51545ceac6
Change-Id: I6267c9bfb66940d0b6fe5368514210a058ebd3cc Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7494 Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
562 lines
18 KiB
C
562 lines
18 KiB
C
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
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* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/buf.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#include <openssl/obj.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/sha.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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/* ssl3_do_write sends |ssl->init_buf| in records of type 'type'
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* (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC). It returns -1 on error, 1
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* on success or zero if the transmission is still incomplete. */
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int ssl3_do_write(SSL *ssl, int type) {
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int n;
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n = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, &ssl->init_buf->data[ssl->init_off],
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ssl->init_num);
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if (n < 0) {
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return -1;
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}
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if (n == ssl->init_num) {
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if (ssl->msg_callback) {
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ssl->msg_callback(1, ssl->version, type, ssl->init_buf->data,
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(size_t)(ssl->init_off + ssl->init_num), ssl,
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ssl->msg_callback_arg);
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}
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return 1;
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}
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ssl->init_off += n;
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ssl->init_num -= n;
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return 0;
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}
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int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *ssl, int a, int b) {
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uint8_t *p;
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int n;
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if (ssl->state == a) {
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p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl);
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n = ssl->s3->enc_method->final_finish_mac(ssl, ssl->server,
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ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md);
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if (n == 0) {
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return 0;
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}
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ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = n;
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memcpy(p, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
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/* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */
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if (!ssl_log_master_secret(ssl, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
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ssl->session->master_key,
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ssl->session->master_key_length)) {
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return 0;
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}
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/* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */
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if (ssl->server) {
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assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
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memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
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ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = n;
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} else {
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assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
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memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.finish_md, n);
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ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = n;
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}
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if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, n)) {
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return 0;
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}
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ssl->state = b;
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}
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/* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
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return ssl_do_write(ssl);
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}
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/* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
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* so far. */
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static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *ssl) {
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/* If no new cipher setup then return immediately: other functions will set
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* the appropriate error. */
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if (ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
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return;
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}
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ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = ssl->s3->enc_method->final_finish_mac(
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ssl, !ssl->server, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
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}
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int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *ssl, int a, int b) {
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int al, finished_len, ok;
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long message_len;
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uint8_t *p;
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message_len = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(
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ssl, a, b, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, ssl_dont_hash_message, &ok);
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if (!ok) {
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return message_len;
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}
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/* Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. */
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ssl3_take_mac(ssl);
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if (!ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) {
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goto err;
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}
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p = ssl->init_msg;
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finished_len = ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
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if (finished_len != message_len) {
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al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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goto f_err;
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}
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int finished_ret =
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CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len);
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#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
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finished_ret = 0;
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#endif
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if (finished_ret != 0) {
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al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
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goto f_err;
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}
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/* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */
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if (ssl->server) {
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assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
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memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
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finished_len);
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ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len;
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} else {
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assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
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memcpy(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
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finished_len);
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ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len;
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}
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return 1;
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f_err:
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ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
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err:
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return 0;
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}
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int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl, int a, int b) {
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if (ssl->state == a) {
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*((uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data) = SSL3_MT_CCS;
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ssl->init_num = 1;
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ssl->init_off = 0;
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ssl->state = b;
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}
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/* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
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return ssl3_do_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
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}
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int ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *ssl) {
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uint8_t *p;
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unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl);
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if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(ssl, &l)) {
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return 0;
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}
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l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(ssl);
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p = ssl_handshake_start(ssl);
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l2n3(l, p);
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l += 3;
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return ssl_set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l);
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}
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/* Obtain handshake message of message type |msg_type| (any if |msg_type| == -1),
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* maximum acceptable body length |max|. The first four bytes (msg_type and
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* length) are read in state |header_state|, the body is read in state
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* |body_state|. */
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long ssl3_get_message(SSL *ssl, int header_state, int body_state, int msg_type,
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long max, enum ssl_hash_message_t hash_message, int *ok) {
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uint8_t *p;
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unsigned long l;
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long n;
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int al;
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if (ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
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/* A ssl_dont_hash_message call cannot be combined with reuse_message; the
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* ssl_dont_hash_message would have to have been applied to the previous
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* call. */
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assert(hash_message == ssl_hash_message);
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ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
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if (msg_type >= 0 && ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) {
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al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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goto f_err;
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}
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*ok = 1;
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ssl->state = body_state;
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ssl->init_msg = (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + 4;
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ssl->init_num = (int)ssl->s3->tmp.message_size;
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return ssl->init_num;
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}
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p = (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data;
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if (ssl->state == header_state) {
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assert(ssl->init_num < 4);
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for (;;) {
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while (ssl->init_num < 4) {
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int bytes_read = ssl3_read_bytes(
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ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[ssl->init_num], 4 - ssl->init_num, 0);
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if (bytes_read <= 0) {
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*ok = 0;
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return bytes_read;
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}
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ssl->init_num += bytes_read;
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}
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static const uint8_t kHelloRequest[4] = {SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0};
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if (ssl->server || memcmp(p, kHelloRequest, sizeof(kHelloRequest)) != 0) {
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break;
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}
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/* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are doing
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* a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is correct.
