e2ab21d194
The last-minute TLS 1.3 change was done partly for consistency with DTLS 1.3, where authenticating the record header is less obviously pointless than in TLS. There, reconstructing it would be messy. Instead, pass in the record header and let SSLAEADContext decide whether or not to assemble its own. (While I'm here, reorder all the flags so the AD and nonce ones are grouped together.) Change-Id: I06e65d526b21a08019e5ca6f1b7c7e0e579e7760 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27024 Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com> Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
441 lines
14 KiB
C++
441 lines
14 KiB
C++
/* Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/aead.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
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#define FUZZER_MODE true
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#else
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#define FUZZER_MODE false
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#endif
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namespace bssl {
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SSLAEADContext::SSLAEADContext(uint16_t version_arg, bool is_dtls_arg,
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const SSL_CIPHER *cipher_arg)
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: cipher_(cipher_arg),
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version_(version_arg),
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is_dtls_(is_dtls_arg),
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variable_nonce_included_in_record_(false),
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random_variable_nonce_(false),
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xor_fixed_nonce_(false),
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omit_length_in_ad_(false),
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omit_version_in_ad_(false),
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omit_ad_(false),
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ad_is_header_(false) {
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OPENSSL_memset(fixed_nonce_, 0, sizeof(fixed_nonce_));
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}
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SSLAEADContext::~SSLAEADContext() {}
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UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> SSLAEADContext::CreateNullCipher(bool is_dtls) {
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return MakeUnique<SSLAEADContext>(0 /* version */, is_dtls,
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nullptr /* cipher */);
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}
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UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> SSLAEADContext::Create(
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enum evp_aead_direction_t direction, uint16_t version, int is_dtls,
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const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, Span<const uint8_t> enc_key,
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Span<const uint8_t> mac_key, Span<const uint8_t> fixed_iv) {
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const EVP_AEAD *aead;
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uint16_t protocol_version;
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size_t expected_mac_key_len, expected_fixed_iv_len;
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if (!ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&protocol_version, version) ||
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!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, &expected_mac_key_len,
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&expected_fixed_iv_len, cipher, protocol_version,
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is_dtls) ||
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// Ensure the caller returned correct key sizes.
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expected_fixed_iv_len != fixed_iv.size() ||
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expected_mac_key_len != mac_key.size()) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return nullptr;
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}
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uint8_t merged_key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
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if (!mac_key.empty()) {
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// This is a "stateful" AEAD (for compatibility with pre-AEAD cipher
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// suites).
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if (mac_key.size() + enc_key.size() + fixed_iv.size() >
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sizeof(merged_key)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return nullptr;
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}
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OPENSSL_memcpy(merged_key, mac_key.data(), mac_key.size());
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OPENSSL_memcpy(merged_key + mac_key.size(), enc_key.data(), enc_key.size());
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OPENSSL_memcpy(merged_key + mac_key.size() + enc_key.size(),
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fixed_iv.data(), fixed_iv.size());
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enc_key = MakeConstSpan(merged_key,
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enc_key.size() + mac_key.size() + fixed_iv.size());
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}
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UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_ctx =
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MakeUnique<SSLAEADContext>(version, is_dtls, cipher);
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if (!aead_ctx) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return nullptr;
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}
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assert(aead_ctx->ProtocolVersion() == protocol_version);
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if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
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aead_ctx->ctx_.get(), aead, enc_key.data(), enc_key.size(),
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EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, direction)) {
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return nullptr;
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}
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assert(EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead) <= EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH);
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static_assert(EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH < 256,
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"variable_nonce_len doesn't fit in uint8_t");
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aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ = (uint8_t)EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead);
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if (mac_key.empty()) {
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assert(fixed_iv.size() <= sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_));
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OPENSSL_memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_, fixed_iv.data(), fixed_iv.size());
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aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len_ = fixed_iv.size();
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if (cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) {
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// The fixed nonce into the actual nonce (the sequence number).
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aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce_ = true;
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aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ = 8;
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} else {
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// The fixed IV is prepended to the nonce.
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assert(fixed_iv.size() <= aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_);
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aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ -= fixed_iv.size();
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}
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// AES-GCM uses an explicit nonce.
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if (cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM)) {
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aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record_ = true;
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}
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// The TLS 1.3 construction XORs the fixed nonce into the sequence number
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// and omits the additional data.
