diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/META.yml b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/META.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..95b0df3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/META.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+name: SPHINCS+
+type: signature
+claimed-nist-level: 1
+length-public-key: 32
+length-signature: 16976
+testvectors-sha256: f0f84722cf529a108006d84b52966cbebd92146ee33cacdd7d1bba2cdc1944fd
+principal-submitter: Andreas Hülsing
+auxiliary-submitters:
+ - Jean-Philippe Aumasson
+ - Daniel J. Bernstein,
+ - Christoph Dobraunig
+ - Maria Eichlseder
+ - Scott Fluhrer
+ - Stefan-Lukas Gazdag
+ - Panos Kampanakis
+ - Stefan Kölbl
+ - Tanja Lange
+ - Martin M. Lauridsen
+ - Florian Mendel
+ - Ruben Niederhagen
+ - Christian Rechberger
+ - Joost Rijneveld
+ - Peter Schwabe
+implementations:
+ - name: clean
+ version: https://github.com/sphincs/sphincsplus/commit/492ec4f1f6d3b3dc4b435783bbaaf4e41cdb6f32
+ length-secret-key: 64
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/LICENSE b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/LICENSE
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..670154e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/LICENSE
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+CC0 1.0 Universal
+
+Statement of Purpose
+
+The laws of most jurisdictions throughout the world automatically confer
+exclusive Copyright and Related Rights (defined below) upon the creator and
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+ vii. other similar, equivalent or corresponding rights throughout the world
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+2. Waiver. To the greatest extent permitted by, but not in contravention of,
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+any other legal or equitable action to disrupt the quiet enjoyment of the Work
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+3. Public License Fallback. Should any part of the Waiver for any reason be
+judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, then the Waiver
+shall be preserved to the maximum extent permitted taking into account
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+is so judged Affirmer hereby grants to each affected person a royalty-free,
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+4. Limitations and Disclaimers.
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+ a. No trademark or patent rights held by Affirmer are waived, abandoned,
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+For more information, please see
+
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/Makefile b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9716e43e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with GNU Make or BSD Make
+
+LIB=libsphincs-haraka-128f-robust_clean.a
+
+HEADERS = params.h address.h wots.h utils.h fors.h api.h hash.h thash.h haraka.h
+OBJECTS = address.o wots.o utils.o fors.o sign.o hash_haraka.o thash_haraka_robust.o haraka.o
+
+CFLAGS=-Wall -Wconversion -Wextra -Wpedantic -Werror -Wmissing-prototypes -std=c99 -I../../../common $(EXTRAFLAGS)
+
+all: $(LIB)
+
+%.o: %.c $(HEADERS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
+
+$(LIB): $(OBJECTS)
+ $(AR) -r $@ $(OBJECTS)
+
+clean:
+ $(RM) $(OBJECTS)
+ $(RM) $(LIB)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ff0a5821
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with Microsoft Visual Studio's nmake using the command:
+# nmake /f Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
+
+LIBRARY=libsphincs-haraka-128f-robust_clean.lib
+OBJECTS=address.obj wots.obj utils.obj fors.obj sign.obj hash_haraka.obj thash_haraka_robust.obj haraka.obj
+
+CFLAGS=/nologo /I ..\..\..\common /W4 /WX
+
+all: $(LIBRARY)
+
+# Make sure objects are recompiled if headers change.
+$(OBJECTS): *.h
+
+$(LIBRARY): $(OBJECTS)
+ LIB.EXE /NOLOGO /WX /OUT:$@ $**
+
+clean:
+ -DEL $(OBJECTS)
+ -DEL $(LIBRARY)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/address.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/address.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..76591a03
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/address.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ bytes + i * 4, 4, addr[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer) {
+ addr[0] = layer;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree) {
+ addr[1] = 0;
+ addr[2] = (uint32_t) (tree >> 32);
+ addr[3] = (uint32_t) tree;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type) {
+ addr[4] = type;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for OTS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair) {
+ addr[5] = keypair;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+ out[5] = in[5];
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain) {
+ addr[6] = chain;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash) {
+ addr[7] = hash;
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height) {
+ addr[6] = tree_height;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index) {
+ addr[7] = tree_index;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/address.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/address.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0695c893
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/address.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+#ifndef SPX_ADDRESS_H
+#define SPX_ADDRESS_H
+
+#include
+
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS 0
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK 1
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE 2
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE 3
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK 4
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type);
+
+/* Copies the layer and tree part of one address into the other */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for WOTS and FORS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/api.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/api.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7b723bd4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/api.h
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#ifndef PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_API_H
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_API_H
+
+#include
+#include
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_ALGNAME "SPHINCS+"
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES 64
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES 32
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES 16976
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES 48
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair given a seed.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/fors.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/fors.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f1d08c51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/fors.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+static void fors_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ sk, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_sk_to_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ leaf, sk, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* Only copy the parts that must be kept in fors_leaf_addr. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_leaf_addr, fors_tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_leaf_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_leaf_addr, addr_idx);
+
+ fors_gen_sk(leaf, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, leaf, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Interprets m as SPX_FORS_HEIGHT-bit unsigned integers.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ * Assumes indices has space for SPX_FORS_TREES integers.
+ */
+static void message_to_indices(uint32_t *indices, const unsigned char *m) {
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ indices[i] = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < SPX_FORS_HEIGHT; j++) {
+ indices[i] ^= (((uint32_t)m[offset >> 3] >> (offset & 0x7)) & 0x1) << j;
+ offset++;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Include the secret key part that produces the selected leaf node. */
+ fors_gen_sk(sig, sk_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for this leaf node. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ indices[i], idx_offset, fors_gen_leaf, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Derive the leaf from the included secret key part. */
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, sig, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Derive the corresponding root node of this tree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, leaf, indices[i], idx_offset, sig,
+ SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/fors.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/fors.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8eadb7bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/fors.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_FORS_H
+#define SPX_FORS_H
+
+#include
+
+#include "params.h"
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..24858deb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+/*
+Plain C implementation of the Haraka256 and Haraka512 permutations.
+*/
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+#define HARAKAS_RATE 32
+
+static const unsigned char haraka_rc[40][16] = {
+ {0x9d, 0x7b, 0x81, 0x75, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xc5, 0xb2, 0x0a, 0xc0, 0x20, 0xe6, 0x4c, 0x70, 0x84, 0x06},
+ {0x17, 0xf7, 0x08, 0x2f, 0xa4, 0x6b, 0x0f, 0x64, 0x6b, 0xa0, 0xf3, 0x88, 0xe1, 0xb4, 0x66, 0x8b},
+ {0x14, 0x91, 0x02, 0x9f, 0x60, 0x9d, 0x02, 0xcf, 0x98, 0x84, 0xf2, 0x53, 0x2d, 0xde, 0x02, 0x34},
+ {0x79, 0x4f, 0x5b, 0xfd, 0xaf, 0xbc, 0xf3, 0xbb, 0x08, 0x4f, 0x7b, 0x2e, 0xe6, 0xea, 0xd6, 0x0e},
+ {0x44, 0x70, 0x39, 0xbe, 0x1c, 0xcd, 0xee, 0x79, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x72, 0x48, 0xcb, 0xb0, 0xcf, 0xcb},
+ {0x7b, 0x05, 0x8a, 0x2b, 0xed, 0x35, 0x53, 0x8d, 0xb7, 0x32, 0x90, 0x6e, 0xee, 0xcd, 0xea, 0x7e},
+ {0x1b, 0xef, 0x4f, 0xda, 0x61, 0x27, 0x41, 0xe2, 0xd0, 0x7c, 0x2e, 0x5e, 0x43, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x67},
+ {0x3b, 0x0b, 0xc7, 0x1f, 0xe2, 0xfd, 0x5f, 0x67, 0x07, 0xcc, 0xca, 0xaf, 0xb0, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x29},
+ {0xee, 0x65, 0xd4, 0xb9, 0xca, 0x8f, 0xdb, 0xec, 0xe9, 0x7f, 0x86, 0xe6, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x4d, 0xab},
+ {0x33, 0x7e, 0x03, 0xad, 0x4f, 0x40, 0x2a, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xcd, 0xb7, 0xd4, 0x84, 0xbf, 0x30, 0x1c},
+ {0x00, 0x98, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x2e, 0x8b, 0x02, 0x69, 0xbf, 0x23, 0x17, 0x94, 0xb9, 0x0b, 0xcc, 0xb2},
+ {0x8a, 0x2d, 0x9d, 0x5c, 0xc8, 0x9e, 0xaa, 0x4a, 0x72, 0x55, 0x6f, 0xde, 0xa6, 0x78, 0x04, 0xfa},
+ {0xd4, 0x9f, 0x12, 0x29, 0x2e, 0x4f, 0xfa, 0x0e, 0x12, 0x2a, 0x77, 0x6b, 0x2b, 0x9f, 0xb4, 0xdf},
+ {0xee, 0x12, 0x6a, 0xbb, 0xae, 0x11, 0xd6, 0x32, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x49, 0xf4, 0x44, 0x03, 0xa1, 0x1e},
+ {0xa6, 0xec, 0xa8, 0x9c, 0xc9, 0x00, 0x96, 0x5f, 0x84, 0x00, 0x05, 0x4b, 0x88, 0x49, 0x04, 0xaf},
+ {0xec, 0x93, 0xe5, 0x27, 0xe3, 0xc7, 0xa2, 0x78, 0x4f, 0x9c, 0x19, 0x9d, 0xd8, 0x5e, 0x02, 0x21},
+ {0x73, 0x01, 0xd4, 0x82, 0xcd, 0x2e, 0x28, 0xb9, 0xb7, 0xc9, 0x59, 0xa7, 0xf8, 0xaa, 0x3a, 0xbf},
+ {0x6b, 0x7d, 0x30, 0x10, 0xd9, 0xef, 0xf2, 0x37, 0x17, 0xb0, 0x86, 0x61, 0x0d, 0x70, 0x60, 0x62},
+ {0xc6, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0xf6, 0x53, 0x91, 0xc2, 0x81, 0x43, 0x04, 0x30, 0x21, 0xc2, 0x45, 0xca, 0x5a},
+ {0x3a, 0x94, 0xd1, 0x36, 0xe8, 0x92, 0xaf, 0x2c, 0xbb, 0x68, 0x6b, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x97, 0x23, 0x92},
+ {0xb4, 0x71, 0x10, 0xe5, 0x58, 0xb9, 0xba, 0x6c, 0xeb, 0x86, 0x58, 0x22, 0x38, 0x92, 0xbf, 0xd3},
+ {0x8d, 0x12, 0xe1, 0x24, 0xdd, 0xfd, 0x3d, 0x93, 0x77, 0xc6, 0xf0, 0xae, 0xe5, 0x3c, 0x86, 0xdb},
+ {0xb1, 0x12, 0x22, 0xcb, 0xe3, 0x8d, 0xe4, 0x83, 0x9c, 0xa0, 0xeb, 0xff, 0x68, 0x62, 0x60, 0xbb},
+ {0x7d, 0xf7, 0x2b, 0xc7, 0x4e, 0x1a, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0x9c, 0xd1, 0xe4, 0xe2, 0xdc, 0xd3, 0x4b, 0x73},
+ {0x4e, 0x92, 0xb3, 0x2c, 0xc4, 0x15, 0x14, 0x4b, 0x43, 0x1b, 0x30, 0x61, 0xc3, 0x47, 0xbb, 0x43},
+ {0x99, 0x68, 0xeb, 0x16, 0xdd, 0x31, 0xb2, 0x03, 0xf6, 0xef, 0x07, 0xe7, 0xa8, 0x75, 0xa7, 0xdb},
+ {0x2c, 0x47, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x23, 0x5e, 0x8e, 0x77, 0x59, 0x75, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x61, 0xf3, 0x6d},
+ {0xf9, 0x17, 0x86, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xe5, 0x1b, 0x6d, 0x77, 0x7d, 0xde, 0xd6, 0x17, 0x5a, 0xa7, 0xcd},
+ {0x5d, 0xee, 0x46, 0xa9, 0x9d, 0x06, 0x6c, 0x9d, 0xaa, 0xe9, 0xa8, 0x6b, 0xf0, 0x43, 0x6b, 0xec},
+ {0xc1, 0x27, 0xf3, 0x3b, 0x59, 0x11, 0x53, 0xa2, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x57, 0xf9, 0x50, 0x69, 0x1e, 0xcb},
+ {0xd9, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x60, 0x53, 0x03, 0xed, 0xe4, 0x9c, 0x61, 0xda, 0x00, 0x75, 0x0c, 0xee, 0x2c},
+ {0x50, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0x63, 0xbc, 0xba, 0xbb, 0x80, 0xab, 0x0c, 0xe9, 0x96, 0xa1, 0xa5, 0xb1, 0xf0},
+ {0x39, 0xca, 0x8d, 0x93, 0x30, 0xde, 0x0d, 0xab, 0x88, 0x29, 0x96, 0x5e, 0x02, 0xb1, 0x3d, 0xae},
+ {0x42, 0xb4, 0x75, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf3, 0x14, 0x88, 0x0b, 0xa4, 0x54, 0xd5, 0x38, 0x8f, 0xbb, 0x17},
+ {0xf6, 0x16, 0x0a, 0x36, 0x79, 0xb7, 0xb6, 0xae, 0xd7, 0x7f, 0x42, 0x5f, 0x5b, 0x8a, 0xbb, 0x34},
+ {0xde, 0xaf, 0xba, 0xff, 0x18, 0x59, 0xce, 0x43, 0x38, 0x54, 0xe5, 0xcb, 0x41, 0x52, 0xf6, 0x26},
+ {0x78, 0xc9, 0x9e, 0x83, 0xf7, 0x9c, 0xca, 0xa2, 0x6a, 0x02, 0xf3, 0xb9, 0x54, 0x9a, 0xe9, 0x4c},
+ {0x35, 0x12, 0x90, 0x22, 0x28, 0x6e, 0xc0, 0x40, 0xbe, 0xf7, 0xdf, 0x1b, 0x1a, 0xa5, 0x51, 0xae},
+ {0xcf, 0x59, 0xa6, 0x48, 0x0f, 0xbc, 0x73, 0xc1, 0x2b, 0xd2, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x61, 0xc1, 0xa0},
+ {0xa1, 0x9d, 0xc5, 0xe9, 0xfd, 0xbd, 0xd6, 0x4a, 0x88, 0x82, 0x28, 0x02, 0x03, 0xcc, 0x6a, 0x75}
+};
+
+static unsigned char rc[40][16];
+static unsigned char rc_sseed[40][16];
+
+static const unsigned char sbox[256] = {
+ 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe,
+ 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4,
+ 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7,
+ 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15, 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3,
+ 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x09,
+ 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3,
+ 0x2f, 0x84, 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe,
+ 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85,
+ 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8, 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92,
+ 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x0c,
+ 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19,
+ 0x73, 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14,
+ 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2,
+ 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79, 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5,
+ 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08, 0xba, 0x78, 0x25,
+ 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a,
+ 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86,
+ 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e,
+ 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42,
+ 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
+};
+
+#define XT(x) (((x) << 1) ^ ((((x) >> 7) & 1) * 0x1b))
+
+// Simulate _mm_aesenc_si128 instructions from AESNI
+static void aesenc(unsigned char *s, const unsigned char *rk) {
+ uint8_t i, t, u, v[4][4];
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ v[((i / 4) + 4 - (i % 4) ) % 4][i % 4] = sbox[s[i]];
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+ t = v[i][0];
+ u = v[i][0] ^ v[i][1] ^ v[i][2] ^ v[i][3];
+ v[i][0] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][0] ^ v[i][1]));
+ v[i][1] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][1] ^ v[i][2]));
+ v[i][2] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][2] ^ v[i][3]));
+ v[i][3] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][3] ^ t));
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ s[i] = v[i / 4][i % 4] ^ rk[i];
+ }
+}
+
+// Simulate _mm_unpacklo_epi32
+static void unpacklo32(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ memcpy(tmp, a, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 4, b, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 8, a + 4, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 12, b + 4, 4);
+ memcpy(t, tmp, 16);
+}
+
+// Simulate _mm_unpackhi_epi32
+static void unpackhi32(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ memcpy(tmp, a + 8, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 4, b + 8, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 8, a + 12, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 12, b + 12, 4);
+ memcpy(t, tmp, 16);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_tweak_constants(
+ const unsigned char *pk_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ unsigned long long seed_length) {
+ unsigned char buf[40 * 16];
+
+ /* Use the standard constants to generate tweaked ones. */
+ memcpy(rc, haraka_rc, 40 * 16);
+
+ /* Constants for sk.seed */
+ if (sk_seed != NULL) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(buf, 40 * 16, sk_seed, seed_length);
+ memcpy(rc_sseed, buf, 40 * 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Constants for pk.seed */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(buf, 40 * 16, pk_seed, seed_length);
+ memcpy(rc, buf, 40 * 16);
+}
+
+static void haraka_S_absorb(unsigned char *s, unsigned int r,
+ const unsigned char *m, unsigned long long mlen,
+ unsigned char p) {
+ unsigned long long i;
+ unsigned char t[r];
+
+ while (mlen >= r) {
+ // XOR block to state
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ s[i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s, s);
+ mlen -= r;
+ m += r;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ t[i] = 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; ++i) {
+ t[i] = m[i];
+ }
+ t[i] = p;
+ t[r - 1] |= 128;
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ s[i] ^= t[i];
+ }
+}
+
+static void haraka_S_squeezeblocks(unsigned char *h, unsigned long long nblocks,
+ unsigned char *s, unsigned int r) {
+ while (nblocks > 0) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s, s);
+ memcpy(h, s, HARAKAS_RATE);
+ h += r;
+ nblocks--;
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ s_inc[i] = 0;
+ }
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(uint8_t *s_inc, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Recall that s_inc[64] is the non-absorbed bytes xored into the state */
+ while (mlen + s_inc[64] >= HARAKAS_RATE) {
+ for (i = 0; i < (size_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64]); i++) {
+ /* Take the i'th byte from message
+ xor with the s_inc[64] + i'th byte of the state */
+ s_inc[s_inc[64] + i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ mlen -= (size_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64]);
+ m += HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64];
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s_inc, s_inc);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; i++) {
+ s_inc[s_inc[64] + i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(mlen + s_inc[64]);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ /* After haraka_S_inc_absorb, we are guaranteed that s_inc[64] < HARAKAS_RATE,
+ so we can always use one more byte for p in the current state. */
+ s_inc[s_inc[64]] ^= 0x1F;
+ s_inc[HARAKAS_RATE - 1] ^= 128;
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ uint8_t i;
+
+ /* First consume any bytes we still have sitting around */
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen && i < s_inc[64]; i++) {
+ /* There are s_inc[64] bytes left, so r - s_inc[64] is the first
+ available byte. We consume from there, i.e., up to r. */
+ out[i] = s_inc[(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64] + i)];
+ }
+ out += i;
+ outlen -= i;
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(s_inc[64] - i);
+
+ /* Then squeeze the remaining necessary blocks */
+ while (outlen > 0) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s_inc, s_inc);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen && i < HARAKAS_RATE; i++) {
+ out[i] = s_inc[i];
+ }
+ out += i;
+ outlen -= i;
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - i);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned long long outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen) {
+ unsigned long long i;
+ unsigned char s[64];
+ unsigned char d[32];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ s[i] = 0;
+ }
+ haraka_S_absorb(s, 32, in, inlen, 0x1F);
+
+ haraka_S_squeezeblocks(out, outlen / 32, s, 32);
+ out += (outlen / 32) * 32;
+
+ if (outlen % 32) {
+ haraka_S_squeezeblocks(d, 1, s, 32);
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen % 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = d[i];
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[64], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 32, in + 32, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 48, in + 48, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 1]);
+ aesenc(s + 32, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 2]);
+ aesenc(s + 48, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 3]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s, s, s + 16);
+ unpacklo32(s + 16, s + 32, s + 48);
+ unpackhi32(s + 32, s + 32, s + 48);
+ unpacklo32(s + 48, s, s + 32);
+ unpackhi32(s, s, s + 32);
+ unpackhi32(s + 32, s + 16, tmp);
+ unpacklo32(s + 16, s + 16, tmp);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(out, s, 64);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i;
+
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(buf, in);
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ buf[i] = buf[i] ^ in[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Truncated */
+ memcpy(out, buf + 8, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 8, buf + 24, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 16, buf + 32, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 24, buf + 48, 8);
+}
+
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[32], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j + 1]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s + 16, s, s + 16);
+ memcpy(s, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ s[i];
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[32], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc_sseed[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc_sseed[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j + 1]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s + 16, s, s + 16);
+ memcpy(s, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ s[i];
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/haraka.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/haraka.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b4b880df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/haraka.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_HARAKA_H
+#define SPX_HARAKA_H
+
+/* Tweak constants with seed */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_tweak_constants(
+ const unsigned char *pk_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ unsigned long long seed_length);
+
+/* Haraka Sponge */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(uint8_t *s_inc, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned long long outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen);
+
+/* Applies the 512-bit Haraka permutation to in. */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-512 */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-256 */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-256 using sk.seed constants */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/hash.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/hash.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c2449fb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/hash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifndef SPX_HASH_H
+#define SPX_HASH_H
+
+#include
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf, const unsigned char *optrand,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ unsigned char *digest, uint64_t *tree, uint32_t *leaf_idx,
+ const unsigned char *R, const unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/hash_haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/hash_haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cec634c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/hash_haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_tweak_constants(pub_seed, sk_seed, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes PRF(key, addr), given a secret key of SPX_N bytes and an address
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES];
+ /* Since SPX_N may be smaller than 32, we need a temporary buffer. */
+ unsigned char outbuf[32];
+
+ (void)key; /* Suppress an 'unused parameter' warning. */
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf, addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(outbuf, buf);
+ memcpy(out, outbuf, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the message-dependent randomness R, using a secret seed and an
+ * optional randomization value as well as the message.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf, const unsigned char *optrand,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) {
+ uint8_t s_inc[65];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, sk_prf, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, optrand, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, m, mlen);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(R, SPX_N, s_inc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the message hash using R, the public key, and the message.
+ * Outputs the message digest and the index of the leaf. The index is split in
+ * the tree index and the leaf index, for convenient copying to an address.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ unsigned char *digest, uint64_t *tree, uint32_t *leaf_idx,
+ const unsigned char *R, const unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) {
+#define SPX_TREE_BITS (SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * (SPX_D - 1))
+#define SPX_TREE_BYTES ((SPX_TREE_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_LEAF_BITS SPX_TREE_HEIGHT
+#define SPX_LEAF_BYTES ((SPX_LEAF_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_DGST_BYTES (SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES + SPX_TREE_BYTES + SPX_LEAF_BYTES)
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_DGST_BYTES];
+ unsigned char *bufp = buf;
+ uint8_t s_inc[65];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, R, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, pk, SPX_PK_BYTES);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, m, mlen);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(buf, SPX_DGST_BYTES, s_inc);
+
+ memcpy(digest, bufp, SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES);
+ bufp += SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES;
+
+ *tree = PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(bufp, SPX_TREE_BYTES);
+ *tree &= (~(uint64_t)0) >> (64 - SPX_TREE_BITS);
+ bufp += SPX_TREE_BYTES;
+
+ *leaf_idx = (uint32_t)PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ bufp, SPX_LEAF_BYTES);
+ *leaf_idx &= (~(uint32_t)0) >> (32 - SPX_LEAF_BITS);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/params.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/params.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..367ef88d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/params.h
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#ifndef SPX_PARAMS_H
+#define SPX_PARAMS_H
+
+/* Hash output length in bytes. */
+#define SPX_N 16
+/* Height of the hypertree. */
+#define SPX_FULL_HEIGHT 60
+/* Number of subtree layer. */
+#define SPX_D 20
+/* FORS tree dimensions. */
+#define SPX_FORS_HEIGHT 9
+#define SPX_FORS_TREES 30
+/* Winternitz parameter, */
+#define SPX_WOTS_W 16
+
+/* The hash function is defined by linking a different hash.c file, as opposed
+ to setting a #define constant. */
+
+/* For clarity */
+#define SPX_ADDR_BYTES 32
+
+/* WOTS parameters. */
+#define SPX_WOTS_LOGW 4
+
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN1 (8 * SPX_N / SPX_WOTS_LOGW)
+
+/* SPX_WOTS_LEN2 is floor(log(len_1 * (w - 1)) / log(w)) + 1; we precompute */
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN2 3
+
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN (SPX_WOTS_LEN1 + SPX_WOTS_LEN2)
+#define SPX_WOTS_BYTES (SPX_WOTS_LEN * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_WOTS_PK_BYTES SPX_WOTS_BYTES
+
+/* Subtree size. */
+#define SPX_TREE_HEIGHT (SPX_FULL_HEIGHT / SPX_D)
+
+/* FORS parameters. */
+#define SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES ((SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_FORS_BYTES ((SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1) * SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_FORS_PK_BYTES SPX_N
+
+/* Resulting SPX sizes. */
+#define SPX_BYTES (SPX_N + SPX_FORS_BYTES + SPX_D * SPX_WOTS_BYTES +\
+ SPX_FULL_HEIGHT * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_PK_BYTES (2 * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_SK_BYTES (2 * SPX_N + SPX_PK_BYTES)
+
+/* Optionally, signing can be made non-deterministic using optrand.
+ This can help counter side-channel attacks that would benefit from
+ getting a large number of traces when the signer uses the same nodes. */
+#define SPX_OPTRAND_BYTES 32
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/sign.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..977d01d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "api.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "randombytes.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "wots.h"
+
+/**
+ * Computes the leaf at a given address. First generates the WOTS key pair,
+ * then computes leaf by hashing horizontally.
+ */
+static void wots_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+ unsigned char pk[SPX_WOTS_BYTES];
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t wots_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, addr_idx);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ pk, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ wots_pk_addr, wots_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ leaf, pk, pub_seed, wots_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates an SPX key pair given a seed of length
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [PUB_SEED || root]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed) {
+ /* We do not need the auth path in key generation, but it simplifies the
+ code to have just one treehash routine that computes both root and path
+ in one function. */
+ unsigned char auth_path[SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t top_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ top_tree_addr, SPX_D - 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ top_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+
+ /* Initialize SK_SEED, SK_PRF and PUB_SEED from seed. */
+ memcpy(sk, seed, PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES);
+
+ memcpy(pk, sk + 2 * SPX_N, SPX_N);
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(pk, sk);
+
+ /* Compute root node of the top-most subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ sk + 3 * SPX_N, auth_path, sk, sk + 2 * SPX_N, 0, 0,
+ wots_gen_leaf, top_tree_addr);
+
+ memcpy(pk + SPX_N, sk + 3 * SPX_N, SPX_N);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates an SPX key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [PUB_SEED || root]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
+ unsigned char seed[PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES];
+ randombytes(seed, PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ pk, sk, seed);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed = sk;
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf = sk + SPX_N;
+ const unsigned char *pk = sk + 2 * SPX_N;
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed = pk;
+
+ unsigned char optrand[SPX_N];
+ unsigned char mhash[SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+ unsigned char root[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t i;
+ uint64_t tree;
+ uint32_t idx_leaf;
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ pub_seed, sk_seed);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+
+ /* Optionally, signing can be made non-deterministic using optrand.
+ This can help counter side-channel attacks that would benefit from
+ getting a large number of traces when the signer uses the same nodes. */
+ randombytes(optrand, SPX_N);
+ /* Compute the digest randomization value. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ sig, sk_prf, optrand, m, mlen);
+
+ /* Derive the message digest and leaf index from R, PK and M. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ mhash, &tree, &idx_leaf, sig, pk, m, mlen);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(wots_addr, tree);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ /* Sign the message hash using FORS. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ sig, root, mhash, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_FORS_BYTES;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_D; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(tree_addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(tree_addr, tree);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ /* Compute a WOTS signature. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ sig, root, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_WOTS_BYTES;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for the used WOTS leaf. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ root, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed, idx_leaf, 0,
+ wots_gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N;
+
+ /* Update the indices for the next layer. */
+ idx_leaf = (tree & ((1 << SPX_TREE_HEIGHT) - 1));
+ tree = tree >> SPX_TREE_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ *siglen = SPX_BYTES;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed = pk;
+ const unsigned char *pub_root = pk + SPX_N;
+ unsigned char mhash[SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+ unsigned char wots_pk[SPX_WOTS_BYTES];
+ unsigned char root[SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ unsigned int i;
+ uint64_t tree;
+ uint32_t idx_leaf;
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t wots_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ if (siglen != SPX_BYTES) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ pub_seed, NULL);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK);
+
+ /* Derive the message digest and leaf index from R || PK || M. */
+ /* The additional SPX_N is a result of the hash domain separator. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ mhash, &tree, &idx_leaf, sig, pk, m, mlen);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Layer correctly defaults to 0, so no need to set_layer_addr */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(wots_addr, tree);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ root, sig, mhash, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_FORS_BYTES;
+
+ /* For each subtree.. */
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_D; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(tree_addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(tree_addr, tree);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ wots_pk_addr, wots_addr);
+
+ /* The WOTS public key is only correct if the signature was correct. */
+ /* Initially, root is the FORS pk, but on subsequent iterations it is
+ the root of the subtree below the currently processed subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ wots_pk, sig, root, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_WOTS_BYTES;
+
+ /* Compute the leaf node using the WOTS public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ leaf, wots_pk, pub_seed, wots_pk_addr);
+
+ /* Compute the root node of this subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ root, leaf, idx_leaf, 0, sig, SPX_TREE_HEIGHT,
+ pub_seed, tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N;
+
+ /* Update the indices for the next layer. */
+ idx_leaf = (tree & ((1 << SPX_TREE_HEIGHT) - 1));
+ tree = tree >> SPX_TREE_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the root node equals the root node in the public key. */
+ if (memcmp(root, pub_root, SPX_N) != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
+ size_t siglen;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ sm, &siglen, m, mlen, sk);
+
+ memmove(sm + SPX_BYTES, m, mlen);
+ *smlen = siglen + mlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
+ /* The API caller does not necessarily know what size a signature should be
+ but SPHINCS+ signatures are always exactly SPX_BYTES. */
+ if (smlen < SPX_BYTES) {
+ memset(m, 0, smlen);
+ *mlen = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *mlen = smlen - SPX_BYTES;
+
+ if (PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ sm, SPX_BYTES, sm + SPX_BYTES, *mlen, pk)) {
+ memset(m, 0, smlen);
+ *mlen = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* If verification was successful, move the message to the right place. */
+ memmove(m, sm + SPX_BYTES, *mlen);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/thash.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/thash.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..355d680f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/thash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifndef SPX_THASH_H
+#define SPX_THASH_H
+
+#include
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/thash_haraka_robust.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/thash_haraka_robust.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..aa86229d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/thash_haraka_robust.c
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+/**
+ * Takes an array of inblocks concatenated arrays of SPX_N bytes.
+ */
+static void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inblocks,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char *bitmask = buf + SPX_ADDR_BYTES;
+ unsigned char outbuf[32];
+ unsigned char buf_tmp[64];
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ (void)pub_seed; /* Suppress an 'unused parameter' warning. */
+
+ if (inblocks == 1) {
+ /* F function */
+ /* Since SPX_N may be smaller than 32, we need a temporary buffer. */
+ memset(buf_tmp, 0, 64);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf_tmp, addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256(outbuf, buf_tmp);
+ for (i = 0; i < inblocks * SPX_N; i++) {
+ buf_tmp[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + i] = in[i] ^ outbuf[i];
+ }
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512(outbuf, buf_tmp);
+ memcpy(out, outbuf, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ /* All other tweakable hashes*/
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf, addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ bitmask, inblocks * SPX_N, buf, SPX_ADDR_BYTES);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < inblocks * SPX_N; i++) {
+ buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + i] = in[i] ^ bitmask[i];
+ }
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ out, SPX_N, buf, SPX_ADDR_BYTES + inblocks * SPX_N);
+ }
+}
+
+/* The wrappers below ensure that we use fixed-size buffers on the stack */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + 1 * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, 1, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + 2 * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, 2, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + SPX_WOTS_LEN * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, SPX_WOTS_LEN, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, SPX_FORS_TREES, pub_seed, addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/utils.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7fe7d983
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+/**
+ * Converts the value of 'in' to 'outlen' bytes in big-endian byte order.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned long long in) {
+
+ /* Iterate over out in decreasing order, for big-endianness. */
+ for (size_t i = outlen; i > 0; i--) {
+ out[i - 1] = in & 0xff;
+ in = in >> 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Converts the inlen bytes in 'in' from big-endian byte order to an integer.
+ */
+unsigned long long PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) {
+ unsigned long long retval = 0;
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < inlen; i++) {
+ retval |= ((unsigned long long)in[i]) << (8 * (inlen - 1 - i));
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an auth path.
+ * Expects address to be complete other than the tree_height and tree_index.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ const unsigned char *auth_path, uint32_t tree_height,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+ unsigned char buffer[2 * SPX_N];
+
+ /* If leaf_idx is odd (last bit = 1), current path element is a right child
+ and auth_path has to go left. Otherwise it is the other way around. */
+ if (leaf_idx & 1) {
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, leaf, SPX_N);
+ memcpy(buffer, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(buffer, leaf, SPX_N);
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ }
+ auth_path += SPX_N;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tree_height - 1; i++) {
+ leaf_idx >>= 1;
+ idx_offset >>= 1;
+ /* Set the address of the node we're creating. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(addr, i + 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ addr, leaf_idx + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Pick the right or left neighbor, depending on parity of the node. */
+ if (leaf_idx & 1) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ buffer + SPX_N, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+ memcpy(buffer, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ buffer, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ }
+ auth_path += SPX_N;
+ }
+
+ /* The last iteration is exceptional; we do not copy an auth_path node. */
+ leaf_idx >>= 1;
+ idx_offset >>= 1;
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(addr, tree_height);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ addr, leaf_idx + idx_offset);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ root, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * For a given leaf index, computes the authentication path and the resulting
+ * root node using Merkle's TreeHash algorithm.
+ * Expects the layer and tree parts of the tree_addr to be set, as well as the
+ * tree type (i.e. SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE or SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE).
+ * Applies the offset idx_offset to indices before building addresses, so that
+ * it is possible to continue counting indices across trees.
+ */
+static void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ unsigned char *stack, unsigned int *heights,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset, uint32_t tree_height,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+ uint32_t idx;
+ uint32_t tree_idx;
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < (uint32_t)(1 << tree_height); idx++) {
+ /* Add the next leaf node to the stack. */
+ gen_leaf(stack + offset * SPX_N,
+ sk_seed, pub_seed, idx + idx_offset, tree_addr);
+ offset++;
+ heights[offset - 1] = 0;
+
+ /* If this is a node we need for the auth path.. */
+ if ((leaf_idx ^ 0x1) == idx) {
+ memcpy(auth_path, stack + (offset - 1)*SPX_N, SPX_N);
+ }
+
+ /* While the top-most nodes are of equal height.. */
+ while (offset >= 2 && heights[offset - 1] == heights[offset - 2]) {
+ /* Compute index of the new node, in the next layer. */
+ tree_idx = (idx >> (heights[offset - 1] + 1));
+
+ /* Set the address of the node we're creating. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ tree_addr, heights[offset - 1] + 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ tree_addr, tree_idx + (idx_offset >> (heights[offset - 1] + 1)));
+ /* Hash the top-most nodes from the stack together. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ stack + (offset - 2)*SPX_N, stack + (offset - 2)*SPX_N,
+ pub_seed, tree_addr);
+ offset--;
+ /* Note that the top-most node is now one layer higher. */
+ heights[offset - 1]++;
+
+ /* If this is a node we need for the auth path.. */
+ if (((leaf_idx >> heights[offset - 1]) ^ 0x1) == tree_idx) {
+ memcpy(auth_path + heights[offset - 1]*SPX_N,
+ stack + (offset - 1)*SPX_N, SPX_N);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(root, stack, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/* The wrappers below ensure that we use fixed-size buffers on the stack */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char stack[(SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1)*SPX_N];
+ unsigned int heights[SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash(
+ root, auth_path, stack, heights, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ leaf_idx, idx_offset, SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char stack[(SPX_TREE_HEIGHT + 1)*SPX_N];
+ unsigned int heights[SPX_TREE_HEIGHT + 1];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash(
+ root, auth_path, stack, heights, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ leaf_idx, idx_offset, SPX_TREE_HEIGHT, gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/utils.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/utils.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..50fa131a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/utils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+#ifndef SPX_UTILS_H
+#define SPX_UTILS_H
+
+#include "params.h"
+#include
+#include
+
+/**
+ * Converts the value of 'in' to 'outlen' bytes in big-endian byte order.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned long long in);
+
+/**
+ * Converts the inlen bytes in 'in' from big-endian byte order to an integer.
+ */
+unsigned long long PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an auth path.
+ * Expects address to be complete other than the tree_height and tree_index.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ const unsigned char *auth_path, uint32_t tree_height,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * For a given leaf index, computes the authentication path and the resulting
+ * root node using Merkle's TreeHash algorithm.
+ * Expects the layer and tree parts of the tree_addr to be set, as well as the
+ * tree type (i.e. SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE or SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE).
+ * Applies the offset idx_offset to indices before building addresses, so that
+ * it is possible to continue counting indices across trees.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/wots.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/wots.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8a806365
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/wots.c
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "wots.h"
+
+// TODO clarify address expectations, and make them more uniform.
+// TODO i.e. do we expect types to be set already?
+// TODO and do we expect modifications or copies?
+
+/**
+ * Computes the starting value for a chain, i.e. the secret key.
+ * Expects the address to be complete up to the chain address.
+ */
+static void wots_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8]) {
+ /* Make sure that the hash address is actually zeroed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(wots_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Generate sk element. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(sk, sk_seed, wots_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the chaining function.
+ * out and in have to be n-byte arrays.
+ *
+ * Interprets in as start-th value of the chain.
+ * addr has to contain the address of the chain.
+ */
+static void gen_chain(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int start, unsigned int steps,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ /* Initialize out with the value at position 'start'. */
+ memcpy(out, in, SPX_N);
+
+ /* Iterate 'steps' calls to the hash function. */
+ for (i = start; i < (start + steps) && i < SPX_WOTS_W; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ out, out, pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * base_w algorithm as described in draft.
+ * Interprets an array of bytes as integers in base w.
+ * This only works when log_w is a divisor of 8.
+ */
+static void base_w(unsigned int *output, const size_t out_len,
+ const unsigned char *input) {
+ size_t in = 0;
+ size_t out = 0;
+ unsigned char total = 0;
+ unsigned int bits = 0;
+ size_t consumed;
+
+ for (consumed = 0; consumed < out_len; consumed++) {
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ total = input[in];
+ in++;
+ bits += 8;
+ }
+ bits -= SPX_WOTS_LOGW;
+ output[out] = (unsigned int)((total >> bits) & (SPX_WOTS_W - 1));
+ out++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Computes the WOTS+ checksum over a message (in base_w). */
+static void wots_checksum(unsigned int *csum_base_w,
+ const unsigned int *msg_base_w) {
+ unsigned int csum = 0;
+ unsigned char csum_bytes[(SPX_WOTS_LEN2 * SPX_WOTS_LOGW + 7) / 8];
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ /* Compute checksum. */
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN1; i++) {
+ csum += SPX_WOTS_W - 1 - msg_base_w[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Convert checksum to base_w. */
+ /* Make sure expected empty zero bits are the least significant bits. */
+ csum = csum << (8 - ((SPX_WOTS_LEN2 * SPX_WOTS_LOGW) % 8));
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ csum_bytes, sizeof(csum_bytes), csum);
+ base_w(csum_base_w, SPX_WOTS_LEN2, csum_bytes);
+}
+
+/* Takes a message and derives the matching chain lengths. */
+static void chain_lengths(unsigned int *lengths, const unsigned char *msg) {
+ base_w(lengths, SPX_WOTS_LEN1, msg);
+ wots_checksum(lengths + SPX_WOTS_LEN1, lengths);
+}
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32 byte sk_seed, expands it to WOTS private key
+ * elements and computes the corresponding public key.
+ * It requires the seed pub_seed (used to generate bitmasks and hash keys)
+ * and the address of this WOTS key pair.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ wots_gen_sk(pk + i * SPX_N, sk_seed, addr);
+ gen_chain(pk + i * SPX_N, pk + i * SPX_N,
+ 0, SPX_WOTS_W - 1, pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Takes a n-byte message and the 32-byte sk_see to compute a signature 'sig'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned int lengths[SPX_WOTS_LEN];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ chain_lengths(lengths, msg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ wots_gen_sk(sig + i * SPX_N, sk_seed, addr);
+ gen_chain(sig + i * SPX_N, sig + i * SPX_N, 0, lengths[i], pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature and an n-byte message, computes a WOTS public key.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned int lengths[SPX_WOTS_LEN];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ chain_lengths(lengths, msg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ gen_chain(pk + i * SPX_N, sig + i * SPX_N,
+ lengths[i], SPX_WOTS_W - 1 - lengths[i], pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/wots.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/wots.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c0393e26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-robust/clean/wots.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#ifndef SPX_WOTS_H
+#define SPX_WOTS_H
+
+#include "params.h"
+#include
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32 byte seed for the private key, expands it to
+ * a full WOTS private key and computes the corresponding public key.
