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boringssl/ssl/ssl_cipher.cc
Matthew Braithwaite d2ed382e64 Serialize SSL configuration in handoff and check it on application. 
A split SSL handshake may involve 2 binaries, potentially built at
different versions: call them the "handoff/handback" binary and the
"handshake" binary.  We would like to guarantee that the
handoff/handback binary does not make any promises that the handshake
binary cannot keep.

As a start, this commit serializes |kCiphers| to the handoff message.
When the handoff message is applied to an |SSL|, any configured
ciphers not listed in the handoff message will be removed, in order to
prevent them from being negotiated.

Subsequent commits will apply the same approach to other lists of features.

Change-Id: Idf6dbeadb750c076ab0509c09b9d3f22eb162b9c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/29264
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
2018-11-02 19:45:42 +00:00

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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE. */
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/stack.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../crypto/internal.h"
BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
static constexpr SSL_CIPHER kCiphers[] = {
// The RSA ciphers
// Cipher 02
{
SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA,
"TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA",
SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA,
SSL_kRSA,
SSL_aRSA,
SSL_eNULL,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
},
// Cipher 0A
{
SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
"TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA,
SSL_kRSA,
SSL_aRSA,
SSL_3DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
},
// New AES ciphersuites
// Cipher 2F
{
TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA,
SSL_kRSA,
SSL_aRSA,
SSL_AES128,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
},
// Cipher 35
{
TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA,
SSL_kRSA,
SSL_aRSA,
SSL_AES256,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
},
// PSK cipher suites.
// Cipher 8C
{
TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
"TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
SSL_kPSK,
SSL_aPSK,
SSL_AES128,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
},
// Cipher 8D
{
TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
"TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
SSL_kPSK,
SSL_aPSK,
SSL_AES256,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
},
// GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288
// Cipher 9C
{
TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
SSL_kRSA,
SSL_aRSA,
SSL_AES128GCM,
SSL_AEAD,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
},
// Cipher 9D
{
TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
"TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
SSL_kRSA,
SSL_aRSA,
SSL_AES256GCM,
SSL_AEAD,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
},
// TLS 1.3 suites.
// Cipher 1301
{
TLS1_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
TLS1_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
SSL_kGENERIC,
SSL_aGENERIC,
SSL_AES128GCM,
SSL_AEAD,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
},
// Cipher 1302
{
TLS1_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
"TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
TLS1_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
SSL_kGENERIC,
SSL_aGENERIC,
SSL_AES256GCM,
SSL_AEAD,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
},
// Cipher 1303
{
TLS1_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
TLS1_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
SSL_kGENERIC,
SSL_aGENERIC,
SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
SSL_AEAD,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
},
// Cipher C009
{
TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
"TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
SSL_kECDHE,
SSL_aECDSA,
SSL_AES128,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
},
// Cipher C00A
{
TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
"TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
SSL_kECDHE,
SSL_aECDSA,
SSL_AES256,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
},
// Cipher C013
{
TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
"TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
SSL_kECDHE,
SSL_aRSA,
SSL_AES128,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
},
// Cipher C014
{
TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
"TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
SSL_kECDHE,
SSL_aRSA,
SSL_AES256,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
},
// GCM based TLS v1.2 ciphersuites from RFC5289
// Cipher C02B
{
TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
"TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
SSL_kECDHE,
SSL_aECDSA,
SSL_AES128GCM,
SSL_AEAD,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
},
// Cipher C02C
{
TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
"TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
SSL_kECDHE,
SSL_aECDSA,
SSL_AES256GCM,
SSL_AEAD,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
},
// Cipher C02F
{
TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
"TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
SSL_kECDHE,
SSL_aRSA,
SSL_AES128GCM,
SSL_AEAD,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
},
// Cipher C030
{
TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
"TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
SSL_kECDHE,
SSL_aRSA,
SSL_AES256GCM,
SSL_AEAD,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384,
},
// ECDHE-PSK cipher suites.
