)
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} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CRL_INFO, X509_CRL_INFO)
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/* Set CRL entry issuer according to CRL certificate issuer extension.
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* Check for unhandled critical CRL entry extensions.
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*/
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static int crl_set_issuers(X509_CRL *crl)
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{
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size_t i, k;
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int j;
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GENERAL_NAMES *gens, *gtmp;
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STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revoked;
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revoked = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl);
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gens = NULL;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revoked); i++)
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{
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X509_REVOKED *rev = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revoked, i);
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STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
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ASN1_ENUMERATED *reason;
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X509_EXTENSION *ext;
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gtmp = X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(rev,
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NID_certificate_issuer,
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&j, NULL);
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if (!gtmp && (j != -1))
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{
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crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
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return 1;
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}
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if (gtmp)
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{
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gens = gtmp;
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if (!crl->issuers)
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{
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crl->issuers = sk_GENERAL_NAMES_new_null();
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if (!crl->issuers)
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return 0;
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}
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if (!sk_GENERAL_NAMES_push(crl->issuers, gtmp))
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return 0;
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}
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rev->issuer = gens;
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reason = X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(rev, NID_crl_reason,
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&j, NULL);
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if (!reason && (j != -1))
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{
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crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
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return 1;
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}
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if (reason)
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{
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rev->reason = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(reason);
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ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(reason);
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}
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else
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rev->reason = CRL_REASON_NONE;
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/* Check for critical CRL entry extensions */
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exts = rev->extensions;
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for (k = 0; k < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); k++)
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{
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ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, k);
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if (ext->critical > 0)
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{
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if (OBJ_obj2nid(ext->object) ==
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NID_certificate_issuer)
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continue;
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crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/* The X509_CRL structure needs a bit of customisation. Cache some extensions
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* and hash of the whole CRL.
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*/
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static int crl_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
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void *exarg)
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{
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X509_CRL *crl = (X509_CRL *)*pval;
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STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
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X509_EXTENSION *ext;
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size_t idx;
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switch(operation)
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{
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case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
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crl->idp = NULL;
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crl->akid = NULL;
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crl->flags = 0;
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crl->idp_flags = 0;
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crl->idp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
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crl->meth = default_crl_method;
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crl->meth_data = NULL;
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crl->issuers = NULL;
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crl->crl_number = NULL;
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crl->base_crl_number = NULL;
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break;
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case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST:
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X509_CRL_digest(crl, EVP_sha1(), crl->sha1_hash, NULL);
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crl->idp = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
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NID_issuing_distribution_point, NULL, NULL);
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if (crl->idp)
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setup_idp(crl, crl->idp);
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crl->akid = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
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NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
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crl->crl_number = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
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NID_crl_number, NULL, NULL);
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crl->base_crl_number = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
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NID_delta_crl, NULL, NULL);
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/* Delta CRLs must have CRL number */
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if (crl->base_crl_number && !crl->crl_number)
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crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
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/* See if we have any unhandled critical CRL extensions and
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* indicate this in a flag. We only currently handle IDP so
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* anything else critical sets the flag.
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*
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* This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly:
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* applications shouldn't do this.
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*/
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exts = crl->crl->extensions;
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for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)
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{
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int nid;
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ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
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nid = OBJ_obj2nid(ext->object);
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if (nid == NID_freshest_crl)
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crl->flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
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if (ext->critical > 0)
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{
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/* We handle IDP and deltas */
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if ((nid == NID_issuing_distribution_point)
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|| (nid == NID_authority_key_identifier)
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|| (nid == NID_delta_crl))
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break;;
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crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (!crl_set_issuers(crl))
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return 0;
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if (crl->meth->crl_init)
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{
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if (crl->meth->crl_init(crl) == 0)
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return 0;
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}
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break;
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case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST:
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if (crl->meth->crl_free)
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{
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if (!crl->meth->crl_free(crl))
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return 0;
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}
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if (crl->akid)
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AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(crl->akid);
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if (crl->idp)
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ISSUING_DIST_POINT_free(crl->idp);
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ASN1_INTEGER_free(crl->crl_number);
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ASN1_INTEGER_free(crl->base_crl_number);
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sk_GENERAL_NAMES_pop_free(crl->issuers, GENERAL_NAMES_free);
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break;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/* Convert IDP into a more convenient form */