+ * It requires the seed pub_seed (used to generate bitmasks and hash keys)
+ * and the address of this WOTS key pair.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a n-byte message and the 32-byte seed for the private key to compute a
+ * signature that is placed at 'sig'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature and an n-byte message, computes a WOTS public key.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/META.yml b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/META.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..de673b17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/META.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+name: SPHINCS+
+type: signature
+claimed-nist-level: 1
+length-public-key: 32
+length-signature: 16976
+testvectors-sha256: b9ea5703411a79c215a2643862bf4924ff62eeec08a0d1e328e39f47417fec8f
+principal-submitter: Andreas Hülsing
+auxiliary-submitters:
+ - Jean-Philippe Aumasson
+ - Daniel J. Bernstein,
+ - Christoph Dobraunig
+ - Maria Eichlseder
+ - Scott Fluhrer
+ - Stefan-Lukas Gazdag
+ - Panos Kampanakis
+ - Stefan Kölbl
+ - Tanja Lange
+ - Martin M. Lauridsen
+ - Florian Mendel
+ - Ruben Niederhagen
+ - Christian Rechberger
+ - Joost Rijneveld
+ - Peter Schwabe
+implementations:
+ - name: clean
+ version: https://github.com/sphincs/sphincsplus/commit/492ec4f1f6d3b3dc4b435783bbaaf4e41cdb6f32
+ length-secret-key: 64
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/LICENSE b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/LICENSE
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..670154e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/LICENSE
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+CC0 1.0 Universal
+
+Statement of Purpose
+
+The laws of most jurisdictions throughout the world automatically confer
+exclusive Copyright and Related Rights (defined below) upon the creator and
+subsequent owner(s) (each and all, an "owner") of an original work of
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+
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+contribute to the Commons to promote the ideal of a free culture and the
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+
+For these and/or other purposes and motivations, and without any expectation
+of additional consideration or compensation, the person associating CC0 with a
+Work (the "Affirmer"), to the extent that he or she is an owner of Copyright
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+1. Copyright and Related Rights. A Work made available under CC0 may be
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+
+ vii. other similar, equivalent or corresponding rights throughout the world
+ based on applicable law or treaty, and any national implementations thereof.
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+2. Waiver. To the greatest extent permitted by, but not in contravention of,
+applicable law, Affirmer hereby overtly, fully, permanently, irrevocably and
+unconditionally waives, abandons, and surrenders all of Affirmer's Copyright
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+the Waiver for the benefit of each member of the public at large and to the
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+any other legal or equitable action to disrupt the quiet enjoyment of the Work
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+
+3. Public License Fallback. Should any part of the Waiver for any reason be
+judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, then the Waiver
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+Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose. In addition, to the extent the Waiver
+is so judged Affirmer hereby grants to each affected person a royalty-free,
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+unconditional license to exercise Affirmer's Copyright and Related Rights in
+the Work (i) in all territories worldwide, (ii) for the maximum duration
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+applicable law, such partial invalidity or ineffectiveness shall not
+invalidate the remainder of the License, and in such case Affirmer hereby
+affirms that he or she will not (i) exercise any of his or her remaining
+Copyright and Related Rights in the Work or (ii) assert any associated claims
+and causes of action with respect to the Work, in either case contrary to
+Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+4. Limitations and Disclaimers.
+
+ a. No trademark or patent rights held by Affirmer are waived, abandoned,
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+ discoverable, all to the greatest extent permissible under applicable law.
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+For more information, please see
+
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/Makefile b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..502a4585
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with GNU Make or BSD Make
+
+LIB=libsphincs-haraka-128f-simple_clean.a
+
+HEADERS = params.h address.h wots.h utils.h fors.h api.h hash.h thash.h haraka.h
+OBJECTS = address.o wots.o utils.o fors.o sign.o hash_haraka.o thash_haraka_simple.o haraka.o
+
+CFLAGS=-Wall -Wconversion -Wextra -Wpedantic -Werror -Wmissing-prototypes -std=c99 -I../../../common $(EXTRAFLAGS)
+
+all: $(LIB)
+
+%.o: %.c $(HEADERS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
+
+$(LIB): $(OBJECTS)
+ $(AR) -r $@ $(OBJECTS)
+
+clean:
+ $(RM) $(OBJECTS)
+ $(RM) $(LIB)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a7cc9c83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with Microsoft Visual Studio's nmake using the command:
+# nmake /f Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
+
+LIBRARY=libsphincs-haraka-128f-simple_clean.lib
+OBJECTS=address.obj wots.obj utils.obj fors.obj sign.obj hash_haraka.obj thash_haraka_simple.obj haraka.obj
+
+CFLAGS=/nologo /I ..\..\..\common /W4 /WX
+
+all: $(LIBRARY)
+
+# Make sure objects are recompiled if headers change.
+$(OBJECTS): *.h
+
+$(LIBRARY): $(OBJECTS)
+ LIB.EXE /NOLOGO /WX /OUT:$@ $**
+
+clean:
+ -DEL $(OBJECTS)
+ -DEL $(LIBRARY)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/address.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/address.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ce8106a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/address.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ bytes + i * 4, 4, addr[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer) {
+ addr[0] = layer;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree) {
+ addr[1] = 0;
+ addr[2] = (uint32_t) (tree >> 32);
+ addr[3] = (uint32_t) tree;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type) {
+ addr[4] = type;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for OTS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair) {
+ addr[5] = keypair;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+ out[5] = in[5];
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain) {
+ addr[6] = chain;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash) {
+ addr[7] = hash;
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height) {
+ addr[6] = tree_height;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index) {
+ addr[7] = tree_index;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/address.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/address.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c3de4306
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/address.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+#ifndef SPX_ADDRESS_H
+#define SPX_ADDRESS_H
+
+#include
+
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS 0
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK 1
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE 2
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE 3
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK 4
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type);
+
+/* Copies the layer and tree part of one address into the other */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for WOTS and FORS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/api.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/api.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..04bedc68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/api.h
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#ifndef PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_API_H
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_API_H
+
+#include
+#include
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_ALGNAME "SPHINCS+"
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES 64
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES 32
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES 16976
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES 48
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair given a seed.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/fors.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/fors.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5a84fe7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/fors.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+static void fors_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ sk, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_sk_to_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ leaf, sk, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* Only copy the parts that must be kept in fors_leaf_addr. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_leaf_addr, fors_tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_leaf_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_leaf_addr, addr_idx);
+
+ fors_gen_sk(leaf, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, leaf, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Interprets m as SPX_FORS_HEIGHT-bit unsigned integers.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ * Assumes indices has space for SPX_FORS_TREES integers.
+ */
+static void message_to_indices(uint32_t *indices, const unsigned char *m) {
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ indices[i] = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < SPX_FORS_HEIGHT; j++) {
+ indices[i] ^= (((uint32_t)m[offset >> 3] >> (offset & 0x7)) & 0x1) << j;
+ offset++;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Include the secret key part that produces the selected leaf node. */
+ fors_gen_sk(sig, sk_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for this leaf node. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ indices[i], idx_offset, fors_gen_leaf, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Derive the leaf from the included secret key part. */
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, sig, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Derive the corresponding root node of this tree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, leaf, indices[i], idx_offset, sig,
+ SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/fors.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/fors.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3fb1be7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/fors.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_FORS_H
+#define SPX_FORS_H
+
+#include
+
+#include "params.h"
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d53b16a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+/*
+Plain C implementation of the Haraka256 and Haraka512 permutations.
+*/
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+#define HARAKAS_RATE 32
+
+static const unsigned char haraka_rc[40][16] = {
+ {0x9d, 0x7b, 0x81, 0x75, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xc5, 0xb2, 0x0a, 0xc0, 0x20, 0xe6, 0x4c, 0x70, 0x84, 0x06},
+ {0x17, 0xf7, 0x08, 0x2f, 0xa4, 0x6b, 0x0f, 0x64, 0x6b, 0xa0, 0xf3, 0x88, 0xe1, 0xb4, 0x66, 0x8b},
+ {0x14, 0x91, 0x02, 0x9f, 0x60, 0x9d, 0x02, 0xcf, 0x98, 0x84, 0xf2, 0x53, 0x2d, 0xde, 0x02, 0x34},
+ {0x79, 0x4f, 0x5b, 0xfd, 0xaf, 0xbc, 0xf3, 0xbb, 0x08, 0x4f, 0x7b, 0x2e, 0xe6, 0xea, 0xd6, 0x0e},
+ {0x44, 0x70, 0x39, 0xbe, 0x1c, 0xcd, 0xee, 0x79, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x72, 0x48, 0xcb, 0xb0, 0xcf, 0xcb},
+ {0x7b, 0x05, 0x8a, 0x2b, 0xed, 0x35, 0x53, 0x8d, 0xb7, 0x32, 0x90, 0x6e, 0xee, 0xcd, 0xea, 0x7e},
+ {0x1b, 0xef, 0x4f, 0xda, 0x61, 0x27, 0x41, 0xe2, 0xd0, 0x7c, 0x2e, 0x5e, 0x43, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x67},
+ {0x3b, 0x0b, 0xc7, 0x1f, 0xe2, 0xfd, 0x5f, 0x67, 0x07, 0xcc, 0xca, 0xaf, 0xb0, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x29},
+ {0xee, 0x65, 0xd4, 0xb9, 0xca, 0x8f, 0xdb, 0xec, 0xe9, 0x7f, 0x86, 0xe6, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x4d, 0xab},
+ {0x33, 0x7e, 0x03, 0xad, 0x4f, 0x40, 0x2a, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xcd, 0xb7, 0xd4, 0x84, 0xbf, 0x30, 0x1c},
+ {0x00, 0x98, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x2e, 0x8b, 0x02, 0x69, 0xbf, 0x23, 0x17, 0x94, 0xb9, 0x0b, 0xcc, 0xb2},
+ {0x8a, 0x2d, 0x9d, 0x5c, 0xc8, 0x9e, 0xaa, 0x4a, 0x72, 0x55, 0x6f, 0xde, 0xa6, 0x78, 0x04, 0xfa},
+ {0xd4, 0x9f, 0x12, 0x29, 0x2e, 0x4f, 0xfa, 0x0e, 0x12, 0x2a, 0x77, 0x6b, 0x2b, 0x9f, 0xb4, 0xdf},
+ {0xee, 0x12, 0x6a, 0xbb, 0xae, 0x11, 0xd6, 0x32, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x49, 0xf4, 0x44, 0x03, 0xa1, 0x1e},
+ {0xa6, 0xec, 0xa8, 0x9c, 0xc9, 0x00, 0x96, 0x5f, 0x84, 0x00, 0x05, 0x4b, 0x88, 0x49, 0x04, 0xaf},
+ {0xec, 0x93, 0xe5, 0x27, 0xe3, 0xc7, 0xa2, 0x78, 0x4f, 0x9c, 0x19, 0x9d, 0xd8, 0x5e, 0x02, 0x21},
+ {0x73, 0x01, 0xd4, 0x82, 0xcd, 0x2e, 0x28, 0xb9, 0xb7, 0xc9, 0x59, 0xa7, 0xf8, 0xaa, 0x3a, 0xbf},
+ {0x6b, 0x7d, 0x30, 0x10, 0xd9, 0xef, 0xf2, 0x37, 0x17, 0xb0, 0x86, 0x61, 0x0d, 0x70, 0x60, 0x62},
+ {0xc6, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0xf6, 0x53, 0x91, 0xc2, 0x81, 0x43, 0x04, 0x30, 0x21, 0xc2, 0x45, 0xca, 0x5a},
+ {0x3a, 0x94, 0xd1, 0x36, 0xe8, 0x92, 0xaf, 0x2c, 0xbb, 0x68, 0x6b, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x97, 0x23, 0x92},
+ {0xb4, 0x71, 0x10, 0xe5, 0x58, 0xb9, 0xba, 0x6c, 0xeb, 0x86, 0x58, 0x22, 0x38, 0x92, 0xbf, 0xd3},
+ {0x8d, 0x12, 0xe1, 0x24, 0xdd, 0xfd, 0x3d, 0x93, 0x77, 0xc6, 0xf0, 0xae, 0xe5, 0x3c, 0x86, 0xdb},
+ {0xb1, 0x12, 0x22, 0xcb, 0xe3, 0x8d, 0xe4, 0x83, 0x9c, 0xa0, 0xeb, 0xff, 0x68, 0x62, 0x60, 0xbb},
+ {0x7d, 0xf7, 0x2b, 0xc7, 0x4e, 0x1a, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0x9c, 0xd1, 0xe4, 0xe2, 0xdc, 0xd3, 0x4b, 0x73},
+ {0x4e, 0x92, 0xb3, 0x2c, 0xc4, 0x15, 0x14, 0x4b, 0x43, 0x1b, 0x30, 0x61, 0xc3, 0x47, 0xbb, 0x43},
+ {0x99, 0x68, 0xeb, 0x16, 0xdd, 0x31, 0xb2, 0x03, 0xf6, 0xef, 0x07, 0xe7, 0xa8, 0x75, 0xa7, 0xdb},
+ {0x2c, 0x47, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x23, 0x5e, 0x8e, 0x77, 0x59, 0x75, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x61, 0xf3, 0x6d},
+ {0xf9, 0x17, 0x86, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xe5, 0x1b, 0x6d, 0x77, 0x7d, 0xde, 0xd6, 0x17, 0x5a, 0xa7, 0xcd},
+ {0x5d, 0xee, 0x46, 0xa9, 0x9d, 0x06, 0x6c, 0x9d, 0xaa, 0xe9, 0xa8, 0x6b, 0xf0, 0x43, 0x6b, 0xec},
+ {0xc1, 0x27, 0xf3, 0x3b, 0x59, 0x11, 0x53, 0xa2, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x57, 0xf9, 0x50, 0x69, 0x1e, 0xcb},
+ {0xd9, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x60, 0x53, 0x03, 0xed, 0xe4, 0x9c, 0x61, 0xda, 0x00, 0x75, 0x0c, 0xee, 0x2c},
+ {0x50, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0x63, 0xbc, 0xba, 0xbb, 0x80, 0xab, 0x0c, 0xe9, 0x96, 0xa1, 0xa5, 0xb1, 0xf0},
+ {0x39, 0xca, 0x8d, 0x93, 0x30, 0xde, 0x0d, 0xab, 0x88, 0x29, 0x96, 0x5e, 0x02, 0xb1, 0x3d, 0xae},
+ {0x42, 0xb4, 0x75, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf3, 0x14, 0x88, 0x0b, 0xa4, 0x54, 0xd5, 0x38, 0x8f, 0xbb, 0x17},
+ {0xf6, 0x16, 0x0a, 0x36, 0x79, 0xb7, 0xb6, 0xae, 0xd7, 0x7f, 0x42, 0x5f, 0x5b, 0x8a, 0xbb, 0x34},
+ {0xde, 0xaf, 0xba, 0xff, 0x18, 0x59, 0xce, 0x43, 0x38, 0x54, 0xe5, 0xcb, 0x41, 0x52, 0xf6, 0x26},
+ {0x78, 0xc9, 0x9e, 0x83, 0xf7, 0x9c, 0xca, 0xa2, 0x6a, 0x02, 0xf3, 0xb9, 0x54, 0x9a, 0xe9, 0x4c},
+ {0x35, 0x12, 0x90, 0x22, 0x28, 0x6e, 0xc0, 0x40, 0xbe, 0xf7, 0xdf, 0x1b, 0x1a, 0xa5, 0x51, 0xae},
+ {0xcf, 0x59, 0xa6, 0x48, 0x0f, 0xbc, 0x73, 0xc1, 0x2b, 0xd2, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x61, 0xc1, 0xa0},
+ {0xa1, 0x9d, 0xc5, 0xe9, 0xfd, 0xbd, 0xd6, 0x4a, 0x88, 0x82, 0x28, 0x02, 0x03, 0xcc, 0x6a, 0x75}
+};
+
+static unsigned char rc[40][16];
+static unsigned char rc_sseed[40][16];
+
+static const unsigned char sbox[256] = {
+ 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe,
+ 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4,
+ 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7,
+ 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15, 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3,
+ 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x09,
+ 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3,
+ 0x2f, 0x84, 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe,
+ 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85,
+ 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8, 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92,
+ 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x0c,
+ 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19,
+ 0x73, 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14,
+ 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2,
+ 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79, 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5,
+ 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08, 0xba, 0x78, 0x25,
+ 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a,
+ 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86,
+ 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e,
+ 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42,
+ 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
+};
+
+#define XT(x) (((x) << 1) ^ ((((x) >> 7) & 1) * 0x1b))
+
+// Simulate _mm_aesenc_si128 instructions from AESNI
+static void aesenc(unsigned char *s, const unsigned char *rk) {
+ uint8_t i, t, u, v[4][4];
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ v[((i / 4) + 4 - (i % 4) ) % 4][i % 4] = sbox[s[i]];
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+ t = v[i][0];
+ u = v[i][0] ^ v[i][1] ^ v[i][2] ^ v[i][3];
+ v[i][0] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][0] ^ v[i][1]));
+ v[i][1] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][1] ^ v[i][2]));
+ v[i][2] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][2] ^ v[i][3]));
+ v[i][3] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][3] ^ t));
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ s[i] = v[i / 4][i % 4] ^ rk[i];
+ }
+}
+
+// Simulate _mm_unpacklo_epi32
+static void unpacklo32(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ memcpy(tmp, a, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 4, b, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 8, a + 4, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 12, b + 4, 4);
+ memcpy(t, tmp, 16);
+}
+
+// Simulate _mm_unpackhi_epi32
+static void unpackhi32(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ memcpy(tmp, a + 8, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 4, b + 8, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 8, a + 12, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 12, b + 12, 4);
+ memcpy(t, tmp, 16);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_tweak_constants(
+ const unsigned char *pk_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ unsigned long long seed_length) {
+ unsigned char buf[40 * 16];
+
+ /* Use the standard constants to generate tweaked ones. */
+ memcpy(rc, haraka_rc, 40 * 16);
+
+ /* Constants for sk.seed */
+ if (sk_seed != NULL) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(buf, 40 * 16, sk_seed, seed_length);
+ memcpy(rc_sseed, buf, 40 * 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Constants for pk.seed */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(buf, 40 * 16, pk_seed, seed_length);
+ memcpy(rc, buf, 40 * 16);
+}
+
+static void haraka_S_absorb(unsigned char *s, unsigned int r,
+ const unsigned char *m, unsigned long long mlen,
+ unsigned char p) {
+ unsigned long long i;
+ unsigned char t[r];
+
+ while (mlen >= r) {
+ // XOR block to state
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ s[i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s, s);
+ mlen -= r;
+ m += r;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ t[i] = 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; ++i) {
+ t[i] = m[i];
+ }
+ t[i] = p;
+ t[r - 1] |= 128;
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ s[i] ^= t[i];
+ }
+}
+
+static void haraka_S_squeezeblocks(unsigned char *h, unsigned long long nblocks,
+ unsigned char *s, unsigned int r) {
+ while (nblocks > 0) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s, s);
+ memcpy(h, s, HARAKAS_RATE);
+ h += r;
+ nblocks--;
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ s_inc[i] = 0;
+ }
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(uint8_t *s_inc, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Recall that s_inc[64] is the non-absorbed bytes xored into the state */
+ while (mlen + s_inc[64] >= HARAKAS_RATE) {
+ for (i = 0; i < (size_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64]); i++) {
+ /* Take the i'th byte from message
+ xor with the s_inc[64] + i'th byte of the state */
+ s_inc[s_inc[64] + i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ mlen -= (size_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64]);
+ m += HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64];
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s_inc, s_inc);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; i++) {
+ s_inc[s_inc[64] + i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(mlen + s_inc[64]);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ /* After haraka_S_inc_absorb, we are guaranteed that s_inc[64] < HARAKAS_RATE,
+ so we can always use one more byte for p in the current state. */
+ s_inc[s_inc[64]] ^= 0x1F;
+ s_inc[HARAKAS_RATE - 1] ^= 128;
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ uint8_t i;
+
+ /* First consume any bytes we still have sitting around */
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen && i < s_inc[64]; i++) {
+ /* There are s_inc[64] bytes left, so r - s_inc[64] is the first
+ available byte. We consume from there, i.e., up to r. */
+ out[i] = s_inc[(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64] + i)];
+ }
+ out += i;
+ outlen -= i;
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(s_inc[64] - i);
+
+ /* Then squeeze the remaining necessary blocks */
+ while (outlen > 0) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s_inc, s_inc);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen && i < HARAKAS_RATE; i++) {
+ out[i] = s_inc[i];
+ }
+ out += i;
+ outlen -= i;
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - i);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned long long outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen) {
+ unsigned long long i;
+ unsigned char s[64];
+ unsigned char d[32];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ s[i] = 0;
+ }
+ haraka_S_absorb(s, 32, in, inlen, 0x1F);
+
+ haraka_S_squeezeblocks(out, outlen / 32, s, 32);
+ out += (outlen / 32) * 32;
+
+ if (outlen % 32) {
+ haraka_S_squeezeblocks(d, 1, s, 32);
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen % 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = d[i];
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[64], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 32, in + 32, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 48, in + 48, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 1]);
+ aesenc(s + 32, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 2]);
+ aesenc(s + 48, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 3]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s, s, s + 16);
+ unpacklo32(s + 16, s + 32, s + 48);
+ unpackhi32(s + 32, s + 32, s + 48);
+ unpacklo32(s + 48, s, s + 32);
+ unpackhi32(s, s, s + 32);
+ unpackhi32(s + 32, s + 16, tmp);
+ unpacklo32(s + 16, s + 16, tmp);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(out, s, 64);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i;
+
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(buf, in);
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ buf[i] = buf[i] ^ in[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Truncated */
+ memcpy(out, buf + 8, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 8, buf + 24, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 16, buf + 32, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 24, buf + 48, 8);
+}
+
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[32], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j + 1]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s + 16, s, s + 16);
+ memcpy(s, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ s[i];
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[32], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc_sseed[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc_sseed[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j + 1]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s + 16, s, s + 16);
+ memcpy(s, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ s[i];
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/haraka.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/haraka.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cc5ae81d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/haraka.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_HARAKA_H
+#define SPX_HARAKA_H
+
+/* Tweak constants with seed */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_tweak_constants(
+ const unsigned char *pk_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ unsigned long long seed_length);
+
+/* Haraka Sponge */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(uint8_t *s_inc, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned long long outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen);
+
+/* Applies the 512-bit Haraka permutation to in. */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-512 */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-256 */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-256 using sk.seed constants */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/hash.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/hash.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b7e666be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/hash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifndef SPX_HASH_H
+#define SPX_HASH_H
+
+#include
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf, const unsigned char *optrand,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ unsigned char *digest, uint64_t *tree, uint32_t *leaf_idx,
+ const unsigned char *R, const unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/hash_haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/hash_haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2fd368a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/hash_haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_tweak_constants(pub_seed, sk_seed, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes PRF(key, addr), given a secret key of SPX_N bytes and an address
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES];
+ /* Since SPX_N may be smaller than 32, we need a temporary buffer. */
+ unsigned char outbuf[32];
+
+ (void)key; /* Suppress an 'unused parameter' warning. */
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf, addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(outbuf, buf);
+ memcpy(out, outbuf, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the message-dependent randomness R, using a secret seed and an
+ * optional randomization value as well as the message.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf, const unsigned char *optrand,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) {
+ uint8_t s_inc[65];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, sk_prf, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, optrand, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, m, mlen);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(R, SPX_N, s_inc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the message hash using R, the public key, and the message.
+ * Outputs the message digest and the index of the leaf. The index is split in
+ * the tree index and the leaf index, for convenient copying to an address.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ unsigned char *digest, uint64_t *tree, uint32_t *leaf_idx,
+ const unsigned char *R, const unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) {
+#define SPX_TREE_BITS (SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * (SPX_D - 1))
+#define SPX_TREE_BYTES ((SPX_TREE_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_LEAF_BITS SPX_TREE_HEIGHT
+#define SPX_LEAF_BYTES ((SPX_LEAF_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_DGST_BYTES (SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES + SPX_TREE_BYTES + SPX_LEAF_BYTES)
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_DGST_BYTES];
+ unsigned char *bufp = buf;
+ uint8_t s_inc[65];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, R, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, pk, SPX_PK_BYTES);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, m, mlen);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(buf, SPX_DGST_BYTES, s_inc);
+
+ memcpy(digest, bufp, SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES);
+ bufp += SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES;
+
+ *tree = PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(bufp, SPX_TREE_BYTES);
+ *tree &= (~(uint64_t)0) >> (64 - SPX_TREE_BITS);
+ bufp += SPX_TREE_BYTES;
+
+ *leaf_idx = (uint32_t)PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ bufp, SPX_LEAF_BYTES);
+ *leaf_idx &= (~(uint32_t)0) >> (32 - SPX_LEAF_BITS);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/params.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/params.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..367ef88d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/params.h
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#ifndef SPX_PARAMS_H
+#define SPX_PARAMS_H
+
+/* Hash output length in bytes. */
+#define SPX_N 16
+/* Height of the hypertree. */
+#define SPX_FULL_HEIGHT 60
+/* Number of subtree layer. */
+#define SPX_D 20
+/* FORS tree dimensions. */
+#define SPX_FORS_HEIGHT 9
+#define SPX_FORS_TREES 30
+/* Winternitz parameter, */
+#define SPX_WOTS_W 16
+
+/* The hash function is defined by linking a different hash.c file, as opposed
+ to setting a #define constant. */
+
+/* For clarity */
+#define SPX_ADDR_BYTES 32
+
+/* WOTS parameters. */
+#define SPX_WOTS_LOGW 4
+
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN1 (8 * SPX_N / SPX_WOTS_LOGW)
+
+/* SPX_WOTS_LEN2 is floor(log(len_1 * (w - 1)) / log(w)) + 1; we precompute */
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN2 3
+
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN (SPX_WOTS_LEN1 + SPX_WOTS_LEN2)
+#define SPX_WOTS_BYTES (SPX_WOTS_LEN * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_WOTS_PK_BYTES SPX_WOTS_BYTES
+
+/* Subtree size. */
+#define SPX_TREE_HEIGHT (SPX_FULL_HEIGHT / SPX_D)
+
+/* FORS parameters. */
+#define SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES ((SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_FORS_BYTES ((SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1) * SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_FORS_PK_BYTES SPX_N
+
+/* Resulting SPX sizes. */
+#define SPX_BYTES (SPX_N + SPX_FORS_BYTES + SPX_D * SPX_WOTS_BYTES +\
+ SPX_FULL_HEIGHT * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_PK_BYTES (2 * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_SK_BYTES (2 * SPX_N + SPX_PK_BYTES)
+
+/* Optionally, signing can be made non-deterministic using optrand.
+ This can help counter side-channel attacks that would benefit from
+ getting a large number of traces when the signer uses the same nodes. */
+#define SPX_OPTRAND_BYTES 32
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/sign.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3742fed4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "api.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "randombytes.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "wots.h"
+
+/**
+ * Computes the leaf at a given address. First generates the WOTS key pair,
+ * then computes leaf by hashing horizontally.
+ */
+static void wots_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+ unsigned char pk[SPX_WOTS_BYTES];
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t wots_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, addr_idx);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ pk, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ wots_pk_addr, wots_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ leaf, pk, pub_seed, wots_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates an SPX key pair given a seed of length
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [PUB_SEED || root]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed) {
+ /* We do not need the auth path in key generation, but it simplifies the
+ code to have just one treehash routine that computes both root and path
+ in one function. */
+ unsigned char auth_path[SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t top_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ top_tree_addr, SPX_D - 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ top_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+
+ /* Initialize SK_SEED, SK_PRF and PUB_SEED from seed. */
+ memcpy(sk, seed, PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES);
+
+ memcpy(pk, sk + 2 * SPX_N, SPX_N);
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(pk, sk);
+
+ /* Compute root node of the top-most subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ sk + 3 * SPX_N, auth_path, sk, sk + 2 * SPX_N, 0, 0,
+ wots_gen_leaf, top_tree_addr);
+
+ memcpy(pk + SPX_N, sk + 3 * SPX_N, SPX_N);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates an SPX key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [PUB_SEED || root]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
+ unsigned char seed[PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES];
+ randombytes(seed, PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ pk, sk, seed);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed = sk;
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf = sk + SPX_N;
+ const unsigned char *pk = sk + 2 * SPX_N;
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed = pk;
+
+ unsigned char optrand[SPX_N];
+ unsigned char mhash[SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+ unsigned char root[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t i;
+ uint64_t tree;
+ uint32_t idx_leaf;
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ pub_seed, sk_seed);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+
+ /* Optionally, signing can be made non-deterministic using optrand.
+ This can help counter side-channel attacks that would benefit from
+ getting a large number of traces when the signer uses the same nodes. */
+ randombytes(optrand, SPX_N);
+ /* Compute the digest randomization value. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ sig, sk_prf, optrand, m, mlen);
+
+ /* Derive the message digest and leaf index from R, PK and M. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ mhash, &tree, &idx_leaf, sig, pk, m, mlen);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(wots_addr, tree);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ /* Sign the message hash using FORS. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ sig, root, mhash, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_FORS_BYTES;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_D; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(tree_addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(tree_addr, tree);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ /* Compute a WOTS signature. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ sig, root, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_WOTS_BYTES;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for the used WOTS leaf. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ root, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed, idx_leaf, 0,
+ wots_gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N;
+
+ /* Update the indices for the next layer. */
+ idx_leaf = (tree & ((1 << SPX_TREE_HEIGHT) - 1));
+ tree = tree >> SPX_TREE_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ *siglen = SPX_BYTES;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed = pk;
+ const unsigned char *pub_root = pk + SPX_N;
+ unsigned char mhash[SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+ unsigned char wots_pk[SPX_WOTS_BYTES];
+ unsigned char root[SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ unsigned int i;
+ uint64_t tree;
+ uint32_t idx_leaf;
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t wots_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ if (siglen != SPX_BYTES) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ pub_seed, NULL);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK);
+
+ /* Derive the message digest and leaf index from R || PK || M. */
+ /* The additional SPX_N is a result of the hash domain separator. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ mhash, &tree, &idx_leaf, sig, pk, m, mlen);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Layer correctly defaults to 0, so no need to set_layer_addr */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(wots_addr, tree);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ root, sig, mhash, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_FORS_BYTES;
+
+ /* For each subtree.. */
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_D; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(tree_addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(tree_addr, tree);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ wots_pk_addr, wots_addr);
+
+ /* The WOTS public key is only correct if the signature was correct. */
+ /* Initially, root is the FORS pk, but on subsequent iterations it is
+ the root of the subtree below the currently processed subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ wots_pk, sig, root, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_WOTS_BYTES;
+
+ /* Compute the leaf node using the WOTS public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ leaf, wots_pk, pub_seed, wots_pk_addr);
+
+ /* Compute the root node of this subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ root, leaf, idx_leaf, 0, sig, SPX_TREE_HEIGHT,
+ pub_seed, tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N;
+
+ /* Update the indices for the next layer. */
+ idx_leaf = (tree & ((1 << SPX_TREE_HEIGHT) - 1));
+ tree = tree >> SPX_TREE_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the root node equals the root node in the public key. */
+ if (memcmp(root, pub_root, SPX_N) != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
+ size_t siglen;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ sm, &siglen, m, mlen, sk);
+
+ memmove(sm + SPX_BYTES, m, mlen);
+ *smlen = siglen + mlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
+ /* The API caller does not necessarily know what size a signature should be
+ but SPHINCS+ signatures are always exactly SPX_BYTES. */
+ if (smlen < SPX_BYTES) {
+ memset(m, 0, smlen);
+ *mlen = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *mlen = smlen - SPX_BYTES;
+
+ if (PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ sm, SPX_BYTES, sm + SPX_BYTES, *mlen, pk)) {
+ memset(m, 0, smlen);
+ *mlen = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* If verification was successful, move the message to the right place. */
+ memmove(m, sm + SPX_BYTES, *mlen);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/thash.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/thash.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6d387539
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/thash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifndef SPX_THASH_H
+#define SPX_THASH_H
+
+#include
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/thash_haraka_simple.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/thash_haraka_simple.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d4580ee8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/thash_haraka_simple.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+/**
+ * Takes an array of inblocks concatenated arrays of SPX_N bytes.
+ */
+static void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inblocks,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char outbuf[32];
+ unsigned char buf_tmp[64];
+
+ (void)pub_seed; /* Suppress an 'unused parameter' warning. */
+
+ if (inblocks == 1) {
+ /* F function */
+ /* Since SPX_N may be smaller than 32, we need a temporary buffer. */
+ memset(buf_tmp, 0, 64);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf_tmp, addr);
+ memcpy(buf_tmp + SPX_ADDR_BYTES, in, SPX_N);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512(outbuf, buf_tmp);
+ memcpy(out, outbuf, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ /* All other tweakable hashes*/
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf, addr);
+ memcpy(buf + SPX_ADDR_BYTES, in, inblocks * SPX_N);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ out, SPX_N, buf, SPX_ADDR_BYTES + inblocks * SPX_N);
+ }
+}
+
+/* The wrappers below ensure that we use fixed-size buffers on the stack */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + 1 * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, 1, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + 2 * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, 2, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + SPX_WOTS_LEN * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, SPX_WOTS_LEN, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, SPX_FORS_TREES, pub_seed, addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/utils.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f6002aa4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+/**
+ * Converts the value of 'in' to 'outlen' bytes in big-endian byte order.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned long long in) {
+
+ /* Iterate over out in decreasing order, for big-endianness. */
+ for (size_t i = outlen; i > 0; i--) {
+ out[i - 1] = in & 0xff;
+ in = in >> 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Converts the inlen bytes in 'in' from big-endian byte order to an integer.
+ */
+unsigned long long PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) {
+ unsigned long long retval = 0;
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < inlen; i++) {
+ retval |= ((unsigned long long)in[i]) << (8 * (inlen - 1 - i));
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an auth path.
+ * Expects address to be complete other than the tree_height and tree_index.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ const unsigned char *auth_path, uint32_t tree_height,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+ unsigned char buffer[2 * SPX_N];
+
+ /* If leaf_idx is odd (last bit = 1), current path element is a right child
+ and auth_path has to go left. Otherwise it is the other way around. */
+ if (leaf_idx & 1) {
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, leaf, SPX_N);
+ memcpy(buffer, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(buffer, leaf, SPX_N);
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ }
+ auth_path += SPX_N;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tree_height - 1; i++) {
+ leaf_idx >>= 1;
+ idx_offset >>= 1;
+ /* Set the address of the node we're creating. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(addr, i + 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ addr, leaf_idx + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Pick the right or left neighbor, depending on parity of the node. */
+ if (leaf_idx & 1) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ buffer + SPX_N, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+ memcpy(buffer, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ buffer, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ }
+ auth_path += SPX_N;
+ }
+
+ /* The last iteration is exceptional; we do not copy an auth_path node. */
+ leaf_idx >>= 1;
+ idx_offset >>= 1;
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(addr, tree_height);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ addr, leaf_idx + idx_offset);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ root, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * For a given leaf index, computes the authentication path and the resulting
+ * root node using Merkle's TreeHash algorithm.
+ * Expects the layer and tree parts of the tree_addr to be set, as well as the
+ * tree type (i.e. SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE or SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE).
+ * Applies the offset idx_offset to indices before building addresses, so that
+ * it is possible to continue counting indices across trees.
+ */
+static void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ unsigned char *stack, unsigned int *heights,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset, uint32_t tree_height,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+ uint32_t idx;
+ uint32_t tree_idx;
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < (uint32_t)(1 << tree_height); idx++) {
+ /* Add the next leaf node to the stack. */
+ gen_leaf(stack + offset * SPX_N,
+ sk_seed, pub_seed, idx + idx_offset, tree_addr);
+ offset++;
+ heights[offset - 1] = 0;
+
+ /* If this is a node we need for the auth path.. */
+ if ((leaf_idx ^ 0x1) == idx) {
+ memcpy(auth_path, stack + (offset - 1)*SPX_N, SPX_N);
+ }
+
+ /* While the top-most nodes are of equal height.. */
+ while (offset >= 2 && heights[offset - 1] == heights[offset - 2]) {
+ /* Compute index of the new node, in the next layer. */
+ tree_idx = (idx >> (heights[offset - 1] + 1));
+
+ /* Set the address of the node we're creating. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ tree_addr, heights[offset - 1] + 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ tree_addr, tree_idx + (idx_offset >> (heights[offset - 1] + 1)));
+ /* Hash the top-most nodes from the stack together. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ stack + (offset - 2)*SPX_N, stack + (offset - 2)*SPX_N,
+ pub_seed, tree_addr);
+ offset--;
+ /* Note that the top-most node is now one layer higher. */
+ heights[offset - 1]++;
+
+ /* If this is a node we need for the auth path.. */
+ if (((leaf_idx >> heights[offset - 1]) ^ 0x1) == tree_idx) {
+ memcpy(auth_path + heights[offset - 1]*SPX_N,
+ stack + (offset - 1)*SPX_N, SPX_N);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(root, stack, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/* The wrappers below ensure that we use fixed-size buffers on the stack */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char stack[(SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1)*SPX_N];
+ unsigned int heights[SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash(
+ root, auth_path, stack, heights, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ leaf_idx, idx_offset, SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char stack[(SPX_TREE_HEIGHT + 1)*SPX_N];
+ unsigned int heights[SPX_TREE_HEIGHT + 1];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash(
+ root, auth_path, stack, heights, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ leaf_idx, idx_offset, SPX_TREE_HEIGHT, gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/utils.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/utils.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..799f080a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/utils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+#ifndef SPX_UTILS_H
+#define SPX_UTILS_H
+
+#include "params.h"
+#include
+#include
+
+/**
+ * Converts the value of 'in' to 'outlen' bytes in big-endian byte order.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned long long in);
+
+/**
+ * Converts the inlen bytes in 'in' from big-endian byte order to an integer.
+ */
+unsigned long long PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an auth path.
+ * Expects address to be complete other than the tree_height and tree_index.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ const unsigned char *auth_path, uint32_t tree_height,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * For a given leaf index, computes the authentication path and the resulting
+ * root node using Merkle's TreeHash algorithm.
+ * Expects the layer and tree parts of the tree_addr to be set, as well as the
+ * tree type (i.e. SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE or SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE).
+ * Applies the offset idx_offset to indices before building addresses, so that
+ * it is possible to continue counting indices across trees.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/wots.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/wots.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cc7f4e52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/wots.c
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "wots.h"
+
+// TODO clarify address expectations, and make them more uniform.
+// TODO i.e. do we expect types to be set already?
+// TODO and do we expect modifications or copies?
+
+/**
+ * Computes the starting value for a chain, i.e. the secret key.
+ * Expects the address to be complete up to the chain address.
+ */
+static void wots_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8]) {
+ /* Make sure that the hash address is actually zeroed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(wots_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Generate sk element. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_prf_addr(sk, sk_seed, wots_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the chaining function.
+ * out and in have to be n-byte arrays.
+ *
+ * Interprets in as start-th value of the chain.
+ * addr has to contain the address of the chain.
+ */
+static void gen_chain(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int start, unsigned int steps,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ /* Initialize out with the value at position 'start'. */
+ memcpy(out, in, SPX_N);
+
+ /* Iterate 'steps' calls to the hash function. */
+ for (i = start; i < (start + steps) && i < SPX_WOTS_W; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ out, out, pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * base_w algorithm as described in draft.
+ * Interprets an array of bytes as integers in base w.
+ * This only works when log_w is a divisor of 8.
+ */
+static void base_w(unsigned int *output, const size_t out_len,
+ const unsigned char *input) {
+ size_t in = 0;
+ size_t out = 0;
+ unsigned char total = 0;
+ unsigned int bits = 0;
+ size_t consumed;
+
+ for (consumed = 0; consumed < out_len; consumed++) {
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ total = input[in];
+ in++;
+ bits += 8;
+ }
+ bits -= SPX_WOTS_LOGW;
+ output[out] = (unsigned int)((total >> bits) & (SPX_WOTS_W - 1));
+ out++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Computes the WOTS+ checksum over a message (in base_w). */
+static void wots_checksum(unsigned int *csum_base_w,
+ const unsigned int *msg_base_w) {
+ unsigned int csum = 0;
+ unsigned char csum_bytes[(SPX_WOTS_LEN2 * SPX_WOTS_LOGW + 7) / 8];
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ /* Compute checksum. */
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN1; i++) {
+ csum += SPX_WOTS_W - 1 - msg_base_w[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Convert checksum to base_w. */
+ /* Make sure expected empty zero bits are the least significant bits. */
+ csum = csum << (8 - ((SPX_WOTS_LEN2 * SPX_WOTS_LOGW) % 8));
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ csum_bytes, sizeof(csum_bytes), csum);
+ base_w(csum_base_w, SPX_WOTS_LEN2, csum_bytes);
+}
+
+/* Takes a message and derives the matching chain lengths. */
+static void chain_lengths(unsigned int *lengths, const unsigned char *msg) {
+ base_w(lengths, SPX_WOTS_LEN1, msg);
+ wots_checksum(lengths + SPX_WOTS_LEN1, lengths);
+}
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32 byte sk_seed, expands it to WOTS private key
+ * elements and computes the corresponding public key.