// Cipher C035
{
TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
"TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA",
TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
SSL_kECDHE,
SSL_aPSK,
SSL_AES128,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
},
// Cipher C036
{
TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
"TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA",
TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
SSL_kECDHE,
SSL_aPSK,
SSL_AES256,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT,
},
// ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suites.
// Cipher CCA8
{
TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
"TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
SSL_kECDHE,
SSL_aRSA,
SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
SSL_AEAD,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
},
// Cipher CCA9
{
TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
"TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
SSL_kECDHE,
SSL_aECDSA,
SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
SSL_AEAD,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
},
// Cipher CCAB
{
TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
"TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256",
TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
SSL_kECDHE,
SSL_aPSK,
SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305,
SSL_AEAD,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
},
};
Span<const SSL_CIPHER> AllCiphers() {
return MakeConstSpan(kCiphers, OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCiphers));
}
#define CIPHER_ADD 1
#define CIPHER_KILL 2
#define CIPHER_DEL 3
#define CIPHER_ORD 4
#define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5
typedef struct cipher_order_st {
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
bool active;
bool in_group;
struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev;
} CIPHER_ORDER;
typedef struct cipher_alias_st {
// name is the name of the cipher alias.
const char *name;
// The following fields are bitmasks for the corresponding fields on
// |SSL_CIPHER|. A cipher matches a cipher alias iff, for each bitmask, the
// bit corresponding to the cipher's value is set to 1. If any bitmask is
// all zeroes, the alias matches nothing. Use |~0u| for the default value.
uint32_t algorithm_mkey;
uint32_t algorithm_auth;
uint32_t algorithm_enc;
uint32_t algorithm_mac;
// min_version, if non-zero, matches all ciphers which were added in that
// particular protocol version.
uint16_t min_version;
} CIPHER_ALIAS;
static const CIPHER_ALIAS kCipherAliases[] = {
// "ALL" doesn't include eNULL. It must be explicitly enabled.
{"ALL", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
// The "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" rule is omitted. It matches nothing.
// key exchange aliases
// (some of those using only a single bit here combine
// multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs.
{"kRSA", SSL_kRSA, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
{"kECDHE", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
{"kEECDH", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
{"ECDH", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
{"kPSK", SSL_kPSK, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
// server authentication aliases
{"aRSA", ~0u, SSL_aRSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
{"aECDSA", ~0u, SSL_aECDSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
{"ECDSA", ~0u, SSL_aECDSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
{"aPSK", ~0u, SSL_aPSK, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
// aliases combining key exchange and server authentication
{"ECDHE", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
{"EECDH", SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
{"RSA", SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
{"PSK", SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
// symmetric encryption aliases
{"3DES", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_3DES, ~0u, 0},
{"AES128", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM, ~0u, 0},
{"AES256", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0},
{"AES", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES, ~0u, 0},
{"AESGCM", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0},
{"CHACHA20", ~0u, ~0u, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, ~0u, 0},
// MAC aliases
{"SHA1", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_SHA1, 0},
{"SHA", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_SHA1, 0},
// Legacy protocol minimum version aliases. "TLSv1" is intentionally the
// same as "SSLv3".
{"SSLv3", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL3_VERSION},
{"TLSv1", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, SSL3_VERSION},
{"TLSv1.2", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, TLS1_2_VERSION},
// Legacy strength classes.
{"HIGH", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
{"FIPS", ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0},
// Temporary no-op aliases corresponding to removed SHA-2 legacy CBC
// ciphers. These should be removed after 2018-05-14.
{"SHA256", 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
{"SHA384", 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
};
static const size_t kCipherAliasesLen = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCipherAliases);
bool ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(const EVP_AEAD **out_aead,
size_t *out_mac_secret_len,
size_t *out_fixed_iv_len, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
uint16_t version, bool is_dtls) {
*out_aead = NULL;
*out_mac_secret_len = 0;
*out_fixed_iv_len = 0;
const bool is_tls12 = version == TLS1_2_VERSION && !is_dtls;
const bool is_tls13 = version == TLS1_3_VERSION && !is_dtls;
if (cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD) {
if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128GCM) {
if (is_tls12) {
*out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls12();
} else if (is_tls13) {
*out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls13();
} else {
*out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm();
}
*out_fixed_iv_len = 4;
} else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256GCM) {
if (is_tls12) {
*out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls12();
} else if (is_tls13) {
*out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls13();
} else {
*out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm();
}
*out_fixed_iv_len = 4;
} else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) {
*out_aead = EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305();
*out_fixed_iv_len = 12;
} else {
return false;
}
// In TLS 1.3, the iv_len is equal to the AEAD nonce length whereas the code
// above computes the TLS 1.2 construction.