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if (protocol_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
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aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce_ = true;
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aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ = 8;
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aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record_ = false;
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if (ssl_is_draft28(version)) {
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aead_ctx->ad_is_header_ = true;
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} else {
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aead_ctx->omit_ad_ = true;
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}
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assert(fixed_iv.size() >= aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_);
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}
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} else {
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assert(protocol_version < TLS1_3_VERSION);
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aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record_ = true;
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aead_ctx->random_variable_nonce_ = true;
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aead_ctx->omit_length_in_ad_ = true;
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aead_ctx->omit_version_in_ad_ = (protocol_version == SSL3_VERSION);
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}
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return aead_ctx;
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}
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void SSLAEADContext::SetVersionIfNullCipher(uint16_t version) {
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if (is_null_cipher()) {
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version_ = version;
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}
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}
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uint16_t SSLAEADContext::ProtocolVersion() const {
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uint16_t protocol_version;
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if(!ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&protocol_version, version_)) {
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assert(false);
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return 0;
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}
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return protocol_version;
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}
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uint16_t SSLAEADContext::RecordVersion() const {
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if (version_ == 0) {
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assert(is_null_cipher());
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return is_dtls_ ? DTLS1_VERSION : TLS1_VERSION;
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}
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if (ProtocolVersion() <= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
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return version_;
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}
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return TLS1_2_VERSION;
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}
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size_t SSLAEADContext::ExplicitNonceLen() const {
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if (!FUZZER_MODE && variable_nonce_included_in_record_) {
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return variable_nonce_len_;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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bool SSLAEADContext::SuffixLen(size_t *out_suffix_len, const size_t in_len,
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const size_t extra_in_len) const {
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if (is_null_cipher() || FUZZER_MODE) {
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*out_suffix_len = extra_in_len;
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return true;
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}
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return !!EVP_AEAD_CTX_tag_len(ctx_.get(), out_suffix_len, in_len,
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extra_in_len);
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}
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bool SSLAEADContext::CiphertextLen(size_t *out_len, const size_t in_len,
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const size_t extra_in_len) const {
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size_t len;
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if (!SuffixLen(&len, in_len, extra_in_len)) {
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return false;
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}
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len += ExplicitNonceLen();
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len += in_len;
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if (len < in_len || len >= 0xffff) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return false;
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}
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*out_len = len;
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return true;
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}
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size_t SSLAEADContext::MaxOverhead() const {
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return ExplicitNonceLen() +
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(is_null_cipher() || FUZZER_MODE
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? 0
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: EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(EVP_AEAD_CTX_aead(ctx_.get())));
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}
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Span<const uint8_t> SSLAEADContext::GetAdditionalData(
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uint8_t storage[13], uint8_t type, uint16_t record_version,
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const uint8_t seqnum[8], size_t plaintext_len, Span<const uint8_t> header) {
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if (ad_is_header_) {
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return header;
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}
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if (omit_ad_) {
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return {};
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}
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OPENSSL_memcpy(storage, seqnum, 8);
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size_t len = 8;
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storage[len++] = type;
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if (!omit_version_in_ad_) {
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storage[len++] = static_cast<uint8_t>((record_version >> 8));
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storage[len++] = static_cast<uint8_t>(record_version);
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}
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if (!omit_length_in_ad_) {
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storage[len++] = static_cast<uint8_t>((plaintext_len >> 8));
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storage[len++] = static_cast<uint8_t>(plaintext_len);
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}
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return MakeConstSpan(storage, len);
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}
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bool SSLAEADContext::Open(Span<uint8_t> *out, uint8_t type,
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uint16_t record_version, const uint8_t seqnum[8],
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Span<const uint8_t> header, Span<uint8_t> in) {
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if (is_null_cipher() || FUZZER_MODE) {
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// Handle the initial NULL cipher.
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*out = in;
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return true;
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}
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// TLS 1.2 AEADs include the length in the AD and are assumed to have fixed
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// overhead. Otherwise the parameter is unused.
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size_t plaintext_len = 0;
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if (!omit_length_in_ad_) {
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size_t overhead = MaxOverhead();
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if (in.size() < overhead) {
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// Publicly invalid.
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
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return false;
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}
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plaintext_len = in.size() - overhead;
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}
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uint8_t ad_storage[13];
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Span<const uint8_t> ad = GetAdditionalData(ad_storage, type, record_version,
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seqnum, plaintext_len, header);
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// Assemble the nonce.
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uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
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size_t nonce_len = 0;
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// Prepend the fixed nonce, or left-pad with zeros if XORing.
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if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
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nonce_len = fixed_nonce_len_ - variable_nonce_len_;
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OPENSSL_memset(nonce, 0, nonce_len);
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} else {
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OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce, fixed_nonce_, fixed_nonce_len_);
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nonce_len += fixed_nonce_len_;
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}
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// Add the variable nonce.
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if (variable_nonce_included_in_record_) {
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if (in.size() < variable_nonce_len_) {
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// Publicly invalid.