+ * It requires the seed pub_seed (used to generate bitmasks and hash keys)
+ * and the address of this WOTS key pair.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ wots_gen_sk(pk + i * SPX_N, sk_seed, addr);
+ gen_chain(pk + i * SPX_N, pk + i * SPX_N,
+ 0, SPX_WOTS_W - 1, pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Takes a n-byte message and the 32-byte sk_see to compute a signature 'sig'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned int lengths[SPX_WOTS_LEN];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ chain_lengths(lengths, msg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ wots_gen_sk(sig + i * SPX_N, sk_seed, addr);
+ gen_chain(sig + i * SPX_N, sig + i * SPX_N, 0, lengths[i], pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature and an n-byte message, computes a WOTS public key.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned int lengths[SPX_WOTS_LEN];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ chain_lengths(lengths, msg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ gen_chain(pk + i * SPX_N, sig + i * SPX_N,
+ lengths[i], SPX_WOTS_W - 1 - lengths[i], pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/wots.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/wots.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..03513306
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128f-simple/clean/wots.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#ifndef SPX_WOTS_H
+#define SPX_WOTS_H
+
+#include "params.h"
+#include
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32 byte seed for the private key, expands it to
+ * a full WOTS private key and computes the corresponding public key.
+ * It requires the seed pub_seed (used to generate bitmasks and hash keys)
+ * and the address of this WOTS key pair.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a n-byte message and the 32-byte seed for the private key to compute a
+ * signature that is placed at 'sig'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature and an n-byte message, computes a WOTS public key.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128FSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/META.yml b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/META.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7eb67b73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/META.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+name: SPHINCS+
+type: signature
+claimed-nist-level: 1
+length-public-key: 32
+length-signature: 8080
+testvectors-sha256: a7057ca5ce0d7f01d1c1aabe474f8449796b051becbc8b148a78c84893193fcf
+principal-submitter: Andreas Hülsing
+auxiliary-submitters:
+ - Jean-Philippe Aumasson
+ - Daniel J. Bernstein,
+ - Christoph Dobraunig
+ - Maria Eichlseder
+ - Scott Fluhrer
+ - Stefan-Lukas Gazdag
+ - Panos Kampanakis
+ - Stefan Kölbl
+ - Tanja Lange
+ - Martin M. Lauridsen
+ - Florian Mendel
+ - Ruben Niederhagen
+ - Christian Rechberger
+ - Joost Rijneveld
+ - Peter Schwabe
+implementations:
+ - name: clean
+ version: https://github.com/sphincs/sphincsplus/commit/492ec4f1f6d3b3dc4b435783bbaaf4e41cdb6f32
+ length-secret-key: 64
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/LICENSE b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/LICENSE
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..670154e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/LICENSE
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+CC0 1.0 Universal
+
+Statement of Purpose
+
+The laws of most jurisdictions throughout the world automatically confer
+exclusive Copyright and Related Rights (defined below) upon the creator and
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+
+Certain owners wish to permanently relinquish those rights to a Work for the
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+purposes, including without limitation commercial purposes. These owners may
+contribute to the Commons to promote the ideal of a free culture and the
+further production of creative, cultural and scientific works, or to gain
+reputation or greater distribution for their Work in part through the use and
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+
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+of additional consideration or compensation, the person associating CC0 with a
+Work (the "Affirmer"), to the extent that he or she is an owner of Copyright
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+
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+
+3. Public License Fallback. Should any part of the Waiver for any reason be
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+invalidate the remainder of the License, and in such case Affirmer hereby
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+4. Limitations and Disclaimers.
+
+ a. No trademark or patent rights held by Affirmer are waived, abandoned,
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+
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/Makefile b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6ab2d592
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with GNU Make or BSD Make
+
+LIB=libsphincs-haraka-128s-robust_clean.a
+
+HEADERS = params.h address.h wots.h utils.h fors.h api.h hash.h thash.h haraka.h
+OBJECTS = address.o wots.o utils.o fors.o sign.o hash_haraka.o thash_haraka_robust.o haraka.o
+
+CFLAGS=-Wall -Wconversion -Wextra -Wpedantic -Werror -Wmissing-prototypes -std=c99 -I../../../common $(EXTRAFLAGS)
+
+all: $(LIB)
+
+%.o: %.c $(HEADERS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
+
+$(LIB): $(OBJECTS)
+ $(AR) -r $@ $(OBJECTS)
+
+clean:
+ $(RM) $(OBJECTS)
+ $(RM) $(LIB)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..26dc2df1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with Microsoft Visual Studio's nmake using the command:
+# nmake /f Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
+
+LIBRARY=libsphincs-haraka-128s-robust_clean.lib
+OBJECTS=address.obj wots.obj utils.obj fors.obj sign.obj hash_haraka.obj thash_haraka_robust.obj haraka.obj
+
+CFLAGS=/nologo /I ..\..\..\common /W4 /WX
+
+all: $(LIBRARY)
+
+# Make sure objects are recompiled if headers change.
+$(OBJECTS): *.h
+
+$(LIBRARY): $(OBJECTS)
+ LIB.EXE /NOLOGO /WX /OUT:$@ $**
+
+clean:
+ -DEL $(OBJECTS)
+ -DEL $(LIBRARY)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/address.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/address.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..495d9451
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/address.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ bytes + i * 4, 4, addr[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer) {
+ addr[0] = layer;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree) {
+ addr[1] = 0;
+ addr[2] = (uint32_t) (tree >> 32);
+ addr[3] = (uint32_t) tree;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type) {
+ addr[4] = type;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for OTS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair) {
+ addr[5] = keypair;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+ out[5] = in[5];
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain) {
+ addr[6] = chain;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash) {
+ addr[7] = hash;
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height) {
+ addr[6] = tree_height;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index) {
+ addr[7] = tree_index;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/address.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/address.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..bb97668a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/address.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+#ifndef SPX_ADDRESS_H
+#define SPX_ADDRESS_H
+
+#include
+
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS 0
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK 1
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE 2
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE 3
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK 4
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type);
+
+/* Copies the layer and tree part of one address into the other */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for WOTS and FORS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/api.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/api.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..33e6a2b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/api.h
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#ifndef PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_API_H
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_API_H
+
+#include
+#include
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_ALGNAME "SPHINCS+"
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES 64
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES 32
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES 16976
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES 48
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair given a seed.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/fors.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/fors.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c797af4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/fors.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+static void fors_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ sk, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_sk_to_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ leaf, sk, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* Only copy the parts that must be kept in fors_leaf_addr. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_leaf_addr, fors_tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_leaf_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_leaf_addr, addr_idx);
+
+ fors_gen_sk(leaf, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, leaf, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Interprets m as SPX_FORS_HEIGHT-bit unsigned integers.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ * Assumes indices has space for SPX_FORS_TREES integers.
+ */
+static void message_to_indices(uint32_t *indices, const unsigned char *m) {
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ indices[i] = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < SPX_FORS_HEIGHT; j++) {
+ indices[i] ^= (((uint32_t)m[offset >> 3] >> (offset & 0x7)) & 0x1) << j;
+ offset++;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Include the secret key part that produces the selected leaf node. */
+ fors_gen_sk(sig, sk_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for this leaf node. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ indices[i], idx_offset, fors_gen_leaf, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Derive the leaf from the included secret key part. */
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, sig, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Derive the corresponding root node of this tree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, leaf, indices[i], idx_offset, sig,
+ SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/fors.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/fors.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..135be456
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/fors.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_FORS_H
+#define SPX_FORS_H
+
+#include
+
+#include "params.h"
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6b8f4030
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+/*
+Plain C implementation of the Haraka256 and Haraka512 permutations.
+*/
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+#define HARAKAS_RATE 32
+
+static const unsigned char haraka_rc[40][16] = {
+ {0x9d, 0x7b, 0x81, 0x75, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xc5, 0xb2, 0x0a, 0xc0, 0x20, 0xe6, 0x4c, 0x70, 0x84, 0x06},
+ {0x17, 0xf7, 0x08, 0x2f, 0xa4, 0x6b, 0x0f, 0x64, 0x6b, 0xa0, 0xf3, 0x88, 0xe1, 0xb4, 0x66, 0x8b},
+ {0x14, 0x91, 0x02, 0x9f, 0x60, 0x9d, 0x02, 0xcf, 0x98, 0x84, 0xf2, 0x53, 0x2d, 0xde, 0x02, 0x34},
+ {0x79, 0x4f, 0x5b, 0xfd, 0xaf, 0xbc, 0xf3, 0xbb, 0x08, 0x4f, 0x7b, 0x2e, 0xe6, 0xea, 0xd6, 0x0e},
+ {0x44, 0x70, 0x39, 0xbe, 0x1c, 0xcd, 0xee, 0x79, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x72, 0x48, 0xcb, 0xb0, 0xcf, 0xcb},
+ {0x7b, 0x05, 0x8a, 0x2b, 0xed, 0x35, 0x53, 0x8d, 0xb7, 0x32, 0x90, 0x6e, 0xee, 0xcd, 0xea, 0x7e},
+ {0x1b, 0xef, 0x4f, 0xda, 0x61, 0x27, 0x41, 0xe2, 0xd0, 0x7c, 0x2e, 0x5e, 0x43, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x67},
+ {0x3b, 0x0b, 0xc7, 0x1f, 0xe2, 0xfd, 0x5f, 0x67, 0x07, 0xcc, 0xca, 0xaf, 0xb0, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x29},
+ {0xee, 0x65, 0xd4, 0xb9, 0xca, 0x8f, 0xdb, 0xec, 0xe9, 0x7f, 0x86, 0xe6, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x4d, 0xab},
+ {0x33, 0x7e, 0x03, 0xad, 0x4f, 0x40, 0x2a, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xcd, 0xb7, 0xd4, 0x84, 0xbf, 0x30, 0x1c},
+ {0x00, 0x98, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x2e, 0x8b, 0x02, 0x69, 0xbf, 0x23, 0x17, 0x94, 0xb9, 0x0b, 0xcc, 0xb2},
+ {0x8a, 0x2d, 0x9d, 0x5c, 0xc8, 0x9e, 0xaa, 0x4a, 0x72, 0x55, 0x6f, 0xde, 0xa6, 0x78, 0x04, 0xfa},
+ {0xd4, 0x9f, 0x12, 0x29, 0x2e, 0x4f, 0xfa, 0x0e, 0x12, 0x2a, 0x77, 0x6b, 0x2b, 0x9f, 0xb4, 0xdf},
+ {0xee, 0x12, 0x6a, 0xbb, 0xae, 0x11, 0xd6, 0x32, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x49, 0xf4, 0x44, 0x03, 0xa1, 0x1e},
+ {0xa6, 0xec, 0xa8, 0x9c, 0xc9, 0x00, 0x96, 0x5f, 0x84, 0x00, 0x05, 0x4b, 0x88, 0x49, 0x04, 0xaf},
+ {0xec, 0x93, 0xe5, 0x27, 0xe3, 0xc7, 0xa2, 0x78, 0x4f, 0x9c, 0x19, 0x9d, 0xd8, 0x5e, 0x02, 0x21},
+ {0x73, 0x01, 0xd4, 0x82, 0xcd, 0x2e, 0x28, 0xb9, 0xb7, 0xc9, 0x59, 0xa7, 0xf8, 0xaa, 0x3a, 0xbf},
+ {0x6b, 0x7d, 0x30, 0x10, 0xd9, 0xef, 0xf2, 0x37, 0x17, 0xb0, 0x86, 0x61, 0x0d, 0x70, 0x60, 0x62},
+ {0xc6, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0xf6, 0x53, 0x91, 0xc2, 0x81, 0x43, 0x04, 0x30, 0x21, 0xc2, 0x45, 0xca, 0x5a},
+ {0x3a, 0x94, 0xd1, 0x36, 0xe8, 0x92, 0xaf, 0x2c, 0xbb, 0x68, 0x6b, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x97, 0x23, 0x92},
+ {0xb4, 0x71, 0x10, 0xe5, 0x58, 0xb9, 0xba, 0x6c, 0xeb, 0x86, 0x58, 0x22, 0x38, 0x92, 0xbf, 0xd3},
+ {0x8d, 0x12, 0xe1, 0x24, 0xdd, 0xfd, 0x3d, 0x93, 0x77, 0xc6, 0xf0, 0xae, 0xe5, 0x3c, 0x86, 0xdb},
+ {0xb1, 0x12, 0x22, 0xcb, 0xe3, 0x8d, 0xe4, 0x83, 0x9c, 0xa0, 0xeb, 0xff, 0x68, 0x62, 0x60, 0xbb},
+ {0x7d, 0xf7, 0x2b, 0xc7, 0x4e, 0x1a, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0x9c, 0xd1, 0xe4, 0xe2, 0xdc, 0xd3, 0x4b, 0x73},
+ {0x4e, 0x92, 0xb3, 0x2c, 0xc4, 0x15, 0x14, 0x4b, 0x43, 0x1b, 0x30, 0x61, 0xc3, 0x47, 0xbb, 0x43},
+ {0x99, 0x68, 0xeb, 0x16, 0xdd, 0x31, 0xb2, 0x03, 0xf6, 0xef, 0x07, 0xe7, 0xa8, 0x75, 0xa7, 0xdb},
+ {0x2c, 0x47, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x23, 0x5e, 0x8e, 0x77, 0x59, 0x75, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x61, 0xf3, 0x6d},
+ {0xf9, 0x17, 0x86, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xe5, 0x1b, 0x6d, 0x77, 0x7d, 0xde, 0xd6, 0x17, 0x5a, 0xa7, 0xcd},
+ {0x5d, 0xee, 0x46, 0xa9, 0x9d, 0x06, 0x6c, 0x9d, 0xaa, 0xe9, 0xa8, 0x6b, 0xf0, 0x43, 0x6b, 0xec},
+ {0xc1, 0x27, 0xf3, 0x3b, 0x59, 0x11, 0x53, 0xa2, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x57, 0xf9, 0x50, 0x69, 0x1e, 0xcb},
+ {0xd9, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x60, 0x53, 0x03, 0xed, 0xe4, 0x9c, 0x61, 0xda, 0x00, 0x75, 0x0c, 0xee, 0x2c},
+ {0x50, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0x63, 0xbc, 0xba, 0xbb, 0x80, 0xab, 0x0c, 0xe9, 0x96, 0xa1, 0xa5, 0xb1, 0xf0},
+ {0x39, 0xca, 0x8d, 0x93, 0x30, 0xde, 0x0d, 0xab, 0x88, 0x29, 0x96, 0x5e, 0x02, 0xb1, 0x3d, 0xae},
+ {0x42, 0xb4, 0x75, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf3, 0x14, 0x88, 0x0b, 0xa4, 0x54, 0xd5, 0x38, 0x8f, 0xbb, 0x17},
+ {0xf6, 0x16, 0x0a, 0x36, 0x79, 0xb7, 0xb6, 0xae, 0xd7, 0x7f, 0x42, 0x5f, 0x5b, 0x8a, 0xbb, 0x34},
+ {0xde, 0xaf, 0xba, 0xff, 0x18, 0x59, 0xce, 0x43, 0x38, 0x54, 0xe5, 0xcb, 0x41, 0x52, 0xf6, 0x26},
+ {0x78, 0xc9, 0x9e, 0x83, 0xf7, 0x9c, 0xca, 0xa2, 0x6a, 0x02, 0xf3, 0xb9, 0x54, 0x9a, 0xe9, 0x4c},
+ {0x35, 0x12, 0x90, 0x22, 0x28, 0x6e, 0xc0, 0x40, 0xbe, 0xf7, 0xdf, 0x1b, 0x1a, 0xa5, 0x51, 0xae},
+ {0xcf, 0x59, 0xa6, 0x48, 0x0f, 0xbc, 0x73, 0xc1, 0x2b, 0xd2, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x61, 0xc1, 0xa0},
+ {0xa1, 0x9d, 0xc5, 0xe9, 0xfd, 0xbd, 0xd6, 0x4a, 0x88, 0x82, 0x28, 0x02, 0x03, 0xcc, 0x6a, 0x75}
+};
+
+static unsigned char rc[40][16];
+static unsigned char rc_sseed[40][16];
+
+static const unsigned char sbox[256] = {
+ 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe,
+ 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4,
+ 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7,
+ 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15, 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3,
+ 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x09,
+ 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3,
+ 0x2f, 0x84, 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe,
+ 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85,
+ 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8, 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92,
+ 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x0c,
+ 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19,
+ 0x73, 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14,
+ 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2,
+ 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79, 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5,
+ 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08, 0xba, 0x78, 0x25,
+ 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a,
+ 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86,
+ 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e,
+ 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42,
+ 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
+};
+
+#define XT(x) (((x) << 1) ^ ((((x) >> 7) & 1) * 0x1b))
+
+// Simulate _mm_aesenc_si128 instructions from AESNI
+static void aesenc(unsigned char *s, const unsigned char *rk) {
+ uint8_t i, t, u, v[4][4];
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ v[((i / 4) + 4 - (i % 4) ) % 4][i % 4] = sbox[s[i]];
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+ t = v[i][0];
+ u = v[i][0] ^ v[i][1] ^ v[i][2] ^ v[i][3];
+ v[i][0] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][0] ^ v[i][1]));
+ v[i][1] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][1] ^ v[i][2]));
+ v[i][2] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][2] ^ v[i][3]));
+ v[i][3] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][3] ^ t));
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ s[i] = v[i / 4][i % 4] ^ rk[i];
+ }
+}
+
+// Simulate _mm_unpacklo_epi32
+static void unpacklo32(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ memcpy(tmp, a, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 4, b, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 8, a + 4, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 12, b + 4, 4);
+ memcpy(t, tmp, 16);
+}
+
+// Simulate _mm_unpackhi_epi32
+static void unpackhi32(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ memcpy(tmp, a + 8, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 4, b + 8, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 8, a + 12, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 12, b + 12, 4);
+ memcpy(t, tmp, 16);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_tweak_constants(
+ const unsigned char *pk_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ unsigned long long seed_length) {
+ unsigned char buf[40 * 16];
+
+ /* Use the standard constants to generate tweaked ones. */
+ memcpy(rc, haraka_rc, 40 * 16);
+
+ /* Constants for sk.seed */
+ if (sk_seed != NULL) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(buf, 40 * 16, sk_seed, seed_length);
+ memcpy(rc_sseed, buf, 40 * 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Constants for pk.seed */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(buf, 40 * 16, pk_seed, seed_length);
+ memcpy(rc, buf, 40 * 16);
+}
+
+static void haraka_S_absorb(unsigned char *s, unsigned int r,
+ const unsigned char *m, unsigned long long mlen,
+ unsigned char p) {
+ unsigned long long i;
+ unsigned char t[r];
+
+ while (mlen >= r) {
+ // XOR block to state
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ s[i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s, s);
+ mlen -= r;
+ m += r;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ t[i] = 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; ++i) {
+ t[i] = m[i];
+ }
+ t[i] = p;
+ t[r - 1] |= 128;
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ s[i] ^= t[i];
+ }
+}
+
+static void haraka_S_squeezeblocks(unsigned char *h, unsigned long long nblocks,
+ unsigned char *s, unsigned int r) {
+ while (nblocks > 0) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s, s);
+ memcpy(h, s, HARAKAS_RATE);
+ h += r;
+ nblocks--;
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ s_inc[i] = 0;
+ }
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(uint8_t *s_inc, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Recall that s_inc[64] is the non-absorbed bytes xored into the state */
+ while (mlen + s_inc[64] >= HARAKAS_RATE) {
+ for (i = 0; i < (size_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64]); i++) {
+ /* Take the i'th byte from message
+ xor with the s_inc[64] + i'th byte of the state */
+ s_inc[s_inc[64] + i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ mlen -= (size_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64]);
+ m += HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64];
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s_inc, s_inc);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; i++) {
+ s_inc[s_inc[64] + i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(mlen + s_inc[64]);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ /* After haraka_S_inc_absorb, we are guaranteed that s_inc[64] < HARAKAS_RATE,
+ so we can always use one more byte for p in the current state. */
+ s_inc[s_inc[64]] ^= 0x1F;
+ s_inc[HARAKAS_RATE - 1] ^= 128;
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ uint8_t i;
+
+ /* First consume any bytes we still have sitting around */
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen && i < s_inc[64]; i++) {
+ /* There are s_inc[64] bytes left, so r - s_inc[64] is the first
+ available byte. We consume from there, i.e., up to r. */
+ out[i] = s_inc[(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64] + i)];
+ }
+ out += i;
+ outlen -= i;
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(s_inc[64] - i);
+
+ /* Then squeeze the remaining necessary blocks */
+ while (outlen > 0) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s_inc, s_inc);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen && i < HARAKAS_RATE; i++) {
+ out[i] = s_inc[i];
+ }
+ out += i;
+ outlen -= i;
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - i);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned long long outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen) {
+ unsigned long long i;
+ unsigned char s[64];
+ unsigned char d[32];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ s[i] = 0;
+ }
+ haraka_S_absorb(s, 32, in, inlen, 0x1F);
+
+ haraka_S_squeezeblocks(out, outlen / 32, s, 32);
+ out += (outlen / 32) * 32;
+
+ if (outlen % 32) {
+ haraka_S_squeezeblocks(d, 1, s, 32);
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen % 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = d[i];
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[64], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 32, in + 32, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 48, in + 48, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 1]);
+ aesenc(s + 32, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 2]);
+ aesenc(s + 48, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 3]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s, s, s + 16);
+ unpacklo32(s + 16, s + 32, s + 48);
+ unpackhi32(s + 32, s + 32, s + 48);
+ unpacklo32(s + 48, s, s + 32);
+ unpackhi32(s, s, s + 32);
+ unpackhi32(s + 32, s + 16, tmp);
+ unpacklo32(s + 16, s + 16, tmp);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(out, s, 64);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i;
+
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(buf, in);
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ buf[i] = buf[i] ^ in[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Truncated */
+ memcpy(out, buf + 8, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 8, buf + 24, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 16, buf + 32, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 24, buf + 48, 8);
+}
+
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[32], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j + 1]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s + 16, s, s + 16);
+ memcpy(s, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ s[i];
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[32], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc_sseed[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc_sseed[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j + 1]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s + 16, s, s + 16);
+ memcpy(s, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ s[i];
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/haraka.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/haraka.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d60ad356
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/haraka.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_HARAKA_H
+#define SPX_HARAKA_H
+
+/* Tweak constants with seed */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_tweak_constants(
+ const unsigned char *pk_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ unsigned long long seed_length);
+
+/* Haraka Sponge */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(uint8_t *s_inc, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned long long outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen);
+
+/* Applies the 512-bit Haraka permutation to in. */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-512 */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-256 */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-256 using sk.seed constants */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/hash.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/hash.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c03147f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/hash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifndef SPX_HASH_H
+#define SPX_HASH_H
+
+#include
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf, const unsigned char *optrand,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ unsigned char *digest, uint64_t *tree, uint32_t *leaf_idx,
+ const unsigned char *R, const unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/hash_haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/hash_haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3e401c33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/hash_haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_tweak_constants(pub_seed, sk_seed, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes PRF(key, addr), given a secret key of SPX_N bytes and an address
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES];
+ /* Since SPX_N may be smaller than 32, we need a temporary buffer. */
+ unsigned char outbuf[32];
+
+ (void)key; /* Suppress an 'unused parameter' warning. */
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf, addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(outbuf, buf);
+ memcpy(out, outbuf, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the message-dependent randomness R, using a secret seed and an
+ * optional randomization value as well as the message.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf, const unsigned char *optrand,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) {
+ uint8_t s_inc[65];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, sk_prf, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, optrand, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, m, mlen);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(R, SPX_N, s_inc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the message hash using R, the public key, and the message.
+ * Outputs the message digest and the index of the leaf. The index is split in
+ * the tree index and the leaf index, for convenient copying to an address.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ unsigned char *digest, uint64_t *tree, uint32_t *leaf_idx,
+ const unsigned char *R, const unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) {
+#define SPX_TREE_BITS (SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * (SPX_D - 1))
+#define SPX_TREE_BYTES ((SPX_TREE_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_LEAF_BITS SPX_TREE_HEIGHT
+#define SPX_LEAF_BYTES ((SPX_LEAF_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_DGST_BYTES (SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES + SPX_TREE_BYTES + SPX_LEAF_BYTES)
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_DGST_BYTES];
+ unsigned char *bufp = buf;
+ uint8_t s_inc[65];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, R, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, pk, SPX_PK_BYTES);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, m, mlen);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(buf, SPX_DGST_BYTES, s_inc);
+
+ memcpy(digest, bufp, SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES);
+ bufp += SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES;
+
+ *tree = PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(bufp, SPX_TREE_BYTES);
+ *tree &= (~(uint64_t)0) >> (64 - SPX_TREE_BITS);
+ bufp += SPX_TREE_BYTES;
+
+ *leaf_idx = (uint32_t)PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ bufp, SPX_LEAF_BYTES);
+ *leaf_idx &= (~(uint32_t)0) >> (32 - SPX_LEAF_BITS);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/params.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/params.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ac30fdea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/params.h
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#ifndef SPX_PARAMS_H
+#define SPX_PARAMS_H
+
+/* Hash output length in bytes. */
+#define SPX_N 16
+/* Height of the hypertree. */
+#define SPX_FULL_HEIGHT 64
+/* Number of subtree layer. */
+#define SPX_D 8
+/* FORS tree dimensions. */
+#define SPX_FORS_HEIGHT 15
+#define SPX_FORS_TREES 10
+/* Winternitz parameter, */
+#define SPX_WOTS_W 16
+
+/* The hash function is defined by linking a different hash.c file, as opposed
+ to setting a #define constant. */
+
+/* For clarity */
+#define SPX_ADDR_BYTES 32
+
+/* WOTS parameters. */
+#define SPX_WOTS_LOGW 4
+
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN1 (8 * SPX_N / SPX_WOTS_LOGW)
+
+/* SPX_WOTS_LEN2 is floor(log(len_1 * (w - 1)) / log(w)) + 1; we precompute */
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN2 3
+
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN (SPX_WOTS_LEN1 + SPX_WOTS_LEN2)
+#define SPX_WOTS_BYTES (SPX_WOTS_LEN * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_WOTS_PK_BYTES SPX_WOTS_BYTES
+
+/* Subtree size. */
+#define SPX_TREE_HEIGHT (SPX_FULL_HEIGHT / SPX_D)
+
+/* FORS parameters. */
+#define SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES ((SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_FORS_BYTES ((SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1) * SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_FORS_PK_BYTES SPX_N
+
+/* Resulting SPX sizes. */
+#define SPX_BYTES (SPX_N + SPX_FORS_BYTES + SPX_D * SPX_WOTS_BYTES +\
+ SPX_FULL_HEIGHT * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_PK_BYTES (2 * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_SK_BYTES (2 * SPX_N + SPX_PK_BYTES)
+
+/* Optionally, signing can be made non-deterministic using optrand.
+ This can help counter side-channel attacks that would benefit from
+ getting a large number of traces when the signer uses the same nodes. */
+#define SPX_OPTRAND_BYTES 32
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/sign.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5f859e47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "api.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "randombytes.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "wots.h"
+
+/**
+ * Computes the leaf at a given address. First generates the WOTS key pair,
+ * then computes leaf by hashing horizontally.
+ */
+static void wots_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+ unsigned char pk[SPX_WOTS_BYTES];
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t wots_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, addr_idx);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ pk, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ wots_pk_addr, wots_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ leaf, pk, pub_seed, wots_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates an SPX key pair given a seed of length
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [PUB_SEED || root]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed) {
+ /* We do not need the auth path in key generation, but it simplifies the
+ code to have just one treehash routine that computes both root and path
+ in one function. */
+ unsigned char auth_path[SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t top_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ top_tree_addr, SPX_D - 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ top_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+
+ /* Initialize SK_SEED, SK_PRF and PUB_SEED from seed. */
+ memcpy(sk, seed, PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES);
+
+ memcpy(pk, sk + 2 * SPX_N, SPX_N);
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(pk, sk);
+
+ /* Compute root node of the top-most subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ sk + 3 * SPX_N, auth_path, sk, sk + 2 * SPX_N, 0, 0,
+ wots_gen_leaf, top_tree_addr);
+
+ memcpy(pk + SPX_N, sk + 3 * SPX_N, SPX_N);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates an SPX key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [PUB_SEED || root]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
+ unsigned char seed[PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES];
+ randombytes(seed, PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ pk, sk, seed);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed = sk;
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf = sk + SPX_N;
+ const unsigned char *pk = sk + 2 * SPX_N;
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed = pk;
+
+ unsigned char optrand[SPX_N];
+ unsigned char mhash[SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+ unsigned char root[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t i;
+ uint64_t tree;
+ uint32_t idx_leaf;
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ pub_seed, sk_seed);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+
+ /* Optionally, signing can be made non-deterministic using optrand.
+ This can help counter side-channel attacks that would benefit from
+ getting a large number of traces when the signer uses the same nodes. */
+ randombytes(optrand, SPX_N);
+ /* Compute the digest randomization value. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ sig, sk_prf, optrand, m, mlen);
+
+ /* Derive the message digest and leaf index from R, PK and M. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ mhash, &tree, &idx_leaf, sig, pk, m, mlen);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(wots_addr, tree);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ /* Sign the message hash using FORS. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ sig, root, mhash, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_FORS_BYTES;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_D; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(tree_addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(tree_addr, tree);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ /* Compute a WOTS signature. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ sig, root, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_WOTS_BYTES;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for the used WOTS leaf. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ root, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed, idx_leaf, 0,
+ wots_gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N;
+
+ /* Update the indices for the next layer. */
+ idx_leaf = (tree & ((1 << SPX_TREE_HEIGHT) - 1));
+ tree = tree >> SPX_TREE_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ *siglen = SPX_BYTES;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed = pk;
+ const unsigned char *pub_root = pk + SPX_N;
+ unsigned char mhash[SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+ unsigned char wots_pk[SPX_WOTS_BYTES];
+ unsigned char root[SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ unsigned int i;
+ uint64_t tree;
+ uint32_t idx_leaf;
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t wots_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ if (siglen != SPX_BYTES) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ pub_seed, NULL);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK);
+
+ /* Derive the message digest and leaf index from R || PK || M. */
+ /* The additional SPX_N is a result of the hash domain separator. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ mhash, &tree, &idx_leaf, sig, pk, m, mlen);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Layer correctly defaults to 0, so no need to set_layer_addr */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(wots_addr, tree);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ root, sig, mhash, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_FORS_BYTES;
+
+ /* For each subtree.. */
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_D; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(tree_addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(tree_addr, tree);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ wots_pk_addr, wots_addr);
+
+ /* The WOTS public key is only correct if the signature was correct. */
+ /* Initially, root is the FORS pk, but on subsequent iterations it is
+ the root of the subtree below the currently processed subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ wots_pk, sig, root, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_WOTS_BYTES;
+
+ /* Compute the leaf node using the WOTS public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ leaf, wots_pk, pub_seed, wots_pk_addr);
+
+ /* Compute the root node of this subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ root, leaf, idx_leaf, 0, sig, SPX_TREE_HEIGHT,
+ pub_seed, tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N;
+
+ /* Update the indices for the next layer. */
+ idx_leaf = (tree & ((1 << SPX_TREE_HEIGHT) - 1));
+ tree = tree >> SPX_TREE_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the root node equals the root node in the public key. */
+ if (memcmp(root, pub_root, SPX_N) != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
+ size_t siglen;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ sm, &siglen, m, mlen, sk);
+
+ memmove(sm + SPX_BYTES, m, mlen);
+ *smlen = siglen + mlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
+ /* The API caller does not necessarily know what size a signature should be
+ but SPHINCS+ signatures are always exactly SPX_BYTES. */
+ if (smlen < SPX_BYTES) {
+ memset(m, 0, smlen);
+ *mlen = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *mlen = smlen - SPX_BYTES;
+
+ if (PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ sm, SPX_BYTES, sm + SPX_BYTES, *mlen, pk)) {
+ memset(m, 0, smlen);
+ *mlen = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* If verification was successful, move the message to the right place. */
+ memmove(m, sm + SPX_BYTES, *mlen);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/thash.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/thash.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..23f18b6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/thash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifndef SPX_THASH_H
+#define SPX_THASH_H
+
+#include
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/thash_haraka_robust.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/thash_haraka_robust.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..58c02163
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/thash_haraka_robust.c
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+/**
+ * Takes an array of inblocks concatenated arrays of SPX_N bytes.
+ */
+static void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inblocks,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char *bitmask = buf + SPX_ADDR_BYTES;
+ unsigned char outbuf[32];
+ unsigned char buf_tmp[64];
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ (void)pub_seed; /* Suppress an 'unused parameter' warning. */
+
+ if (inblocks == 1) {
+ /* F function */
+ /* Since SPX_N may be smaller than 32, we need a temporary buffer. */
+ memset(buf_tmp, 0, 64);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf_tmp, addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256(outbuf, buf_tmp);
+ for (i = 0; i < inblocks * SPX_N; i++) {
+ buf_tmp[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + i] = in[i] ^ outbuf[i];
+ }
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512(outbuf, buf_tmp);
+ memcpy(out, outbuf, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ /* All other tweakable hashes*/
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf, addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ bitmask, inblocks * SPX_N, buf, SPX_ADDR_BYTES);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < inblocks * SPX_N; i++) {
+ buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + i] = in[i] ^ bitmask[i];
+ }
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ out, SPX_N, buf, SPX_ADDR_BYTES + inblocks * SPX_N);
+ }
+}
+
+/* The wrappers below ensure that we use fixed-size buffers on the stack */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + 1 * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, 1, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + 2 * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, 2, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + SPX_WOTS_LEN * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, SPX_WOTS_LEN, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, SPX_FORS_TREES, pub_seed, addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/utils.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d00b223c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+/**
+ * Converts the value of 'in' to 'outlen' bytes in big-endian byte order.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned long long in) {
+
+ /* Iterate over out in decreasing order, for big-endianness. */
+ for (size_t i = outlen; i > 0; i--) {
+ out[i - 1] = in & 0xff;
+ in = in >> 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Converts the inlen bytes in 'in' from big-endian byte order to an integer.
+ */
+unsigned long long PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) {
+ unsigned long long retval = 0;
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < inlen; i++) {
+ retval |= ((unsigned long long)in[i]) << (8 * (inlen - 1 - i));
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an auth path.
+ * Expects address to be complete other than the tree_height and tree_index.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ const unsigned char *auth_path, uint32_t tree_height,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+ unsigned char buffer[2 * SPX_N];
+
+ /* If leaf_idx is odd (last bit = 1), current path element is a right child
+ and auth_path has to go left. Otherwise it is the other way around. */
+ if (leaf_idx & 1) {
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, leaf, SPX_N);
+ memcpy(buffer, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(buffer, leaf, SPX_N);
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ }
+ auth_path += SPX_N;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tree_height - 1; i++) {
+ leaf_idx >>= 1;
+ idx_offset >>= 1;
+ /* Set the address of the node we're creating. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(addr, i + 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ addr, leaf_idx + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Pick the right or left neighbor, depending on parity of the node. */
+ if (leaf_idx & 1) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ buffer + SPX_N, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+ memcpy(buffer, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ buffer, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ }
+ auth_path += SPX_N;
+ }
+
+ /* The last iteration is exceptional; we do not copy an auth_path node. */
+ leaf_idx >>= 1;
+ idx_offset >>= 1;
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(addr, tree_height);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ addr, leaf_idx + idx_offset);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ root, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * For a given leaf index, computes the authentication path and the resulting
+ * root node using Merkle's TreeHash algorithm.
+ * Expects the layer and tree parts of the tree_addr to be set, as well as the
+ * tree type (i.e. SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE or SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE).
+ * Applies the offset idx_offset to indices before building addresses, so that
+ * it is possible to continue counting indices across trees.
+ */
+static void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ unsigned char *stack, unsigned int *heights,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset, uint32_t tree_height,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+ uint32_t idx;
+ uint32_t tree_idx;
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < (uint32_t)(1 << tree_height); idx++) {
+ /* Add the next leaf node to the stack. */
+ gen_leaf(stack + offset * SPX_N,
+ sk_seed, pub_seed, idx + idx_offset, tree_addr);
+ offset++;
+ heights[offset - 1] = 0;
+
+ /* If this is a node we need for the auth path.. */
+ if ((leaf_idx ^ 0x1) == idx) {
+ memcpy(auth_path, stack + (offset - 1)*SPX_N, SPX_N);
+ }
+
+ /* While the top-most nodes are of equal height.. */
+ while (offset >= 2 && heights[offset - 1] == heights[offset - 2]) {
+ /* Compute index of the new node, in the next layer. */
+ tree_idx = (idx >> (heights[offset - 1] + 1));
+
+ /* Set the address of the node we're creating. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ tree_addr, heights[offset - 1] + 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ tree_addr, tree_idx + (idx_offset >> (heights[offset - 1] + 1)));
+ /* Hash the top-most nodes from the stack together. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ stack + (offset - 2)*SPX_N, stack + (offset - 2)*SPX_N,
+ pub_seed, tree_addr);
+ offset--;
+ /* Note that the top-most node is now one layer higher. */
+ heights[offset - 1]++;
+
+ /* If this is a node we need for the auth path.. */
+ if (((leaf_idx >> heights[offset - 1]) ^ 0x1) == tree_idx) {
+ memcpy(auth_path + heights[offset - 1]*SPX_N,
+ stack + (offset - 1)*SPX_N, SPX_N);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(root, stack, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/* The wrappers below ensure that we use fixed-size buffers on the stack */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char stack[(SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1)*SPX_N];
+ unsigned int heights[SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash(
+ root, auth_path, stack, heights, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ leaf_idx, idx_offset, SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char stack[(SPX_TREE_HEIGHT + 1)*SPX_N];
+ unsigned int heights[SPX_TREE_HEIGHT + 1];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash(
+ root, auth_path, stack, heights, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ leaf_idx, idx_offset, SPX_TREE_HEIGHT, gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/utils.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/utils.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..de929b27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/utils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+#ifndef SPX_UTILS_H
+#define SPX_UTILS_H
+
+#include "params.h"
+#include
+#include
+
+/**
+ * Converts the value of 'in' to 'outlen' bytes in big-endian byte order.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned long long in);
+
+/**
+ * Converts the inlen bytes in 'in' from big-endian byte order to an integer.
+ */
+unsigned long long PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an auth path.
+ * Expects address to be complete other than the tree_height and tree_index.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ const unsigned char *auth_path, uint32_t tree_height,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * For a given leaf index, computes the authentication path and the resulting
+ * root node using Merkle's TreeHash algorithm.
+ * Expects the layer and tree parts of the tree_addr to be set, as well as the
+ * tree type (i.e. SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE or SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE).
+ * Applies the offset idx_offset to indices before building addresses, so that
+ * it is possible to continue counting indices across trees.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/wots.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/wots.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..74fdc431
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/wots.c
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "wots.h"
+
+// TODO clarify address expectations, and make them more uniform.
+// TODO i.e. do we expect types to be set already?
+// TODO and do we expect modifications or copies?
+
+/**
+ * Computes the starting value for a chain, i.e. the secret key.
+ * Expects the address to be complete up to the chain address.
+ */
+static void wots_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8]) {
+ /* Make sure that the hash address is actually zeroed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(wots_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Generate sk element. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(sk, sk_seed, wots_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the chaining function.
+ * out and in have to be n-byte arrays.
+ *
+ * Interprets in as start-th value of the chain.
+ * addr has to contain the address of the chain.
+ */
+static void gen_chain(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int start, unsigned int steps,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ /* Initialize out with the value at position 'start'. */
+ memcpy(out, in, SPX_N);
+
+ /* Iterate 'steps' calls to the hash function. */
+ for (i = start; i < (start + steps) && i < SPX_WOTS_W; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ out, out, pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * base_w algorithm as described in draft.
+ * Interprets an array of bytes as integers in base w.
+ * This only works when log_w is a divisor of 8.
+ */
+static void base_w(unsigned int *output, const size_t out_len,
+ const unsigned char *input) {
+ size_t in = 0;
+ size_t out = 0;
+ unsigned char total = 0;
+ unsigned int bits = 0;
+ size_t consumed;
+
+ for (consumed = 0; consumed < out_len; consumed++) {
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ total = input[in];
+ in++;
+ bits += 8;
+ }
+ bits -= SPX_WOTS_LOGW;
+ output[out] = (unsigned int)((total >> bits) & (SPX_WOTS_W - 1));
+ out++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Computes the WOTS+ checksum over a message (in base_w). */
+static void wots_checksum(unsigned int *csum_base_w,
+ const unsigned int *msg_base_w) {
+ unsigned int csum = 0;
+ unsigned char csum_bytes[(SPX_WOTS_LEN2 * SPX_WOTS_LOGW + 7) / 8];
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ /* Compute checksum. */
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN1; i++) {
+ csum += SPX_WOTS_W - 1 - msg_base_w[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Convert checksum to base_w. */
+ /* Make sure expected empty zero bits are the least significant bits. */
+ csum = csum << (8 - ((SPX_WOTS_LEN2 * SPX_WOTS_LOGW) % 8));
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ csum_bytes, sizeof(csum_bytes), csum);
+ base_w(csum_base_w, SPX_WOTS_LEN2, csum_bytes);
+}
+
+/* Takes a message and derives the matching chain lengths. */
+static void chain_lengths(unsigned int *lengths, const unsigned char *msg) {
+ base_w(lengths, SPX_WOTS_LEN1, msg);
+ wots_checksum(lengths + SPX_WOTS_LEN1, lengths);
+}
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32 byte sk_seed, expands it to WOTS private key
+ * elements and computes the corresponding public key.