if (version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
*out_fixed_iv_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(*out_aead);
}
} else if (cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1) {
if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) {
*out_aead = EVP_aead_null_sha1_tls();
} else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_3DES) {
if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
*out_aead = EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv();
*out_fixed_iv_len = 8;
} else {
*out_aead = EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls();
}
} else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128) {
if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
*out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv();
*out_fixed_iv_len = 16;
} else {
*out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls();
}
} else if (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256) {
if (version == TLS1_VERSION) {
*out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv();
*out_fixed_iv_len = 16;
} else {
*out_aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls();
}
} else {
return false;
}
*out_mac_secret_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
} else {
return false;
}
return true;
}
const EVP_MD *ssl_get_handshake_digest(uint16_t version,
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
switch (cipher->algorithm_prf) {
case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT:
return version >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_md5_sha1();
case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256:
return EVP_sha256();
case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384:
return EVP_sha384();
default:
assert(0);
return NULL;
}
}
static bool is_cipher_list_separator(char c, bool is_strict) {
if (c == ':') {
return true;
}
return !is_strict && (c == ' ' || c == ';' || c == ',');
}
// rule_equals returns whether the NUL-terminated string |rule| is equal to the
// |buf_len| bytes at |buf|.
static bool rule_equals(const char *rule, const char *buf, size_t buf_len) {
// |strncmp| alone only checks that |buf| is a prefix of |rule|.
return strncmp(rule, buf, buf_len) == 0 && rule[buf_len] == '\0';
}
static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
CIPHER_ORDER **tail) {
if (curr == *tail) {
return;
}
if (curr == *head) {
*head = curr->next;
}
if (curr->prev != NULL) {
curr->prev->next = curr->next;
}
if (curr->next != NULL) {
curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
}
(*tail)->next = curr;
curr->prev = *tail;
curr->next = NULL;
*tail = curr;
}
static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
CIPHER_ORDER **tail) {
if (curr == *head) {
return;
}
if (curr == *tail) {
*tail = curr->prev;
}
if (curr->next != NULL) {
curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
}
if (curr->prev != NULL) {
curr->prev->next = curr->next;
}
(*head)->prev = curr;
curr->next = *head;
curr->prev = NULL;
*head = curr;
}
static bool ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(Array<CIPHER_ORDER> *out_co_list,
CIPHER_ORDER **out_head,
CIPHER_ORDER **out_tail) {
Array<CIPHER_ORDER> co_list;
if (!co_list.Init(OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCiphers))) {
return false;
}
size_t co_list_num = 0;
for (const SSL_CIPHER &cipher : kCiphers) {
// TLS 1.3 ciphers do not participate in this mechanism.
if (cipher.algorithm_mkey != SSL_kGENERIC) {
co_list[co_list_num].cipher = &cipher;
co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL;
co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL;
co_list[co_list_num].active = false;
co_list[co_list_num].in_group = false;
co_list_num++;
}
}
// Prepare linked list from list entries.
