boringssl/ssl/ssl_buffer.c
David Benjamin 4c5ddb8047 Set rwstate consistently.
We reset it to SSL_NOTHING at the start of ever SSL_get_error-using operation.
Then we only set it to a non-NOTHING value in the rest of the stack on error
paths.

Currently, ssl->rwstate is set all over the place. Sometimes the pattern is:

  ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
  if (BIO_write(...) <= 0) {
    goto err;
  }
  ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;

Sometimes we only set it to the non-NOTHING value on error.

  if (BIO_write(...) <= 0) {
    ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
  }
  ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;

Sometimes we just set it to SSL_NOTHING far from any callback in random places.

The third case is arbitrary and clearly should be removed.

But, in the second case, we sometimes forget to undo it afterwards. This is
largely harmless since an error in the error queue overrides rwstate, but we
don't always put something in the error queue (falling back to
SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL for "I'm not sure why it failed. Perhaps it was one of your
callbacks? Check your errno equivalent."), but in that case a stray rwstate
value will cause it to be wrong.

We could fix the cases where we fail to set SSL_NOTHING on success cases, but
this doesn't account for there being multiple SSL_get_error operations. The
consumer may have an SSL_read and an SSL_write running concurrently. Instead,
it seems the best option is to lift the SSL_NOTHING reset to the operations and
set SSL_WRITING and friends as in the second case.

(Someday hopefully we can fix this to just be an enum that is internally
returned. It can convert to something stateful at the API layer.)

Change-Id: I54665ec066a64eb0e48a06e2fcd0d2681a42df7f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7453
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-04-18 20:30:32 +00:00