+ * It requires the seed pub_seed (used to generate bitmasks and hash keys)
+ * and the address of this WOTS key pair.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ wots_gen_sk(pk + i * SPX_N, sk_seed, addr);
+ gen_chain(pk + i * SPX_N, pk + i * SPX_N,
+ 0, SPX_WOTS_W - 1, pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Takes a n-byte message and the 32-byte sk_see to compute a signature 'sig'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned int lengths[SPX_WOTS_LEN];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ chain_lengths(lengths, msg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ wots_gen_sk(sig + i * SPX_N, sk_seed, addr);
+ gen_chain(sig + i * SPX_N, sig + i * SPX_N, 0, lengths[i], pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature and an n-byte message, computes a WOTS public key.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned int lengths[SPX_WOTS_LEN];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ chain_lengths(lengths, msg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ gen_chain(pk + i * SPX_N, sig + i * SPX_N,
+ lengths[i], SPX_WOTS_W - 1 - lengths[i], pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/wots.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/wots.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0aa00577
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-robust/clean/wots.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#ifndef SPX_WOTS_H
+#define SPX_WOTS_H
+
+#include "params.h"
+#include
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32 byte seed for the private key, expands it to
+ * a full WOTS private key and computes the corresponding public key.
+ * It requires the seed pub_seed (used to generate bitmasks and hash keys)
+ * and the address of this WOTS key pair.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a n-byte message and the 32-byte seed for the private key to compute a
+ * signature that is placed at 'sig'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature and an n-byte message, computes a WOTS public key.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SROBUST_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/META.yml b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/META.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ff5d1e71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/META.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+name: SPHINCS+
+type: signature
+claimed-nist-level: 1
+length-public-key: 32
+length-signature: 8080
+testvectors-sha256: fcc816e14d200e212b4b955d3011f5a6b61240c7c0003e17acb1bf396ca5d4ad
+principal-submitter: Andreas Hülsing
+auxiliary-submitters:
+ - Jean-Philippe Aumasson
+ - Daniel J. Bernstein,
+ - Christoph Dobraunig
+ - Maria Eichlseder
+ - Scott Fluhrer
+ - Stefan-Lukas Gazdag
+ - Panos Kampanakis
+ - Stefan Kölbl
+ - Tanja Lange
+ - Martin M. Lauridsen
+ - Florian Mendel
+ - Ruben Niederhagen
+ - Christian Rechberger
+ - Joost Rijneveld
+ - Peter Schwabe
+implementations:
+ - name: clean
+ version: https://github.com/sphincs/sphincsplus/commit/492ec4f1f6d3b3dc4b435783bbaaf4e41cdb6f32
+ length-secret-key: 64
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/LICENSE b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/LICENSE
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..670154e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/LICENSE
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+CC0 1.0 Universal
+
+Statement of Purpose
+
+The laws of most jurisdictions throughout the world automatically confer
+exclusive Copyright and Related Rights (defined below) upon the creator and
+subsequent owner(s) (each and all, an "owner") of an original work of
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+
+Certain owners wish to permanently relinquish those rights to a Work for the
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+and redistribute as freely as possible in any form whatsoever and for any
+purposes, including without limitation commercial purposes. These owners may
+contribute to the Commons to promote the ideal of a free culture and the
+further production of creative, cultural and scientific works, or to gain
+reputation or greater distribution for their Work in part through the use and
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+
+For these and/or other purposes and motivations, and without any expectation
+of additional consideration or compensation, the person associating CC0 with a
+Work (the "Affirmer"), to the extent that he or she is an owner of Copyright
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+1. Copyright and Related Rights. A Work made available under CC0 may be
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+ including any amended or successor version of such directive); and
+
+ vii. other similar, equivalent or corresponding rights throughout the world
+ based on applicable law or treaty, and any national implementations thereof.
+
+2. Waiver. To the greatest extent permitted by, but not in contravention of,
+applicable law, Affirmer hereby overtly, fully, permanently, irrevocably and
+unconditionally waives, abandons, and surrenders all of Affirmer's Copyright
+and Related Rights and associated claims and causes of action, whether now
+known or unknown (including existing as well as future claims and causes of
+action), in the Work (i) in all territories worldwide, (ii) for the maximum
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+extensions), (iii) in any current or future medium and for any number of
+copies, and (iv) for any purpose whatsoever, including without limitation
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+the Waiver for the benefit of each member of the public at large and to the
+detriment of Affirmer's heirs and successors, fully intending that such Waiver
+shall not be subject to revocation, rescission, cancellation, termination, or
+any other legal or equitable action to disrupt the quiet enjoyment of the Work
+by the public as contemplated by Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+3. Public License Fallback. Should any part of the Waiver for any reason be
+judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, then the Waiver
+shall be preserved to the maximum extent permitted taking into account
+Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose. In addition, to the extent the Waiver
+is so judged Affirmer hereby grants to each affected person a royalty-free,
+non transferable, non sublicensable, non exclusive, irrevocable and
+unconditional license to exercise Affirmer's Copyright and Related Rights in
+the Work (i) in all territories worldwide, (ii) for the maximum duration
+provided by applicable law or treaty (including future time extensions), (iii)
+in any current or future medium and for any number of copies, and (iv) for any
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+promotional purposes (the "License"). The License shall be deemed effective as
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+License for any reason be judged legally invalid or ineffective under
+applicable law, such partial invalidity or ineffectiveness shall not
+invalidate the remainder of the License, and in such case Affirmer hereby
+affirms that he or she will not (i) exercise any of his or her remaining
+Copyright and Related Rights in the Work or (ii) assert any associated claims
+and causes of action with respect to the Work, in either case contrary to
+Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+4. Limitations and Disclaimers.
+
+ a. No trademark or patent rights held by Affirmer are waived, abandoned,
+ surrendered, licensed or otherwise affected by this document.
+
+ b. Affirmer offers the Work as-is and makes no representations or warranties
+ of any kind concerning the Work, express, implied, statutory or otherwise,
+ including without limitation warranties of title, merchantability, fitness
+ for a particular purpose, non infringement, or the absence of latent or
+ other defects, accuracy, or the present or absence of errors, whether or not
+ discoverable, all to the greatest extent permissible under applicable law.
+
+ c. Affirmer disclaims responsibility for clearing rights of other persons
+ that may apply to the Work or any use thereof, including without limitation
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+ disclaims responsibility for obtaining any necessary consents, permissions
+ or other rights required for any use of the Work.
+
+ d. Affirmer understands and acknowledges that Creative Commons is not a
+ party to this document and has no duty or obligation with respect to this
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+
+For more information, please see
+
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/Makefile b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f6dfd16c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with GNU Make or BSD Make
+
+LIB=libsphincs-haraka-128s-simple_clean.a
+
+HEADERS = params.h address.h wots.h utils.h fors.h api.h hash.h thash.h haraka.h
+OBJECTS = address.o wots.o utils.o fors.o sign.o hash_haraka.o thash_haraka_simple.o haraka.o
+
+CFLAGS=-Wall -Wconversion -Wextra -Wpedantic -Werror -Wmissing-prototypes -std=c99 -I../../../common $(EXTRAFLAGS)
+
+all: $(LIB)
+
+%.o: %.c $(HEADERS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
+
+$(LIB): $(OBJECTS)
+ $(AR) -r $@ $(OBJECTS)
+
+clean:
+ $(RM) $(OBJECTS)
+ $(RM) $(LIB)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..11d2bb0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with Microsoft Visual Studio's nmake using the command:
+# nmake /f Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
+
+LIBRARY=libsphincs-haraka-128s-simple_clean.lib
+OBJECTS=address.obj wots.obj utils.obj fors.obj sign.obj hash_haraka.obj thash_haraka_simple.obj haraka.obj
+
+CFLAGS=/nologo /I ..\..\..\common /W4 /WX
+
+all: $(LIBRARY)
+
+# Make sure objects are recompiled if headers change.
+$(OBJECTS): *.h
+
+$(LIBRARY): $(OBJECTS)
+ LIB.EXE /NOLOGO /WX /OUT:$@ $**
+
+clean:
+ -DEL $(OBJECTS)
+ -DEL $(LIBRARY)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/address.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/address.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7c4de6f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/address.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ bytes + i * 4, 4, addr[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer) {
+ addr[0] = layer;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree) {
+ addr[1] = 0;
+ addr[2] = (uint32_t) (tree >> 32);
+ addr[3] = (uint32_t) tree;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type) {
+ addr[4] = type;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for OTS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair) {
+ addr[5] = keypair;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+ out[5] = in[5];
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain) {
+ addr[6] = chain;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash) {
+ addr[7] = hash;
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height) {
+ addr[6] = tree_height;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index) {
+ addr[7] = tree_index;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/address.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/address.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..179a3761
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/address.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+#ifndef SPX_ADDRESS_H
+#define SPX_ADDRESS_H
+
+#include
+
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS 0
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK 1
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE 2
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE 3
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK 4
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type);
+
+/* Copies the layer and tree part of one address into the other */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for WOTS and FORS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/api.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/api.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7b3561ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/api.h
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#ifndef PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_API_H
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_API_H
+
+#include
+#include
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_ALGNAME "SPHINCS+"
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES 64
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES 32
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES 16976
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES 48
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair given a seed.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/fors.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/fors.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..296a451a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/fors.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+static void fors_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ sk, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_sk_to_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ leaf, sk, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* Only copy the parts that must be kept in fors_leaf_addr. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_leaf_addr, fors_tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_leaf_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_leaf_addr, addr_idx);
+
+ fors_gen_sk(leaf, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, leaf, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Interprets m as SPX_FORS_HEIGHT-bit unsigned integers.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ * Assumes indices has space for SPX_FORS_TREES integers.
+ */
+static void message_to_indices(uint32_t *indices, const unsigned char *m) {
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ indices[i] = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < SPX_FORS_HEIGHT; j++) {
+ indices[i] ^= (((uint32_t)m[offset >> 3] >> (offset & 0x7)) & 0x1) << j;
+ offset++;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Include the secret key part that produces the selected leaf node. */
+ fors_gen_sk(sig, sk_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for this leaf node. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ indices[i], idx_offset, fors_gen_leaf, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Derive the leaf from the included secret key part. */
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, sig, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Derive the corresponding root node of this tree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, leaf, indices[i], idx_offset, sig,
+ SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/fors.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/fors.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0907a358
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/fors.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_FORS_H
+#define SPX_FORS_H
+
+#include
+
+#include "params.h"
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..78ac75d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+/*
+Plain C implementation of the Haraka256 and Haraka512 permutations.
+*/
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+#define HARAKAS_RATE 32
+
+static const unsigned char haraka_rc[40][16] = {
+ {0x9d, 0x7b, 0x81, 0x75, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xc5, 0xb2, 0x0a, 0xc0, 0x20, 0xe6, 0x4c, 0x70, 0x84, 0x06},
+ {0x17, 0xf7, 0x08, 0x2f, 0xa4, 0x6b, 0x0f, 0x64, 0x6b, 0xa0, 0xf3, 0x88, 0xe1, 0xb4, 0x66, 0x8b},
+ {0x14, 0x91, 0x02, 0x9f, 0x60, 0x9d, 0x02, 0xcf, 0x98, 0x84, 0xf2, 0x53, 0x2d, 0xde, 0x02, 0x34},
+ {0x79, 0x4f, 0x5b, 0xfd, 0xaf, 0xbc, 0xf3, 0xbb, 0x08, 0x4f, 0x7b, 0x2e, 0xe6, 0xea, 0xd6, 0x0e},
+ {0x44, 0x70, 0x39, 0xbe, 0x1c, 0xcd, 0xee, 0x79, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x72, 0x48, 0xcb, 0xb0, 0xcf, 0xcb},
+ {0x7b, 0x05, 0x8a, 0x2b, 0xed, 0x35, 0x53, 0x8d, 0xb7, 0x32, 0x90, 0x6e, 0xee, 0xcd, 0xea, 0x7e},
+ {0x1b, 0xef, 0x4f, 0xda, 0x61, 0x27, 0x41, 0xe2, 0xd0, 0x7c, 0x2e, 0x5e, 0x43, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x67},
+ {0x3b, 0x0b, 0xc7, 0x1f, 0xe2, 0xfd, 0x5f, 0x67, 0x07, 0xcc, 0xca, 0xaf, 0xb0, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x29},
+ {0xee, 0x65, 0xd4, 0xb9, 0xca, 0x8f, 0xdb, 0xec, 0xe9, 0x7f, 0x86, 0xe6, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x4d, 0xab},
+ {0x33, 0x7e, 0x03, 0xad, 0x4f, 0x40, 0x2a, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xcd, 0xb7, 0xd4, 0x84, 0xbf, 0x30, 0x1c},
+ {0x00, 0x98, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x2e, 0x8b, 0x02, 0x69, 0xbf, 0x23, 0x17, 0x94, 0xb9, 0x0b, 0xcc, 0xb2},
+ {0x8a, 0x2d, 0x9d, 0x5c, 0xc8, 0x9e, 0xaa, 0x4a, 0x72, 0x55, 0x6f, 0xde, 0xa6, 0x78, 0x04, 0xfa},
+ {0xd4, 0x9f, 0x12, 0x29, 0x2e, 0x4f, 0xfa, 0x0e, 0x12, 0x2a, 0x77, 0x6b, 0x2b, 0x9f, 0xb4, 0xdf},
+ {0xee, 0x12, 0x6a, 0xbb, 0xae, 0x11, 0xd6, 0x32, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x49, 0xf4, 0x44, 0x03, 0xa1, 0x1e},
+ {0xa6, 0xec, 0xa8, 0x9c, 0xc9, 0x00, 0x96, 0x5f, 0x84, 0x00, 0x05, 0x4b, 0x88, 0x49, 0x04, 0xaf},
+ {0xec, 0x93, 0xe5, 0x27, 0xe3, 0xc7, 0xa2, 0x78, 0x4f, 0x9c, 0x19, 0x9d, 0xd8, 0x5e, 0x02, 0x21},
+ {0x73, 0x01, 0xd4, 0x82, 0xcd, 0x2e, 0x28, 0xb9, 0xb7, 0xc9, 0x59, 0xa7, 0xf8, 0xaa, 0x3a, 0xbf},
+ {0x6b, 0x7d, 0x30, 0x10, 0xd9, 0xef, 0xf2, 0x37, 0x17, 0xb0, 0x86, 0x61, 0x0d, 0x70, 0x60, 0x62},
+ {0xc6, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0xf6, 0x53, 0x91, 0xc2, 0x81, 0x43, 0x04, 0x30, 0x21, 0xc2, 0x45, 0xca, 0x5a},
+ {0x3a, 0x94, 0xd1, 0x36, 0xe8, 0x92, 0xaf, 0x2c, 0xbb, 0x68, 0x6b, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x97, 0x23, 0x92},
+ {0xb4, 0x71, 0x10, 0xe5, 0x58, 0xb9, 0xba, 0x6c, 0xeb, 0x86, 0x58, 0x22, 0x38, 0x92, 0xbf, 0xd3},
+ {0x8d, 0x12, 0xe1, 0x24, 0xdd, 0xfd, 0x3d, 0x93, 0x77, 0xc6, 0xf0, 0xae, 0xe5, 0x3c, 0x86, 0xdb},
+ {0xb1, 0x12, 0x22, 0xcb, 0xe3, 0x8d, 0xe4, 0x83, 0x9c, 0xa0, 0xeb, 0xff, 0x68, 0x62, 0x60, 0xbb},
+ {0x7d, 0xf7, 0x2b, 0xc7, 0x4e, 0x1a, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0x9c, 0xd1, 0xe4, 0xe2, 0xdc, 0xd3, 0x4b, 0x73},
+ {0x4e, 0x92, 0xb3, 0x2c, 0xc4, 0x15, 0x14, 0x4b, 0x43, 0x1b, 0x30, 0x61, 0xc3, 0x47, 0xbb, 0x43},
+ {0x99, 0x68, 0xeb, 0x16, 0xdd, 0x31, 0xb2, 0x03, 0xf6, 0xef, 0x07, 0xe7, 0xa8, 0x75, 0xa7, 0xdb},
+ {0x2c, 0x47, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x23, 0x5e, 0x8e, 0x77, 0x59, 0x75, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x61, 0xf3, 0x6d},
+ {0xf9, 0x17, 0x86, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xe5, 0x1b, 0x6d, 0x77, 0x7d, 0xde, 0xd6, 0x17, 0x5a, 0xa7, 0xcd},
+ {0x5d, 0xee, 0x46, 0xa9, 0x9d, 0x06, 0x6c, 0x9d, 0xaa, 0xe9, 0xa8, 0x6b, 0xf0, 0x43, 0x6b, 0xec},
+ {0xc1, 0x27, 0xf3, 0x3b, 0x59, 0x11, 0x53, 0xa2, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x57, 0xf9, 0x50, 0x69, 0x1e, 0xcb},
+ {0xd9, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x60, 0x53, 0x03, 0xed, 0xe4, 0x9c, 0x61, 0xda, 0x00, 0x75, 0x0c, 0xee, 0x2c},
+ {0x50, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0x63, 0xbc, 0xba, 0xbb, 0x80, 0xab, 0x0c, 0xe9, 0x96, 0xa1, 0xa5, 0xb1, 0xf0},
+ {0x39, 0xca, 0x8d, 0x93, 0x30, 0xde, 0x0d, 0xab, 0x88, 0x29, 0x96, 0x5e, 0x02, 0xb1, 0x3d, 0xae},
+ {0x42, 0xb4, 0x75, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf3, 0x14, 0x88, 0x0b, 0xa4, 0x54, 0xd5, 0x38, 0x8f, 0xbb, 0x17},
+ {0xf6, 0x16, 0x0a, 0x36, 0x79, 0xb7, 0xb6, 0xae, 0xd7, 0x7f, 0x42, 0x5f, 0x5b, 0x8a, 0xbb, 0x34},
+ {0xde, 0xaf, 0xba, 0xff, 0x18, 0x59, 0xce, 0x43, 0x38, 0x54, 0xe5, 0xcb, 0x41, 0x52, 0xf6, 0x26},
+ {0x78, 0xc9, 0x9e, 0x83, 0xf7, 0x9c, 0xca, 0xa2, 0x6a, 0x02, 0xf3, 0xb9, 0x54, 0x9a, 0xe9, 0x4c},
+ {0x35, 0x12, 0x90, 0x22, 0x28, 0x6e, 0xc0, 0x40, 0xbe, 0xf7, 0xdf, 0x1b, 0x1a, 0xa5, 0x51, 0xae},
+ {0xcf, 0x59, 0xa6, 0x48, 0x0f, 0xbc, 0x73, 0xc1, 0x2b, 0xd2, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x61, 0xc1, 0xa0},
+ {0xa1, 0x9d, 0xc5, 0xe9, 0xfd, 0xbd, 0xd6, 0x4a, 0x88, 0x82, 0x28, 0x02, 0x03, 0xcc, 0x6a, 0x75}
+};
+
+static unsigned char rc[40][16];
+static unsigned char rc_sseed[40][16];
+
+static const unsigned char sbox[256] = {
+ 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe,
+ 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4,
+ 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7,
+ 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15, 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3,
+ 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x09,
+ 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3,
+ 0x2f, 0x84, 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe,
+ 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85,
+ 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8, 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92,
+ 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x0c,
+ 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19,
+ 0x73, 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14,
+ 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2,
+ 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79, 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5,
+ 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08, 0xba, 0x78, 0x25,
+ 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a,
+ 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86,
+ 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e,
+ 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42,
+ 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
+};
+
+#define XT(x) (((x) << 1) ^ ((((x) >> 7) & 1) * 0x1b))
+
+// Simulate _mm_aesenc_si128 instructions from AESNI
+static void aesenc(unsigned char *s, const unsigned char *rk) {
+ uint8_t i, t, u, v[4][4];
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ v[((i / 4) + 4 - (i % 4) ) % 4][i % 4] = sbox[s[i]];
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+ t = v[i][0];
+ u = v[i][0] ^ v[i][1] ^ v[i][2] ^ v[i][3];
+ v[i][0] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][0] ^ v[i][1]));
+ v[i][1] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][1] ^ v[i][2]));
+ v[i][2] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][2] ^ v[i][3]));
+ v[i][3] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][3] ^ t));
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ s[i] = v[i / 4][i % 4] ^ rk[i];
+ }
+}
+
+// Simulate _mm_unpacklo_epi32
+static void unpacklo32(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ memcpy(tmp, a, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 4, b, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 8, a + 4, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 12, b + 4, 4);
+ memcpy(t, tmp, 16);
+}
+
+// Simulate _mm_unpackhi_epi32
+static void unpackhi32(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ memcpy(tmp, a + 8, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 4, b + 8, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 8, a + 12, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 12, b + 12, 4);
+ memcpy(t, tmp, 16);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_tweak_constants(
+ const unsigned char *pk_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ unsigned long long seed_length) {
+ unsigned char buf[40 * 16];
+
+ /* Use the standard constants to generate tweaked ones. */
+ memcpy(rc, haraka_rc, 40 * 16);
+
+ /* Constants for sk.seed */
+ if (sk_seed != NULL) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(buf, 40 * 16, sk_seed, seed_length);
+ memcpy(rc_sseed, buf, 40 * 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Constants for pk.seed */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(buf, 40 * 16, pk_seed, seed_length);
+ memcpy(rc, buf, 40 * 16);
+}
+
+static void haraka_S_absorb(unsigned char *s, unsigned int r,
+ const unsigned char *m, unsigned long long mlen,
+ unsigned char p) {
+ unsigned long long i;
+ unsigned char t[r];
+
+ while (mlen >= r) {
+ // XOR block to state
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ s[i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s, s);
+ mlen -= r;
+ m += r;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ t[i] = 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; ++i) {
+ t[i] = m[i];
+ }
+ t[i] = p;
+ t[r - 1] |= 128;
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ s[i] ^= t[i];
+ }
+}
+
+static void haraka_S_squeezeblocks(unsigned char *h, unsigned long long nblocks,
+ unsigned char *s, unsigned int r) {
+ while (nblocks > 0) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s, s);
+ memcpy(h, s, HARAKAS_RATE);
+ h += r;
+ nblocks--;
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ s_inc[i] = 0;
+ }
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(uint8_t *s_inc, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Recall that s_inc[64] is the non-absorbed bytes xored into the state */
+ while (mlen + s_inc[64] >= HARAKAS_RATE) {
+ for (i = 0; i < (size_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64]); i++) {
+ /* Take the i'th byte from message
+ xor with the s_inc[64] + i'th byte of the state */
+ s_inc[s_inc[64] + i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ mlen -= (size_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64]);
+ m += HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64];
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s_inc, s_inc);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; i++) {
+ s_inc[s_inc[64] + i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(mlen + s_inc[64]);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ /* After haraka_S_inc_absorb, we are guaranteed that s_inc[64] < HARAKAS_RATE,
+ so we can always use one more byte for p in the current state. */
+ s_inc[s_inc[64]] ^= 0x1F;
+ s_inc[HARAKAS_RATE - 1] ^= 128;
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ uint8_t i;
+
+ /* First consume any bytes we still have sitting around */
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen && i < s_inc[64]; i++) {
+ /* There are s_inc[64] bytes left, so r - s_inc[64] is the first
+ available byte. We consume from there, i.e., up to r. */
+ out[i] = s_inc[(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64] + i)];
+ }
+ out += i;
+ outlen -= i;
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(s_inc[64] - i);
+
+ /* Then squeeze the remaining necessary blocks */
+ while (outlen > 0) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s_inc, s_inc);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen && i < HARAKAS_RATE; i++) {
+ out[i] = s_inc[i];
+ }
+ out += i;
+ outlen -= i;
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - i);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned long long outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen) {
+ unsigned long long i;
+ unsigned char s[64];
+ unsigned char d[32];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ s[i] = 0;
+ }
+ haraka_S_absorb(s, 32, in, inlen, 0x1F);
+
+ haraka_S_squeezeblocks(out, outlen / 32, s, 32);
+ out += (outlen / 32) * 32;
+
+ if (outlen % 32) {
+ haraka_S_squeezeblocks(d, 1, s, 32);
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen % 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = d[i];
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[64], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 32, in + 32, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 48, in + 48, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 1]);
+ aesenc(s + 32, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 2]);
+ aesenc(s + 48, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 3]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s, s, s + 16);
+ unpacklo32(s + 16, s + 32, s + 48);
+ unpackhi32(s + 32, s + 32, s + 48);
+ unpacklo32(s + 48, s, s + 32);
+ unpackhi32(s, s, s + 32);
+ unpackhi32(s + 32, s + 16, tmp);
+ unpacklo32(s + 16, s + 16, tmp);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(out, s, 64);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i;
+
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(buf, in);
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ buf[i] = buf[i] ^ in[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Truncated */
+ memcpy(out, buf + 8, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 8, buf + 24, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 16, buf + 32, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 24, buf + 48, 8);
+}
+
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[32], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j + 1]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s + 16, s, s + 16);
+ memcpy(s, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ s[i];
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[32], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc_sseed[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc_sseed[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j + 1]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s + 16, s, s + 16);
+ memcpy(s, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ s[i];
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/haraka.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/haraka.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f09e5abf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/haraka.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_HARAKA_H
+#define SPX_HARAKA_H
+
+/* Tweak constants with seed */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_tweak_constants(
+ const unsigned char *pk_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ unsigned long long seed_length);
+
+/* Haraka Sponge */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(uint8_t *s_inc, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned long long outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen);
+
+/* Applies the 512-bit Haraka permutation to in. */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-512 */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-256 */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-256 using sk.seed constants */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/hash.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/hash.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..17afdf61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/hash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifndef SPX_HASH_H
+#define SPX_HASH_H
+
+#include
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf, const unsigned char *optrand,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ unsigned char *digest, uint64_t *tree, uint32_t *leaf_idx,
+ const unsigned char *R, const unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/hash_haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/hash_haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b926eb3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/hash_haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_tweak_constants(pub_seed, sk_seed, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes PRF(key, addr), given a secret key of SPX_N bytes and an address
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES];
+ /* Since SPX_N may be smaller than 32, we need a temporary buffer. */
+ unsigned char outbuf[32];
+
+ (void)key; /* Suppress an 'unused parameter' warning. */
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf, addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(outbuf, buf);
+ memcpy(out, outbuf, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the message-dependent randomness R, using a secret seed and an
+ * optional randomization value as well as the message.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf, const unsigned char *optrand,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) {
+ uint8_t s_inc[65];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, sk_prf, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, optrand, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, m, mlen);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(R, SPX_N, s_inc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the message hash using R, the public key, and the message.
+ * Outputs the message digest and the index of the leaf. The index is split in
+ * the tree index and the leaf index, for convenient copying to an address.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ unsigned char *digest, uint64_t *tree, uint32_t *leaf_idx,
+ const unsigned char *R, const unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) {
+#define SPX_TREE_BITS (SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * (SPX_D - 1))
+#define SPX_TREE_BYTES ((SPX_TREE_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_LEAF_BITS SPX_TREE_HEIGHT
+#define SPX_LEAF_BYTES ((SPX_LEAF_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_DGST_BYTES (SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES + SPX_TREE_BYTES + SPX_LEAF_BYTES)
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_DGST_BYTES];
+ unsigned char *bufp = buf;
+ uint8_t s_inc[65];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, R, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, pk, SPX_PK_BYTES);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, m, mlen);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(buf, SPX_DGST_BYTES, s_inc);
+
+ memcpy(digest, bufp, SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES);
+ bufp += SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES;
+
+ *tree = PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(bufp, SPX_TREE_BYTES);
+ *tree &= (~(uint64_t)0) >> (64 - SPX_TREE_BITS);
+ bufp += SPX_TREE_BYTES;
+
+ *leaf_idx = (uint32_t)PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ bufp, SPX_LEAF_BYTES);
+ *leaf_idx &= (~(uint32_t)0) >> (32 - SPX_LEAF_BITS);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/params.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/params.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ac30fdea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/params.h
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#ifndef SPX_PARAMS_H
+#define SPX_PARAMS_H
+
+/* Hash output length in bytes. */
+#define SPX_N 16
+/* Height of the hypertree. */
+#define SPX_FULL_HEIGHT 64
+/* Number of subtree layer. */
+#define SPX_D 8
+/* FORS tree dimensions. */
+#define SPX_FORS_HEIGHT 15
+#define SPX_FORS_TREES 10
+/* Winternitz parameter, */
+#define SPX_WOTS_W 16
+
+/* The hash function is defined by linking a different hash.c file, as opposed
+ to setting a #define constant. */
+
+/* For clarity */
+#define SPX_ADDR_BYTES 32
+
+/* WOTS parameters. */
+#define SPX_WOTS_LOGW 4
+
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN1 (8 * SPX_N / SPX_WOTS_LOGW)
+
+/* SPX_WOTS_LEN2 is floor(log(len_1 * (w - 1)) / log(w)) + 1; we precompute */
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN2 3
+
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN (SPX_WOTS_LEN1 + SPX_WOTS_LEN2)
+#define SPX_WOTS_BYTES (SPX_WOTS_LEN * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_WOTS_PK_BYTES SPX_WOTS_BYTES
+
+/* Subtree size. */
+#define SPX_TREE_HEIGHT (SPX_FULL_HEIGHT / SPX_D)
+
+/* FORS parameters. */
+#define SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES ((SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_FORS_BYTES ((SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1) * SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_FORS_PK_BYTES SPX_N
+
+/* Resulting SPX sizes. */
+#define SPX_BYTES (SPX_N + SPX_FORS_BYTES + SPX_D * SPX_WOTS_BYTES +\
+ SPX_FULL_HEIGHT * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_PK_BYTES (2 * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_SK_BYTES (2 * SPX_N + SPX_PK_BYTES)
+
+/* Optionally, signing can be made non-deterministic using optrand.
+ This can help counter side-channel attacks that would benefit from
+ getting a large number of traces when the signer uses the same nodes. */
+#define SPX_OPTRAND_BYTES 32
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/sign.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5a230816
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "api.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "randombytes.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "wots.h"
+
+/**
+ * Computes the leaf at a given address. First generates the WOTS key pair,
+ * then computes leaf by hashing horizontally.
+ */
+static void wots_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+ unsigned char pk[SPX_WOTS_BYTES];
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t wots_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, addr_idx);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ pk, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ wots_pk_addr, wots_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ leaf, pk, pub_seed, wots_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates an SPX key pair given a seed of length
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [PUB_SEED || root]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed) {
+ /* We do not need the auth path in key generation, but it simplifies the
+ code to have just one treehash routine that computes both root and path
+ in one function. */
+ unsigned char auth_path[SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t top_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ top_tree_addr, SPX_D - 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ top_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+
+ /* Initialize SK_SEED, SK_PRF and PUB_SEED from seed. */
+ memcpy(sk, seed, PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES);
+
+ memcpy(pk, sk + 2 * SPX_N, SPX_N);
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(pk, sk);
+
+ /* Compute root node of the top-most subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ sk + 3 * SPX_N, auth_path, sk, sk + 2 * SPX_N, 0, 0,
+ wots_gen_leaf, top_tree_addr);
+
+ memcpy(pk + SPX_N, sk + 3 * SPX_N, SPX_N);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates an SPX key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [PUB_SEED || root]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
+ unsigned char seed[PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES];
+ randombytes(seed, PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ pk, sk, seed);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed = sk;
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf = sk + SPX_N;
+ const unsigned char *pk = sk + 2 * SPX_N;
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed = pk;
+
+ unsigned char optrand[SPX_N];
+ unsigned char mhash[SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+ unsigned char root[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t i;
+ uint64_t tree;
+ uint32_t idx_leaf;
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ pub_seed, sk_seed);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+
+ /* Optionally, signing can be made non-deterministic using optrand.
+ This can help counter side-channel attacks that would benefit from
+ getting a large number of traces when the signer uses the same nodes. */
+ randombytes(optrand, SPX_N);
+ /* Compute the digest randomization value. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ sig, sk_prf, optrand, m, mlen);
+
+ /* Derive the message digest and leaf index from R, PK and M. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ mhash, &tree, &idx_leaf, sig, pk, m, mlen);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(wots_addr, tree);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ /* Sign the message hash using FORS. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ sig, root, mhash, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_FORS_BYTES;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_D; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(tree_addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(tree_addr, tree);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ /* Compute a WOTS signature. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ sig, root, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_WOTS_BYTES;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for the used WOTS leaf. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ root, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed, idx_leaf, 0,
+ wots_gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N;
+
+ /* Update the indices for the next layer. */
+ idx_leaf = (tree & ((1 << SPX_TREE_HEIGHT) - 1));
+ tree = tree >> SPX_TREE_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ *siglen = SPX_BYTES;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed = pk;
+ const unsigned char *pub_root = pk + SPX_N;
+ unsigned char mhash[SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+ unsigned char wots_pk[SPX_WOTS_BYTES];
+ unsigned char root[SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ unsigned int i;
+ uint64_t tree;
+ uint32_t idx_leaf;
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t wots_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ if (siglen != SPX_BYTES) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ pub_seed, NULL);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK);
+
+ /* Derive the message digest and leaf index from R || PK || M. */
+ /* The additional SPX_N is a result of the hash domain separator. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ mhash, &tree, &idx_leaf, sig, pk, m, mlen);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Layer correctly defaults to 0, so no need to set_layer_addr */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(wots_addr, tree);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ root, sig, mhash, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_FORS_BYTES;
+
+ /* For each subtree.. */
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_D; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(tree_addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(tree_addr, tree);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ wots_pk_addr, wots_addr);
+
+ /* The WOTS public key is only correct if the signature was correct. */
+ /* Initially, root is the FORS pk, but on subsequent iterations it is
+ the root of the subtree below the currently processed subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ wots_pk, sig, root, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_WOTS_BYTES;
+
+ /* Compute the leaf node using the WOTS public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ leaf, wots_pk, pub_seed, wots_pk_addr);
+
+ /* Compute the root node of this subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ root, leaf, idx_leaf, 0, sig, SPX_TREE_HEIGHT,
+ pub_seed, tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N;
+
+ /* Update the indices for the next layer. */
+ idx_leaf = (tree & ((1 << SPX_TREE_HEIGHT) - 1));
+ tree = tree >> SPX_TREE_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the root node equals the root node in the public key. */
+ if (memcmp(root, pub_root, SPX_N) != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
+ size_t siglen;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ sm, &siglen, m, mlen, sk);
+
+ memmove(sm + SPX_BYTES, m, mlen);
+ *smlen = siglen + mlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
+ /* The API caller does not necessarily know what size a signature should be
+ but SPHINCS+ signatures are always exactly SPX_BYTES. */
+ if (smlen < SPX_BYTES) {
+ memset(m, 0, smlen);
+ *mlen = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *mlen = smlen - SPX_BYTES;
+
+ if (PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ sm, SPX_BYTES, sm + SPX_BYTES, *mlen, pk)) {
+ memset(m, 0, smlen);
+ *mlen = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* If verification was successful, move the message to the right place. */
+ memmove(m, sm + SPX_BYTES, *mlen);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/thash.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/thash.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6ee7086b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/thash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifndef SPX_THASH_H
+#define SPX_THASH_H
+
+#include
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/thash_haraka_simple.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/thash_haraka_simple.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a9ae35e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/thash_haraka_simple.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+/**
+ * Takes an array of inblocks concatenated arrays of SPX_N bytes.
+ */
+static void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inblocks,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char outbuf[32];
+ unsigned char buf_tmp[64];
+
+ (void)pub_seed; /* Suppress an 'unused parameter' warning. */
+
+ if (inblocks == 1) {
+ /* F function */
+ /* Since SPX_N may be smaller than 32, we need a temporary buffer. */
+ memset(buf_tmp, 0, 64);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf_tmp, addr);
+ memcpy(buf_tmp + SPX_ADDR_BYTES, in, SPX_N);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512(outbuf, buf_tmp);
+ memcpy(out, outbuf, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ /* All other tweakable hashes*/
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf, addr);
+ memcpy(buf + SPX_ADDR_BYTES, in, inblocks * SPX_N);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ out, SPX_N, buf, SPX_ADDR_BYTES + inblocks * SPX_N);
+ }
+}
+
+/* The wrappers below ensure that we use fixed-size buffers on the stack */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + 1 * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, 1, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + 2 * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, 2, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + SPX_WOTS_LEN * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, SPX_WOTS_LEN, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, SPX_FORS_TREES, pub_seed, addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/utils.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e65d91c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+/**
+ * Converts the value of 'in' to 'outlen' bytes in big-endian byte order.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned long long in) {
+
+ /* Iterate over out in decreasing order, for big-endianness. */
+ for (size_t i = outlen; i > 0; i--) {
+ out[i - 1] = in & 0xff;
+ in = in >> 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Converts the inlen bytes in 'in' from big-endian byte order to an integer.
+ */
+unsigned long long PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) {
+ unsigned long long retval = 0;
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < inlen; i++) {
+ retval |= ((unsigned long long)in[i]) << (8 * (inlen - 1 - i));
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an auth path.
+ * Expects address to be complete other than the tree_height and tree_index.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ const unsigned char *auth_path, uint32_t tree_height,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+ unsigned char buffer[2 * SPX_N];
+
+ /* If leaf_idx is odd (last bit = 1), current path element is a right child
+ and auth_path has to go left. Otherwise it is the other way around. */
+ if (leaf_idx & 1) {
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, leaf, SPX_N);
+ memcpy(buffer, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(buffer, leaf, SPX_N);
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ }
+ auth_path += SPX_N;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tree_height - 1; i++) {
+ leaf_idx >>= 1;
+ idx_offset >>= 1;
+ /* Set the address of the node we're creating. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(addr, i + 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ addr, leaf_idx + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Pick the right or left neighbor, depending on parity of the node. */
+ if (leaf_idx & 1) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ buffer + SPX_N, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+ memcpy(buffer, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ buffer, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ }
+ auth_path += SPX_N;
+ }
+
+ /* The last iteration is exceptional; we do not copy an auth_path node. */
+ leaf_idx >>= 1;
+ idx_offset >>= 1;
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(addr, tree_height);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ addr, leaf_idx + idx_offset);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ root, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * For a given leaf index, computes the authentication path and the resulting
+ * root node using Merkle's TreeHash algorithm.
+ * Expects the layer and tree parts of the tree_addr to be set, as well as the
+ * tree type (i.e. SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE or SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE).
+ * Applies the offset idx_offset to indices before building addresses, so that
+ * it is possible to continue counting indices across trees.
+ */
+static void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ unsigned char *stack, unsigned int *heights,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset, uint32_t tree_height,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+ uint32_t idx;
+ uint32_t tree_idx;
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < (uint32_t)(1 << tree_height); idx++) {
+ /* Add the next leaf node to the stack. */
+ gen_leaf(stack + offset * SPX_N,
+ sk_seed, pub_seed, idx + idx_offset, tree_addr);
+ offset++;
+ heights[offset - 1] = 0;
+
+ /* If this is a node we need for the auth path.. */
+ if ((leaf_idx ^ 0x1) == idx) {
+ memcpy(auth_path, stack + (offset - 1)*SPX_N, SPX_N);
+ }
+
+ /* While the top-most nodes are of equal height.. */
+ while (offset >= 2 && heights[offset - 1] == heights[offset - 2]) {
+ /* Compute index of the new node, in the next layer. */
+ tree_idx = (idx >> (heights[offset - 1] + 1));
+
+ /* Set the address of the node we're creating. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ tree_addr, heights[offset - 1] + 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ tree_addr, tree_idx + (idx_offset >> (heights[offset - 1] + 1)));
+ /* Hash the top-most nodes from the stack together. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ stack + (offset - 2)*SPX_N, stack + (offset - 2)*SPX_N,
+ pub_seed, tree_addr);
+ offset--;
+ /* Note that the top-most node is now one layer higher. */
+ heights[offset - 1]++;
+
+ /* If this is a node we need for the auth path.. */
+ if (((leaf_idx >> heights[offset - 1]) ^ 0x1) == tree_idx) {
+ memcpy(auth_path + heights[offset - 1]*SPX_N,
+ stack + (offset - 1)*SPX_N, SPX_N);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(root, stack, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/* The wrappers below ensure that we use fixed-size buffers on the stack */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char stack[(SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1)*SPX_N];
+ unsigned int heights[SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash(
+ root, auth_path, stack, heights, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ leaf_idx, idx_offset, SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char stack[(SPX_TREE_HEIGHT + 1)*SPX_N];
+ unsigned int heights[SPX_TREE_HEIGHT + 1];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash(
+ root, auth_path, stack, heights, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ leaf_idx, idx_offset, SPX_TREE_HEIGHT, gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/utils.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/utils.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..583c889e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/utils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+#ifndef SPX_UTILS_H
+#define SPX_UTILS_H
+
+#include "params.h"
+#include
+#include
+
+/**
+ * Converts the value of 'in' to 'outlen' bytes in big-endian byte order.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned long long in);
+
+/**
+ * Converts the inlen bytes in 'in' from big-endian byte order to an integer.