if (co_list_num > 0) {
co_list[0].prev = NULL;
if (co_list_num > 1) {
co_list[0].next = &co_list[1];
for (size_t i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) {
co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1];
co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1];
}
co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2];
}
co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL;
*out_head = &co_list[0];
*out_tail = &co_list[co_list_num - 1];
} else {
*out_head = nullptr;
*out_tail = nullptr;
}
*out_co_list = std::move(co_list);
return true;
}
SSLCipherPreferenceList::~SSLCipherPreferenceList() {
OPENSSL_free(in_group_flags);
}
bool SSLCipherPreferenceList::Init(UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)> ciphers_arg,
Span<const bool> in_group_flags_arg) {
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers_arg.get()) != in_group_flags_arg.size()) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return false;
}
Array<bool> copy;
if (!copy.CopyFrom(in_group_flags_arg)) {
return false;
}
ciphers = std::move(ciphers_arg);
size_t unused_len;
copy.Release(&in_group_flags, &unused_len);
return true;
}
bool SSLCipherPreferenceList::Init(const SSLCipherPreferenceList& other) {
size_t size = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(other.ciphers.get());
Span<const bool> other_flags(other.in_group_flags, size);
UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)> other_ciphers(sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(
other.ciphers.get()));
if (!other_ciphers) {
return false;
}
return Init(std::move(other_ciphers), other_flags);
}
void SSLCipherPreferenceList::Remove(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
size_t index;
if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(ciphers.get(), &index, cipher)) {
return;
}
if (!in_group_flags[index] /* last element of group */ && index > 0) {
in_group_flags[index-1] = false;
}
for (size_t i = index; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers.get()) - 1; ++i) {
in_group_flags[i] = in_group_flags[i+1];
}
sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(ciphers.get(), index);
}
// ssl_cipher_apply_rule applies the rule type |rule| to ciphers matching its
// parameters in the linked list from |*head_p| to |*tail_p|. It writes the new
// head and tail of the list to |*head_p| and |*tail_p|, respectively.
//
// - If |cipher_id| is non-zero, only that cipher is selected.
// - Otherwise, if |strength_bits| is non-negative, it selects ciphers
// of that strength.
// - Otherwise, it selects ciphers that match each bitmasks in |alg_*| and
// |min_version|.
static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(
uint32_t cipher_id, uint32_t alg_mkey, uint32_t alg_auth,
uint32_t alg_enc, uint32_t alg_mac, uint16_t min_version, int rule,
int strength_bits, bool in_group, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last;
const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
bool reverse = false;
if (cipher_id == 0 && strength_bits == -1 && min_version == 0 &&
(alg_mkey == 0 || alg_auth == 0 || alg_enc == 0 || alg_mac == 0)) {
// The rule matches nothing, so bail early.
return;
}
if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) {
// needed to maintain sorting between currently deleted ciphers
reverse = true;
}
head = *head_p;
tail = *tail_p;
if (reverse) {
next = tail;
last = head;
} else {
next = head;
last = tail;
}
curr = NULL;
for (;;) {
if (curr == last) {
break;
}
curr = next;
if (curr == NULL) {
break;
}
next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
cp = curr->cipher;
// Selection criteria is either a specific cipher, the value of
// |strength_bits|, or the algorithms used.
if (cipher_id != 0) {
if (cipher_id != cp->id) {
continue;
}
} else if (strength_bits >= 0) {
if (strength_bits != SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cp, NULL)) {
continue;
}
} else {
if (!(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey) ||
!(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth) ||
!(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc) ||
!(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac) ||
(min_version != 0 && SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cp) != min_version) ||
// The NULL cipher must be selected explicitly.
cp->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) {
continue;
}
}
// add the cipher if it has not been added yet.
if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) {
// reverse == false
if (!curr->active) {
ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
curr->active = true;
curr->in_group = in_group;
}
}
// Move the added cipher to this location
else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) {
// reverse == false
if (curr->active) {
ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
curr->in_group = false;
}
} else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) {
// reverse == true
if (curr->active) {
// most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions
// for any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop
// works in reverse to maintain the order)
ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail);
curr->active = false;
curr->in_group = false;
}
} else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) {
// reverse == false
if (head == curr) {
head = curr->next;
} else {
curr->prev->next = curr->next;
}
if (tail == curr) {
tail = curr->prev;
}
curr->active = false;
if (curr->next != NULL) {
curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
}
if (curr->prev != NULL) {
curr->prev->next = curr->next;
}
curr->next = NULL;
curr->prev = NULL;
}
}
*head_p = head;
*tail_p = tail;
}
static bool ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
// This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting must
// keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting routine as
// '+' movement to the end of the list.
