ad004af661
I went with NID_x25519 to match NID_sha1 and friends in being lowercase. However, upstream seems to have since chosen NID_X25519. Match their name. Change-Id: Icc7b183a2e2dfbe42c88e08e538fcbd242478ac3 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7331 Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
375 lines
9.7 KiB
C
375 lines
9.7 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
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#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
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#include <openssl/ec.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/obj.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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/* |EC_POINT| implementation. */
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static void ssl_ec_point_cleanup(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx) {
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BIGNUM *private_key = (BIGNUM *)ctx->data;
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BN_clear_free(private_key);
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}
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static int ssl_ec_point_generate_keypair(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, CBB *out) {
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assert(ctx->data == NULL);
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BIGNUM *private_key = BN_new();
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if (private_key == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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ctx->data = private_key;
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/* Set up a shared |BN_CTX| for all operations. */
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BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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if (bn_ctx == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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BN_CTX_start(bn_ctx);
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int ret = 0;
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EC_POINT *public_key = NULL;
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EC_GROUP *group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(ctx->method->nid);
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if (group == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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/* Generate a private key. */
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const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
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do {
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if (!BN_rand_range(private_key, order)) {
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goto err;
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}
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} while (BN_is_zero(private_key));
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/* Compute the corresponding public key and serialize it. */
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public_key = EC_POINT_new(group);
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if (public_key == NULL ||
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!EC_POINT_mul(group, public_key, private_key, NULL, NULL, bn_ctx) ||
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!EC_POINT_point2cbb(out, group, public_key, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
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bn_ctx)) {
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goto err;
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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EC_GROUP_free(group);
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EC_POINT_free(public_key);
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BN_CTX_end(bn_ctx);
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BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
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return ret;
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}
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int ssl_ec_point_compute_secret(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, uint8_t **out_secret,
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size_t *out_secret_len, uint8_t *out_alert,
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const uint8_t *peer_key, size_t peer_key_len) {
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BIGNUM *private_key = (BIGNUM *)ctx->data;
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assert(private_key != NULL);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
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/* Set up a shared |BN_CTX| for all operations. */
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BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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if (bn_ctx == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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BN_CTX_start(bn_ctx);
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int ret = 0;
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EC_GROUP *group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(ctx->method->nid);
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EC_POINT *peer_point = NULL, *result = NULL;
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uint8_t *secret = NULL;
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if (group == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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/* Compute the x-coordinate of |peer_key| * |private_key|. */
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peer_point = EC_POINT_new(group);
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result = EC_POINT_new(group);
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if (peer_point == NULL || result == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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BIGNUM *x = BN_CTX_get(bn_ctx);
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if (x == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, peer_point, peer_key, peer_key_len, bn_ctx)) {
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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goto err;
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}
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if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, result, NULL, peer_point, private_key, bn_ctx) ||
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!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, result, x, NULL, bn_ctx)) {
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goto err;
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}
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/* Encode the x-coordinate left-padded with zeros. */
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size_t secret_len = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
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secret = OPENSSL_malloc(secret_len);
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if (secret == NULL || !BN_bn2bin_padded(secret, secret_len, x)) {
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goto err;
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}
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*out_secret = secret;
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*out_secret_len = secret_len;
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secret = NULL;
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ret = 1;
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err:
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EC_GROUP_free(group);
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EC_POINT_free(peer_point);
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EC_POINT_free(result);
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BN_CTX_end(bn_ctx);
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BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
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OPENSSL_free(secret);
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return ret;
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}
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/* X25119 implementation. */
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static void ssl_x25519_cleanup(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx) {
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if (ctx->data == NULL) {
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return;
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}
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OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->data, 32);
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OPENSSL_free(ctx->data);
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}
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static int ssl_x25519_generate_keypair(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, CBB *out) {
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assert(ctx->data == NULL);
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ctx->data = OPENSSL_malloc(32);
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if (ctx->data == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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uint8_t public_key[32];
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X25519_keypair(public_key, (uint8_t *)ctx->data);
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return CBB_add_bytes(out, public_key, sizeof(public_key));
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}
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static int ssl_x25519_compute_secret(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, uint8_t **out_secret,
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size_t *out_secret_len, uint8_t *out_alert,
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const uint8_t *peer_key,
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size_t peer_key_len) {
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assert(ctx->data != NULL);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
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uint8_t *secret = OPENSSL_malloc(32);
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if (secret == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (peer_key_len != 32 ||
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!X25519(secret, (uint8_t *)ctx->data, peer_key)) {
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OPENSSL_free(secret);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
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return 0;
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}
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*out_secret = secret;
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*out_secret_len = 32;
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return 1;
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}
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/* Legacy DHE-based implementation. */