+ */
+unsigned long long PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an auth path.
+ * Expects address to be complete other than the tree_height and tree_index.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ const unsigned char *auth_path, uint32_t tree_height,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * For a given leaf index, computes the authentication path and the resulting
+ * root node using Merkle's TreeHash algorithm.
+ * Expects the layer and tree parts of the tree_addr to be set, as well as the
+ * tree type (i.e. SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE or SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE).
+ * Applies the offset idx_offset to indices before building addresses, so that
+ * it is possible to continue counting indices across trees.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/wots.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/wots.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..291e5e0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/wots.c
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "wots.h"
+
+// TODO clarify address expectations, and make them more uniform.
+// TODO i.e. do we expect types to be set already?
+// TODO and do we expect modifications or copies?
+
+/**
+ * Computes the starting value for a chain, i.e. the secret key.
+ * Expects the address to be complete up to the chain address.
+ */
+static void wots_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8]) {
+ /* Make sure that the hash address is actually zeroed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(wots_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Generate sk element. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_prf_addr(sk, sk_seed, wots_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the chaining function.
+ * out and in have to be n-byte arrays.
+ *
+ * Interprets in as start-th value of the chain.
+ * addr has to contain the address of the chain.
+ */
+static void gen_chain(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int start, unsigned int steps,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ /* Initialize out with the value at position 'start'. */
+ memcpy(out, in, SPX_N);
+
+ /* Iterate 'steps' calls to the hash function. */
+ for (i = start; i < (start + steps) && i < SPX_WOTS_W; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ out, out, pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * base_w algorithm as described in draft.
+ * Interprets an array of bytes as integers in base w.
+ * This only works when log_w is a divisor of 8.
+ */
+static void base_w(unsigned int *output, const size_t out_len,
+ const unsigned char *input) {
+ size_t in = 0;
+ size_t out = 0;
+ unsigned char total = 0;
+ unsigned int bits = 0;
+ size_t consumed;
+
+ for (consumed = 0; consumed < out_len; consumed++) {
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ total = input[in];
+ in++;
+ bits += 8;
+ }
+ bits -= SPX_WOTS_LOGW;
+ output[out] = (unsigned int)((total >> bits) & (SPX_WOTS_W - 1));
+ out++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Computes the WOTS+ checksum over a message (in base_w). */
+static void wots_checksum(unsigned int *csum_base_w,
+ const unsigned int *msg_base_w) {
+ unsigned int csum = 0;
+ unsigned char csum_bytes[(SPX_WOTS_LEN2 * SPX_WOTS_LOGW + 7) / 8];
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ /* Compute checksum. */
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN1; i++) {
+ csum += SPX_WOTS_W - 1 - msg_base_w[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Convert checksum to base_w. */
+ /* Make sure expected empty zero bits are the least significant bits. */
+ csum = csum << (8 - ((SPX_WOTS_LEN2 * SPX_WOTS_LOGW) % 8));
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ csum_bytes, sizeof(csum_bytes), csum);
+ base_w(csum_base_w, SPX_WOTS_LEN2, csum_bytes);
+}
+
+/* Takes a message and derives the matching chain lengths. */
+static void chain_lengths(unsigned int *lengths, const unsigned char *msg) {
+ base_w(lengths, SPX_WOTS_LEN1, msg);
+ wots_checksum(lengths + SPX_WOTS_LEN1, lengths);
+}
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32 byte sk_seed, expands it to WOTS private key
+ * elements and computes the corresponding public key.
+ * It requires the seed pub_seed (used to generate bitmasks and hash keys)
+ * and the address of this WOTS key pair.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ wots_gen_sk(pk + i * SPX_N, sk_seed, addr);
+ gen_chain(pk + i * SPX_N, pk + i * SPX_N,
+ 0, SPX_WOTS_W - 1, pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Takes a n-byte message and the 32-byte sk_see to compute a signature 'sig'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned int lengths[SPX_WOTS_LEN];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ chain_lengths(lengths, msg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ wots_gen_sk(sig + i * SPX_N, sk_seed, addr);
+ gen_chain(sig + i * SPX_N, sig + i * SPX_N, 0, lengths[i], pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature and an n-byte message, computes a WOTS public key.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned int lengths[SPX_WOTS_LEN];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ chain_lengths(lengths, msg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ gen_chain(pk + i * SPX_N, sig + i * SPX_N,
+ lengths[i], SPX_WOTS_W - 1 - lengths[i], pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/wots.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/wots.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..414cf1e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-128s-simple/clean/wots.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#ifndef SPX_WOTS_H
+#define SPX_WOTS_H
+
+#include "params.h"
+#include
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32 byte seed for the private key, expands it to
+ * a full WOTS private key and computes the corresponding public key.
+ * It requires the seed pub_seed (used to generate bitmasks and hash keys)
+ * and the address of this WOTS key pair.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a n-byte message and the 32-byte seed for the private key to compute a
+ * signature that is placed at 'sig'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature and an n-byte message, computes a WOTS public key.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA128SSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/META.yml b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/META.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2e4b98ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/META.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+name: SPHINCS+
+type: signature
+claimed-nist-level: 3
+length-public-key: 48
+length-signature: 35664
+testvectors-sha256: e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855
+principal-submitter: Andreas Hülsing
+auxiliary-submitters:
+ - Jean-Philippe Aumasson
+ - Daniel J. Bernstein,
+ - Christoph Dobraunig
+ - Maria Eichlseder
+ - Scott Fluhrer
+ - Stefan-Lukas Gazdag
+ - Panos Kampanakis
+ - Stefan Kölbl
+ - Tanja Lange
+ - Martin M. Lauridsen
+ - Florian Mendel
+ - Ruben Niederhagen
+ - Christian Rechberger
+ - Joost Rijneveld
+ - Peter Schwabe
+implementations:
+ - name: clean
+ version: https://github.com/sphincs/sphincsplus/commit/492ec4f1f6d3b3dc4b435783bbaaf4e41cdb6f32
+ length-secret-key: 96
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/LICENSE b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/LICENSE
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..670154e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/LICENSE
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+CC0 1.0 Universal
+
+Statement of Purpose
+
+The laws of most jurisdictions throughout the world automatically confer
+exclusive Copyright and Related Rights (defined below) upon the creator and
+subsequent owner(s) (each and all, an "owner") of an original work of
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+
+Certain owners wish to permanently relinquish those rights to a Work for the
+purpose of contributing to a commons of creative, cultural and scientific
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+and redistribute as freely as possible in any form whatsoever and for any
+purposes, including without limitation commercial purposes. These owners may
+contribute to the Commons to promote the ideal of a free culture and the
+further production of creative, cultural and scientific works, or to gain
+reputation or greater distribution for their Work in part through the use and
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+
+For these and/or other purposes and motivations, and without any expectation
+of additional consideration or compensation, the person associating CC0 with a
+Work (the "Affirmer"), to the extent that he or she is an owner of Copyright
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+
+1. Copyright and Related Rights. A Work made available under CC0 may be
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+
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+
+ vii. other similar, equivalent or corresponding rights throughout the world
+ based on applicable law or treaty, and any national implementations thereof.
+
+2. Waiver. To the greatest extent permitted by, but not in contravention of,
+applicable law, Affirmer hereby overtly, fully, permanently, irrevocably and
+unconditionally waives, abandons, and surrenders all of Affirmer's Copyright
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+known or unknown (including existing as well as future claims and causes of
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+the Waiver for the benefit of each member of the public at large and to the
+detriment of Affirmer's heirs and successors, fully intending that such Waiver
+shall not be subject to revocation, rescission, cancellation, termination, or
+any other legal or equitable action to disrupt the quiet enjoyment of the Work
+by the public as contemplated by Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+3. Public License Fallback. Should any part of the Waiver for any reason be
+judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, then the Waiver
+shall be preserved to the maximum extent permitted taking into account
+Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose. In addition, to the extent the Waiver
+is so judged Affirmer hereby grants to each affected person a royalty-free,
+non transferable, non sublicensable, non exclusive, irrevocable and
+unconditional license to exercise Affirmer's Copyright and Related Rights in
+the Work (i) in all territories worldwide, (ii) for the maximum duration
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+applicable law, such partial invalidity or ineffectiveness shall not
+invalidate the remainder of the License, and in such case Affirmer hereby
+affirms that he or she will not (i) exercise any of his or her remaining
+Copyright and Related Rights in the Work or (ii) assert any associated claims
+and causes of action with respect to the Work, in either case contrary to
+Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+4. Limitations and Disclaimers.
+
+ a. No trademark or patent rights held by Affirmer are waived, abandoned,
+ surrendered, licensed or otherwise affected by this document.
+
+ b. Affirmer offers the Work as-is and makes no representations or warranties
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+ discoverable, all to the greatest extent permissible under applicable law.
+
+ c. Affirmer disclaims responsibility for clearing rights of other persons
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+ d. Affirmer understands and acknowledges that Creative Commons is not a
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+
+For more information, please see
+
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/Makefile b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f599064e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with GNU Make or BSD Make
+
+LIB=libsphincs-haraka-192f-robust_clean.a
+
+HEADERS = params.h address.h wots.h utils.h fors.h api.h hash.h thash.h haraka.h
+OBJECTS = address.o wots.o utils.o fors.o sign.o hash_haraka.o thash_haraka_robust.o haraka.o
+
+CFLAGS=-Wall -Wconversion -Wextra -Wpedantic -Werror -Wmissing-prototypes -std=c99 -I../../../common $(EXTRAFLAGS)
+
+all: $(LIB)
+
+%.o: %.c $(HEADERS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
+
+$(LIB): $(OBJECTS)
+ $(AR) -r $@ $(OBJECTS)
+
+clean:
+ $(RM) $(OBJECTS)
+ $(RM) $(LIB)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c2d2d985
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with Microsoft Visual Studio's nmake using the command:
+# nmake /f Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
+
+LIBRARY=libsphincs-haraka-192f-robust_clean.lib
+OBJECTS=address.obj wots.obj utils.obj fors.obj sign.obj hash_haraka.obj thash_haraka_robust.obj haraka.obj
+
+CFLAGS=/nologo /I ..\..\..\common /W4 /WX
+
+all: $(LIBRARY)
+
+# Make sure objects are recompiled if headers change.
+$(OBJECTS): *.h
+
+$(LIBRARY): $(OBJECTS)
+ LIB.EXE /NOLOGO /WX /OUT:$@ $**
+
+clean:
+ -DEL $(OBJECTS)
+ -DEL $(LIBRARY)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/address.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/address.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7bd831e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/address.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ bytes + i * 4, 4, addr[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer) {
+ addr[0] = layer;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree) {
+ addr[1] = 0;
+ addr[2] = (uint32_t) (tree >> 32);
+ addr[3] = (uint32_t) tree;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type) {
+ addr[4] = type;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for OTS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair) {
+ addr[5] = keypair;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+ out[5] = in[5];
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain) {
+ addr[6] = chain;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash) {
+ addr[7] = hash;
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height) {
+ addr[6] = tree_height;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index) {
+ addr[7] = tree_index;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/address.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/address.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9f679132
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/address.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+#ifndef SPX_ADDRESS_H
+#define SPX_ADDRESS_H
+
+#include
+
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS 0
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK 1
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE 2
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE 3
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK 4
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type);
+
+/* Copies the layer and tree part of one address into the other */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for WOTS and FORS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/api.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/api.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8a85092c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/api.h
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#ifndef PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_API_H
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_API_H
+
+#include
+#include
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_ALGNAME "SPHINCS+"
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES 64
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES 32
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES 16976
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES 48
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair given a seed.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/fors.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/fors.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6293338f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/fors.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+static void fors_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ sk, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_sk_to_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ leaf, sk, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* Only copy the parts that must be kept in fors_leaf_addr. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_leaf_addr, fors_tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_leaf_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_leaf_addr, addr_idx);
+
+ fors_gen_sk(leaf, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, leaf, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Interprets m as SPX_FORS_HEIGHT-bit unsigned integers.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ * Assumes indices has space for SPX_FORS_TREES integers.
+ */
+static void message_to_indices(uint32_t *indices, const unsigned char *m) {
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ indices[i] = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < SPX_FORS_HEIGHT; j++) {
+ indices[i] ^= (((uint32_t)m[offset >> 3] >> (offset & 0x7)) & 0x1) << j;
+ offset++;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Include the secret key part that produces the selected leaf node. */
+ fors_gen_sk(sig, sk_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for this leaf node. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ indices[i], idx_offset, fors_gen_leaf, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Derive the leaf from the included secret key part. */
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, sig, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Derive the corresponding root node of this tree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, leaf, indices[i], idx_offset, sig,
+ SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/fors.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/fors.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..74b26ae6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/fors.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_FORS_H
+#define SPX_FORS_H
+
+#include
+
+#include "params.h"
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ab61e613
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+/*
+Plain C implementation of the Haraka256 and Haraka512 permutations.
+*/
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+#define HARAKAS_RATE 32
+
+static const unsigned char haraka_rc[40][16] = {
+ {0x9d, 0x7b, 0x81, 0x75, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xc5, 0xb2, 0x0a, 0xc0, 0x20, 0xe6, 0x4c, 0x70, 0x84, 0x06},
+ {0x17, 0xf7, 0x08, 0x2f, 0xa4, 0x6b, 0x0f, 0x64, 0x6b, 0xa0, 0xf3, 0x88, 0xe1, 0xb4, 0x66, 0x8b},
+ {0x14, 0x91, 0x02, 0x9f, 0x60, 0x9d, 0x02, 0xcf, 0x98, 0x84, 0xf2, 0x53, 0x2d, 0xde, 0x02, 0x34},
+ {0x79, 0x4f, 0x5b, 0xfd, 0xaf, 0xbc, 0xf3, 0xbb, 0x08, 0x4f, 0x7b, 0x2e, 0xe6, 0xea, 0xd6, 0x0e},
+ {0x44, 0x70, 0x39, 0xbe, 0x1c, 0xcd, 0xee, 0x79, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x72, 0x48, 0xcb, 0xb0, 0xcf, 0xcb},
+ {0x7b, 0x05, 0x8a, 0x2b, 0xed, 0x35, 0x53, 0x8d, 0xb7, 0x32, 0x90, 0x6e, 0xee, 0xcd, 0xea, 0x7e},
+ {0x1b, 0xef, 0x4f, 0xda, 0x61, 0x27, 0x41, 0xe2, 0xd0, 0x7c, 0x2e, 0x5e, 0x43, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x67},
+ {0x3b, 0x0b, 0xc7, 0x1f, 0xe2, 0xfd, 0x5f, 0x67, 0x07, 0xcc, 0xca, 0xaf, 0xb0, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x29},
+ {0xee, 0x65, 0xd4, 0xb9, 0xca, 0x8f, 0xdb, 0xec, 0xe9, 0x7f, 0x86, 0xe6, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x4d, 0xab},
+ {0x33, 0x7e, 0x03, 0xad, 0x4f, 0x40, 0x2a, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xcd, 0xb7, 0xd4, 0x84, 0xbf, 0x30, 0x1c},
+ {0x00, 0x98, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x2e, 0x8b, 0x02, 0x69, 0xbf, 0x23, 0x17, 0x94, 0xb9, 0x0b, 0xcc, 0xb2},
+ {0x8a, 0x2d, 0x9d, 0x5c, 0xc8, 0x9e, 0xaa, 0x4a, 0x72, 0x55, 0x6f, 0xde, 0xa6, 0x78, 0x04, 0xfa},
+ {0xd4, 0x9f, 0x12, 0x29, 0x2e, 0x4f, 0xfa, 0x0e, 0x12, 0x2a, 0x77, 0x6b, 0x2b, 0x9f, 0xb4, 0xdf},
+ {0xee, 0x12, 0x6a, 0xbb, 0xae, 0x11, 0xd6, 0x32, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x49, 0xf4, 0x44, 0x03, 0xa1, 0x1e},
+ {0xa6, 0xec, 0xa8, 0x9c, 0xc9, 0x00, 0x96, 0x5f, 0x84, 0x00, 0x05, 0x4b, 0x88, 0x49, 0x04, 0xaf},
+ {0xec, 0x93, 0xe5, 0x27, 0xe3, 0xc7, 0xa2, 0x78, 0x4f, 0x9c, 0x19, 0x9d, 0xd8, 0x5e, 0x02, 0x21},
+ {0x73, 0x01, 0xd4, 0x82, 0xcd, 0x2e, 0x28, 0xb9, 0xb7, 0xc9, 0x59, 0xa7, 0xf8, 0xaa, 0x3a, 0xbf},
+ {0x6b, 0x7d, 0x30, 0x10, 0xd9, 0xef, 0xf2, 0x37, 0x17, 0xb0, 0x86, 0x61, 0x0d, 0x70, 0x60, 0x62},
+ {0xc6, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0xf6, 0x53, 0x91, 0xc2, 0x81, 0x43, 0x04, 0x30, 0x21, 0xc2, 0x45, 0xca, 0x5a},
+ {0x3a, 0x94, 0xd1, 0x36, 0xe8, 0x92, 0xaf, 0x2c, 0xbb, 0x68, 0x6b, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x97, 0x23, 0x92},
+ {0xb4, 0x71, 0x10, 0xe5, 0x58, 0xb9, 0xba, 0x6c, 0xeb, 0x86, 0x58, 0x22, 0x38, 0x92, 0xbf, 0xd3},
+ {0x8d, 0x12, 0xe1, 0x24, 0xdd, 0xfd, 0x3d, 0x93, 0x77, 0xc6, 0xf0, 0xae, 0xe5, 0x3c, 0x86, 0xdb},
+ {0xb1, 0x12, 0x22, 0xcb, 0xe3, 0x8d, 0xe4, 0x83, 0x9c, 0xa0, 0xeb, 0xff, 0x68, 0x62, 0x60, 0xbb},
+ {0x7d, 0xf7, 0x2b, 0xc7, 0x4e, 0x1a, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0x9c, 0xd1, 0xe4, 0xe2, 0xdc, 0xd3, 0x4b, 0x73},
+ {0x4e, 0x92, 0xb3, 0x2c, 0xc4, 0x15, 0x14, 0x4b, 0x43, 0x1b, 0x30, 0x61, 0xc3, 0x47, 0xbb, 0x43},
+ {0x99, 0x68, 0xeb, 0x16, 0xdd, 0x31, 0xb2, 0x03, 0xf6, 0xef, 0x07, 0xe7, 0xa8, 0x75, 0xa7, 0xdb},
+ {0x2c, 0x47, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x23, 0x5e, 0x8e, 0x77, 0x59, 0x75, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x61, 0xf3, 0x6d},
+ {0xf9, 0x17, 0x86, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xe5, 0x1b, 0x6d, 0x77, 0x7d, 0xde, 0xd6, 0x17, 0x5a, 0xa7, 0xcd},
+ {0x5d, 0xee, 0x46, 0xa9, 0x9d, 0x06, 0x6c, 0x9d, 0xaa, 0xe9, 0xa8, 0x6b, 0xf0, 0x43, 0x6b, 0xec},
+ {0xc1, 0x27, 0xf3, 0x3b, 0x59, 0x11, 0x53, 0xa2, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x57, 0xf9, 0x50, 0x69, 0x1e, 0xcb},
+ {0xd9, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x60, 0x53, 0x03, 0xed, 0xe4, 0x9c, 0x61, 0xda, 0x00, 0x75, 0x0c, 0xee, 0x2c},
+ {0x50, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0x63, 0xbc, 0xba, 0xbb, 0x80, 0xab, 0x0c, 0xe9, 0x96, 0xa1, 0xa5, 0xb1, 0xf0},
+ {0x39, 0xca, 0x8d, 0x93, 0x30, 0xde, 0x0d, 0xab, 0x88, 0x29, 0x96, 0x5e, 0x02, 0xb1, 0x3d, 0xae},
+ {0x42, 0xb4, 0x75, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf3, 0x14, 0x88, 0x0b, 0xa4, 0x54, 0xd5, 0x38, 0x8f, 0xbb, 0x17},
+ {0xf6, 0x16, 0x0a, 0x36, 0x79, 0xb7, 0xb6, 0xae, 0xd7, 0x7f, 0x42, 0x5f, 0x5b, 0x8a, 0xbb, 0x34},
+ {0xde, 0xaf, 0xba, 0xff, 0x18, 0x59, 0xce, 0x43, 0x38, 0x54, 0xe5, 0xcb, 0x41, 0x52, 0xf6, 0x26},
+ {0x78, 0xc9, 0x9e, 0x83, 0xf7, 0x9c, 0xca, 0xa2, 0x6a, 0x02, 0xf3, 0xb9, 0x54, 0x9a, 0xe9, 0x4c},
+ {0x35, 0x12, 0x90, 0x22, 0x28, 0x6e, 0xc0, 0x40, 0xbe, 0xf7, 0xdf, 0x1b, 0x1a, 0xa5, 0x51, 0xae},
+ {0xcf, 0x59, 0xa6, 0x48, 0x0f, 0xbc, 0x73, 0xc1, 0x2b, 0xd2, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x61, 0xc1, 0xa0},
+ {0xa1, 0x9d, 0xc5, 0xe9, 0xfd, 0xbd, 0xd6, 0x4a, 0x88, 0x82, 0x28, 0x02, 0x03, 0xcc, 0x6a, 0x75}
+};
+
+static unsigned char rc[40][16];
+static unsigned char rc_sseed[40][16];
+
+static const unsigned char sbox[256] = {
+ 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe,
+ 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4,
+ 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7,
+ 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15, 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3,
+ 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x09,
+ 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3,
+ 0x2f, 0x84, 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe,
+ 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85,
+ 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8, 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92,
+ 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x0c,
+ 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19,
+ 0x73, 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14,
+ 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2,
+ 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79, 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5,
+ 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08, 0xba, 0x78, 0x25,
+ 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a,
+ 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86,
+ 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e,
+ 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42,
+ 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
+};
+
+#define XT(x) (((x) << 1) ^ ((((x) >> 7) & 1) * 0x1b))
+
+// Simulate _mm_aesenc_si128 instructions from AESNI
+static void aesenc(unsigned char *s, const unsigned char *rk) {
+ uint8_t i, t, u, v[4][4];
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ v[((i / 4) + 4 - (i % 4) ) % 4][i % 4] = sbox[s[i]];
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+ t = v[i][0];
+ u = v[i][0] ^ v[i][1] ^ v[i][2] ^ v[i][3];
+ v[i][0] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][0] ^ v[i][1]));
+ v[i][1] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][1] ^ v[i][2]));
+ v[i][2] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][2] ^ v[i][3]));
+ v[i][3] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][3] ^ t));
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ s[i] = v[i / 4][i % 4] ^ rk[i];
+ }
+}
+
+// Simulate _mm_unpacklo_epi32
+static void unpacklo32(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ memcpy(tmp, a, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 4, b, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 8, a + 4, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 12, b + 4, 4);
+ memcpy(t, tmp, 16);
+}
+
+// Simulate _mm_unpackhi_epi32
+static void unpackhi32(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ memcpy(tmp, a + 8, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 4, b + 8, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 8, a + 12, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 12, b + 12, 4);
+ memcpy(t, tmp, 16);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_tweak_constants(
+ const unsigned char *pk_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ unsigned long long seed_length) {
+ unsigned char buf[40 * 16];
+
+ /* Use the standard constants to generate tweaked ones. */
+ memcpy(rc, haraka_rc, 40 * 16);
+
+ /* Constants for sk.seed */
+ if (sk_seed != NULL) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(buf, 40 * 16, sk_seed, seed_length);
+ memcpy(rc_sseed, buf, 40 * 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Constants for pk.seed */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(buf, 40 * 16, pk_seed, seed_length);
+ memcpy(rc, buf, 40 * 16);
+}
+
+static void haraka_S_absorb(unsigned char *s, unsigned int r,
+ const unsigned char *m, unsigned long long mlen,
+ unsigned char p) {
+ unsigned long long i;
+ unsigned char t[r];
+
+ while (mlen >= r) {
+ // XOR block to state
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ s[i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s, s);
+ mlen -= r;
+ m += r;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ t[i] = 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; ++i) {
+ t[i] = m[i];
+ }
+ t[i] = p;
+ t[r - 1] |= 128;
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ s[i] ^= t[i];
+ }
+}
+
+static void haraka_S_squeezeblocks(unsigned char *h, unsigned long long nblocks,
+ unsigned char *s, unsigned int r) {
+ while (nblocks > 0) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s, s);
+ memcpy(h, s, HARAKAS_RATE);
+ h += r;
+ nblocks--;
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ s_inc[i] = 0;
+ }
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(uint8_t *s_inc, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Recall that s_inc[64] is the non-absorbed bytes xored into the state */
+ while (mlen + s_inc[64] >= HARAKAS_RATE) {
+ for (i = 0; i < (size_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64]); i++) {
+ /* Take the i'th byte from message
+ xor with the s_inc[64] + i'th byte of the state */
+ s_inc[s_inc[64] + i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ mlen -= (size_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64]);
+ m += HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64];
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s_inc, s_inc);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; i++) {
+ s_inc[s_inc[64] + i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(mlen + s_inc[64]);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ /* After haraka_S_inc_absorb, we are guaranteed that s_inc[64] < HARAKAS_RATE,
+ so we can always use one more byte for p in the current state. */
+ s_inc[s_inc[64]] ^= 0x1F;
+ s_inc[HARAKAS_RATE - 1] ^= 128;
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ uint8_t i;
+
+ /* First consume any bytes we still have sitting around */
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen && i < s_inc[64]; i++) {
+ /* There are s_inc[64] bytes left, so r - s_inc[64] is the first
+ available byte. We consume from there, i.e., up to r. */
+ out[i] = s_inc[(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64] + i)];
+ }
+ out += i;
+ outlen -= i;
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(s_inc[64] - i);
+
+ /* Then squeeze the remaining necessary blocks */
+ while (outlen > 0) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s_inc, s_inc);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen && i < HARAKAS_RATE; i++) {
+ out[i] = s_inc[i];
+ }
+ out += i;
+ outlen -= i;
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - i);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned long long outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen) {
+ unsigned long long i;
+ unsigned char s[64];
+ unsigned char d[32];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ s[i] = 0;
+ }
+ haraka_S_absorb(s, 32, in, inlen, 0x1F);
+
+ haraka_S_squeezeblocks(out, outlen / 32, s, 32);
+ out += (outlen / 32) * 32;
+
+ if (outlen % 32) {
+ haraka_S_squeezeblocks(d, 1, s, 32);
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen % 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = d[i];
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[64], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 32, in + 32, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 48, in + 48, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 1]);
+ aesenc(s + 32, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 2]);
+ aesenc(s + 48, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 3]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s, s, s + 16);
+ unpacklo32(s + 16, s + 32, s + 48);
+ unpackhi32(s + 32, s + 32, s + 48);
+ unpacklo32(s + 48, s, s + 32);
+ unpackhi32(s, s, s + 32);
+ unpackhi32(s + 32, s + 16, tmp);
+ unpacklo32(s + 16, s + 16, tmp);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(out, s, 64);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i;
+
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(buf, in);
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ buf[i] = buf[i] ^ in[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Truncated */
+ memcpy(out, buf + 8, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 8, buf + 24, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 16, buf + 32, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 24, buf + 48, 8);
+}
+
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[32], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j + 1]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s + 16, s, s + 16);
+ memcpy(s, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ s[i];
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[32], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc_sseed[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc_sseed[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j + 1]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s + 16, s, s + 16);
+ memcpy(s, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ s[i];
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/haraka.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/haraka.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..768856b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/haraka.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_HARAKA_H
+#define SPX_HARAKA_H
+
+/* Tweak constants with seed */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_tweak_constants(
+ const unsigned char *pk_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ unsigned long long seed_length);
+
+/* Haraka Sponge */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(uint8_t *s_inc, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned long long outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen);
+
+/* Applies the 512-bit Haraka permutation to in. */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-512 */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-256 */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-256 using sk.seed constants */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/hash.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/hash.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..97023993
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/hash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifndef SPX_HASH_H
+#define SPX_HASH_H
+
+#include
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf, const unsigned char *optrand,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ unsigned char *digest, uint64_t *tree, uint32_t *leaf_idx,
+ const unsigned char *R, const unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/hash_haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/hash_haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ff28b376
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/hash_haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_tweak_constants(pub_seed, sk_seed, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes PRF(key, addr), given a secret key of SPX_N bytes and an address
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES];
+ /* Since SPX_N may be smaller than 32, we need a temporary buffer. */
+ unsigned char outbuf[32];
+
+ (void)key; /* Suppress an 'unused parameter' warning. */
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf, addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(outbuf, buf);
+ memcpy(out, outbuf, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the message-dependent randomness R, using a secret seed and an
+ * optional randomization value as well as the message.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf, const unsigned char *optrand,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) {
+ uint8_t s_inc[65];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, sk_prf, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, optrand, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, m, mlen);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(R, SPX_N, s_inc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the message hash using R, the public key, and the message.
+ * Outputs the message digest and the index of the leaf. The index is split in
+ * the tree index and the leaf index, for convenient copying to an address.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ unsigned char *digest, uint64_t *tree, uint32_t *leaf_idx,
+ const unsigned char *R, const unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) {
+#define SPX_TREE_BITS (SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * (SPX_D - 1))
+#define SPX_TREE_BYTES ((SPX_TREE_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_LEAF_BITS SPX_TREE_HEIGHT
+#define SPX_LEAF_BYTES ((SPX_LEAF_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_DGST_BYTES (SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES + SPX_TREE_BYTES + SPX_LEAF_BYTES)
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_DGST_BYTES];
+ unsigned char *bufp = buf;
+ uint8_t s_inc[65];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, R, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, pk, SPX_PK_BYTES);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, m, mlen);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(buf, SPX_DGST_BYTES, s_inc);
+
+ memcpy(digest, bufp, SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES);
+ bufp += SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES;
+
+ *tree = PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(bufp, SPX_TREE_BYTES);
+ *tree &= (~(uint64_t)0) >> (64 - SPX_TREE_BITS);
+ bufp += SPX_TREE_BYTES;
+
+ *leaf_idx = (uint32_t)PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ bufp, SPX_LEAF_BYTES);
+ *leaf_idx &= (~(uint32_t)0) >> (32 - SPX_LEAF_BITS);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/params.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/params.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..898f177f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/params.h
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#ifndef SPX_PARAMS_H
+#define SPX_PARAMS_H
+
+/* Hash output length in bytes. */
+#define SPX_N 24
+/* Height of the hypertree. */
+#define SPX_FULL_HEIGHT 66
+/* Number of subtree layer. */
+#define SPX_D 22
+/* FORS tree dimensions. */
+#define SPX_FORS_HEIGHT 8
+#define SPX_FORS_TREES 33
+/* Winternitz parameter, */
+#define SPX_WOTS_W 16
+
+/* The hash function is defined by linking a different hash.c file, as opposed
+ to setting a #define constant. */
+
+/* For clarity */
+#define SPX_ADDR_BYTES 32
+
+/* WOTS parameters. */
+#define SPX_WOTS_LOGW 4
+
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN1 (8 * SPX_N / SPX_WOTS_LOGW)
+
+/* SPX_WOTS_LEN2 is floor(log(len_1 * (w - 1)) / log(w)) + 1; we precompute */
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN2 3
+
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN (SPX_WOTS_LEN1 + SPX_WOTS_LEN2)
+#define SPX_WOTS_BYTES (SPX_WOTS_LEN * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_WOTS_PK_BYTES SPX_WOTS_BYTES
+
+/* Subtree size. */
+#define SPX_TREE_HEIGHT (SPX_FULL_HEIGHT / SPX_D)
+
+/* FORS parameters. */
+#define SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES ((SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_FORS_BYTES ((SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1) * SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_FORS_PK_BYTES SPX_N
+
+/* Resulting SPX sizes. */
+#define SPX_BYTES (SPX_N + SPX_FORS_BYTES + SPX_D * SPX_WOTS_BYTES +\
+ SPX_FULL_HEIGHT * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_PK_BYTES (2 * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_SK_BYTES (2 * SPX_N + SPX_PK_BYTES)
+
+/* Optionally, signing can be made non-deterministic using optrand.
+ This can help counter side-channel attacks that would benefit from
+ getting a large number of traces when the signer uses the same nodes. */
+#define SPX_OPTRAND_BYTES 32
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/sign.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f9f19227
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "api.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "randombytes.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "wots.h"
+
+/**
+ * Computes the leaf at a given address. First generates the WOTS key pair,
+ * then computes leaf by hashing horizontally.
+ */
+static void wots_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+ unsigned char pk[SPX_WOTS_BYTES];
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t wots_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, addr_idx);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ pk, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ wots_pk_addr, wots_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ leaf, pk, pub_seed, wots_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates an SPX key pair given a seed of length
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [PUB_SEED || root]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed) {
+ /* We do not need the auth path in key generation, but it simplifies the
+ code to have just one treehash routine that computes both root and path
+ in one function. */
+ unsigned char auth_path[SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t top_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ top_tree_addr, SPX_D - 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ top_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+
+ /* Initialize SK_SEED, SK_PRF and PUB_SEED from seed. */
+ memcpy(sk, seed, PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES);
+
+ memcpy(pk, sk + 2 * SPX_N, SPX_N);
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(pk, sk);
+
+ /* Compute root node of the top-most subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ sk + 3 * SPX_N, auth_path, sk, sk + 2 * SPX_N, 0, 0,
+ wots_gen_leaf, top_tree_addr);
+
+ memcpy(pk + SPX_N, sk + 3 * SPX_N, SPX_N);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates an SPX key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [PUB_SEED || root]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
+ unsigned char seed[PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES];
+ randombytes(seed, PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ pk, sk, seed);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed = sk;
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf = sk + SPX_N;
+ const unsigned char *pk = sk + 2 * SPX_N;
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed = pk;
+
+ unsigned char optrand[SPX_N];
+ unsigned char mhash[SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+ unsigned char root[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t i;
+ uint64_t tree;
+ uint32_t idx_leaf;
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ pub_seed, sk_seed);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+
+ /* Optionally, signing can be made non-deterministic using optrand.
+ This can help counter side-channel attacks that would benefit from
+ getting a large number of traces when the signer uses the same nodes. */
+ randombytes(optrand, SPX_N);
+ /* Compute the digest randomization value. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ sig, sk_prf, optrand, m, mlen);
+
+ /* Derive the message digest and leaf index from R, PK and M. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ mhash, &tree, &idx_leaf, sig, pk, m, mlen);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(wots_addr, tree);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ /* Sign the message hash using FORS. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ sig, root, mhash, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_FORS_BYTES;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_D; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(tree_addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(tree_addr, tree);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ /* Compute a WOTS signature. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ sig, root, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_WOTS_BYTES;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for the used WOTS leaf. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ root, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed, idx_leaf, 0,
+ wots_gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N;
+
+ /* Update the indices for the next layer. */
+ idx_leaf = (tree & ((1 << SPX_TREE_HEIGHT) - 1));
+ tree = tree >> SPX_TREE_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ *siglen = SPX_BYTES;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed = pk;
+ const unsigned char *pub_root = pk + SPX_N;
+ unsigned char mhash[SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+ unsigned char wots_pk[SPX_WOTS_BYTES];
+ unsigned char root[SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ unsigned int i;
+ uint64_t tree;
+ uint32_t idx_leaf;
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t wots_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ if (siglen != SPX_BYTES) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ pub_seed, NULL);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK);
+
+ /* Derive the message digest and leaf index from R || PK || M. */
+ /* The additional SPX_N is a result of the hash domain separator. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ mhash, &tree, &idx_leaf, sig, pk, m, mlen);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Layer correctly defaults to 0, so no need to set_layer_addr */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(wots_addr, tree);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ root, sig, mhash, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_FORS_BYTES;
+
+ /* For each subtree.. */
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_D; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(tree_addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(tree_addr, tree);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ wots_pk_addr, wots_addr);
+
+ /* The WOTS public key is only correct if the signature was correct. */
+ /* Initially, root is the FORS pk, but on subsequent iterations it is
+ the root of the subtree below the currently processed subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ wots_pk, sig, root, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_WOTS_BYTES;
+
+ /* Compute the leaf node using the WOTS public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ leaf, wots_pk, pub_seed, wots_pk_addr);
+
+ /* Compute the root node of this subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ root, leaf, idx_leaf, 0, sig, SPX_TREE_HEIGHT,
+ pub_seed, tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N;
+
+ /* Update the indices for the next layer. */
+ idx_leaf = (tree & ((1 << SPX_TREE_HEIGHT) - 1));
+ tree = tree >> SPX_TREE_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the root node equals the root node in the public key. */
+ if (memcmp(root, pub_root, SPX_N) != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
+ size_t siglen;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ sm, &siglen, m, mlen, sk);
+
+ memmove(sm + SPX_BYTES, m, mlen);
+ *smlen = siglen + mlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
+ /* The API caller does not necessarily know what size a signature should be
+ but SPHINCS+ signatures are always exactly SPX_BYTES. */
+ if (smlen < SPX_BYTES) {
+ memset(m, 0, smlen);
+ *mlen = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *mlen = smlen - SPX_BYTES;
+
+ if (PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ sm, SPX_BYTES, sm + SPX_BYTES, *mlen, pk)) {
+ memset(m, 0, smlen);
+ *mlen = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* If verification was successful, move the message to the right place. */
+ memmove(m, sm + SPX_BYTES, *mlen);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/thash.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/thash.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6765ced5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/thash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifndef SPX_THASH_H
+#define SPX_THASH_H
+
+#include
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/thash_haraka_robust.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/thash_haraka_robust.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..85c78083
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/thash_haraka_robust.c
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+/**
+ * Takes an array of inblocks concatenated arrays of SPX_N bytes.
+ */
+static void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inblocks,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char *bitmask = buf + SPX_ADDR_BYTES;
+ unsigned char outbuf[32];
+ unsigned char buf_tmp[64];
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ (void)pub_seed; /* Suppress an 'unused parameter' warning. */
+
+ if (inblocks == 1) {
+ /* F function */
+ /* Since SPX_N may be smaller than 32, we need a temporary buffer. */
+ memset(buf_tmp, 0, 64);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf_tmp, addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256(outbuf, buf_tmp);
+ for (i = 0; i < inblocks * SPX_N; i++) {
+ buf_tmp[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + i] = in[i] ^ outbuf[i];
+ }
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512(outbuf, buf_tmp);
+ memcpy(out, outbuf, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ /* All other tweakable hashes*/
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf, addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ bitmask, inblocks * SPX_N, buf, SPX_ADDR_BYTES);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < inblocks * SPX_N; i++) {
+ buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + i] = in[i] ^ bitmask[i];
+ }
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ out, SPX_N, buf, SPX_ADDR_BYTES + inblocks * SPX_N);
+ }
+}
+
+/* The wrappers below ensure that we use fixed-size buffers on the stack */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + 1 * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, 1, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + 2 * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, 2, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + SPX_WOTS_LEN * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, SPX_WOTS_LEN, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, SPX_FORS_TREES, pub_seed, addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/utils.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..10e2e6a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+/**
+ * Converts the value of 'in' to 'outlen' bytes in big-endian byte order.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned long long in) {
+
+ /* Iterate over out in decreasing order, for big-endianness. */
+ for (size_t i = outlen; i > 0; i--) {
+ out[i - 1] = in & 0xff;
+ in = in >> 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Converts the inlen bytes in 'in' from big-endian byte order to an integer.
+ */
+unsigned long long PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) {
+ unsigned long long retval = 0;
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < inlen; i++) {
+ retval |= ((unsigned long long)in[i]) << (8 * (inlen - 1 - i));
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an auth path.
+ * Expects address to be complete other than the tree_height and tree_index.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ const unsigned char *auth_path, uint32_t tree_height,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+ unsigned char buffer[2 * SPX_N];
+
+ /* If leaf_idx is odd (last bit = 1), current path element is a right child
+ and auth_path has to go left. Otherwise it is the other way around. */
+ if (leaf_idx & 1) {
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, leaf, SPX_N);
+ memcpy(buffer, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(buffer, leaf, SPX_N);
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ }
+ auth_path += SPX_N;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tree_height - 1; i++) {
+ leaf_idx >>= 1;
+ idx_offset >>= 1;
+ /* Set the address of the node we're creating. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(addr, i + 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ addr, leaf_idx + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Pick the right or left neighbor, depending on parity of the node. */
+ if (leaf_idx & 1) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ buffer + SPX_N, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+ memcpy(buffer, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ buffer, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ }
+ auth_path += SPX_N;
+ }
+
+ /* The last iteration is exceptional; we do not copy an auth_path node. */
+ leaf_idx >>= 1;
+ idx_offset >>= 1;
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(addr, tree_height);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ addr, leaf_idx + idx_offset);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ root, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * For a given leaf index, computes the authentication path and the resulting
+ * root node using Merkle's TreeHash algorithm.
+ * Expects the layer and tree parts of the tree_addr to be set, as well as the
+ * tree type (i.e. SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE or SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE).