int max_strength_bits = 0;
CIPHER_ORDER *curr = *head_p;
while (curr != NULL) {
if (curr->active &&
SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(curr->cipher, NULL) > max_strength_bits) {
max_strength_bits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(curr->cipher, NULL);
}
curr = curr->next;
}
Array<int> number_uses;
if (!number_uses.Init(max_strength_bits + 1)) {
return false;
}
OPENSSL_memset(number_uses.data(), 0, (max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int));
// Now find the strength_bits values actually used.
curr = *head_p;
while (curr != NULL) {
if (curr->active) {
number_uses[SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(curr->cipher, NULL)]++;
}
curr = curr->next;
}
// Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending order.
for (int i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--) {
if (number_uses[i] > 0) {
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, false, head_p,
tail_p);
}
}
return true;
}
static bool ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p, bool strict) {
uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac;
uint16_t min_version;
const char *l, *buf;
int rule;
bool multi, skip_rule, in_group = false, has_group = false;
size_t j, buf_len;
uint32_t cipher_id;
char ch;
l = rule_str;
for (;;) {
ch = *l;
if (ch == '\0') {
break; // done
}
if (in_group) {
if (ch == ']') {
if (*tail_p) {
(*tail_p)->in_group = false;
}
in_group = false;
l++;
continue;
}
if (ch == '|') {
rule = CIPHER_ADD;
l++;
continue;
} else if (!(ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z') && !(ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z') &&
!(ch >= '0' && ch <= '9')) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_OPERATOR_IN_GROUP);
return false;
} else {
rule = CIPHER_ADD;
}
} else if (ch == '-') {
rule = CIPHER_DEL;
l++;
} else if (ch == '+') {
rule = CIPHER_ORD;
l++;
} else if (ch == '!') {
rule = CIPHER_KILL;
l++;
} else if (ch == '@') {
rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL;
l++;
} else if (ch == '[') {
assert(!in_group);
in_group = true;
has_group = true;
l++;
continue;
} else {
rule = CIPHER_ADD;
}
// If preference groups are enabled, the only legal operator is +.
// Otherwise the in_group bits will get mixed up.
if (has_group && rule != CIPHER_ADD) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MIXED_SPECIAL_OPERATOR_WITH_GROUPS);
return false;
}
if (is_cipher_list_separator(ch, strict)) {
l++;
continue;
}
multi = false;
cipher_id = 0;
alg_mkey = ~0u;
alg_auth = ~0u;
alg_enc = ~0u;
alg_mac = ~0u;
min_version = 0;
skip_rule = false;
for (;;) {
ch = *l;
buf = l;
buf_len = 0;
while ((ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z') || (ch >= '0' && ch <= '9') ||
(ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z') || ch == '-' || ch == '.' || ch == '_') {
ch = *(++l);
buf_len++;
}
if (buf_len == 0) {
// We hit something we cannot deal with, it is no command or separator
// nor alphanumeric, so we call this an error.
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
return false;
}
if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) {
break;
}
// Look for a matching exact cipher. These aren't allowed in multipart
// rules.
if (!multi && ch != '+') {
for (j = 0; j < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCiphers); j++) {
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = &kCiphers[j];
if (rule_equals(cipher->name, buf, buf_len) ||
rule_equals(cipher->standard_name, buf, buf_len)) {
cipher_id = cipher->id;
break;
}
}
}
if (cipher_id == 0) {
// If not an exact cipher, look for a matching cipher alias.
for (j = 0; j < kCipherAliasesLen; j++) {
if (rule_equals(kCipherAliases[j].name, buf, buf_len)) {
alg_mkey &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_mkey;
alg_auth &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_auth;
alg_enc &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_enc;
alg_mac &= kCipherAliases[j].algorithm_mac;
if (min_version != 0 &&
min_version != kCipherAliases[j].min_version) {
skip_rule = true;
} else {
min_version = kCipherAliases[j].min_version;
}
break;
}
}
if (j == kCipherAliasesLen) {
skip_rule = true;
if (strict) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
return false;
}
}
}
// Check for a multipart rule.