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
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return false;
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}
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OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce + nonce_len, in.data(), variable_nonce_len_);
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in = in.subspan(variable_nonce_len_);
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} else {
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assert(variable_nonce_len_ == 8);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce + nonce_len, seqnum, variable_nonce_len_);
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}
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nonce_len += variable_nonce_len_;
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// XOR the fixed nonce, if necessary.
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if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
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assert(nonce_len == fixed_nonce_len_);
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for (size_t i = 0; i < fixed_nonce_len_; i++) {
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nonce[i] ^= fixed_nonce_[i];
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}
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}
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// Decrypt in-place.
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size_t len;
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if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx_.get(), in.data(), &len, in.size(), nonce,
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nonce_len, in.data(), in.size(), ad.data(),
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ad.size())) {
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return false;
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}
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*out = in.subspan(0, len);
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return true;
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}
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bool SSLAEADContext::SealScatter(uint8_t *out_prefix, uint8_t *out,
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uint8_t *out_suffix, uint8_t type,
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uint16_t record_version,
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const uint8_t seqnum[8],
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Span<const uint8_t> header, const uint8_t *in,
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size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in,
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size_t extra_in_len) {
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const size_t prefix_len = ExplicitNonceLen();
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size_t suffix_len;
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if (!SuffixLen(&suffix_len, in_len, extra_in_len)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
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return false;
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}
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if ((in != out && buffers_alias(in, in_len, out, in_len)) ||
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buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_prefix, prefix_len) ||
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buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_suffix, suffix_len)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT);
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return false;
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}
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if (is_null_cipher() || FUZZER_MODE) {
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// Handle the initial NULL cipher.
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OPENSSL_memmove(out, in, in_len);
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OPENSSL_memmove(out_suffix, extra_in, extra_in_len);
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return true;
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}
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uint8_t ad_storage[13];
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Span<const uint8_t> ad = GetAdditionalData(ad_storage, type, record_version,
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seqnum, in_len, header);
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// Assemble the nonce.
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uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
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size_t nonce_len = 0;
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// Prepend the fixed nonce, or left-pad with zeros if XORing.
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if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
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nonce_len = fixed_nonce_len_ - variable_nonce_len_;
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OPENSSL_memset(nonce, 0, nonce_len);
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} else {
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OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce, fixed_nonce_, fixed_nonce_len_);
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nonce_len += fixed_nonce_len_;
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}
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// Select the variable nonce.
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if (random_variable_nonce_) {
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assert(variable_nonce_included_in_record_);
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if (!RAND_bytes(nonce + nonce_len, variable_nonce_len_)) {
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return false;
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}
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} else {
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// When sending we use the sequence number as the variable part of the
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// nonce.
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assert(variable_nonce_len_ == 8);
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OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce + nonce_len, seqnum, variable_nonce_len_);
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}
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nonce_len += variable_nonce_len_;
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// Emit the variable nonce if included in the record.
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if (variable_nonce_included_in_record_) {
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assert(!xor_fixed_nonce_);
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if (buffers_alias(in, in_len, out_prefix, variable_nonce_len_)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT);
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return false;
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}
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OPENSSL_memcpy(out_prefix, nonce + fixed_nonce_len_,
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variable_nonce_len_);
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}
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// XOR the fixed nonce, if necessary.
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if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
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assert(nonce_len == fixed_nonce_len_);
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for (size_t i = 0; i < fixed_nonce_len_; i++) {
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nonce[i] ^= fixed_nonce_[i];
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}
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}
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size_t written_suffix_len;
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bool result = !!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal_scatter(
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ctx_.get(), out, out_suffix, &written_suffix_len, suffix_len, nonce,
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nonce_len, in, in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len, ad.data(), ad.size());
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assert(!result || written_suffix_len == suffix_len);
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return result;
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}
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bool SSLAEADContext::Seal(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
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uint8_t type, uint16_t record_version,
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const uint8_t seqnum[8], Span<const uint8_t> header,
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const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
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const size_t prefix_len = ExplicitNonceLen();
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size_t suffix_len;
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if (!SuffixLen(&suffix_len, in_len, 0)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
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return false;
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}
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if (in_len + prefix_len < in_len ||
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in_len + prefix_len + suffix_len < in_len + prefix_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
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return false;
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}
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if (in_len + prefix_len + suffix_len > max_out_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return false;
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}
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if (!SealScatter(out, out + prefix_len, out + prefix_len + in_len, type,
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record_version, seqnum, header, in, in_len, 0, 0)) {
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return false;
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}
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*out_len = prefix_len + in_len + suffix_len;
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return true;
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}
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bool SSLAEADContext::GetIV(const uint8_t **out_iv, size_t *out_iv_len) const {
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return !is_null_cipher() &&
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EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_iv(ctx_.get(), out_iv, out_iv_len);
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}
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} // namespace bssl
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