+ * Applies the offset idx_offset to indices before building addresses, so that
+ * it is possible to continue counting indices across trees.
+ */
+static void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ unsigned char *stack, unsigned int *heights,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset, uint32_t tree_height,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+ uint32_t idx;
+ uint32_t tree_idx;
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < (uint32_t)(1 << tree_height); idx++) {
+ /* Add the next leaf node to the stack. */
+ gen_leaf(stack + offset * SPX_N,
+ sk_seed, pub_seed, idx + idx_offset, tree_addr);
+ offset++;
+ heights[offset - 1] = 0;
+
+ /* If this is a node we need for the auth path.. */
+ if ((leaf_idx ^ 0x1) == idx) {
+ memcpy(auth_path, stack + (offset - 1)*SPX_N, SPX_N);
+ }
+
+ /* While the top-most nodes are of equal height.. */
+ while (offset >= 2 && heights[offset - 1] == heights[offset - 2]) {
+ /* Compute index of the new node, in the next layer. */
+ tree_idx = (idx >> (heights[offset - 1] + 1));
+
+ /* Set the address of the node we're creating. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ tree_addr, heights[offset - 1] + 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ tree_addr, tree_idx + (idx_offset >> (heights[offset - 1] + 1)));
+ /* Hash the top-most nodes from the stack together. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ stack + (offset - 2)*SPX_N, stack + (offset - 2)*SPX_N,
+ pub_seed, tree_addr);
+ offset--;
+ /* Note that the top-most node is now one layer higher. */
+ heights[offset - 1]++;
+
+ /* If this is a node we need for the auth path.. */
+ if (((leaf_idx >> heights[offset - 1]) ^ 0x1) == tree_idx) {
+ memcpy(auth_path + heights[offset - 1]*SPX_N,
+ stack + (offset - 1)*SPX_N, SPX_N);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(root, stack, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/* The wrappers below ensure that we use fixed-size buffers on the stack */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char stack[(SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1)*SPX_N];
+ unsigned int heights[SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash(
+ root, auth_path, stack, heights, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ leaf_idx, idx_offset, SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char stack[(SPX_TREE_HEIGHT + 1)*SPX_N];
+ unsigned int heights[SPX_TREE_HEIGHT + 1];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash(
+ root, auth_path, stack, heights, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ leaf_idx, idx_offset, SPX_TREE_HEIGHT, gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/utils.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/utils.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..004ae681
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/utils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+#ifndef SPX_UTILS_H
+#define SPX_UTILS_H
+
+#include "params.h"
+#include
+#include
+
+/**
+ * Converts the value of 'in' to 'outlen' bytes in big-endian byte order.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned long long in);
+
+/**
+ * Converts the inlen bytes in 'in' from big-endian byte order to an integer.
+ */
+unsigned long long PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an auth path.
+ * Expects address to be complete other than the tree_height and tree_index.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ const unsigned char *auth_path, uint32_t tree_height,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * For a given leaf index, computes the authentication path and the resulting
+ * root node using Merkle's TreeHash algorithm.
+ * Expects the layer and tree parts of the tree_addr to be set, as well as the
+ * tree type (i.e. SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE or SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE).
+ * Applies the offset idx_offset to indices before building addresses, so that
+ * it is possible to continue counting indices across trees.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/wots.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/wots.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3910eda0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/wots.c
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "wots.h"
+
+// TODO clarify address expectations, and make them more uniform.
+// TODO i.e. do we expect types to be set already?
+// TODO and do we expect modifications or copies?
+
+/**
+ * Computes the starting value for a chain, i.e. the secret key.
+ * Expects the address to be complete up to the chain address.
+ */
+static void wots_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8]) {
+ /* Make sure that the hash address is actually zeroed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(wots_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Generate sk element. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(sk, sk_seed, wots_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the chaining function.
+ * out and in have to be n-byte arrays.
+ *
+ * Interprets in as start-th value of the chain.
+ * addr has to contain the address of the chain.
+ */
+static void gen_chain(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int start, unsigned int steps,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ /* Initialize out with the value at position 'start'. */
+ memcpy(out, in, SPX_N);
+
+ /* Iterate 'steps' calls to the hash function. */
+ for (i = start; i < (start + steps) && i < SPX_WOTS_W; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ out, out, pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * base_w algorithm as described in draft.
+ * Interprets an array of bytes as integers in base w.
+ * This only works when log_w is a divisor of 8.
+ */
+static void base_w(unsigned int *output, const size_t out_len,
+ const unsigned char *input) {
+ size_t in = 0;
+ size_t out = 0;
+ unsigned char total = 0;
+ unsigned int bits = 0;
+ size_t consumed;
+
+ for (consumed = 0; consumed < out_len; consumed++) {
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ total = input[in];
+ in++;
+ bits += 8;
+ }
+ bits -= SPX_WOTS_LOGW;
+ output[out] = (unsigned int)((total >> bits) & (SPX_WOTS_W - 1));
+ out++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Computes the WOTS+ checksum over a message (in base_w). */
+static void wots_checksum(unsigned int *csum_base_w,
+ const unsigned int *msg_base_w) {
+ unsigned int csum = 0;
+ unsigned char csum_bytes[(SPX_WOTS_LEN2 * SPX_WOTS_LOGW + 7) / 8];
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ /* Compute checksum. */
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN1; i++) {
+ csum += SPX_WOTS_W - 1 - msg_base_w[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Convert checksum to base_w. */
+ /* Make sure expected empty zero bits are the least significant bits. */
+ csum = csum << (8 - ((SPX_WOTS_LEN2 * SPX_WOTS_LOGW) % 8));
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ csum_bytes, sizeof(csum_bytes), csum);
+ base_w(csum_base_w, SPX_WOTS_LEN2, csum_bytes);
+}
+
+/* Takes a message and derives the matching chain lengths. */
+static void chain_lengths(unsigned int *lengths, const unsigned char *msg) {
+ base_w(lengths, SPX_WOTS_LEN1, msg);
+ wots_checksum(lengths + SPX_WOTS_LEN1, lengths);
+}
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32 byte sk_seed, expands it to WOTS private key
+ * elements and computes the corresponding public key.
+ * It requires the seed pub_seed (used to generate bitmasks and hash keys)
+ * and the address of this WOTS key pair.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ wots_gen_sk(pk + i * SPX_N, sk_seed, addr);
+ gen_chain(pk + i * SPX_N, pk + i * SPX_N,
+ 0, SPX_WOTS_W - 1, pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Takes a n-byte message and the 32-byte sk_see to compute a signature 'sig'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned int lengths[SPX_WOTS_LEN];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ chain_lengths(lengths, msg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ wots_gen_sk(sig + i * SPX_N, sk_seed, addr);
+ gen_chain(sig + i * SPX_N, sig + i * SPX_N, 0, lengths[i], pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature and an n-byte message, computes a WOTS public key.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned int lengths[SPX_WOTS_LEN];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ chain_lengths(lengths, msg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ gen_chain(pk + i * SPX_N, sig + i * SPX_N,
+ lengths[i], SPX_WOTS_W - 1 - lengths[i], pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/wots.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/wots.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6a5e27f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-robust/clean/wots.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#ifndef SPX_WOTS_H
+#define SPX_WOTS_H
+
+#include "params.h"
+#include
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32 byte seed for the private key, expands it to
+ * a full WOTS private key and computes the corresponding public key.
+ * It requires the seed pub_seed (used to generate bitmasks and hash keys)
+ * and the address of this WOTS key pair.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a n-byte message and the 32-byte seed for the private key to compute a
+ * signature that is placed at 'sig'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature and an n-byte message, computes a WOTS public key.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/META.yml b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/META.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2e4b98ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/META.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+name: SPHINCS+
+type: signature
+claimed-nist-level: 3
+length-public-key: 48
+length-signature: 35664
+testvectors-sha256: e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855
+principal-submitter: Andreas Hülsing
+auxiliary-submitters:
+ - Jean-Philippe Aumasson
+ - Daniel J. Bernstein,
+ - Christoph Dobraunig
+ - Maria Eichlseder
+ - Scott Fluhrer
+ - Stefan-Lukas Gazdag
+ - Panos Kampanakis
+ - Stefan Kölbl
+ - Tanja Lange
+ - Martin M. Lauridsen
+ - Florian Mendel
+ - Ruben Niederhagen
+ - Christian Rechberger
+ - Joost Rijneveld
+ - Peter Schwabe
+implementations:
+ - name: clean
+ version: https://github.com/sphincs/sphincsplus/commit/492ec4f1f6d3b3dc4b435783bbaaf4e41cdb6f32
+ length-secret-key: 96
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/LICENSE b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/LICENSE
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..670154e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/LICENSE
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+CC0 1.0 Universal
+
+Statement of Purpose
+
+The laws of most jurisdictions throughout the world automatically confer
+exclusive Copyright and Related Rights (defined below) upon the creator and
+subsequent owner(s) (each and all, an "owner") of an original work of
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+
+Certain owners wish to permanently relinquish those rights to a Work for the
+purpose of contributing to a commons of creative, cultural and scientific
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+and redistribute as freely as possible in any form whatsoever and for any
+purposes, including without limitation commercial purposes. These owners may
+contribute to the Commons to promote the ideal of a free culture and the
+further production of creative, cultural and scientific works, or to gain
+reputation or greater distribution for their Work in part through the use and
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+
+For these and/or other purposes and motivations, and without any expectation
+of additional consideration or compensation, the person associating CC0 with a
+Work (the "Affirmer"), to the extent that he or she is an owner of Copyright
+and Related Rights in the Work, voluntarily elects to apply CC0 to the Work
+and publicly distribute the Work under its terms, with knowledge of his or her
+Copyright and Related Rights in the Work and the meaning and intended legal
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+
+1. Copyright and Related Rights. A Work made available under CC0 may be
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+to, the following:
+
+ i. the right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, display, communicate,
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+ ii. moral rights retained by the original author(s) and/or performer(s);
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+
+ vii. other similar, equivalent or corresponding rights throughout the world
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+
+2. Waiver. To the greatest extent permitted by, but not in contravention of,
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+3. Public License Fallback. Should any part of the Waiver for any reason be
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+purpose whatsoever, including without limitation commercial, advertising or
+promotional purposes (the "License"). The License shall be deemed effective as
+of the date CC0 was applied by Affirmer to the Work. Should any part of the
+License for any reason be judged legally invalid or ineffective under
+applicable law, such partial invalidity or ineffectiveness shall not
+invalidate the remainder of the License, and in such case Affirmer hereby
+affirms that he or she will not (i) exercise any of his or her remaining
+Copyright and Related Rights in the Work or (ii) assert any associated claims
+and causes of action with respect to the Work, in either case contrary to
+Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+4. Limitations and Disclaimers.
+
+ a. No trademark or patent rights held by Affirmer are waived, abandoned,
+ surrendered, licensed or otherwise affected by this document.
+
+ b. Affirmer offers the Work as-is and makes no representations or warranties
+ of any kind concerning the Work, express, implied, statutory or otherwise,
+ including without limitation warranties of title, merchantability, fitness
+ for a particular purpose, non infringement, or the absence of latent or
+ other defects, accuracy, or the present or absence of errors, whether or not
+ discoverable, all to the greatest extent permissible under applicable law.
+
+ c. Affirmer disclaims responsibility for clearing rights of other persons
+ that may apply to the Work or any use thereof, including without limitation
+ any person's Copyright and Related Rights in the Work. Further, Affirmer
+ disclaims responsibility for obtaining any necessary consents, permissions
+ or other rights required for any use of the Work.
+
+ d. Affirmer understands and acknowledges that Creative Commons is not a
+ party to this document and has no duty or obligation with respect to this
+ CC0 or use of the Work.
+
+For more information, please see
+
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/Makefile b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1e2c792f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with GNU Make or BSD Make
+
+LIB=libsphincs-haraka-192f-simple_clean.a
+
+HEADERS = params.h address.h wots.h utils.h fors.h api.h hash.h thash.h haraka.h
+OBJECTS = address.o wots.o utils.o fors.o sign.o hash_haraka.o thash_haraka_simple.o haraka.o
+
+CFLAGS=-Wall -Wconversion -Wextra -Wpedantic -Werror -Wmissing-prototypes -std=c99 -I../../../common $(EXTRAFLAGS)
+
+all: $(LIB)
+
+%.o: %.c $(HEADERS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
+
+$(LIB): $(OBJECTS)
+ $(AR) -r $@ $(OBJECTS)
+
+clean:
+ $(RM) $(OBJECTS)
+ $(RM) $(LIB)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..41441823
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with Microsoft Visual Studio's nmake using the command:
+# nmake /f Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
+
+LIBRARY=libsphincs-haraka-192f-simple_clean.lib
+OBJECTS=address.obj wots.obj utils.obj fors.obj sign.obj hash_haraka.obj thash_haraka_simple.obj haraka.obj
+
+CFLAGS=/nologo /I ..\..\..\common /W4 /WX
+
+all: $(LIBRARY)
+
+# Make sure objects are recompiled if headers change.
+$(OBJECTS): *.h
+
+$(LIBRARY): $(OBJECTS)
+ LIB.EXE /NOLOGO /WX /OUT:$@ $**
+
+clean:
+ -DEL $(OBJECTS)
+ -DEL $(LIBRARY)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/address.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/address.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cdee97b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/address.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ bytes + i * 4, 4, addr[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer) {
+ addr[0] = layer;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree) {
+ addr[1] = 0;
+ addr[2] = (uint32_t) (tree >> 32);
+ addr[3] = (uint32_t) tree;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type) {
+ addr[4] = type;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for OTS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair) {
+ addr[5] = keypair;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+ out[5] = in[5];
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain) {
+ addr[6] = chain;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash) {
+ addr[7] = hash;
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height) {
+ addr[6] = tree_height;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index) {
+ addr[7] = tree_index;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/address.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/address.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c9122690
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/address.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+#ifndef SPX_ADDRESS_H
+#define SPX_ADDRESS_H
+
+#include
+
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS 0
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK 1
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE 2
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE 3
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK 4
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type);
+
+/* Copies the layer and tree part of one address into the other */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for WOTS and FORS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/api.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/api.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..584aaf05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/api.h
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#ifndef PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_API_H
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_API_H
+
+#include
+#include
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_ALGNAME "SPHINCS+"
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES 64
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES 32
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES 16976
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES 48
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair given a seed.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/fors.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/fors.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8ed93917
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/fors.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+static void fors_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ sk, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_sk_to_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ leaf, sk, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* Only copy the parts that must be kept in fors_leaf_addr. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_leaf_addr, fors_tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_leaf_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_leaf_addr, addr_idx);
+
+ fors_gen_sk(leaf, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, leaf, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Interprets m as SPX_FORS_HEIGHT-bit unsigned integers.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ * Assumes indices has space for SPX_FORS_TREES integers.
+ */
+static void message_to_indices(uint32_t *indices, const unsigned char *m) {
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ indices[i] = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < SPX_FORS_HEIGHT; j++) {
+ indices[i] ^= (((uint32_t)m[offset >> 3] >> (offset & 0x7)) & 0x1) << j;
+ offset++;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Include the secret key part that produces the selected leaf node. */
+ fors_gen_sk(sig, sk_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for this leaf node. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ indices[i], idx_offset, fors_gen_leaf, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Derive the leaf from the included secret key part. */
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, sig, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Derive the corresponding root node of this tree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, leaf, indices[i], idx_offset, sig,
+ SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/fors.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/fors.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3270a129
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/fors.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_FORS_H
+#define SPX_FORS_H
+
+#include
+
+#include "params.h"
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c0397350
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+/*
+Plain C implementation of the Haraka256 and Haraka512 permutations.
+*/
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+#define HARAKAS_RATE 32
+
+static const unsigned char haraka_rc[40][16] = {
+ {0x9d, 0x7b, 0x81, 0x75, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xc5, 0xb2, 0x0a, 0xc0, 0x20, 0xe6, 0x4c, 0x70, 0x84, 0x06},
+ {0x17, 0xf7, 0x08, 0x2f, 0xa4, 0x6b, 0x0f, 0x64, 0x6b, 0xa0, 0xf3, 0x88, 0xe1, 0xb4, 0x66, 0x8b},
+ {0x14, 0x91, 0x02, 0x9f, 0x60, 0x9d, 0x02, 0xcf, 0x98, 0x84, 0xf2, 0x53, 0x2d, 0xde, 0x02, 0x34},
+ {0x79, 0x4f, 0x5b, 0xfd, 0xaf, 0xbc, 0xf3, 0xbb, 0x08, 0x4f, 0x7b, 0x2e, 0xe6, 0xea, 0xd6, 0x0e},
+ {0x44, 0x70, 0x39, 0xbe, 0x1c, 0xcd, 0xee, 0x79, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x72, 0x48, 0xcb, 0xb0, 0xcf, 0xcb},
+ {0x7b, 0x05, 0x8a, 0x2b, 0xed, 0x35, 0x53, 0x8d, 0xb7, 0x32, 0x90, 0x6e, 0xee, 0xcd, 0xea, 0x7e},
+ {0x1b, 0xef, 0x4f, 0xda, 0x61, 0x27, 0x41, 0xe2, 0xd0, 0x7c, 0x2e, 0x5e, 0x43, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x67},
+ {0x3b, 0x0b, 0xc7, 0x1f, 0xe2, 0xfd, 0x5f, 0x67, 0x07, 0xcc, 0xca, 0xaf, 0xb0, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x29},
+ {0xee, 0x65, 0xd4, 0xb9, 0xca, 0x8f, 0xdb, 0xec, 0xe9, 0x7f, 0x86, 0xe6, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x4d, 0xab},
+ {0x33, 0x7e, 0x03, 0xad, 0x4f, 0x40, 0x2a, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xcd, 0xb7, 0xd4, 0x84, 0xbf, 0x30, 0x1c},
+ {0x00, 0x98, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x2e, 0x8b, 0x02, 0x69, 0xbf, 0x23, 0x17, 0x94, 0xb9, 0x0b, 0xcc, 0xb2},
+ {0x8a, 0x2d, 0x9d, 0x5c, 0xc8, 0x9e, 0xaa, 0x4a, 0x72, 0x55, 0x6f, 0xde, 0xa6, 0x78, 0x04, 0xfa},
+ {0xd4, 0x9f, 0x12, 0x29, 0x2e, 0x4f, 0xfa, 0x0e, 0x12, 0x2a, 0x77, 0x6b, 0x2b, 0x9f, 0xb4, 0xdf},
+ {0xee, 0x12, 0x6a, 0xbb, 0xae, 0x11, 0xd6, 0x32, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x49, 0xf4, 0x44, 0x03, 0xa1, 0x1e},
+ {0xa6, 0xec, 0xa8, 0x9c, 0xc9, 0x00, 0x96, 0x5f, 0x84, 0x00, 0x05, 0x4b, 0x88, 0x49, 0x04, 0xaf},
+ {0xec, 0x93, 0xe5, 0x27, 0xe3, 0xc7, 0xa2, 0x78, 0x4f, 0x9c, 0x19, 0x9d, 0xd8, 0x5e, 0x02, 0x21},
+ {0x73, 0x01, 0xd4, 0x82, 0xcd, 0x2e, 0x28, 0xb9, 0xb7, 0xc9, 0x59, 0xa7, 0xf8, 0xaa, 0x3a, 0xbf},
+ {0x6b, 0x7d, 0x30, 0x10, 0xd9, 0xef, 0xf2, 0x37, 0x17, 0xb0, 0x86, 0x61, 0x0d, 0x70, 0x60, 0x62},
+ {0xc6, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0xf6, 0x53, 0x91, 0xc2, 0x81, 0x43, 0x04, 0x30, 0x21, 0xc2, 0x45, 0xca, 0x5a},
+ {0x3a, 0x94, 0xd1, 0x36, 0xe8, 0x92, 0xaf, 0x2c, 0xbb, 0x68, 0x6b, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x97, 0x23, 0x92},
+ {0xb4, 0x71, 0x10, 0xe5, 0x58, 0xb9, 0xba, 0x6c, 0xeb, 0x86, 0x58, 0x22, 0x38, 0x92, 0xbf, 0xd3},
+ {0x8d, 0x12, 0xe1, 0x24, 0xdd, 0xfd, 0x3d, 0x93, 0x77, 0xc6, 0xf0, 0xae, 0xe5, 0x3c, 0x86, 0xdb},
+ {0xb1, 0x12, 0x22, 0xcb, 0xe3, 0x8d, 0xe4, 0x83, 0x9c, 0xa0, 0xeb, 0xff, 0x68, 0x62, 0x60, 0xbb},
+ {0x7d, 0xf7, 0x2b, 0xc7, 0x4e, 0x1a, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0x9c, 0xd1, 0xe4, 0xe2, 0xdc, 0xd3, 0x4b, 0x73},
+ {0x4e, 0x92, 0xb3, 0x2c, 0xc4, 0x15, 0x14, 0x4b, 0x43, 0x1b, 0x30, 0x61, 0xc3, 0x47, 0xbb, 0x43},
+ {0x99, 0x68, 0xeb, 0x16, 0xdd, 0x31, 0xb2, 0x03, 0xf6, 0xef, 0x07, 0xe7, 0xa8, 0x75, 0xa7, 0xdb},
+ {0x2c, 0x47, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x23, 0x5e, 0x8e, 0x77, 0x59, 0x75, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x61, 0xf3, 0x6d},
+ {0xf9, 0x17, 0x86, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xe5, 0x1b, 0x6d, 0x77, 0x7d, 0xde, 0xd6, 0x17, 0x5a, 0xa7, 0xcd},
+ {0x5d, 0xee, 0x46, 0xa9, 0x9d, 0x06, 0x6c, 0x9d, 0xaa, 0xe9, 0xa8, 0x6b, 0xf0, 0x43, 0x6b, 0xec},
+ {0xc1, 0x27, 0xf3, 0x3b, 0x59, 0x11, 0x53, 0xa2, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x57, 0xf9, 0x50, 0x69, 0x1e, 0xcb},
+ {0xd9, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x60, 0x53, 0x03, 0xed, 0xe4, 0x9c, 0x61, 0xda, 0x00, 0x75, 0x0c, 0xee, 0x2c},
+ {0x50, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0x63, 0xbc, 0xba, 0xbb, 0x80, 0xab, 0x0c, 0xe9, 0x96, 0xa1, 0xa5, 0xb1, 0xf0},
+ {0x39, 0xca, 0x8d, 0x93, 0x30, 0xde, 0x0d, 0xab, 0x88, 0x29, 0x96, 0x5e, 0x02, 0xb1, 0x3d, 0xae},
+ {0x42, 0xb4, 0x75, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf3, 0x14, 0x88, 0x0b, 0xa4, 0x54, 0xd5, 0x38, 0x8f, 0xbb, 0x17},
+ {0xf6, 0x16, 0x0a, 0x36, 0x79, 0xb7, 0xb6, 0xae, 0xd7, 0x7f, 0x42, 0x5f, 0x5b, 0x8a, 0xbb, 0x34},
+ {0xde, 0xaf, 0xba, 0xff, 0x18, 0x59, 0xce, 0x43, 0x38, 0x54, 0xe5, 0xcb, 0x41, 0x52, 0xf6, 0x26},
+ {0x78, 0xc9, 0x9e, 0x83, 0xf7, 0x9c, 0xca, 0xa2, 0x6a, 0x02, 0xf3, 0xb9, 0x54, 0x9a, 0xe9, 0x4c},
+ {0x35, 0x12, 0x90, 0x22, 0x28, 0x6e, 0xc0, 0x40, 0xbe, 0xf7, 0xdf, 0x1b, 0x1a, 0xa5, 0x51, 0xae},
+ {0xcf, 0x59, 0xa6, 0x48, 0x0f, 0xbc, 0x73, 0xc1, 0x2b, 0xd2, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x61, 0xc1, 0xa0},
+ {0xa1, 0x9d, 0xc5, 0xe9, 0xfd, 0xbd, 0xd6, 0x4a, 0x88, 0x82, 0x28, 0x02, 0x03, 0xcc, 0x6a, 0x75}
+};
+
+static unsigned char rc[40][16];
+static unsigned char rc_sseed[40][16];
+
+static const unsigned char sbox[256] = {
+ 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe,
+ 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4,
+ 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7,
+ 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15, 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3,
+ 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x09,
+ 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3,
+ 0x2f, 0x84, 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe,
+ 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85,
+ 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8, 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92,
+ 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x0c,
+ 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19,
+ 0x73, 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14,
+ 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2,
+ 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79, 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5,
+ 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08, 0xba, 0x78, 0x25,
+ 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a,
+ 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86,
+ 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e,
+ 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42,
+ 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
+};
+
+#define XT(x) (((x) << 1) ^ ((((x) >> 7) & 1) * 0x1b))
+
+// Simulate _mm_aesenc_si128 instructions from AESNI
+static void aesenc(unsigned char *s, const unsigned char *rk) {
+ uint8_t i, t, u, v[4][4];
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ v[((i / 4) + 4 - (i % 4) ) % 4][i % 4] = sbox[s[i]];
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+ t = v[i][0];
+ u = v[i][0] ^ v[i][1] ^ v[i][2] ^ v[i][3];
+ v[i][0] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][0] ^ v[i][1]));
+ v[i][1] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][1] ^ v[i][2]));
+ v[i][2] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][2] ^ v[i][3]));
+ v[i][3] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][3] ^ t));
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ s[i] = v[i / 4][i % 4] ^ rk[i];
+ }
+}
+
+// Simulate _mm_unpacklo_epi32
+static void unpacklo32(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ memcpy(tmp, a, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 4, b, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 8, a + 4, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 12, b + 4, 4);
+ memcpy(t, tmp, 16);
+}
+
+// Simulate _mm_unpackhi_epi32
+static void unpackhi32(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ memcpy(tmp, a + 8, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 4, b + 8, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 8, a + 12, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 12, b + 12, 4);
+ memcpy(t, tmp, 16);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_tweak_constants(
+ const unsigned char *pk_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ unsigned long long seed_length) {
+ unsigned char buf[40 * 16];
+
+ /* Use the standard constants to generate tweaked ones. */
+ memcpy(rc, haraka_rc, 40 * 16);
+
+ /* Constants for sk.seed */
+ if (sk_seed != NULL) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(buf, 40 * 16, sk_seed, seed_length);
+ memcpy(rc_sseed, buf, 40 * 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Constants for pk.seed */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(buf, 40 * 16, pk_seed, seed_length);
+ memcpy(rc, buf, 40 * 16);
+}
+
+static void haraka_S_absorb(unsigned char *s, unsigned int r,
+ const unsigned char *m, unsigned long long mlen,
+ unsigned char p) {
+ unsigned long long i;
+ unsigned char t[r];
+
+ while (mlen >= r) {
+ // XOR block to state
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ s[i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s, s);
+ mlen -= r;
+ m += r;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ t[i] = 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; ++i) {
+ t[i] = m[i];
+ }
+ t[i] = p;
+ t[r - 1] |= 128;
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ s[i] ^= t[i];
+ }
+}
+
+static void haraka_S_squeezeblocks(unsigned char *h, unsigned long long nblocks,
+ unsigned char *s, unsigned int r) {
+ while (nblocks > 0) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s, s);
+ memcpy(h, s, HARAKAS_RATE);
+ h += r;
+ nblocks--;
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ s_inc[i] = 0;
+ }
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(uint8_t *s_inc, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Recall that s_inc[64] is the non-absorbed bytes xored into the state */
+ while (mlen + s_inc[64] >= HARAKAS_RATE) {
+ for (i = 0; i < (size_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64]); i++) {
+ /* Take the i'th byte from message
+ xor with the s_inc[64] + i'th byte of the state */
+ s_inc[s_inc[64] + i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ mlen -= (size_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64]);
+ m += HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64];
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s_inc, s_inc);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; i++) {
+ s_inc[s_inc[64] + i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(mlen + s_inc[64]);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ /* After haraka_S_inc_absorb, we are guaranteed that s_inc[64] < HARAKAS_RATE,
+ so we can always use one more byte for p in the current state. */
+ s_inc[s_inc[64]] ^= 0x1F;
+ s_inc[HARAKAS_RATE - 1] ^= 128;
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ uint8_t i;
+
+ /* First consume any bytes we still have sitting around */
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen && i < s_inc[64]; i++) {
+ /* There are s_inc[64] bytes left, so r - s_inc[64] is the first
+ available byte. We consume from there, i.e., up to r. */
+ out[i] = s_inc[(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64] + i)];
+ }
+ out += i;
+ outlen -= i;
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(s_inc[64] - i);
+
+ /* Then squeeze the remaining necessary blocks */
+ while (outlen > 0) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s_inc, s_inc);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen && i < HARAKAS_RATE; i++) {
+ out[i] = s_inc[i];
+ }
+ out += i;
+ outlen -= i;
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - i);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned long long outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen) {
+ unsigned long long i;
+ unsigned char s[64];
+ unsigned char d[32];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ s[i] = 0;
+ }
+ haraka_S_absorb(s, 32, in, inlen, 0x1F);
+
+ haraka_S_squeezeblocks(out, outlen / 32, s, 32);
+ out += (outlen / 32) * 32;
+
+ if (outlen % 32) {
+ haraka_S_squeezeblocks(d, 1, s, 32);
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen % 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = d[i];
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[64], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 32, in + 32, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 48, in + 48, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 1]);
+ aesenc(s + 32, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 2]);
+ aesenc(s + 48, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 3]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s, s, s + 16);
+ unpacklo32(s + 16, s + 32, s + 48);
+ unpackhi32(s + 32, s + 32, s + 48);
+ unpacklo32(s + 48, s, s + 32);
+ unpackhi32(s, s, s + 32);
+ unpackhi32(s + 32, s + 16, tmp);
+ unpacklo32(s + 16, s + 16, tmp);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(out, s, 64);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i;
+
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(buf, in);
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ buf[i] = buf[i] ^ in[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Truncated */
+ memcpy(out, buf + 8, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 8, buf + 24, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 16, buf + 32, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 24, buf + 48, 8);
+}
+
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[32], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j + 1]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s + 16, s, s + 16);
+ memcpy(s, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ s[i];
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[32], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc_sseed[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc_sseed[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j + 1]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s + 16, s, s + 16);
+ memcpy(s, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ s[i];
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/haraka.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/haraka.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ff547019
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/haraka.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_HARAKA_H
+#define SPX_HARAKA_H
+
+/* Tweak constants with seed */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_tweak_constants(
+ const unsigned char *pk_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ unsigned long long seed_length);
+
+/* Haraka Sponge */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(uint8_t *s_inc, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned long long outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen);
+
+/* Applies the 512-bit Haraka permutation to in. */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-512 */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-256 */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-256 using sk.seed constants */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/hash.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/hash.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f1d4a167
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/hash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifndef SPX_HASH_H
+#define SPX_HASH_H
+
+#include
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf, const unsigned char *optrand,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ unsigned char *digest, uint64_t *tree, uint32_t *leaf_idx,
+ const unsigned char *R, const unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/hash_haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/hash_haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5f1c9cde
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/hash_haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_tweak_constants(pub_seed, sk_seed, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes PRF(key, addr), given a secret key of SPX_N bytes and an address
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES];
+ /* Since SPX_N may be smaller than 32, we need a temporary buffer. */
+ unsigned char outbuf[32];
+
+ (void)key; /* Suppress an 'unused parameter' warning. */
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf, addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(outbuf, buf);
+ memcpy(out, outbuf, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the message-dependent randomness R, using a secret seed and an
+ * optional randomization value as well as the message.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf, const unsigned char *optrand,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) {
+ uint8_t s_inc[65];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, sk_prf, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, optrand, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, m, mlen);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(R, SPX_N, s_inc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the message hash using R, the public key, and the message.
+ * Outputs the message digest and the index of the leaf. The index is split in
+ * the tree index and the leaf index, for convenient copying to an address.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ unsigned char *digest, uint64_t *tree, uint32_t *leaf_idx,
+ const unsigned char *R, const unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) {
+#define SPX_TREE_BITS (SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * (SPX_D - 1))
+#define SPX_TREE_BYTES ((SPX_TREE_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_LEAF_BITS SPX_TREE_HEIGHT
+#define SPX_LEAF_BYTES ((SPX_LEAF_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_DGST_BYTES (SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES + SPX_TREE_BYTES + SPX_LEAF_BYTES)
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_DGST_BYTES];
+ unsigned char *bufp = buf;
+ uint8_t s_inc[65];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, R, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, pk, SPX_PK_BYTES);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, m, mlen);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(buf, SPX_DGST_BYTES, s_inc);
+
+ memcpy(digest, bufp, SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES);
+ bufp += SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES;
+
+ *tree = PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(bufp, SPX_TREE_BYTES);
+ *tree &= (~(uint64_t)0) >> (64 - SPX_TREE_BITS);
+ bufp += SPX_TREE_BYTES;
+
+ *leaf_idx = (uint32_t)PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ bufp, SPX_LEAF_BYTES);
+ *leaf_idx &= (~(uint32_t)0) >> (32 - SPX_LEAF_BITS);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/params.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/params.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..898f177f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/params.h
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#ifndef SPX_PARAMS_H
+#define SPX_PARAMS_H
+
+/* Hash output length in bytes. */
+#define SPX_N 24
+/* Height of the hypertree. */
+#define SPX_FULL_HEIGHT 66
+/* Number of subtree layer. */
+#define SPX_D 22
+/* FORS tree dimensions. */
+#define SPX_FORS_HEIGHT 8
+#define SPX_FORS_TREES 33
+/* Winternitz parameter, */
+#define SPX_WOTS_W 16
+
+/* The hash function is defined by linking a different hash.c file, as opposed
+ to setting a #define constant. */
+
+/* For clarity */
+#define SPX_ADDR_BYTES 32
+
+/* WOTS parameters. */
+#define SPX_WOTS_LOGW 4
+
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN1 (8 * SPX_N / SPX_WOTS_LOGW)
+
+/* SPX_WOTS_LEN2 is floor(log(len_1 * (w - 1)) / log(w)) + 1; we precompute */
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN2 3
+
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN (SPX_WOTS_LEN1 + SPX_WOTS_LEN2)
+#define SPX_WOTS_BYTES (SPX_WOTS_LEN * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_WOTS_PK_BYTES SPX_WOTS_BYTES
+
+/* Subtree size. */
+#define SPX_TREE_HEIGHT (SPX_FULL_HEIGHT / SPX_D)
+
+/* FORS parameters. */
+#define SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES ((SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_FORS_BYTES ((SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1) * SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_FORS_PK_BYTES SPX_N
+
+/* Resulting SPX sizes. */
+#define SPX_BYTES (SPX_N + SPX_FORS_BYTES + SPX_D * SPX_WOTS_BYTES +\
+ SPX_FULL_HEIGHT * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_PK_BYTES (2 * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_SK_BYTES (2 * SPX_N + SPX_PK_BYTES)
+
+/* Optionally, signing can be made non-deterministic using optrand.
+ This can help counter side-channel attacks that would benefit from
+ getting a large number of traces when the signer uses the same nodes. */
+#define SPX_OPTRAND_BYTES 32
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/sign.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8c8bfaaf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "api.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "randombytes.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "wots.h"
+
+/**
+ * Computes the leaf at a given address. First generates the WOTS key pair,
+ * then computes leaf by hashing horizontally.
+ */
+static void wots_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+ unsigned char pk[SPX_WOTS_BYTES];
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t wots_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, addr_idx);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ pk, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ wots_pk_addr, wots_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ leaf, pk, pub_seed, wots_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates an SPX key pair given a seed of length
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [PUB_SEED || root]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed) {
+ /* We do not need the auth path in key generation, but it simplifies the
+ code to have just one treehash routine that computes both root and path
+ in one function. */
+ unsigned char auth_path[SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t top_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ top_tree_addr, SPX_D - 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ top_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+
+ /* Initialize SK_SEED, SK_PRF and PUB_SEED from seed. */
+ memcpy(sk, seed, PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES);
+
+ memcpy(pk, sk + 2 * SPX_N, SPX_N);
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(pk, sk);
+
+ /* Compute root node of the top-most subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ sk + 3 * SPX_N, auth_path, sk, sk + 2 * SPX_N, 0, 0,
+ wots_gen_leaf, top_tree_addr);
+
+ memcpy(pk + SPX_N, sk + 3 * SPX_N, SPX_N);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates an SPX key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [PUB_SEED || root]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
+ unsigned char seed[PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES];
+ randombytes(seed, PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ pk, sk, seed);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed = sk;
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf = sk + SPX_N;
+ const unsigned char *pk = sk + 2 * SPX_N;
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed = pk;
+
+ unsigned char optrand[SPX_N];
+ unsigned char mhash[SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+ unsigned char root[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t i;
+ uint64_t tree;
+ uint32_t idx_leaf;
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ pub_seed, sk_seed);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+
+ /* Optionally, signing can be made non-deterministic using optrand.
+ This can help counter side-channel attacks that would benefit from
+ getting a large number of traces when the signer uses the same nodes. */
+ randombytes(optrand, SPX_N);
+ /* Compute the digest randomization value. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ sig, sk_prf, optrand, m, mlen);
+
+ /* Derive the message digest and leaf index from R, PK and M. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ mhash, &tree, &idx_leaf, sig, pk, m, mlen);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(wots_addr, tree);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ /* Sign the message hash using FORS. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ sig, root, mhash, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_FORS_BYTES;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_D; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(tree_addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(tree_addr, tree);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ /* Compute a WOTS signature. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ sig, root, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_WOTS_BYTES;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for the used WOTS leaf. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ root, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed, idx_leaf, 0,
+ wots_gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N;
+
+ /* Update the indices for the next layer. */
+ idx_leaf = (tree & ((1 << SPX_TREE_HEIGHT) - 1));
+ tree = tree >> SPX_TREE_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ *siglen = SPX_BYTES;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed = pk;
+ const unsigned char *pub_root = pk + SPX_N;
+ unsigned char mhash[SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+ unsigned char wots_pk[SPX_WOTS_BYTES];
+ unsigned char root[SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ unsigned int i;
+ uint64_t tree;
+ uint32_t idx_leaf;
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t wots_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ if (siglen != SPX_BYTES) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ pub_seed, NULL);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK);
+
+ /* Derive the message digest and leaf index from R || PK || M. */
+ /* The additional SPX_N is a result of the hash domain separator. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ mhash, &tree, &idx_leaf, sig, pk, m, mlen);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Layer correctly defaults to 0, so no need to set_layer_addr */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(wots_addr, tree);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ root, sig, mhash, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_FORS_BYTES;
+
+ /* For each subtree.. */
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_D; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(tree_addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(tree_addr, tree);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ wots_pk_addr, wots_addr);
+
+ /* The WOTS public key is only correct if the signature was correct. */
+ /* Initially, root is the FORS pk, but on subsequent iterations it is
+ the root of the subtree below the currently processed subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ wots_pk, sig, root, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_WOTS_BYTES;
+
+ /* Compute the leaf node using the WOTS public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ leaf, wots_pk, pub_seed, wots_pk_addr);
+
+ /* Compute the root node of this subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ root, leaf, idx_leaf, 0, sig, SPX_TREE_HEIGHT,
+ pub_seed, tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N;
+
+ /* Update the indices for the next layer. */
+ idx_leaf = (tree & ((1 << SPX_TREE_HEIGHT) - 1));
+ tree = tree >> SPX_TREE_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the root node equals the root node in the public key. */
+ if (memcmp(root, pub_root, SPX_N) != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
+ size_t siglen;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ sm, &siglen, m, mlen, sk);
+
+ memmove(sm + SPX_BYTES, m, mlen);
+ *smlen = siglen + mlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
+ /* The API caller does not necessarily know what size a signature should be
+ but SPHINCS+ signatures are always exactly SPX_BYTES. */
+ if (smlen < SPX_BYTES) {
+ memset(m, 0, smlen);
+ *mlen = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *mlen = smlen - SPX_BYTES;
+
+ if (PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ sm, SPX_BYTES, sm + SPX_BYTES, *mlen, pk)) {
+ memset(m, 0, smlen);
+ *mlen = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* If verification was successful, move the message to the right place. */
+ memmove(m, sm + SPX_BYTES, *mlen);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/thash.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/thash.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5ee99ebb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/thash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifndef SPX_THASH_H
+#define SPX_THASH_H
+
+#include
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/thash_haraka_simple.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/thash_haraka_simple.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3fc723df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/thash_haraka_simple.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+/**
+ * Takes an array of inblocks concatenated arrays of SPX_N bytes.
+ */
+static void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inblocks,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char outbuf[32];
+ unsigned char buf_tmp[64];
+
+ (void)pub_seed; /* Suppress an 'unused parameter' warning. */
+
+ if (inblocks == 1) {
+ /* F function */
+ /* Since SPX_N may be smaller than 32, we need a temporary buffer. */
+ memset(buf_tmp, 0, 64);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf_tmp, addr);
+ memcpy(buf_tmp + SPX_ADDR_BYTES, in, SPX_N);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512(outbuf, buf_tmp);
+ memcpy(out, outbuf, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ /* All other tweakable hashes*/
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf, addr);
+ memcpy(buf + SPX_ADDR_BYTES, in, inblocks * SPX_N);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ out, SPX_N, buf, SPX_ADDR_BYTES + inblocks * SPX_N);
+ }
+}
+
+/* The wrappers below ensure that we use fixed-size buffers on the stack */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + 1 * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, 1, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + 2 * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, 2, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + SPX_WOTS_LEN * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, SPX_WOTS_LEN, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, SPX_FORS_TREES, pub_seed, addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/utils.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1b40945d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+/**
+ * Converts the value of 'in' to 'outlen' bytes in big-endian byte order.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned long long in) {
+
+ /* Iterate over out in decreasing order, for big-endianness. */
+ for (size_t i = outlen; i > 0; i--) {
+ out[i - 1] = in & 0xff;
+ in = in >> 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Converts the inlen bytes in 'in' from big-endian byte order to an integer.