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static void setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp)
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{
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int idp_only = 0;
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/* Set various flags according to IDP */
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crl->idp_flags |= IDP_PRESENT;
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if (idp->onlyuser > 0)
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{
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idp_only++;
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crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYUSER;
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}
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if (idp->onlyCA > 0)
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{
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idp_only++;
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crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYCA;
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}
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if (idp->onlyattr > 0)
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{
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idp_only++;
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crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYATTR;
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}
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if (idp_only > 1)
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crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INVALID;
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if (idp->indirectCRL > 0)
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crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INDIRECT;
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if (idp->onlysomereasons)
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{
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crl->idp_flags |= IDP_REASONS;
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if (idp->onlysomereasons->length > 0)
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crl->idp_reasons = idp->onlysomereasons->data[0];
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if (idp->onlysomereasons->length > 1)
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crl->idp_reasons |=
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(idp->onlysomereasons->data[1] << 8);
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crl->idp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
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}
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DIST_POINT_set_dpname(idp->distpoint, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl));
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}
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ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_CRL, crl_cb) = {
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ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, crl, X509_CRL_INFO),
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ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
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ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
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} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509_CRL, X509_CRL)
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IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REVOKED)
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IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_REVOKED)
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IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL_INFO)
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IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL)
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IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_CRL)
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static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED **a,
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const X509_REVOKED **b)
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{
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return(ASN1_STRING_cmp(
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(ASN1_STRING *)(*a)->serialNumber,
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(ASN1_STRING *)(*b)->serialNumber));
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}
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int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev)
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{
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X509_CRL_INFO *inf;
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inf = crl->crl;
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if(!inf->revoked)
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inf->revoked = sk_X509_REVOKED_new(X509_REVOKED_cmp);
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if(!inf->revoked || !sk_X509_REVOKED_push(inf->revoked, rev)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_CRL_add0_revoked, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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inf->enc.modified = 1;
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return 1;
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}
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int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r)
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{
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if (crl->meth->crl_verify)
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return crl->meth->crl_verify(crl, r);
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return 0;
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}
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int X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(X509_CRL *crl,
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X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
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{
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if (crl->meth->crl_lookup)
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return crl->meth->crl_lookup(crl, ret, serial, NULL);
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return 0;
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}
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int X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, X509 *x)
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{
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if (crl->meth->crl_lookup)
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return crl->meth->crl_lookup(crl, ret,
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X509_get_serialNumber(x),
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X509_get_issuer_name(x));
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return 0;
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}
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static int def_crl_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r)
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{
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return(ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO),
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crl->sig_alg, crl->signature,crl->crl,r));
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}
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static int crl_revoked_issuer_match(X509_CRL *crl, X509_NAME *nm,
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X509_REVOKED *rev)
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{
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size_t i;
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if (!rev->issuer)
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{
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if (!nm)
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return 1;
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if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
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return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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if (!nm)
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nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
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for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(rev->issuer); i++)
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{
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GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(rev->issuer, i);
|
|
if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gen->d.directoryName))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX g_crl_sort_lock = CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_INIT;
|
|
|
|
static int def_crl_lookup(X509_CRL *crl,
|
|
X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial, X509_NAME *issuer)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_REVOKED rtmp, *rev;
|
|
size_t idx;
|
|
rtmp.serialNumber = serial;
|
|
/* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted.
|
|
* Do this under a lock to avoid race condition.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_read(&g_crl_sort_lock);
|
|
const int is_sorted = sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked);
|
|
CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock(&g_crl_sort_lock);
|
|
|
|
if (!is_sorted)
|
|
{
|
|
CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(&g_crl_sort_lock);
|
|
if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked))
|
|
{
|
|
sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked);
|
|
}
|
|
CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock(&g_crl_sort_lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &idx, &rtmp))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Need to look for matching name */
|
|
for(;idx < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(crl->crl->revoked); idx++)
|
|
{
|
|
rev = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(crl->crl->revoked, idx);
|
|
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(rev->serialNumber, serial))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (crl_revoked_issuer_match(crl, issuer, rev))
|
|
{
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
*ret = rev;
|
|
if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
|
|
return 2;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_CRL_set_default_method(const X509_CRL_METHOD *meth)
|
|
{
|
|
if (meth == NULL)
|
|
default_crl_method = &int_crl_meth;
|
|
else
|
|
default_crl_method = meth;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_CRL_METHOD *X509_CRL_METHOD_new(
|
|
int (*crl_init)(X509_CRL *crl),
|
|
int (*crl_free)(X509_CRL *crl),
|
|
int (*crl_lookup)(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret,
|
|
ASN1_INTEGER *ser, X509_NAME *issuer),
|
|
int (*crl_verify)(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk))
|
|
{
|
|
X509_CRL_METHOD *m;
|
|
m = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_CRL_METHOD));
|
|
if (!m)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
m->crl_init = crl_init;
|
|
m->crl_free = crl_free;
|
|
m->crl_lookup = crl_lookup;
|
|
m->crl_verify = crl_verify;
|
|
m->flags = X509_CRL_METHOD_DYNAMIC;
|
|
return m;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_CRL_METHOD_free(X509_CRL_METHOD *m)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!(m->flags & X509_CRL_METHOD_DYNAMIC))
|
|
return;
|
|
OPENSSL_free(m);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void X509_CRL_set_meth_data(X509_CRL *crl, void *dat)
|
|
{
|
|
crl->meth_data = dat;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void *X509_CRL_get_meth_data(X509_CRL *crl)
|
|
{
|
|
return crl->meth_data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_REVOKED)
|
|
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_CRL)
|