if (ch != '+') {
break;
}
l++;
multi = true;
}
// Ok, we have the rule, now apply it.
if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) {
if (buf_len != 8 || strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
return false;
}
if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p)) {
return false;
}
// We do not support any "multi" options together with "@", so throw away
// the rest of the command, if any left, until end or ':' is found.
while (*l != '\0' && !is_cipher_list_separator(*l, strict)) {
l++;
}
} else if (!skip_rule) {
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac,
min_version, rule, -1, in_group, head_p, tail_p);
}
}
if (in_group) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool ssl_create_cipher_list(UniquePtr<SSLCipherPreferenceList> *out_cipher_list,
const char *rule_str, bool strict) {
// Return with error if nothing to do.
if (rule_str == NULL || out_cipher_list == NULL) {
return false;
}
// Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled in ciphers.
// We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so it is used for
// allocation.
Array<CIPHER_ORDER> co_list;
CIPHER_ORDER *head = nullptr, *tail = nullptr;
if (!ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(&co_list, &head, &tail)) {
return false;
}
// Now arrange all ciphers by preference:
// TODO(davidben): Compute this order once and copy it.
// Everything else being equal, prefer ECDHE_ECDSA and ECDHE_RSA over other
// key exchange mechanisms
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
false, &head, &tail);
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false,
&head, &tail);
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, false, &head,
&tail);
// Order the bulk ciphers. First the preferred AEAD ciphers. We prefer
// CHACHA20 unless there is hardware support for fast and constant-time
// AES_GCM. Of the two CHACHA20 variants, the new one is preferred over the
// old one.
if (EVP_has_aes_hardware()) {
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
false, &head, &tail);
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
false, &head, &tail);
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD,
-1, false, &head, &tail);
} else {
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD,
-1, false, &head, &tail);
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
false, &head, &tail);
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256GCM, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
false, &head, &tail);
}
// Then the legacy non-AEAD ciphers: AES_128_CBC, AES_256_CBC,
// 3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA.
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES128, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false,
&head, &tail);
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_AES256, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false,
&head, &tail);
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, SSL_3DES, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false,
&head, &tail);
// Temporarily enable everything else for sorting
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, false, &head,
&tail);
// Move ciphers without forward secrecy to the end.
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kPSK), ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_ORD,
-1, false, &head, &tail);
// Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!)
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, ~0u, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, false, &head,
&tail);
// If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule before
// using the (possibly available) additional rules.
const char *rule_p = rule_str;
if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) {
if (!ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, &head, &tail,
strict)) {
return false;
}
rule_p += 7;
if (*rule_p == ':') {
rule_p++;
}
}
if (*rule_p != '\0' &&
!ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, strict)) {
return false;
}
// Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error
// if we cannot get one.
UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)> cipherstack(sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null());
Array<bool> in_group_flags;
if (cipherstack == nullptr ||
!in_group_flags.Init(OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCiphers))) {
return false;
}
// The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added
// to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER).
size_t num_in_group_flags = 0;
for (CIPHER_ORDER *curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) {
if (curr->active) {
if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack.get(), curr->cipher)) {
return false;
}
in_group_flags[num_in_group_flags++] = curr->in_group;
}
}
UniquePtr<SSLCipherPreferenceList> pref_list =
MakeUnique<SSLCipherPreferenceList>();
if (!pref_list ||
!pref_list->Init(
std::move(cipherstack),
MakeConstSpan(in_group_flags).subspan(0, num_in_group_flags))) {
return false;
}
*out_cipher_list = std::move(pref_list);
// Configuring an empty cipher list is an error but still updates the
// output.