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* Does not count for 'Finished' MAC. */
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ssl->init_num = 0;
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if (ssl->msg_callback) {
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ssl->msg_callback(0, ssl->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, ssl,
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ssl->msg_callback_arg);
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}
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}
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/* ssl->init_num == 4 */
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if (msg_type >= 0 && *p != msg_type) {
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al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
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goto f_err;
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}
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ssl->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
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n2l3(p, l);
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if (l > (unsigned long)max) {
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al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
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goto f_err;
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}
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if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(ssl->init_buf, l + 4)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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ssl->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
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ssl->state = body_state;
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ssl->init_msg = (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + 4;
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ssl->init_num = 0;
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}
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/* next state (body_state) */
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p = ssl->init_msg;
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n = ssl->s3->tmp.message_size - ssl->init_num;
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while (n > 0) {
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int bytes_read =
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ssl3_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[ssl->init_num], n, 0);
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if (bytes_read <= 0) {
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ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING;
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*ok = 0;
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return bytes_read;
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}
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ssl->init_num += bytes_read;
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n -= bytes_read;
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}
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/* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
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if (hash_message == ssl_hash_message && !ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) {
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goto err;
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}
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if (ssl->msg_callback) {
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ssl->msg_callback(0, ssl->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, ssl->init_buf->data,
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(size_t)ssl->init_num + 4, ssl, ssl->msg_callback_arg);
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}
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*ok = 1;
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return ssl->init_num;
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f_err:
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ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
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err:
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*ok = 0;
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return -1;
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}
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int ssl3_hash_current_message(SSL *ssl) {
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/* The handshake header (different size between DTLS and TLS) is included in
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* the hash. */
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size_t header_len = ssl->init_msg - (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data;
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return ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data,
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ssl->init_num + header_len);
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}
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/* ssl3_cert_verify_hash is documented as needing EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE because that
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* is sufficient pre-TLS1.2 as well. */
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OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE > MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
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combined_tls_hash_fits_in_max);
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int ssl3_cert_verify_hash(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
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const EVP_MD **out_md, int pkey_type) {
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/* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using
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* agreed digest and cached handshake records. Otherwise, use
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* SHA1 or MD5 + SHA1 depending on key type. */
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if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
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EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
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unsigned len;
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
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if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, *out_md, NULL) ||
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!EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, ssl->s3->handshake_buffer->data,
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ssl->s3->handshake_buffer->length) ||
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!EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, out, &len)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
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return 0;
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}
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*out_len = len;
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} else if (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
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if (ssl->s3->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(ssl, NID_md5, out) == 0 ||
|
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ssl->s3->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(ssl, NID_sha1,
|
|
out + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
*out_len = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
|
*out_md = EVP_md5_sha1();
|
|
} else if (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
|
|
if (ssl->s3->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(ssl, NID_sha1, out) == 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
*out_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
|
*out_md = EVP_sha1();
|
|
} else {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) {
|
|
int al;
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
|
|
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
|
|
al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
|
|
al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return al;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_fill_hello_random(uint8_t *out, size_t len, int is_server) {
|
|
if (is_server) {
|
|
const uint32_t current_time = time(NULL);
|
|
uint8_t *p = out;
|
|
|
|
if (len < 4) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
p[0] = current_time >> 24;
|
|
p[1] = current_time >> 16;
|
|
p[2] = current_time >> 8;
|
|
p[3] = current_time;
|
|
return RAND_bytes(p + 4, len - 4);
|
|
} else {
|
|
return RAND_bytes(out, len);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|