316 lines
8.7 KiB
C

/* Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/type_check.h>
#include "internal.h"
OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(0xffff <= INT_MAX, uint16_fits_in_int);
OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT((SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1)) == 0,
align_to_a_power_of_two);
/* setup_buffer initializes |buf| with capacity |cap|, aligned such that data
* written after |header_len| is aligned to a |SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD|-byte
* boundary. It returns one on success and zero on error. */
static int setup_buffer(SSL3_BUFFER *buf, size_t header_len, size_t cap) {
if (buf->buf != NULL || cap > 0xffff) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* Add up to |SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD| - 1 bytes of slack for alignment. */
buf->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(cap + SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
if (buf->buf == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/* Arrange the buffer such that the record body is aligned. */
buf->offset = (0 - header_len - (uintptr_t)buf->buf) &
(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
buf->len = 0;
buf->cap = cap;
return 1;
}
static void consume_buffer(SSL3_BUFFER *buf, size_t len) {
if (len > buf->len) {
abort();
}
buf->offset += (uint16_t)len;
buf->len -= (uint16_t)len;
buf->cap -= (uint16_t)len;
}
static void clear_buffer(SSL3_BUFFER *buf) {
OPENSSL_free(buf->buf);
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
}
OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH <=
0xffff,
maximum_read_buffer_too_large);
/* setup_read_buffer initializes the read buffer if not already initialized. It
* returns one on success and zero on failure. */
static int setup_read_buffer(SSL *ssl) {
SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->read_buffer;
if (buf->buf != NULL) {
return 1;
}
size_t header_len = ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl);
size_t cap = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
cap += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
} else {
cap += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
}
return setup_buffer(buf, header_len, cap);
}
uint8_t *ssl_read_buffer(SSL *ssl) {
return ssl->s3->read_buffer.buf + ssl->s3->read_buffer.offset;
}
size_t ssl_read_buffer_len(const SSL *ssl) {
return ssl->s3->read_buffer.len;
}
static int dtls_read_buffer_next_packet(SSL *ssl) {
SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->read_buffer;
if (buf->len > 0) {
/* It is an error to call |dtls_read_buffer_extend| when the read buffer is
* not empty. */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/* Read a single packet from |ssl->rbio|. |buf->cap| must fit in an int. */
int ret = BIO_read(ssl->rbio, buf->buf + buf->offset, (int)buf->cap);
if (ret <= 0) {
ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING;
return ret;
}
/* |BIO_read| was bound by |buf->cap|, so this cannot overflow. */
buf->len = (uint16_t)ret;
return 1;
}
static int tls_read_buffer_extend_to(SSL *ssl, size_t len) {
SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->read_buffer;
if (len > buf->cap) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return -1;
}
/* Read until the target length is reached. */
while (buf->len < len) {
/* The amount of data to read is bounded by |buf->cap|, which must fit in an
* int. */
int ret = BIO_read(ssl->rbio, buf->buf + buf->offset + buf->len,
(int)(len - buf->len));
if (ret <= 0) {
ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING;
return ret;
}
/* |BIO_read| was bound by |buf->cap - buf->len|, so this cannot
* overflow. */
buf->len += (uint16_t)ret;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(SSL *ssl, size_t len) {
/* |ssl_read_buffer_extend_to| implicitly discards any consumed data. */
ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
if (!setup_read_buffer(ssl)) {
return -1;
}
if (ssl->rbio == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
return -1;
}
ERR_clear_system_error();
int ret;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
/* |len| is ignored for a datagram transport. */
ret = dtls_read_buffer_next_packet(ssl);
} else {
ret = tls_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, len);
}
if (ret <= 0) {
/* If the buffer was empty originally and remained empty after attempting to
* extend it, release the buffer until the next attempt. */
ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
}
return ret;
}
void ssl_read_buffer_consume(SSL *ssl, size_t len) {
SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->read_buffer;
consume_buffer(buf, len);
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
/* The TLS stack never reads beyond the current record, so there will never
* be unconsumed data. If read-ahead is ever reimplemented,
* |ssl_read_buffer_discard| will require a |memcpy| to shift the excess
* back to the front of the buffer, to ensure there is enough space for the
* next record. */
assert(buf->len == 0);
}
}
void ssl_read_buffer_discard(SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->s3->read_buffer.len == 0) {
ssl_read_buffer_clear(ssl);
}
}
void ssl_read_buffer_clear(SSL *ssl) {
clear_buffer(&ssl->s3->read_buffer);
}
int ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(const SSL *ssl) {
return ssl->s3->write_buffer.len > 0;
}
OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH * 2 +
SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD * 2 +
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH <= 0xffff,
maximum_tls_write_buffer_too_large);
OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH +
SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD +
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH <= 0xffff,
maximum_dtls_write_buffer_too_large);
int ssl_write_buffer_init(SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out_ptr, size_t max_len) {
SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
if (buf->buf != NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
size_t header_len = ssl_seal_prefix_len(ssl);
/* TODO(davidben): This matches the original behavior in keeping the malloc
* size consistent. Does this matter? |cap| could just be |max_len|. */
size_t cap = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
cap += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
} else {
cap += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
if (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) {
cap += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
}
}
if (max_len > cap) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
if (!setup_buffer(buf, header_len, cap)) {
return 0;
}
*out_ptr = buf->buf + buf->offset;
return 1;
}
void ssl_write_buffer_set_len(SSL *ssl, size_t len) {
SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
if (len > buf->cap) {
abort();
}
buf->len = len;
}
static int tls_write_buffer_flush(SSL *ssl) {
SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
while (buf->len > 0) {
int ret = BIO_write(ssl->wbio, buf->buf + buf->offset, buf->len);
if (ret <= 0) {
ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
return ret;
}
consume_buffer(buf, (size_t)ret);
}
ssl_write_buffer_clear(ssl);
return 1;
}
static int dtls_write_buffer_flush(SSL *ssl) {
SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
if (buf->len == 0) {
return 1;
}
int ret = BIO_write(ssl->wbio, buf->buf + buf->offset, buf->len);
if (ret <= 0) {
ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
/* If the write failed, drop the write buffer anyway. Datagram transports
* can't write half a packet, so the caller is expected to retry from the
* top. */
ssl_write_buffer_clear(ssl);
return ret;
}
ssl_write_buffer_clear(ssl);
return 1;
}
int ssl_write_buffer_flush(SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->wbio == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
return -1;
}
ERR_clear_system_error();
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
return dtls_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
} else {
return tls_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
}
}
void ssl_write_buffer_clear(SSL *ssl) {
clear_buffer(&ssl->s3->write_buffer);
}