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num((*out_cipher_list)->ciphers.get()) == 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
return false;
}
return true;
}
uint16_t ssl_cipher_get_value(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
uint32_t id = cipher->id;
// All OpenSSL cipher IDs are prefaced with 0x03. Historically this referred
// to SSLv2 vs SSLv3.
assert((id & 0xff000000) == 0x03000000);
return id & 0xffff;
}
uint32_t ssl_cipher_auth_mask_for_key(const EVP_PKEY *key) {
switch (EVP_PKEY_id(key)) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
return SSL_aRSA;
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
case EVP_PKEY_ED25519:
// Ed25519 keys in TLS 1.2 repurpose the ECDSA ciphers.
return SSL_aECDSA;
default:
return 0;
}
}
bool ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
return (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT) != 0;
}
bool ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
// Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchanges require a ServerKeyExchange. It is
// optional or omitted in all others.
return (cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kECDHE) != 0;
}
size_t ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
size_t block_size;
switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
case SSL_3DES:
block_size = 8;
break;
case SSL_AES128:
case SSL_AES256:
block_size = 16;
break;
default:
return 0;
}
// All supported TLS 1.0 ciphers use SHA-1.
assert(cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1);
size_t ret = 1 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
ret += block_size - (ret % block_size);
return ret;
}
BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
using namespace bssl;
static constexpr int ssl_cipher_id_cmp_inner(const SSL_CIPHER *a,
const SSL_CIPHER *b) {
// C++11's constexpr functions must have a body consisting of just a
// return-statement.
return (a->id > b->id) ? 1 : ((a->id < b->id) ? -1 : 0);
}
static int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b) {
return ssl_cipher_id_cmp_inner(reinterpret_cast<const SSL_CIPHER *>(in_a),
reinterpret_cast<const SSL_CIPHER *>(in_b));
}
template <typename T, size_t N>
static constexpr size_t countof(T const (&)[N]) {
return N;
}
template <typename T, size_t I>
static constexpr int check_order(const T (&arr)[I], size_t N) {
// C++11's constexpr functions must have a body consisting of just a
// return-statement.
return N > 1 ? ((ssl_cipher_id_cmp_inner(&arr[N - 2], &arr[N - 1]) < 0)
? check_order(arr, N - 1)
: 0)
: 1;
}
static_assert(check_order(kCiphers, countof(kCiphers)) == 1,
"Ciphers are not sorted, bsearch won't work");
const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_cipher_by_value(uint16_t value) {
SSL_CIPHER c;
c.id = 0x03000000L | value;
return reinterpret_cast<const SSL_CIPHER *>(bsearch(
&c, kCiphers, OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCiphers), sizeof(SSL_CIPHER),
ssl_cipher_id_cmp));
}
uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { return cipher->id; }
int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
return (cipher->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) != 0;
}
int SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
case SSL_eNULL:
return NID_undef;
case SSL_3DES:
return NID_des_ede3_cbc;
case SSL_AES128:
return NID_aes_128_cbc;
case SSL_AES256:
return NID_aes_256_cbc;
case SSL_AES128GCM:
return NID_aes_128_gcm;
case SSL_AES256GCM:
return NID_aes_256_gcm;
case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
return NID_chacha20_poly1305;
}
assert(0);
return NID_undef;
}
int SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
switch (cipher->algorithm_mac) {
case SSL_AEAD:
return NID_undef;
case SSL_SHA1:
return NID_sha1;
}
assert(0);
return NID_undef;
}
int SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
switch (cipher->algorithm_mkey) {
case SSL_kRSA:
return NID_kx_rsa;
case SSL_kECDHE:
return NID_kx_ecdhe;
case SSL_kPSK:
return NID_kx_psk;
case SSL_kGENERIC:
return NID_kx_any;
}
assert(0);
return NID_undef;
}
int SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
switch (cipher->algorithm_auth) {
case SSL_aRSA:
return NID_auth_rsa;
case SSL_aECDSA:
return NID_auth_ecdsa;
case SSL_aPSK:
return NID_auth_psk;
case SSL_aGENERIC:
return NID_auth_any;
}
assert(0);
return NID_undef;
}
int SSL_CIPHER_get_prf_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
switch (cipher->algorithm_prf) {
case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT:
return NID_md5_sha1;
case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256:
return NID_sha256;
case SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384:
return NID_sha384;
}
assert(0);
return NID_undef;
}
int SSL_CIPHER_is_block_cipher(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
return (cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) == 0 &&
cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD;
}
uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
if (cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kGENERIC ||
cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aGENERIC) {
return TLS1_3_VERSION;
}
if (cipher->algorithm_prf != SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT) {
// Cipher suites before TLS 1.2 use the default PRF, while all those added
// afterwards specify a particular hash.