+ */
+unsigned long long PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) {
+ unsigned long long retval = 0;
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < inlen; i++) {
+ retval |= ((unsigned long long)in[i]) << (8 * (inlen - 1 - i));
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an auth path.
+ * Expects address to be complete other than the tree_height and tree_index.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ const unsigned char *auth_path, uint32_t tree_height,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+ unsigned char buffer[2 * SPX_N];
+
+ /* If leaf_idx is odd (last bit = 1), current path element is a right child
+ and auth_path has to go left. Otherwise it is the other way around. */
+ if (leaf_idx & 1) {
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, leaf, SPX_N);
+ memcpy(buffer, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(buffer, leaf, SPX_N);
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ }
+ auth_path += SPX_N;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tree_height - 1; i++) {
+ leaf_idx >>= 1;
+ idx_offset >>= 1;
+ /* Set the address of the node we're creating. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(addr, i + 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ addr, leaf_idx + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Pick the right or left neighbor, depending on parity of the node. */
+ if (leaf_idx & 1) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ buffer + SPX_N, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+ memcpy(buffer, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ buffer, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ }
+ auth_path += SPX_N;
+ }
+
+ /* The last iteration is exceptional; we do not copy an auth_path node. */
+ leaf_idx >>= 1;
+ idx_offset >>= 1;
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(addr, tree_height);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ addr, leaf_idx + idx_offset);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ root, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * For a given leaf index, computes the authentication path and the resulting
+ * root node using Merkle's TreeHash algorithm.
+ * Expects the layer and tree parts of the tree_addr to be set, as well as the
+ * tree type (i.e. SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE or SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE).
+ * Applies the offset idx_offset to indices before building addresses, so that
+ * it is possible to continue counting indices across trees.
+ */
+static void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ unsigned char *stack, unsigned int *heights,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset, uint32_t tree_height,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+ uint32_t idx;
+ uint32_t tree_idx;
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < (uint32_t)(1 << tree_height); idx++) {
+ /* Add the next leaf node to the stack. */
+ gen_leaf(stack + offset * SPX_N,
+ sk_seed, pub_seed, idx + idx_offset, tree_addr);
+ offset++;
+ heights[offset - 1] = 0;
+
+ /* If this is a node we need for the auth path.. */
+ if ((leaf_idx ^ 0x1) == idx) {
+ memcpy(auth_path, stack + (offset - 1)*SPX_N, SPX_N);
+ }
+
+ /* While the top-most nodes are of equal height.. */
+ while (offset >= 2 && heights[offset - 1] == heights[offset - 2]) {
+ /* Compute index of the new node, in the next layer. */
+ tree_idx = (idx >> (heights[offset - 1] + 1));
+
+ /* Set the address of the node we're creating. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ tree_addr, heights[offset - 1] + 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ tree_addr, tree_idx + (idx_offset >> (heights[offset - 1] + 1)));
+ /* Hash the top-most nodes from the stack together. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ stack + (offset - 2)*SPX_N, stack + (offset - 2)*SPX_N,
+ pub_seed, tree_addr);
+ offset--;
+ /* Note that the top-most node is now one layer higher. */
+ heights[offset - 1]++;
+
+ /* If this is a node we need for the auth path.. */
+ if (((leaf_idx >> heights[offset - 1]) ^ 0x1) == tree_idx) {
+ memcpy(auth_path + heights[offset - 1]*SPX_N,
+ stack + (offset - 1)*SPX_N, SPX_N);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(root, stack, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/* The wrappers below ensure that we use fixed-size buffers on the stack */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char stack[(SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1)*SPX_N];
+ unsigned int heights[SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash(
+ root, auth_path, stack, heights, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ leaf_idx, idx_offset, SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char stack[(SPX_TREE_HEIGHT + 1)*SPX_N];
+ unsigned int heights[SPX_TREE_HEIGHT + 1];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash(
+ root, auth_path, stack, heights, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ leaf_idx, idx_offset, SPX_TREE_HEIGHT, gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/utils.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/utils.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..246968cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/utils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+#ifndef SPX_UTILS_H
+#define SPX_UTILS_H
+
+#include "params.h"
+#include
+#include
+
+/**
+ * Converts the value of 'in' to 'outlen' bytes in big-endian byte order.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned long long in);
+
+/**
+ * Converts the inlen bytes in 'in' from big-endian byte order to an integer.
+ */
+unsigned long long PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an auth path.
+ * Expects address to be complete other than the tree_height and tree_index.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ const unsigned char *auth_path, uint32_t tree_height,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * For a given leaf index, computes the authentication path and the resulting
+ * root node using Merkle's TreeHash algorithm.
+ * Expects the layer and tree parts of the tree_addr to be set, as well as the
+ * tree type (i.e. SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE or SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE).
+ * Applies the offset idx_offset to indices before building addresses, so that
+ * it is possible to continue counting indices across trees.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/wots.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/wots.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..269d9fb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/wots.c
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "wots.h"
+
+// TODO clarify address expectations, and make them more uniform.
+// TODO i.e. do we expect types to be set already?
+// TODO and do we expect modifications or copies?
+
+/**
+ * Computes the starting value for a chain, i.e. the secret key.
+ * Expects the address to be complete up to the chain address.
+ */
+static void wots_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8]) {
+ /* Make sure that the hash address is actually zeroed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(wots_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Generate sk element. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_prf_addr(sk, sk_seed, wots_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the chaining function.
+ * out and in have to be n-byte arrays.
+ *
+ * Interprets in as start-th value of the chain.
+ * addr has to contain the address of the chain.
+ */
+static void gen_chain(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int start, unsigned int steps,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ /* Initialize out with the value at position 'start'. */
+ memcpy(out, in, SPX_N);
+
+ /* Iterate 'steps' calls to the hash function. */
+ for (i = start; i < (start + steps) && i < SPX_WOTS_W; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ out, out, pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * base_w algorithm as described in draft.
+ * Interprets an array of bytes as integers in base w.
+ * This only works when log_w is a divisor of 8.
+ */
+static void base_w(unsigned int *output, const size_t out_len,
+ const unsigned char *input) {
+ size_t in = 0;
+ size_t out = 0;
+ unsigned char total = 0;
+ unsigned int bits = 0;
+ size_t consumed;
+
+ for (consumed = 0; consumed < out_len; consumed++) {
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ total = input[in];
+ in++;
+ bits += 8;
+ }
+ bits -= SPX_WOTS_LOGW;
+ output[out] = (unsigned int)((total >> bits) & (SPX_WOTS_W - 1));
+ out++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Computes the WOTS+ checksum over a message (in base_w). */
+static void wots_checksum(unsigned int *csum_base_w,
+ const unsigned int *msg_base_w) {
+ unsigned int csum = 0;
+ unsigned char csum_bytes[(SPX_WOTS_LEN2 * SPX_WOTS_LOGW + 7) / 8];
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ /* Compute checksum. */
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN1; i++) {
+ csum += SPX_WOTS_W - 1 - msg_base_w[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Convert checksum to base_w. */
+ /* Make sure expected empty zero bits are the least significant bits. */
+ csum = csum << (8 - ((SPX_WOTS_LEN2 * SPX_WOTS_LOGW) % 8));
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ csum_bytes, sizeof(csum_bytes), csum);
+ base_w(csum_base_w, SPX_WOTS_LEN2, csum_bytes);
+}
+
+/* Takes a message and derives the matching chain lengths. */
+static void chain_lengths(unsigned int *lengths, const unsigned char *msg) {
+ base_w(lengths, SPX_WOTS_LEN1, msg);
+ wots_checksum(lengths + SPX_WOTS_LEN1, lengths);
+}
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32 byte sk_seed, expands it to WOTS private key
+ * elements and computes the corresponding public key.
+ * It requires the seed pub_seed (used to generate bitmasks and hash keys)
+ * and the address of this WOTS key pair.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ wots_gen_sk(pk + i * SPX_N, sk_seed, addr);
+ gen_chain(pk + i * SPX_N, pk + i * SPX_N,
+ 0, SPX_WOTS_W - 1, pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Takes a n-byte message and the 32-byte sk_see to compute a signature 'sig'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned int lengths[SPX_WOTS_LEN];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ chain_lengths(lengths, msg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ wots_gen_sk(sig + i * SPX_N, sk_seed, addr);
+ gen_chain(sig + i * SPX_N, sig + i * SPX_N, 0, lengths[i], pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature and an n-byte message, computes a WOTS public key.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned int lengths[SPX_WOTS_LEN];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ chain_lengths(lengths, msg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ gen_chain(pk + i * SPX_N, sig + i * SPX_N,
+ lengths[i], SPX_WOTS_W - 1 - lengths[i], pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/wots.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/wots.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8283078d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192f-simple/clean/wots.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#ifndef SPX_WOTS_H
+#define SPX_WOTS_H
+
+#include "params.h"
+#include
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32 byte seed for the private key, expands it to
+ * a full WOTS private key and computes the corresponding public key.
+ * It requires the seed pub_seed (used to generate bitmasks and hash keys)
+ * and the address of this WOTS key pair.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a n-byte message and the 32-byte seed for the private key to compute a
+ * signature that is placed at 'sig'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature and an n-byte message, computes a WOTS public key.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192FSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/META.yml b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/META.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1574e002
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/META.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+name: SPHINCS+
+type: signature
+claimed-nist-level: 3
+length-public-key: 48
+length-signature: 17064
+testvectors-sha256: a5964b23e6d86db3534501606d80a11c528b4eb3a846bd76505dc23ec4412148
+principal-submitter: Andreas Hülsing
+auxiliary-submitters:
+ - Jean-Philippe Aumasson
+ - Daniel J. Bernstein,
+ - Christoph Dobraunig
+ - Maria Eichlseder
+ - Scott Fluhrer
+ - Stefan-Lukas Gazdag
+ - Panos Kampanakis
+ - Stefan Kölbl
+ - Tanja Lange
+ - Martin M. Lauridsen
+ - Florian Mendel
+ - Ruben Niederhagen
+ - Christian Rechberger
+ - Joost Rijneveld
+ - Peter Schwabe
+implementations:
+ - name: clean
+ version: https://github.com/sphincs/sphincsplus/commit/492ec4f1f6d3b3dc4b435783bbaaf4e41cdb6f32
+ length-secret-key: 96
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/LICENSE b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/LICENSE
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..670154e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/LICENSE
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+CC0 1.0 Universal
+
+Statement of Purpose
+
+The laws of most jurisdictions throughout the world automatically confer
+exclusive Copyright and Related Rights (defined below) upon the creator and
+subsequent owner(s) (each and all, an "owner") of an original work of
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+
+Certain owners wish to permanently relinquish those rights to a Work for the
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+and redistribute as freely as possible in any form whatsoever and for any
+purposes, including without limitation commercial purposes. These owners may
+contribute to the Commons to promote the ideal of a free culture and the
+further production of creative, cultural and scientific works, or to gain
+reputation or greater distribution for their Work in part through the use and
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+
+For these and/or other purposes and motivations, and without any expectation
+of additional consideration or compensation, the person associating CC0 with a
+Work (the "Affirmer"), to the extent that he or she is an owner of Copyright
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+
+1. Copyright and Related Rights. A Work made available under CC0 may be
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+to, the following:
+
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+ ii. moral rights retained by the original author(s) and/or performer(s);
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+
+ v. rights protecting the extraction, dissemination, use and reuse of data in
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+ European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal
+ protection of databases, and under any national implementation thereof,
+ including any amended or successor version of such directive); and
+
+ vii. other similar, equivalent or corresponding rights throughout the world
+ based on applicable law or treaty, and any national implementations thereof.
+
+2. Waiver. To the greatest extent permitted by, but not in contravention of,
+applicable law, Affirmer hereby overtly, fully, permanently, irrevocably and
+unconditionally waives, abandons, and surrenders all of Affirmer's Copyright
+and Related Rights and associated claims and causes of action, whether now
+known or unknown (including existing as well as future claims and causes of
+action), in the Work (i) in all territories worldwide, (ii) for the maximum
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+extensions), (iii) in any current or future medium and for any number of
+copies, and (iv) for any purpose whatsoever, including without limitation
+commercial, advertising or promotional purposes (the "Waiver"). Affirmer makes
+the Waiver for the benefit of each member of the public at large and to the
+detriment of Affirmer's heirs and successors, fully intending that such Waiver
+shall not be subject to revocation, rescission, cancellation, termination, or
+any other legal or equitable action to disrupt the quiet enjoyment of the Work
+by the public as contemplated by Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+3. Public License Fallback. Should any part of the Waiver for any reason be
+judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, then the Waiver
+shall be preserved to the maximum extent permitted taking into account
+Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose. In addition, to the extent the Waiver
+is so judged Affirmer hereby grants to each affected person a royalty-free,
+non transferable, non sublicensable, non exclusive, irrevocable and
+unconditional license to exercise Affirmer's Copyright and Related Rights in
+the Work (i) in all territories worldwide, (ii) for the maximum duration
+provided by applicable law or treaty (including future time extensions), (iii)
+in any current or future medium and for any number of copies, and (iv) for any
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+promotional purposes (the "License"). The License shall be deemed effective as
+of the date CC0 was applied by Affirmer to the Work. Should any part of the
+License for any reason be judged legally invalid or ineffective under
+applicable law, such partial invalidity or ineffectiveness shall not
+invalidate the remainder of the License, and in such case Affirmer hereby
+affirms that he or she will not (i) exercise any of his or her remaining
+Copyright and Related Rights in the Work or (ii) assert any associated claims
+and causes of action with respect to the Work, in either case contrary to
+Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+4. Limitations and Disclaimers.
+
+ a. No trademark or patent rights held by Affirmer are waived, abandoned,
+ surrendered, licensed or otherwise affected by this document.
+
+ b. Affirmer offers the Work as-is and makes no representations or warranties
+ of any kind concerning the Work, express, implied, statutory or otherwise,
+ including without limitation warranties of title, merchantability, fitness
+ for a particular purpose, non infringement, or the absence of latent or
+ other defects, accuracy, or the present or absence of errors, whether or not
+ discoverable, all to the greatest extent permissible under applicable law.
+
+ c. Affirmer disclaims responsibility for clearing rights of other persons
+ that may apply to the Work or any use thereof, including without limitation
+ any person's Copyright and Related Rights in the Work. Further, Affirmer
+ disclaims responsibility for obtaining any necessary consents, permissions
+ or other rights required for any use of the Work.
+
+ d. Affirmer understands and acknowledges that Creative Commons is not a
+ party to this document and has no duty or obligation with respect to this
+ CC0 or use of the Work.
+
+For more information, please see
+
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/Makefile b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a4e20d14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with GNU Make or BSD Make
+
+LIB=libsphincs-haraka-192s-robust_clean.a
+
+HEADERS = params.h address.h wots.h utils.h fors.h api.h hash.h thash.h haraka.h
+OBJECTS = address.o wots.o utils.o fors.o sign.o hash_haraka.o thash_haraka_robust.o haraka.o
+
+CFLAGS=-Wall -Wconversion -Wextra -Wpedantic -Werror -Wmissing-prototypes -std=c99 -I../../../common $(EXTRAFLAGS)
+
+all: $(LIB)
+
+%.o: %.c $(HEADERS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
+
+$(LIB): $(OBJECTS)
+ $(AR) -r $@ $(OBJECTS)
+
+clean:
+ $(RM) $(OBJECTS)
+ $(RM) $(LIB)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b74d7aec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with Microsoft Visual Studio's nmake using the command:
+# nmake /f Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
+
+LIBRARY=libsphincs-haraka-192s-robust_clean.lib
+OBJECTS=address.obj wots.obj utils.obj fors.obj sign.obj hash_haraka.obj thash_haraka_robust.obj haraka.obj
+
+CFLAGS=/nologo /I ..\..\..\common /W4 /WX
+
+all: $(LIBRARY)
+
+# Make sure objects are recompiled if headers change.
+$(OBJECTS): *.h
+
+$(LIBRARY): $(OBJECTS)
+ LIB.EXE /NOLOGO /WX /OUT:$@ $**
+
+clean:
+ -DEL $(OBJECTS)
+ -DEL $(LIBRARY)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/address.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/address.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b97822db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/address.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ bytes + i * 4, 4, addr[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer) {
+ addr[0] = layer;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree) {
+ addr[1] = 0;
+ addr[2] = (uint32_t) (tree >> 32);
+ addr[3] = (uint32_t) tree;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type) {
+ addr[4] = type;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for OTS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair) {
+ addr[5] = keypair;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+ out[5] = in[5];
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain) {
+ addr[6] = chain;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash) {
+ addr[7] = hash;
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height) {
+ addr[6] = tree_height;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index) {
+ addr[7] = tree_index;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/address.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/address.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..60932e74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/address.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+#ifndef SPX_ADDRESS_H
+#define SPX_ADDRESS_H
+
+#include
+
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS 0
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK 1
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE 2
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE 3
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK 4
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type);
+
+/* Copies the layer and tree part of one address into the other */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for WOTS and FORS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/api.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/api.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..15840d8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/api.h
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#ifndef PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_API_H
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_API_H
+
+#include
+#include
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_ALGNAME "SPHINCS+"
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES 64
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES 32
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES 16976
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES 48
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair given a seed.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/fors.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/fors.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5581843d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/fors.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+static void fors_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ sk, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_sk_to_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ leaf, sk, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* Only copy the parts that must be kept in fors_leaf_addr. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_leaf_addr, fors_tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_leaf_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_leaf_addr, addr_idx);
+
+ fors_gen_sk(leaf, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, leaf, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Interprets m as SPX_FORS_HEIGHT-bit unsigned integers.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ * Assumes indices has space for SPX_FORS_TREES integers.
+ */
+static void message_to_indices(uint32_t *indices, const unsigned char *m) {
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ indices[i] = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < SPX_FORS_HEIGHT; j++) {
+ indices[i] ^= (((uint32_t)m[offset >> 3] >> (offset & 0x7)) & 0x1) << j;
+ offset++;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Include the secret key part that produces the selected leaf node. */
+ fors_gen_sk(sig, sk_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for this leaf node. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ indices[i], idx_offset, fors_gen_leaf, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Derive the leaf from the included secret key part. */
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, sig, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Derive the corresponding root node of this tree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, leaf, indices[i], idx_offset, sig,
+ SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/fors.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/fors.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d5a30a0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/fors.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_FORS_H
+#define SPX_FORS_H
+
+#include
+
+#include "params.h"
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5d0b5607
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+/*
+Plain C implementation of the Haraka256 and Haraka512 permutations.
+*/
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+#define HARAKAS_RATE 32
+
+static const unsigned char haraka_rc[40][16] = {
+ {0x9d, 0x7b, 0x81, 0x75, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xc5, 0xb2, 0x0a, 0xc0, 0x20, 0xe6, 0x4c, 0x70, 0x84, 0x06},
+ {0x17, 0xf7, 0x08, 0x2f, 0xa4, 0x6b, 0x0f, 0x64, 0x6b, 0xa0, 0xf3, 0x88, 0xe1, 0xb4, 0x66, 0x8b},
+ {0x14, 0x91, 0x02, 0x9f, 0x60, 0x9d, 0x02, 0xcf, 0x98, 0x84, 0xf2, 0x53, 0x2d, 0xde, 0x02, 0x34},
+ {0x79, 0x4f, 0x5b, 0xfd, 0xaf, 0xbc, 0xf3, 0xbb, 0x08, 0x4f, 0x7b, 0x2e, 0xe6, 0xea, 0xd6, 0x0e},
+ {0x44, 0x70, 0x39, 0xbe, 0x1c, 0xcd, 0xee, 0x79, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x72, 0x48, 0xcb, 0xb0, 0xcf, 0xcb},
+ {0x7b, 0x05, 0x8a, 0x2b, 0xed, 0x35, 0x53, 0x8d, 0xb7, 0x32, 0x90, 0x6e, 0xee, 0xcd, 0xea, 0x7e},
+ {0x1b, 0xef, 0x4f, 0xda, 0x61, 0x27, 0x41, 0xe2, 0xd0, 0x7c, 0x2e, 0x5e, 0x43, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x67},
+ {0x3b, 0x0b, 0xc7, 0x1f, 0xe2, 0xfd, 0x5f, 0x67, 0x07, 0xcc, 0xca, 0xaf, 0xb0, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x29},
+ {0xee, 0x65, 0xd4, 0xb9, 0xca, 0x8f, 0xdb, 0xec, 0xe9, 0x7f, 0x86, 0xe6, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x4d, 0xab},
+ {0x33, 0x7e, 0x03, 0xad, 0x4f, 0x40, 0x2a, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xcd, 0xb7, 0xd4, 0x84, 0xbf, 0x30, 0x1c},
+ {0x00, 0x98, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x2e, 0x8b, 0x02, 0x69, 0xbf, 0x23, 0x17, 0x94, 0xb9, 0x0b, 0xcc, 0xb2},
+ {0x8a, 0x2d, 0x9d, 0x5c, 0xc8, 0x9e, 0xaa, 0x4a, 0x72, 0x55, 0x6f, 0xde, 0xa6, 0x78, 0x04, 0xfa},
+ {0xd4, 0x9f, 0x12, 0x29, 0x2e, 0x4f, 0xfa, 0x0e, 0x12, 0x2a, 0x77, 0x6b, 0x2b, 0x9f, 0xb4, 0xdf},
+ {0xee, 0x12, 0x6a, 0xbb, 0xae, 0x11, 0xd6, 0x32, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x49, 0xf4, 0x44, 0x03, 0xa1, 0x1e},
+ {0xa6, 0xec, 0xa8, 0x9c, 0xc9, 0x00, 0x96, 0x5f, 0x84, 0x00, 0x05, 0x4b, 0x88, 0x49, 0x04, 0xaf},
+ {0xec, 0x93, 0xe5, 0x27, 0xe3, 0xc7, 0xa2, 0x78, 0x4f, 0x9c, 0x19, 0x9d, 0xd8, 0x5e, 0x02, 0x21},
+ {0x73, 0x01, 0xd4, 0x82, 0xcd, 0x2e, 0x28, 0xb9, 0xb7, 0xc9, 0x59, 0xa7, 0xf8, 0xaa, 0x3a, 0xbf},
+ {0x6b, 0x7d, 0x30, 0x10, 0xd9, 0xef, 0xf2, 0x37, 0x17, 0xb0, 0x86, 0x61, 0x0d, 0x70, 0x60, 0x62},
+ {0xc6, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0xf6, 0x53, 0x91, 0xc2, 0x81, 0x43, 0x04, 0x30, 0x21, 0xc2, 0x45, 0xca, 0x5a},
+ {0x3a, 0x94, 0xd1, 0x36, 0xe8, 0x92, 0xaf, 0x2c, 0xbb, 0x68, 0x6b, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x97, 0x23, 0x92},
+ {0xb4, 0x71, 0x10, 0xe5, 0x58, 0xb9, 0xba, 0x6c, 0xeb, 0x86, 0x58, 0x22, 0x38, 0x92, 0xbf, 0xd3},
+ {0x8d, 0x12, 0xe1, 0x24, 0xdd, 0xfd, 0x3d, 0x93, 0x77, 0xc6, 0xf0, 0xae, 0xe5, 0x3c, 0x86, 0xdb},
+ {0xb1, 0x12, 0x22, 0xcb, 0xe3, 0x8d, 0xe4, 0x83, 0x9c, 0xa0, 0xeb, 0xff, 0x68, 0x62, 0x60, 0xbb},
+ {0x7d, 0xf7, 0x2b, 0xc7, 0x4e, 0x1a, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0x9c, 0xd1, 0xe4, 0xe2, 0xdc, 0xd3, 0x4b, 0x73},
+ {0x4e, 0x92, 0xb3, 0x2c, 0xc4, 0x15, 0x14, 0x4b, 0x43, 0x1b, 0x30, 0x61, 0xc3, 0x47, 0xbb, 0x43},
+ {0x99, 0x68, 0xeb, 0x16, 0xdd, 0x31, 0xb2, 0x03, 0xf6, 0xef, 0x07, 0xe7, 0xa8, 0x75, 0xa7, 0xdb},
+ {0x2c, 0x47, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x23, 0x5e, 0x8e, 0x77, 0x59, 0x75, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x61, 0xf3, 0x6d},
+ {0xf9, 0x17, 0x86, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xe5, 0x1b, 0x6d, 0x77, 0x7d, 0xde, 0xd6, 0x17, 0x5a, 0xa7, 0xcd},
+ {0x5d, 0xee, 0x46, 0xa9, 0x9d, 0x06, 0x6c, 0x9d, 0xaa, 0xe9, 0xa8, 0x6b, 0xf0, 0x43, 0x6b, 0xec},
+ {0xc1, 0x27, 0xf3, 0x3b, 0x59, 0x11, 0x53, 0xa2, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x57, 0xf9, 0x50, 0x69, 0x1e, 0xcb},
+ {0xd9, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x60, 0x53, 0x03, 0xed, 0xe4, 0x9c, 0x61, 0xda, 0x00, 0x75, 0x0c, 0xee, 0x2c},
+ {0x50, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0x63, 0xbc, 0xba, 0xbb, 0x80, 0xab, 0x0c, 0xe9, 0x96, 0xa1, 0xa5, 0xb1, 0xf0},
+ {0x39, 0xca, 0x8d, 0x93, 0x30, 0xde, 0x0d, 0xab, 0x88, 0x29, 0x96, 0x5e, 0x02, 0xb1, 0x3d, 0xae},
+ {0x42, 0xb4, 0x75, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf3, 0x14, 0x88, 0x0b, 0xa4, 0x54, 0xd5, 0x38, 0x8f, 0xbb, 0x17},
+ {0xf6, 0x16, 0x0a, 0x36, 0x79, 0xb7, 0xb6, 0xae, 0xd7, 0x7f, 0x42, 0x5f, 0x5b, 0x8a, 0xbb, 0x34},
+ {0xde, 0xaf, 0xba, 0xff, 0x18, 0x59, 0xce, 0x43, 0x38, 0x54, 0xe5, 0xcb, 0x41, 0x52, 0xf6, 0x26},
+ {0x78, 0xc9, 0x9e, 0x83, 0xf7, 0x9c, 0xca, 0xa2, 0x6a, 0x02, 0xf3, 0xb9, 0x54, 0x9a, 0xe9, 0x4c},
+ {0x35, 0x12, 0x90, 0x22, 0x28, 0x6e, 0xc0, 0x40, 0xbe, 0xf7, 0xdf, 0x1b, 0x1a, 0xa5, 0x51, 0xae},
+ {0xcf, 0x59, 0xa6, 0x48, 0x0f, 0xbc, 0x73, 0xc1, 0x2b, 0xd2, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x61, 0xc1, 0xa0},
+ {0xa1, 0x9d, 0xc5, 0xe9, 0xfd, 0xbd, 0xd6, 0x4a, 0x88, 0x82, 0x28, 0x02, 0x03, 0xcc, 0x6a, 0x75}
+};
+
+static unsigned char rc[40][16];
+static unsigned char rc_sseed[40][16];
+
+static const unsigned char sbox[256] = {
+ 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe,
+ 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4,
+ 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7,
+ 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15, 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3,
+ 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x09,
+ 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3,
+ 0x2f, 0x84, 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe,
+ 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85,
+ 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8, 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92,
+ 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x0c,
+ 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19,
+ 0x73, 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14,
+ 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2,
+ 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79, 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5,
+ 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08, 0xba, 0x78, 0x25,
+ 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a,
+ 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86,
+ 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e,
+ 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42,
+ 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
+};
+
+#define XT(x) (((x) << 1) ^ ((((x) >> 7) & 1) * 0x1b))
+
+// Simulate _mm_aesenc_si128 instructions from AESNI
+static void aesenc(unsigned char *s, const unsigned char *rk) {
+ uint8_t i, t, u, v[4][4];
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ v[((i / 4) + 4 - (i % 4) ) % 4][i % 4] = sbox[s[i]];
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+ t = v[i][0];
+ u = v[i][0] ^ v[i][1] ^ v[i][2] ^ v[i][3];
+ v[i][0] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][0] ^ v[i][1]));
+ v[i][1] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][1] ^ v[i][2]));
+ v[i][2] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][2] ^ v[i][3]));
+ v[i][3] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][3] ^ t));
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ s[i] = v[i / 4][i % 4] ^ rk[i];
+ }
+}
+
+// Simulate _mm_unpacklo_epi32
+static void unpacklo32(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ memcpy(tmp, a, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 4, b, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 8, a + 4, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 12, b + 4, 4);
+ memcpy(t, tmp, 16);
+}
+
+// Simulate _mm_unpackhi_epi32
+static void unpackhi32(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ memcpy(tmp, a + 8, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 4, b + 8, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 8, a + 12, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 12, b + 12, 4);
+ memcpy(t, tmp, 16);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_tweak_constants(
+ const unsigned char *pk_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ unsigned long long seed_length) {
+ unsigned char buf[40 * 16];
+
+ /* Use the standard constants to generate tweaked ones. */
+ memcpy(rc, haraka_rc, 40 * 16);
+
+ /* Constants for sk.seed */
+ if (sk_seed != NULL) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(buf, 40 * 16, sk_seed, seed_length);
+ memcpy(rc_sseed, buf, 40 * 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Constants for pk.seed */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(buf, 40 * 16, pk_seed, seed_length);
+ memcpy(rc, buf, 40 * 16);
+}
+
+static void haraka_S_absorb(unsigned char *s, unsigned int r,
+ const unsigned char *m, unsigned long long mlen,
+ unsigned char p) {
+ unsigned long long i;
+ unsigned char t[r];
+
+ while (mlen >= r) {
+ // XOR block to state
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ s[i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s, s);
+ mlen -= r;
+ m += r;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ t[i] = 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; ++i) {
+ t[i] = m[i];
+ }
+ t[i] = p;
+ t[r - 1] |= 128;
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ s[i] ^= t[i];
+ }
+}
+
+static void haraka_S_squeezeblocks(unsigned char *h, unsigned long long nblocks,
+ unsigned char *s, unsigned int r) {
+ while (nblocks > 0) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s, s);
+ memcpy(h, s, HARAKAS_RATE);
+ h += r;
+ nblocks--;
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ s_inc[i] = 0;
+ }
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(uint8_t *s_inc, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Recall that s_inc[64] is the non-absorbed bytes xored into the state */
+ while (mlen + s_inc[64] >= HARAKAS_RATE) {
+ for (i = 0; i < (size_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64]); i++) {
+ /* Take the i'th byte from message
+ xor with the s_inc[64] + i'th byte of the state */
+ s_inc[s_inc[64] + i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ mlen -= (size_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64]);
+ m += HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64];
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s_inc, s_inc);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; i++) {
+ s_inc[s_inc[64] + i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(mlen + s_inc[64]);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ /* After haraka_S_inc_absorb, we are guaranteed that s_inc[64] < HARAKAS_RATE,
+ so we can always use one more byte for p in the current state. */
+ s_inc[s_inc[64]] ^= 0x1F;
+ s_inc[HARAKAS_RATE - 1] ^= 128;
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ uint8_t i;
+
+ /* First consume any bytes we still have sitting around */
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen && i < s_inc[64]; i++) {
+ /* There are s_inc[64] bytes left, so r - s_inc[64] is the first
+ available byte. We consume from there, i.e., up to r. */
+ out[i] = s_inc[(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64] + i)];
+ }
+ out += i;
+ outlen -= i;
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(s_inc[64] - i);
+
+ /* Then squeeze the remaining necessary blocks */
+ while (outlen > 0) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s_inc, s_inc);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen && i < HARAKAS_RATE; i++) {
+ out[i] = s_inc[i];
+ }
+ out += i;
+ outlen -= i;
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - i);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned long long outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen) {
+ unsigned long long i;
+ unsigned char s[64];
+ unsigned char d[32];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ s[i] = 0;
+ }
+ haraka_S_absorb(s, 32, in, inlen, 0x1F);
+
+ haraka_S_squeezeblocks(out, outlen / 32, s, 32);
+ out += (outlen / 32) * 32;
+
+ if (outlen % 32) {
+ haraka_S_squeezeblocks(d, 1, s, 32);
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen % 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = d[i];
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[64], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 32, in + 32, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 48, in + 48, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 1]);
+ aesenc(s + 32, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 2]);
+ aesenc(s + 48, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 3]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s, s, s + 16);
+ unpacklo32(s + 16, s + 32, s + 48);
+ unpackhi32(s + 32, s + 32, s + 48);
+ unpacklo32(s + 48, s, s + 32);
+ unpackhi32(s, s, s + 32);
+ unpackhi32(s + 32, s + 16, tmp);
+ unpacklo32(s + 16, s + 16, tmp);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(out, s, 64);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i;
+
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(buf, in);
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ buf[i] = buf[i] ^ in[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Truncated */
+ memcpy(out, buf + 8, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 8, buf + 24, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 16, buf + 32, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 24, buf + 48, 8);
+}
+
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[32], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j + 1]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s + 16, s, s + 16);
+ memcpy(s, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ s[i];
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[32], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc_sseed[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc_sseed[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j + 1]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s + 16, s, s + 16);
+ memcpy(s, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ s[i];
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/haraka.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/haraka.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..01772b2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/haraka.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_HARAKA_H
+#define SPX_HARAKA_H
+
+/* Tweak constants with seed */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_tweak_constants(
+ const unsigned char *pk_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ unsigned long long seed_length);
+
+/* Haraka Sponge */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(uint8_t *s_inc, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned long long outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen);
+
+/* Applies the 512-bit Haraka permutation to in. */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-512 */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-256 */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-256 using sk.seed constants */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/hash.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/hash.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7d8c166b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/hash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifndef SPX_HASH_H
+#define SPX_HASH_H
+
+#include
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf, const unsigned char *optrand,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ unsigned char *digest, uint64_t *tree, uint32_t *leaf_idx,
+ const unsigned char *R, const unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/hash_haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/hash_haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ccf98f67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/hash_haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_tweak_constants(pub_seed, sk_seed, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes PRF(key, addr), given a secret key of SPX_N bytes and an address
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES];
+ /* Since SPX_N may be smaller than 32, we need a temporary buffer. */
+ unsigned char outbuf[32];
+
+ (void)key; /* Suppress an 'unused parameter' warning. */
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf, addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(outbuf, buf);
+ memcpy(out, outbuf, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the message-dependent randomness R, using a secret seed and an
+ * optional randomization value as well as the message.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf, const unsigned char *optrand,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) {
+ uint8_t s_inc[65];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, sk_prf, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, optrand, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, m, mlen);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(R, SPX_N, s_inc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the message hash using R, the public key, and the message.
+ * Outputs the message digest and the index of the leaf. The index is split in
+ * the tree index and the leaf index, for convenient copying to an address.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ unsigned char *digest, uint64_t *tree, uint32_t *leaf_idx,
+ const unsigned char *R, const unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) {
+#define SPX_TREE_BITS (SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * (SPX_D - 1))
+#define SPX_TREE_BYTES ((SPX_TREE_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_LEAF_BITS SPX_TREE_HEIGHT
+#define SPX_LEAF_BYTES ((SPX_LEAF_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_DGST_BYTES (SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES + SPX_TREE_BYTES + SPX_LEAF_BYTES)
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_DGST_BYTES];
+ unsigned char *bufp = buf;
+ uint8_t s_inc[65];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, R, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, pk, SPX_PK_BYTES);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, m, mlen);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(buf, SPX_DGST_BYTES, s_inc);
+
+ memcpy(digest, bufp, SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES);
+ bufp += SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES;
+
+ *tree = PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(bufp, SPX_TREE_BYTES);
+ *tree &= (~(uint64_t)0) >> (64 - SPX_TREE_BITS);
+ bufp += SPX_TREE_BYTES;
+
+ *leaf_idx = (uint32_t)PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ bufp, SPX_LEAF_BYTES);
+ *leaf_idx &= (~(uint32_t)0) >> (32 - SPX_LEAF_BITS);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/params.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/params.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..483b5374
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/params.h
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#ifndef SPX_PARAMS_H
+#define SPX_PARAMS_H
+
+/* Hash output length in bytes. */
+#define SPX_N 24
+/* Height of the hypertree. */
+#define SPX_FULL_HEIGHT 64
+/* Number of subtree layer. */
+#define SPX_D 8
+/* FORS tree dimensions. */
+#define SPX_FORS_HEIGHT 16
+#define SPX_FORS_TREES 14
+/* Winternitz parameter, */
+#define SPX_WOTS_W 16
+
+/* The hash function is defined by linking a different hash.c file, as opposed
+ to setting a #define constant. */
+
+/* For clarity */
+#define SPX_ADDR_BYTES 32
+
+/* WOTS parameters. */
+#define SPX_WOTS_LOGW 4
+
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN1 (8 * SPX_N / SPX_WOTS_LOGW)
+
+/* SPX_WOTS_LEN2 is floor(log(len_1 * (w - 1)) / log(w)) + 1; we precompute */
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN2 3
+
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN (SPX_WOTS_LEN1 + SPX_WOTS_LEN2)
+#define SPX_WOTS_BYTES (SPX_WOTS_LEN * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_WOTS_PK_BYTES SPX_WOTS_BYTES
+
+/* Subtree size. */
+#define SPX_TREE_HEIGHT (SPX_FULL_HEIGHT / SPX_D)
+
+/* FORS parameters. */
+#define SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES ((SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_FORS_BYTES ((SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1) * SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_FORS_PK_BYTES SPX_N
+
+/* Resulting SPX sizes. */
+#define SPX_BYTES (SPX_N + SPX_FORS_BYTES + SPX_D * SPX_WOTS_BYTES +\
+ SPX_FULL_HEIGHT * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_PK_BYTES (2 * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_SK_BYTES (2 * SPX_N + SPX_PK_BYTES)
+
+/* Optionally, signing can be made non-deterministic using optrand.
+ This can help counter side-channel attacks that would benefit from
+ getting a large number of traces when the signer uses the same nodes. */
+#define SPX_OPTRAND_BYTES 32
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/sign.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..359a6261
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "api.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "randombytes.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "wots.h"
+
+/**
+ * Computes the leaf at a given address. First generates the WOTS key pair,
+ * then computes leaf by hashing horizontally.
+ */
+static void wots_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+ unsigned char pk[SPX_WOTS_BYTES];
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t wots_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, addr_idx);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ pk, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ wots_pk_addr, wots_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ leaf, pk, pub_seed, wots_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates an SPX key pair given a seed of length
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [PUB_SEED || root]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed) {
+ /* We do not need the auth path in key generation, but it simplifies the
+ code to have just one treehash routine that computes both root and path
+ in one function. */
+ unsigned char auth_path[SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t top_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ top_tree_addr, SPX_D - 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ top_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+
+ /* Initialize SK_SEED, SK_PRF and PUB_SEED from seed. */
+ memcpy(sk, seed, PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES);
+
+ memcpy(pk, sk + 2 * SPX_N, SPX_N);
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(pk, sk);
+
+ /* Compute root node of the top-most subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ sk + 3 * SPX_N, auth_path, sk, sk + 2 * SPX_N, 0, 0,
+ wots_gen_leaf, top_tree_addr);
+
+ memcpy(pk + SPX_N, sk + 3 * SPX_N, SPX_N);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates an SPX key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [PUB_SEED || root]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
+ unsigned char seed[PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES];
+ randombytes(seed, PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ pk, sk, seed);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed = sk;
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf = sk + SPX_N;
+ const unsigned char *pk = sk + 2 * SPX_N;
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed = pk;
+
+ unsigned char optrand[SPX_N];
+ unsigned char mhash[SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+ unsigned char root[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t i;
+ uint64_t tree;
+ uint32_t idx_leaf;
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ pub_seed, sk_seed);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+
+ /* Optionally, signing can be made non-deterministic using optrand.
