boringssl/crypto/hkdf/hkdf.c
David Benjamin 808f832917 Run the comment converter on libcrypto.
crypto/{asn1,x509,x509v3,pem} were skipped as they are still OpenSSL
style.

Change-Id: I3cd9a60e1cb483a981aca325041f3fbce294247c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19504
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-08-18 21:49:04 +00:00

113 lines
3.3 KiB
C

/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <openssl/hkdf.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include "../internal.h"
int HKDF(uint8_t *out_key, size_t out_len, const EVP_MD *digest,
const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len, const uint8_t *salt,
size_t salt_len, const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len) {
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2
uint8_t prk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t prk_len;
if (!HKDF_extract(prk, &prk_len, digest, secret, secret_len, salt,
salt_len) ||
!HKDF_expand(out_key, out_len, digest, prk, prk_len, info, info_len)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int HKDF_extract(uint8_t *out_key, size_t *out_len, const EVP_MD *digest,
const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len, const uint8_t *salt,
size_t salt_len) {
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.2
// If salt is not given, HashLength zeros are used. However, HMAC does that
// internally already so we can ignore it.
unsigned len;
if (HMAC(digest, salt, salt_len, secret, secret_len, out_key, &len) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(HKDF, ERR_R_HMAC_LIB);
return 0;
}
*out_len = len;
assert(*out_len == EVP_MD_size(digest));
return 1;
}
int HKDF_expand(uint8_t *out_key, size_t out_len, const EVP_MD *digest,
const uint8_t *prk, size_t prk_len, const uint8_t *info,
size_t info_len) {
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.3
const size_t digest_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
uint8_t previous[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t n, done = 0;
unsigned i;
int ret = 0;
HMAC_CTX hmac;
// Expand key material to desired length.
n = (out_len + digest_len - 1) / digest_len;
if (out_len + digest_len < out_len || n > 255) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(HKDF, HKDF_R_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac);
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, prk, prk_len, digest, NULL)) {
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
uint8_t ctr = i + 1;
size_t todo;
if (i != 0 && (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) ||
!HMAC_Update(&hmac, previous, digest_len))) {
goto out;
}
if (!HMAC_Update(&hmac, info, info_len) ||
!HMAC_Update(&hmac, &ctr, 1) ||
!HMAC_Final(&hmac, previous, NULL)) {
goto out;
}
todo = digest_len;
if (done + todo > out_len) {
todo = out_len - done;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(out_key + done, previous, todo);
done += todo;
}
ret = 1;
out:
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
if (ret != 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(HKDF, ERR_R_HMAC_LIB);
}
return ret;
}