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static void ssl_dhe_cleanup(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx) {
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DH_free((DH *)ctx->data);
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}
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static int ssl_dhe_generate_keypair(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, CBB *out) {
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DH *dh = (DH *)ctx->data;
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/* The group must have been initialized already, but not the key. */
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assert(dh != NULL);
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assert(dh->priv_key == NULL);
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/* Due to a bug in yaSSL, the public key must be zero padded to the size of
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* the prime. */
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return DH_generate_key(dh) &&
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BN_bn2cbb_padded(out, BN_num_bytes(dh->p), dh->pub_key);
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}
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static int ssl_dhe_compute_secret(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, uint8_t **out_secret,
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size_t *out_secret_len, uint8_t *out_alert,
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const uint8_t *peer_key,
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size_t peer_key_len) {
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DH *dh = (DH *)ctx->data;
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assert(dh != NULL);
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assert(dh->priv_key != NULL);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
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int secret_len = 0;
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uint8_t *secret = NULL;
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BIGNUM *peer_point = BN_bin2bn(peer_key, peer_key_len, NULL);
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if (peer_point == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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secret = OPENSSL_malloc(DH_size(dh));
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if (secret == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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secret_len = DH_compute_key(secret, peer_point, dh);
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if (secret_len <= 0) {
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goto err;
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}
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*out_secret = secret;
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*out_secret_len = (size_t)secret_len;
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BN_free(peer_point);
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return 1;
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err:
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if (secret_len > 0) {
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OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, (size_t)secret_len);
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}
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OPENSSL_free(secret);
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BN_free(peer_point);
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return 0;
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}
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static const SSL_ECDH_METHOD kDHEMethod = {
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NID_undef, 0, "",
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ssl_dhe_cleanup,
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ssl_dhe_generate_keypair,
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ssl_dhe_compute_secret,
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};
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static const SSL_ECDH_METHOD kMethods[] = {
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{
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NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
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SSL_CURVE_SECP256R1,
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"P-256",
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ssl_ec_point_cleanup,
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ssl_ec_point_generate_keypair,
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ssl_ec_point_compute_secret,
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},
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{
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NID_secp384r1,
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SSL_CURVE_SECP384R1,
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"P-384",
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ssl_ec_point_cleanup,
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ssl_ec_point_generate_keypair,
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ssl_ec_point_compute_secret,
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},
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{
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NID_secp521r1,
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SSL_CURVE_SECP521R1,
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"P-521",
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ssl_ec_point_cleanup,
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ssl_ec_point_generate_keypair,
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ssl_ec_point_compute_secret,
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},
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{
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NID_X25519,
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SSL_CURVE_X25519,
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"X25519",
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ssl_x25519_cleanup,
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ssl_x25519_generate_keypair,
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ssl_x25519_compute_secret,
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},
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};
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static const SSL_ECDH_METHOD *method_from_curve_id(uint16_t curve_id) {
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size_t i;
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for (i = 0; i < sizeof(kMethods) / sizeof(kMethods[0]); i++) {
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if (kMethods[i].curve_id == curve_id) {
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return &kMethods[i];
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}
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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static const SSL_ECDH_METHOD *method_from_nid(int nid) {
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size_t i;
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for (i = 0; i < sizeof(kMethods) / sizeof(kMethods[0]); i++) {
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if (kMethods[i].nid == nid) {
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return &kMethods[i];
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}
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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const char* SSL_get_curve_name(uint16_t curve_id) {
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const SSL_ECDH_METHOD *method = method_from_curve_id(curve_id);
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if (method == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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return method->name;
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}
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int ssl_nid_to_curve_id(uint16_t *out_curve_id, int nid) {
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const SSL_ECDH_METHOD *method = method_from_nid(nid);
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if (method == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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*out_curve_id = method->curve_id;
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return 1;
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}
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int SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, uint16_t curve_id) {
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SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
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const SSL_ECDH_METHOD *method = method_from_curve_id(curve_id);
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if (method == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
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return 0;
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}
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ctx->method = method;
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return 1;
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}
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void SSL_ECDH_CTX_init_for_dhe(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, DH *params) {
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SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
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ctx->method = &kDHEMethod;
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ctx->data = params;
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}
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void SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx) {
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if (ctx->method == NULL) {
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return;
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}
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ctx->method->cleanup(ctx);
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ctx->method = NULL;
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ctx->data = NULL;
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}
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int SSL_ECDH_CTX_generate_keypair(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, CBB *out_public_key) {
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return ctx->method->generate_keypair(ctx, out_public_key);
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}
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int SSL_ECDH_CTX_compute_secret(SSL_ECDH_CTX *ctx, uint8_t **out_secret,
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size_t *out_secret_len, uint8_t *out_alert,
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const uint8_t *peer_key, size_t peer_key_len) {
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return ctx->method->compute_secret(ctx, out_secret, out_secret_len, out_alert,
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peer_key, peer_key_len);
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}
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