return TLS1_2_VERSION;
}
return SSL3_VERSION;
}
uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
if (cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kGENERIC ||
cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aGENERIC) {
return TLS1_3_VERSION;
}
return TLS1_2_VERSION;
}
// return the actual cipher being used
const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
if (cipher != NULL) {
return cipher->name;
}
return "(NONE)";
}
const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
return cipher->standard_name;
}
const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
if (cipher == NULL) {
return "";
}
switch (cipher->algorithm_mkey) {
case SSL_kRSA:
return "RSA";
case SSL_kECDHE:
switch (cipher->algorithm_auth) {
case SSL_aECDSA:
return "ECDHE_ECDSA";
case SSL_aRSA:
return "ECDHE_RSA";
case SSL_aPSK:
return "ECDHE_PSK";
default:
assert(0);
return "UNKNOWN";
}
case SSL_kPSK:
assert(cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aPSK);
return "PSK";
case SSL_kGENERIC:
assert(cipher->algorithm_auth == SSL_aGENERIC);
return "GENERIC";
default:
assert(0);
return "UNKNOWN";
}
}
char *SSL_CIPHER_get_rfc_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
if (cipher == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return OPENSSL_strdup(SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(cipher));
}
int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, int *out_alg_bits) {
if (cipher == NULL) {
return 0;
}
int alg_bits, strength_bits;
switch (cipher->algorithm_enc) {
case SSL_AES128:
case SSL_AES128GCM:
alg_bits = 128;
strength_bits = 128;
break;
case SSL_AES256:
case SSL_AES256GCM:
case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
alg_bits = 256;
strength_bits = 256;
break;
case SSL_3DES:
alg_bits = 168;
strength_bits = 112;
break;
case SSL_eNULL:
alg_bits = 0;
strength_bits = 0;
break;
default:
assert(0);
alg_bits = 0;
strength_bits = 0;
}
if (out_alg_bits != NULL) {
*out_alg_bits = alg_bits;
}
return strength_bits;
}
const char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf,
int len) {
const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac;
uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac;
alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth;
alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc;
alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac;
switch (alg_mkey) {
case SSL_kRSA:
kx = "RSA";
break;
case SSL_kECDHE:
kx = "ECDH";
break;
case SSL_kPSK:
kx = "PSK";
break;
case SSL_kGENERIC:
kx = "GENERIC";
break;
default:
kx = "unknown";
}
switch (alg_auth) {
case SSL_aRSA:
au = "RSA";
break;
case SSL_aECDSA:
au = "ECDSA";
break;
case SSL_aPSK:
au = "PSK";
break;
case SSL_aGENERIC:
au = "GENERIC";
break;
default:
au = "unknown";
break;
}
switch (alg_enc) {
case SSL_3DES:
enc = "3DES(168)";
break;
case SSL_AES128:
enc = "AES(128)";
break;
case SSL_AES256:
enc = "AES(256)";
break;
case SSL_AES128GCM:
enc = "AESGCM(128)";
break;
case SSL_AES256GCM:
enc = "AESGCM(256)";
break;
case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
enc = "ChaCha20-Poly1305";
break;
case SSL_eNULL:
enc="None";
break;
default:
enc = "unknown";
break;
}
switch (alg_mac) {
case SSL_SHA1:
mac = "SHA1";
break;
case SSL_AEAD:
mac = "AEAD";
break;
default:
mac = "unknown";
break;
}
if (buf == NULL) {
len = 128;
buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
} else if (len < 128) {
return "Buffer too small";
}
BIO_snprintf(buf, len, "%-23s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s\n",
cipher->name, kx, au, enc, mac);
return buf;
}
const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
return "TLSv1/SSLv3";
}
STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) { return NULL; }
int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) { return 1; }
const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp) { return NULL; }
const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp) { return comp->name; }
int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp) { return comp->id; }
void SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods(void) {}
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