+ This can help counter side-channel attacks that would benefit from
+ getting a large number of traces when the signer uses the same nodes. */
+ randombytes(optrand, SPX_N);
+ /* Compute the digest randomization value. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ sig, sk_prf, optrand, m, mlen);
+
+ /* Derive the message digest and leaf index from R, PK and M. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ mhash, &tree, &idx_leaf, sig, pk, m, mlen);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(wots_addr, tree);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ /* Sign the message hash using FORS. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ sig, root, mhash, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_FORS_BYTES;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_D; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(tree_addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(tree_addr, tree);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ /* Compute a WOTS signature. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ sig, root, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_WOTS_BYTES;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for the used WOTS leaf. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ root, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed, idx_leaf, 0,
+ wots_gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N;
+
+ /* Update the indices for the next layer. */
+ idx_leaf = (tree & ((1 << SPX_TREE_HEIGHT) - 1));
+ tree = tree >> SPX_TREE_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ *siglen = SPX_BYTES;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed = pk;
+ const unsigned char *pub_root = pk + SPX_N;
+ unsigned char mhash[SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+ unsigned char wots_pk[SPX_WOTS_BYTES];
+ unsigned char root[SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ unsigned int i;
+ uint64_t tree;
+ uint32_t idx_leaf;
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t wots_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ if (siglen != SPX_BYTES) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ pub_seed, NULL);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK);
+
+ /* Derive the message digest and leaf index from R || PK || M. */
+ /* The additional SPX_N is a result of the hash domain separator. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ mhash, &tree, &idx_leaf, sig, pk, m, mlen);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Layer correctly defaults to 0, so no need to set_layer_addr */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(wots_addr, tree);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ root, sig, mhash, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_FORS_BYTES;
+
+ /* For each subtree.. */
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_D; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(tree_addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(tree_addr, tree);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ wots_pk_addr, wots_addr);
+
+ /* The WOTS public key is only correct if the signature was correct. */
+ /* Initially, root is the FORS pk, but on subsequent iterations it is
+ the root of the subtree below the currently processed subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ wots_pk, sig, root, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_WOTS_BYTES;
+
+ /* Compute the leaf node using the WOTS public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ leaf, wots_pk, pub_seed, wots_pk_addr);
+
+ /* Compute the root node of this subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ root, leaf, idx_leaf, 0, sig, SPX_TREE_HEIGHT,
+ pub_seed, tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N;
+
+ /* Update the indices for the next layer. */
+ idx_leaf = (tree & ((1 << SPX_TREE_HEIGHT) - 1));
+ tree = tree >> SPX_TREE_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the root node equals the root node in the public key. */
+ if (memcmp(root, pub_root, SPX_N) != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
+ size_t siglen;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ sm, &siglen, m, mlen, sk);
+
+ memmove(sm + SPX_BYTES, m, mlen);
+ *smlen = siglen + mlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
+ /* The API caller does not necessarily know what size a signature should be
+ but SPHINCS+ signatures are always exactly SPX_BYTES. */
+ if (smlen < SPX_BYTES) {
+ memset(m, 0, smlen);
+ *mlen = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *mlen = smlen - SPX_BYTES;
+
+ if (PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ sm, SPX_BYTES, sm + SPX_BYTES, *mlen, pk)) {
+ memset(m, 0, smlen);
+ *mlen = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* If verification was successful, move the message to the right place. */
+ memmove(m, sm + SPX_BYTES, *mlen);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/thash.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/thash.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7f0ccc94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/thash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifndef SPX_THASH_H
+#define SPX_THASH_H
+
+#include
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/thash_haraka_robust.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/thash_haraka_robust.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d2541a34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/thash_haraka_robust.c
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+/**
+ * Takes an array of inblocks concatenated arrays of SPX_N bytes.
+ */
+static void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inblocks,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char *bitmask = buf + SPX_ADDR_BYTES;
+ unsigned char outbuf[32];
+ unsigned char buf_tmp[64];
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ (void)pub_seed; /* Suppress an 'unused parameter' warning. */
+
+ if (inblocks == 1) {
+ /* F function */
+ /* Since SPX_N may be smaller than 32, we need a temporary buffer. */
+ memset(buf_tmp, 0, 64);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf_tmp, addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256(outbuf, buf_tmp);
+ for (i = 0; i < inblocks * SPX_N; i++) {
+ buf_tmp[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + i] = in[i] ^ outbuf[i];
+ }
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512(outbuf, buf_tmp);
+ memcpy(out, outbuf, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ /* All other tweakable hashes*/
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf, addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ bitmask, inblocks * SPX_N, buf, SPX_ADDR_BYTES);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < inblocks * SPX_N; i++) {
+ buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + i] = in[i] ^ bitmask[i];
+ }
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ out, SPX_N, buf, SPX_ADDR_BYTES + inblocks * SPX_N);
+ }
+}
+
+/* The wrappers below ensure that we use fixed-size buffers on the stack */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + 1 * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, 1, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + 2 * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, 2, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + SPX_WOTS_LEN * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, SPX_WOTS_LEN, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, SPX_FORS_TREES, pub_seed, addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/utils.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e6372855
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+/**
+ * Converts the value of 'in' to 'outlen' bytes in big-endian byte order.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned long long in) {
+
+ /* Iterate over out in decreasing order, for big-endianness. */
+ for (size_t i = outlen; i > 0; i--) {
+ out[i - 1] = in & 0xff;
+ in = in >> 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Converts the inlen bytes in 'in' from big-endian byte order to an integer.
+ */
+unsigned long long PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) {
+ unsigned long long retval = 0;
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < inlen; i++) {
+ retval |= ((unsigned long long)in[i]) << (8 * (inlen - 1 - i));
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an auth path.
+ * Expects address to be complete other than the tree_height and tree_index.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ const unsigned char *auth_path, uint32_t tree_height,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+ unsigned char buffer[2 * SPX_N];
+
+ /* If leaf_idx is odd (last bit = 1), current path element is a right child
+ and auth_path has to go left. Otherwise it is the other way around. */
+ if (leaf_idx & 1) {
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, leaf, SPX_N);
+ memcpy(buffer, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(buffer, leaf, SPX_N);
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ }
+ auth_path += SPX_N;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tree_height - 1; i++) {
+ leaf_idx >>= 1;
+ idx_offset >>= 1;
+ /* Set the address of the node we're creating. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(addr, i + 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ addr, leaf_idx + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Pick the right or left neighbor, depending on parity of the node. */
+ if (leaf_idx & 1) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ buffer + SPX_N, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+ memcpy(buffer, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ buffer, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ }
+ auth_path += SPX_N;
+ }
+
+ /* The last iteration is exceptional; we do not copy an auth_path node. */
+ leaf_idx >>= 1;
+ idx_offset >>= 1;
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(addr, tree_height);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ addr, leaf_idx + idx_offset);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ root, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * For a given leaf index, computes the authentication path and the resulting
+ * root node using Merkle's TreeHash algorithm.
+ * Expects the layer and tree parts of the tree_addr to be set, as well as the
+ * tree type (i.e. SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE or SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE).
+ * Applies the offset idx_offset to indices before building addresses, so that
+ * it is possible to continue counting indices across trees.
+ */
+static void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ unsigned char *stack, unsigned int *heights,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset, uint32_t tree_height,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+ uint32_t idx;
+ uint32_t tree_idx;
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < (uint32_t)(1 << tree_height); idx++) {
+ /* Add the next leaf node to the stack. */
+ gen_leaf(stack + offset * SPX_N,
+ sk_seed, pub_seed, idx + idx_offset, tree_addr);
+ offset++;
+ heights[offset - 1] = 0;
+
+ /* If this is a node we need for the auth path.. */
+ if ((leaf_idx ^ 0x1) == idx) {
+ memcpy(auth_path, stack + (offset - 1)*SPX_N, SPX_N);
+ }
+
+ /* While the top-most nodes are of equal height.. */
+ while (offset >= 2 && heights[offset - 1] == heights[offset - 2]) {
+ /* Compute index of the new node, in the next layer. */
+ tree_idx = (idx >> (heights[offset - 1] + 1));
+
+ /* Set the address of the node we're creating. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ tree_addr, heights[offset - 1] + 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ tree_addr, tree_idx + (idx_offset >> (heights[offset - 1] + 1)));
+ /* Hash the top-most nodes from the stack together. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ stack + (offset - 2)*SPX_N, stack + (offset - 2)*SPX_N,
+ pub_seed, tree_addr);
+ offset--;
+ /* Note that the top-most node is now one layer higher. */
+ heights[offset - 1]++;
+
+ /* If this is a node we need for the auth path.. */
+ if (((leaf_idx >> heights[offset - 1]) ^ 0x1) == tree_idx) {
+ memcpy(auth_path + heights[offset - 1]*SPX_N,
+ stack + (offset - 1)*SPX_N, SPX_N);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(root, stack, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/* The wrappers below ensure that we use fixed-size buffers on the stack */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char stack[(SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1)*SPX_N];
+ unsigned int heights[SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash(
+ root, auth_path, stack, heights, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ leaf_idx, idx_offset, SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char stack[(SPX_TREE_HEIGHT + 1)*SPX_N];
+ unsigned int heights[SPX_TREE_HEIGHT + 1];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash(
+ root, auth_path, stack, heights, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ leaf_idx, idx_offset, SPX_TREE_HEIGHT, gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/utils.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/utils.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9d689867
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/utils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+#ifndef SPX_UTILS_H
+#define SPX_UTILS_H
+
+#include "params.h"
+#include
+#include
+
+/**
+ * Converts the value of 'in' to 'outlen' bytes in big-endian byte order.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned long long in);
+
+/**
+ * Converts the inlen bytes in 'in' from big-endian byte order to an integer.
+ */
+unsigned long long PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an auth path.
+ * Expects address to be complete other than the tree_height and tree_index.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ const unsigned char *auth_path, uint32_t tree_height,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * For a given leaf index, computes the authentication path and the resulting
+ * root node using Merkle's TreeHash algorithm.
+ * Expects the layer and tree parts of the tree_addr to be set, as well as the
+ * tree type (i.e. SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE or SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE).
+ * Applies the offset idx_offset to indices before building addresses, so that
+ * it is possible to continue counting indices across trees.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/wots.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/wots.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7653f500
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/wots.c
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "wots.h"
+
+// TODO clarify address expectations, and make them more uniform.
+// TODO i.e. do we expect types to be set already?
+// TODO and do we expect modifications or copies?
+
+/**
+ * Computes the starting value for a chain, i.e. the secret key.
+ * Expects the address to be complete up to the chain address.
+ */
+static void wots_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8]) {
+ /* Make sure that the hash address is actually zeroed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(wots_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Generate sk element. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(sk, sk_seed, wots_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the chaining function.
+ * out and in have to be n-byte arrays.
+ *
+ * Interprets in as start-th value of the chain.
+ * addr has to contain the address of the chain.
+ */
+static void gen_chain(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int start, unsigned int steps,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ /* Initialize out with the value at position 'start'. */
+ memcpy(out, in, SPX_N);
+
+ /* Iterate 'steps' calls to the hash function. */
+ for (i = start; i < (start + steps) && i < SPX_WOTS_W; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ out, out, pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * base_w algorithm as described in draft.
+ * Interprets an array of bytes as integers in base w.
+ * This only works when log_w is a divisor of 8.
+ */
+static void base_w(unsigned int *output, const size_t out_len,
+ const unsigned char *input) {
+ size_t in = 0;
+ size_t out = 0;
+ unsigned char total = 0;
+ unsigned int bits = 0;
+ size_t consumed;
+
+ for (consumed = 0; consumed < out_len; consumed++) {
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ total = input[in];
+ in++;
+ bits += 8;
+ }
+ bits -= SPX_WOTS_LOGW;
+ output[out] = (unsigned int)((total >> bits) & (SPX_WOTS_W - 1));
+ out++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Computes the WOTS+ checksum over a message (in base_w). */
+static void wots_checksum(unsigned int *csum_base_w,
+ const unsigned int *msg_base_w) {
+ unsigned int csum = 0;
+ unsigned char csum_bytes[(SPX_WOTS_LEN2 * SPX_WOTS_LOGW + 7) / 8];
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ /* Compute checksum. */
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN1; i++) {
+ csum += SPX_WOTS_W - 1 - msg_base_w[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Convert checksum to base_w. */
+ /* Make sure expected empty zero bits are the least significant bits. */
+ csum = csum << (8 - ((SPX_WOTS_LEN2 * SPX_WOTS_LOGW) % 8));
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ csum_bytes, sizeof(csum_bytes), csum);
+ base_w(csum_base_w, SPX_WOTS_LEN2, csum_bytes);
+}
+
+/* Takes a message and derives the matching chain lengths. */
+static void chain_lengths(unsigned int *lengths, const unsigned char *msg) {
+ base_w(lengths, SPX_WOTS_LEN1, msg);
+ wots_checksum(lengths + SPX_WOTS_LEN1, lengths);
+}
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32 byte sk_seed, expands it to WOTS private key
+ * elements and computes the corresponding public key.
+ * It requires the seed pub_seed (used to generate bitmasks and hash keys)
+ * and the address of this WOTS key pair.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ wots_gen_sk(pk + i * SPX_N, sk_seed, addr);
+ gen_chain(pk + i * SPX_N, pk + i * SPX_N,
+ 0, SPX_WOTS_W - 1, pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Takes a n-byte message and the 32-byte sk_see to compute a signature 'sig'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned int lengths[SPX_WOTS_LEN];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ chain_lengths(lengths, msg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ wots_gen_sk(sig + i * SPX_N, sk_seed, addr);
+ gen_chain(sig + i * SPX_N, sig + i * SPX_N, 0, lengths[i], pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature and an n-byte message, computes a WOTS public key.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned int lengths[SPX_WOTS_LEN];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ chain_lengths(lengths, msg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ gen_chain(pk + i * SPX_N, sig + i * SPX_N,
+ lengths[i], SPX_WOTS_W - 1 - lengths[i], pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/wots.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/wots.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..17239b06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-robust/clean/wots.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#ifndef SPX_WOTS_H
+#define SPX_WOTS_H
+
+#include "params.h"
+#include
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32 byte seed for the private key, expands it to
+ * a full WOTS private key and computes the corresponding public key.
+ * It requires the seed pub_seed (used to generate bitmasks and hash keys)
+ * and the address of this WOTS key pair.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a n-byte message and the 32-byte seed for the private key to compute a
+ * signature that is placed at 'sig'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature and an n-byte message, computes a WOTS public key.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SROBUST_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/META.yml b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/META.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ab7a86c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/META.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+name: SPHINCS+
+type: signature
+claimed-nist-level: 3
+length-public-key: 48
+length-signature: 17064
+testvectors-sha256: 6f3297d5c455729edfb6603229b76e0a64c0f3fe12528099a4bceaccab6b9f10
+principal-submitter: Andreas Hülsing
+auxiliary-submitters:
+ - Jean-Philippe Aumasson
+ - Daniel J. Bernstein,
+ - Christoph Dobraunig
+ - Maria Eichlseder
+ - Scott Fluhrer
+ - Stefan-Lukas Gazdag
+ - Panos Kampanakis
+ - Stefan Kölbl
+ - Tanja Lange
+ - Martin M. Lauridsen
+ - Florian Mendel
+ - Ruben Niederhagen
+ - Christian Rechberger
+ - Joost Rijneveld
+ - Peter Schwabe
+implementations:
+ - name: clean
+ version: https://github.com/sphincs/sphincsplus/commit/492ec4f1f6d3b3dc4b435783bbaaf4e41cdb6f32
+ length-secret-key: 96
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/LICENSE b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/LICENSE
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..670154e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/LICENSE
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+CC0 1.0 Universal
+
+Statement of Purpose
+
+The laws of most jurisdictions throughout the world automatically confer
+exclusive Copyright and Related Rights (defined below) upon the creator and
+subsequent owner(s) (each and all, an "owner") of an original work of
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+
+Certain owners wish to permanently relinquish those rights to a Work for the
+purpose of contributing to a commons of creative, cultural and scientific
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+and redistribute as freely as possible in any form whatsoever and for any
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+contribute to the Commons to promote the ideal of a free culture and the
+further production of creative, cultural and scientific works, or to gain
+reputation or greater distribution for their Work in part through the use and
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+
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+of additional consideration or compensation, the person associating CC0 with a
+Work (the "Affirmer"), to the extent that he or she is an owner of Copyright
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+
+1. Copyright and Related Rights. A Work made available under CC0 may be
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+
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+
+ vii. other similar, equivalent or corresponding rights throughout the world
+ based on applicable law or treaty, and any national implementations thereof.
+
+2. Waiver. To the greatest extent permitted by, but not in contravention of,
+applicable law, Affirmer hereby overtly, fully, permanently, irrevocably and
+unconditionally waives, abandons, and surrenders all of Affirmer's Copyright
+and Related Rights and associated claims and causes of action, whether now
+known or unknown (including existing as well as future claims and causes of
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+the Waiver for the benefit of each member of the public at large and to the
+detriment of Affirmer's heirs and successors, fully intending that such Waiver
+shall not be subject to revocation, rescission, cancellation, termination, or
+any other legal or equitable action to disrupt the quiet enjoyment of the Work
+by the public as contemplated by Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+3. Public License Fallback. Should any part of the Waiver for any reason be
+judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, then the Waiver
+shall be preserved to the maximum extent permitted taking into account
+Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose. In addition, to the extent the Waiver
+is so judged Affirmer hereby grants to each affected person a royalty-free,
+non transferable, non sublicensable, non exclusive, irrevocable and
+unconditional license to exercise Affirmer's Copyright and Related Rights in
+the Work (i) in all territories worldwide, (ii) for the maximum duration
+provided by applicable law or treaty (including future time extensions), (iii)
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+promotional purposes (the "License"). The License shall be deemed effective as
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+License for any reason be judged legally invalid or ineffective under
+applicable law, such partial invalidity or ineffectiveness shall not
+invalidate the remainder of the License, and in such case Affirmer hereby
+affirms that he or she will not (i) exercise any of his or her remaining
+Copyright and Related Rights in the Work or (ii) assert any associated claims
+and causes of action with respect to the Work, in either case contrary to
+Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+4. Limitations and Disclaimers.
+
+ a. No trademark or patent rights held by Affirmer are waived, abandoned,
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+
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+ discoverable, all to the greatest extent permissible under applicable law.
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+ d. Affirmer understands and acknowledges that Creative Commons is not a
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+
+For more information, please see
+
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/Makefile b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1c6a1a4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with GNU Make or BSD Make
+
+LIB=libsphincs-haraka-192s-simple_clean.a
+
+HEADERS = params.h address.h wots.h utils.h fors.h api.h hash.h thash.h haraka.h
+OBJECTS = address.o wots.o utils.o fors.o sign.o hash_haraka.o thash_haraka_simple.o haraka.o
+
+CFLAGS=-Wall -Wconversion -Wextra -Wpedantic -Werror -Wmissing-prototypes -std=c99 -I../../../common $(EXTRAFLAGS)
+
+all: $(LIB)
+
+%.o: %.c $(HEADERS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
+
+$(LIB): $(OBJECTS)
+ $(AR) -r $@ $(OBJECTS)
+
+clean:
+ $(RM) $(OBJECTS)
+ $(RM) $(LIB)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..dd8be4cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with Microsoft Visual Studio's nmake using the command:
+# nmake /f Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
+
+LIBRARY=libsphincs-haraka-192s-simple_clean.lib
+OBJECTS=address.obj wots.obj utils.obj fors.obj sign.obj hash_haraka.obj thash_haraka_simple.obj haraka.obj
+
+CFLAGS=/nologo /I ..\..\..\common /W4 /WX
+
+all: $(LIBRARY)
+
+# Make sure objects are recompiled if headers change.
+$(OBJECTS): *.h
+
+$(LIBRARY): $(OBJECTS)
+ LIB.EXE /NOLOGO /WX /OUT:$@ $**
+
+clean:
+ -DEL $(OBJECTS)
+ -DEL $(LIBRARY)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/address.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/address.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cacdfdcb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/address.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ bytes + i * 4, 4, addr[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer) {
+ addr[0] = layer;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree) {
+ addr[1] = 0;
+ addr[2] = (uint32_t) (tree >> 32);
+ addr[3] = (uint32_t) tree;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type) {
+ addr[4] = type;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for OTS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair) {
+ addr[5] = keypair;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+ out[5] = in[5];
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain) {
+ addr[6] = chain;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash) {
+ addr[7] = hash;
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height) {
+ addr[6] = tree_height;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index) {
+ addr[7] = tree_index;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/address.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/address.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f205b3de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/address.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+#ifndef SPX_ADDRESS_H
+#define SPX_ADDRESS_H
+
+#include
+
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS 0
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK 1
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE 2
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE 3
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK 4
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type);
+
+/* Copies the layer and tree part of one address into the other */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for WOTS and FORS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/api.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/api.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..be13cef2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/api.h
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#ifndef PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_API_H
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_API_H
+
+#include
+#include
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_ALGNAME "SPHINCS+"
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES 64
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES 32
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES 16976
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES 48
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair given a seed.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/fors.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/fors.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3e4b0e9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/fors.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+static void fors_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ sk, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_sk_to_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ leaf, sk, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* Only copy the parts that must be kept in fors_leaf_addr. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_leaf_addr, fors_tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_leaf_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_leaf_addr, addr_idx);
+
+ fors_gen_sk(leaf, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, leaf, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Interprets m as SPX_FORS_HEIGHT-bit unsigned integers.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ * Assumes indices has space for SPX_FORS_TREES integers.
+ */
+static void message_to_indices(uint32_t *indices, const unsigned char *m) {
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ indices[i] = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < SPX_FORS_HEIGHT; j++) {
+ indices[i] ^= (((uint32_t)m[offset >> 3] >> (offset & 0x7)) & 0x1) << j;
+ offset++;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Include the secret key part that produces the selected leaf node. */
+ fors_gen_sk(sig, sk_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for this leaf node. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ indices[i], idx_offset, fors_gen_leaf, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Derive the leaf from the included secret key part. */
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, sig, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Derive the corresponding root node of this tree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, leaf, indices[i], idx_offset, sig,
+ SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/fors.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/fors.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3656d0f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/fors.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_FORS_H
+#define SPX_FORS_H
+
+#include
+
+#include "params.h"
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..38a62689
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+/*
+Plain C implementation of the Haraka256 and Haraka512 permutations.
+*/
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+#define HARAKAS_RATE 32
+
+static const unsigned char haraka_rc[40][16] = {
+ {0x9d, 0x7b, 0x81, 0x75, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xc5, 0xb2, 0x0a, 0xc0, 0x20, 0xe6, 0x4c, 0x70, 0x84, 0x06},
+ {0x17, 0xf7, 0x08, 0x2f, 0xa4, 0x6b, 0x0f, 0x64, 0x6b, 0xa0, 0xf3, 0x88, 0xe1, 0xb4, 0x66, 0x8b},
+ {0x14, 0x91, 0x02, 0x9f, 0x60, 0x9d, 0x02, 0xcf, 0x98, 0x84, 0xf2, 0x53, 0x2d, 0xde, 0x02, 0x34},
+ {0x79, 0x4f, 0x5b, 0xfd, 0xaf, 0xbc, 0xf3, 0xbb, 0x08, 0x4f, 0x7b, 0x2e, 0xe6, 0xea, 0xd6, 0x0e},
+ {0x44, 0x70, 0x39, 0xbe, 0x1c, 0xcd, 0xee, 0x79, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x72, 0x48, 0xcb, 0xb0, 0xcf, 0xcb},
+ {0x7b, 0x05, 0x8a, 0x2b, 0xed, 0x35, 0x53, 0x8d, 0xb7, 0x32, 0x90, 0x6e, 0xee, 0xcd, 0xea, 0x7e},
+ {0x1b, 0xef, 0x4f, 0xda, 0x61, 0x27, 0x41, 0xe2, 0xd0, 0x7c, 0x2e, 0x5e, 0x43, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x67},
+ {0x3b, 0x0b, 0xc7, 0x1f, 0xe2, 0xfd, 0x5f, 0x67, 0x07, 0xcc, 0xca, 0xaf, 0xb0, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x29},
+ {0xee, 0x65, 0xd4, 0xb9, 0xca, 0x8f, 0xdb, 0xec, 0xe9, 0x7f, 0x86, 0xe6, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x4d, 0xab},
+ {0x33, 0x7e, 0x03, 0xad, 0x4f, 0x40, 0x2a, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xcd, 0xb7, 0xd4, 0x84, 0xbf, 0x30, 0x1c},
+ {0x00, 0x98, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x2e, 0x8b, 0x02, 0x69, 0xbf, 0x23, 0x17, 0x94, 0xb9, 0x0b, 0xcc, 0xb2},
+ {0x8a, 0x2d, 0x9d, 0x5c, 0xc8, 0x9e, 0xaa, 0x4a, 0x72, 0x55, 0x6f, 0xde, 0xa6, 0x78, 0x04, 0xfa},
+ {0xd4, 0x9f, 0x12, 0x29, 0x2e, 0x4f, 0xfa, 0x0e, 0x12, 0x2a, 0x77, 0x6b, 0x2b, 0x9f, 0xb4, 0xdf},
+ {0xee, 0x12, 0x6a, 0xbb, 0xae, 0x11, 0xd6, 0x32, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x49, 0xf4, 0x44, 0x03, 0xa1, 0x1e},
+ {0xa6, 0xec, 0xa8, 0x9c, 0xc9, 0x00, 0x96, 0x5f, 0x84, 0x00, 0x05, 0x4b, 0x88, 0x49, 0x04, 0xaf},
+ {0xec, 0x93, 0xe5, 0x27, 0xe3, 0xc7, 0xa2, 0x78, 0x4f, 0x9c, 0x19, 0x9d, 0xd8, 0x5e, 0x02, 0x21},
+ {0x73, 0x01, 0xd4, 0x82, 0xcd, 0x2e, 0x28, 0xb9, 0xb7, 0xc9, 0x59, 0xa7, 0xf8, 0xaa, 0x3a, 0xbf},
+ {0x6b, 0x7d, 0x30, 0x10, 0xd9, 0xef, 0xf2, 0x37, 0x17, 0xb0, 0x86, 0x61, 0x0d, 0x70, 0x60, 0x62},
+ {0xc6, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0xf6, 0x53, 0x91, 0xc2, 0x81, 0x43, 0x04, 0x30, 0x21, 0xc2, 0x45, 0xca, 0x5a},
+ {0x3a, 0x94, 0xd1, 0x36, 0xe8, 0x92, 0xaf, 0x2c, 0xbb, 0x68, 0x6b, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x97, 0x23, 0x92},
+ {0xb4, 0x71, 0x10, 0xe5, 0x58, 0xb9, 0xba, 0x6c, 0xeb, 0x86, 0x58, 0x22, 0x38, 0x92, 0xbf, 0xd3},
+ {0x8d, 0x12, 0xe1, 0x24, 0xdd, 0xfd, 0x3d, 0x93, 0x77, 0xc6, 0xf0, 0xae, 0xe5, 0x3c, 0x86, 0xdb},
+ {0xb1, 0x12, 0x22, 0xcb, 0xe3, 0x8d, 0xe4, 0x83, 0x9c, 0xa0, 0xeb, 0xff, 0x68, 0x62, 0x60, 0xbb},
+ {0x7d, 0xf7, 0x2b, 0xc7, 0x4e, 0x1a, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0x9c, 0xd1, 0xe4, 0xe2, 0xdc, 0xd3, 0x4b, 0x73},
+ {0x4e, 0x92, 0xb3, 0x2c, 0xc4, 0x15, 0x14, 0x4b, 0x43, 0x1b, 0x30, 0x61, 0xc3, 0x47, 0xbb, 0x43},
+ {0x99, 0x68, 0xeb, 0x16, 0xdd, 0x31, 0xb2, 0x03, 0xf6, 0xef, 0x07, 0xe7, 0xa8, 0x75, 0xa7, 0xdb},
+ {0x2c, 0x47, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x23, 0x5e, 0x8e, 0x77, 0x59, 0x75, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x61, 0xf3, 0x6d},
+ {0xf9, 0x17, 0x86, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xe5, 0x1b, 0x6d, 0x77, 0x7d, 0xde, 0xd6, 0x17, 0x5a, 0xa7, 0xcd},
+ {0x5d, 0xee, 0x46, 0xa9, 0x9d, 0x06, 0x6c, 0x9d, 0xaa, 0xe9, 0xa8, 0x6b, 0xf0, 0x43, 0x6b, 0xec},
+ {0xc1, 0x27, 0xf3, 0x3b, 0x59, 0x11, 0x53, 0xa2, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x57, 0xf9, 0x50, 0x69, 0x1e, 0xcb},
+ {0xd9, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x60, 0x53, 0x03, 0xed, 0xe4, 0x9c, 0x61, 0xda, 0x00, 0x75, 0x0c, 0xee, 0x2c},
+ {0x50, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0x63, 0xbc, 0xba, 0xbb, 0x80, 0xab, 0x0c, 0xe9, 0x96, 0xa1, 0xa5, 0xb1, 0xf0},
+ {0x39, 0xca, 0x8d, 0x93, 0x30, 0xde, 0x0d, 0xab, 0x88, 0x29, 0x96, 0x5e, 0x02, 0xb1, 0x3d, 0xae},
+ {0x42, 0xb4, 0x75, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf3, 0x14, 0x88, 0x0b, 0xa4, 0x54, 0xd5, 0x38, 0x8f, 0xbb, 0x17},
+ {0xf6, 0x16, 0x0a, 0x36, 0x79, 0xb7, 0xb6, 0xae, 0xd7, 0x7f, 0x42, 0x5f, 0x5b, 0x8a, 0xbb, 0x34},
+ {0xde, 0xaf, 0xba, 0xff, 0x18, 0x59, 0xce, 0x43, 0x38, 0x54, 0xe5, 0xcb, 0x41, 0x52, 0xf6, 0x26},
+ {0x78, 0xc9, 0x9e, 0x83, 0xf7, 0x9c, 0xca, 0xa2, 0x6a, 0x02, 0xf3, 0xb9, 0x54, 0x9a, 0xe9, 0x4c},
+ {0x35, 0x12, 0x90, 0x22, 0x28, 0x6e, 0xc0, 0x40, 0xbe, 0xf7, 0xdf, 0x1b, 0x1a, 0xa5, 0x51, 0xae},
+ {0xcf, 0x59, 0xa6, 0x48, 0x0f, 0xbc, 0x73, 0xc1, 0x2b, 0xd2, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x61, 0xc1, 0xa0},
+ {0xa1, 0x9d, 0xc5, 0xe9, 0xfd, 0xbd, 0xd6, 0x4a, 0x88, 0x82, 0x28, 0x02, 0x03, 0xcc, 0x6a, 0x75}
+};
+
+static unsigned char rc[40][16];
+static unsigned char rc_sseed[40][16];
+
+static const unsigned char sbox[256] = {
+ 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe,
+ 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4,
+ 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7,
+ 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15, 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3,
+ 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x09,
+ 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3,
+ 0x2f, 0x84, 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe,
+ 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85,
+ 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8, 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92,
+ 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x0c,
+ 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19,
+ 0x73, 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14,
+ 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2,
+ 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79, 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5,
+ 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08, 0xba, 0x78, 0x25,
+ 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a,
+ 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86,
+ 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e,
+ 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42,
+ 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
+};
+
+#define XT(x) (((x) << 1) ^ ((((x) >> 7) & 1) * 0x1b))
+
+// Simulate _mm_aesenc_si128 instructions from AESNI
+static void aesenc(unsigned char *s, const unsigned char *rk) {
+ uint8_t i, t, u, v[4][4];
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ v[((i / 4) + 4 - (i % 4) ) % 4][i % 4] = sbox[s[i]];
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+ t = v[i][0];
+ u = v[i][0] ^ v[i][1] ^ v[i][2] ^ v[i][3];
+ v[i][0] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][0] ^ v[i][1]));
+ v[i][1] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][1] ^ v[i][2]));
+ v[i][2] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][2] ^ v[i][3]));
+ v[i][3] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][3] ^ t));
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ s[i] = v[i / 4][i % 4] ^ rk[i];
+ }
+}
+
+// Simulate _mm_unpacklo_epi32
+static void unpacklo32(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ memcpy(tmp, a, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 4, b, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 8, a + 4, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 12, b + 4, 4);
+ memcpy(t, tmp, 16);
+}
+
+// Simulate _mm_unpackhi_epi32
+static void unpackhi32(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ memcpy(tmp, a + 8, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 4, b + 8, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 8, a + 12, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 12, b + 12, 4);
+ memcpy(t, tmp, 16);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_tweak_constants(
+ const unsigned char *pk_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ unsigned long long seed_length) {
+ unsigned char buf[40 * 16];
+
+ /* Use the standard constants to generate tweaked ones. */
+ memcpy(rc, haraka_rc, 40 * 16);
+
+ /* Constants for sk.seed */
+ if (sk_seed != NULL) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(buf, 40 * 16, sk_seed, seed_length);
+ memcpy(rc_sseed, buf, 40 * 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Constants for pk.seed */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(buf, 40 * 16, pk_seed, seed_length);
+ memcpy(rc, buf, 40 * 16);
+}
+
+static void haraka_S_absorb(unsigned char *s, unsigned int r,
+ const unsigned char *m, unsigned long long mlen,
+ unsigned char p) {
+ unsigned long long i;
+ unsigned char t[r];
+
+ while (mlen >= r) {
+ // XOR block to state
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ s[i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s, s);
+ mlen -= r;
+ m += r;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ t[i] = 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; ++i) {
+ t[i] = m[i];
+ }
+ t[i] = p;
+ t[r - 1] |= 128;
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ s[i] ^= t[i];
+ }
+}
+
+static void haraka_S_squeezeblocks(unsigned char *h, unsigned long long nblocks,
+ unsigned char *s, unsigned int r) {
+ while (nblocks > 0) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s, s);
+ memcpy(h, s, HARAKAS_RATE);
+ h += r;
+ nblocks--;
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ s_inc[i] = 0;
+ }
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(uint8_t *s_inc, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Recall that s_inc[64] is the non-absorbed bytes xored into the state */
+ while (mlen + s_inc[64] >= HARAKAS_RATE) {
+ for (i = 0; i < (size_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64]); i++) {
+ /* Take the i'th byte from message
+ xor with the s_inc[64] + i'th byte of the state */
+ s_inc[s_inc[64] + i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ mlen -= (size_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64]);
+ m += HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64];
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s_inc, s_inc);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; i++) {
+ s_inc[s_inc[64] + i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(mlen + s_inc[64]);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ /* After haraka_S_inc_absorb, we are guaranteed that s_inc[64] < HARAKAS_RATE,
+ so we can always use one more byte for p in the current state. */
+ s_inc[s_inc[64]] ^= 0x1F;
+ s_inc[HARAKAS_RATE - 1] ^= 128;
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ uint8_t i;
+
+ /* First consume any bytes we still have sitting around */
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen && i < s_inc[64]; i++) {
+ /* There are s_inc[64] bytes left, so r - s_inc[64] is the first
+ available byte. We consume from there, i.e., up to r. */
+ out[i] = s_inc[(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64] + i)];
+ }
+ out += i;
+ outlen -= i;
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(s_inc[64] - i);
+
+ /* Then squeeze the remaining necessary blocks */
+ while (outlen > 0) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s_inc, s_inc);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen && i < HARAKAS_RATE; i++) {
+ out[i] = s_inc[i];
+ }
+ out += i;
+ outlen -= i;
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - i);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned long long outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen) {
+ unsigned long long i;
+ unsigned char s[64];
+ unsigned char d[32];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ s[i] = 0;
+ }
+ haraka_S_absorb(s, 32, in, inlen, 0x1F);
+
+ haraka_S_squeezeblocks(out, outlen / 32, s, 32);
+ out += (outlen / 32) * 32;
+
+ if (outlen % 32) {
+ haraka_S_squeezeblocks(d, 1, s, 32);
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen % 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = d[i];
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[64], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 32, in + 32, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 48, in + 48, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 1]);
+ aesenc(s + 32, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 2]);
+ aesenc(s + 48, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 3]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s, s, s + 16);
+ unpacklo32(s + 16, s + 32, s + 48);
+ unpackhi32(s + 32, s + 32, s + 48);
+ unpacklo32(s + 48, s, s + 32);
+ unpackhi32(s, s, s + 32);
+ unpackhi32(s + 32, s + 16, tmp);
+ unpacklo32(s + 16, s + 16, tmp);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(out, s, 64);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i;
+
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(buf, in);
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ buf[i] = buf[i] ^ in[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Truncated */
+ memcpy(out, buf + 8, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 8, buf + 24, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 16, buf + 32, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 24, buf + 48, 8);
+}
+
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[32], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j + 1]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s + 16, s, s + 16);
+ memcpy(s, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ s[i];
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[32], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc_sseed[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc_sseed[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j + 1]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s + 16, s, s + 16);
+ memcpy(s, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ s[i];
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/haraka.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/haraka.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0c477c31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/haraka.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_HARAKA_H
+#define SPX_HARAKA_H
+
+/* Tweak constants with seed */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_tweak_constants(
+ const unsigned char *pk_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ unsigned long long seed_length);
+
+/* Haraka Sponge */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(uint8_t *s_inc, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned long long outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen);
+
+/* Applies the 512-bit Haraka permutation to in. */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-512 */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-256 */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-256 using sk.seed constants */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/hash.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/hash.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..dd194f67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/hash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifndef SPX_HASH_H
+#define SPX_HASH_H
+
+#include
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf, const unsigned char *optrand,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ unsigned char *digest, uint64_t *tree, uint32_t *leaf_idx,
+ const unsigned char *R, const unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/hash_haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/hash_haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1c18e3fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/hash_haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_tweak_constants(pub_seed, sk_seed, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes PRF(key, addr), given a secret key of SPX_N bytes and an address
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES];
+ /* Since SPX_N may be smaller than 32, we need a temporary buffer. */
+ unsigned char outbuf[32];
+
+ (void)key; /* Suppress an 'unused parameter' warning. */
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf, addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(outbuf, buf);
+ memcpy(out, outbuf, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the message-dependent randomness R, using a secret seed and an
+ * optional randomization value as well as the message.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf, const unsigned char *optrand,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) {
+ uint8_t s_inc[65];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, sk_prf, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, optrand, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, m, mlen);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(R, SPX_N, s_inc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the message hash using R, the public key, and the message.
+ * Outputs the message digest and the index of the leaf. The index is split in
+ * the tree index and the leaf index, for convenient copying to an address.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ unsigned char *digest, uint64_t *tree, uint32_t *leaf_idx,
+ const unsigned char *R, const unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) {
+#define SPX_TREE_BITS (SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * (SPX_D - 1))
+#define SPX_TREE_BYTES ((SPX_TREE_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_LEAF_BITS SPX_TREE_HEIGHT
+#define SPX_LEAF_BYTES ((SPX_LEAF_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_DGST_BYTES (SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES + SPX_TREE_BYTES + SPX_LEAF_BYTES)
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_DGST_BYTES];
+ unsigned char *bufp = buf;
+ uint8_t s_inc[65];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, R, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, pk, SPX_PK_BYTES);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, m, mlen);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(buf, SPX_DGST_BYTES, s_inc);
+
+ memcpy(digest, bufp, SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES);
+ bufp += SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES;
+
+ *tree = PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(bufp, SPX_TREE_BYTES);
+ *tree &= (~(uint64_t)0) >> (64 - SPX_TREE_BITS);
+ bufp += SPX_TREE_BYTES;
+
+ *leaf_idx = (uint32_t)PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ bufp, SPX_LEAF_BYTES);
+ *leaf_idx &= (~(uint32_t)0) >> (32 - SPX_LEAF_BITS);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/params.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/params.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..483b5374
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/params.h
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#ifndef SPX_PARAMS_H
+#define SPX_PARAMS_H
+
+/* Hash output length in bytes. */
+#define SPX_N 24
+/* Height of the hypertree. */
+#define SPX_FULL_HEIGHT 64
+/* Number of subtree layer. */
+#define SPX_D 8
+/* FORS tree dimensions. */
+#define SPX_FORS_HEIGHT 16
+#define SPX_FORS_TREES 14
+/* Winternitz parameter, */
+#define SPX_WOTS_W 16
+
+/* The hash function is defined by linking a different hash.c file, as opposed
+ to setting a #define constant. */
+
+/* For clarity */
+#define SPX_ADDR_BYTES 32
+
+/* WOTS parameters. */
+#define SPX_WOTS_LOGW 4
+
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN1 (8 * SPX_N / SPX_WOTS_LOGW)
+
+/* SPX_WOTS_LEN2 is floor(log(len_1 * (w - 1)) / log(w)) + 1; we precompute */
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN2 3
+
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN (SPX_WOTS_LEN1 + SPX_WOTS_LEN2)
+#define SPX_WOTS_BYTES (SPX_WOTS_LEN * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_WOTS_PK_BYTES SPX_WOTS_BYTES
+
+/* Subtree size. */
+#define SPX_TREE_HEIGHT (SPX_FULL_HEIGHT / SPX_D)
+
+/* FORS parameters. */
+#define SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES ((SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_FORS_BYTES ((SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1) * SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_FORS_PK_BYTES SPX_N
+
+/* Resulting SPX sizes. */
+#define SPX_BYTES (SPX_N + SPX_FORS_BYTES + SPX_D * SPX_WOTS_BYTES +\
+ SPX_FULL_HEIGHT * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_PK_BYTES (2 * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_SK_BYTES (2 * SPX_N + SPX_PK_BYTES)
+
+/* Optionally, signing can be made non-deterministic using optrand.
+ This can help counter side-channel attacks that would benefit from
+ getting a large number of traces when the signer uses the same nodes. */
+#define SPX_OPTRAND_BYTES 32
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/sign.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b6a883e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "api.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "randombytes.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "wots.h"
+
+/**
+ * Computes the leaf at a given address. First generates the WOTS key pair,
+ * then computes leaf by hashing horizontally.
+ */
+static void wots_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+ unsigned char pk[SPX_WOTS_BYTES];
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t wots_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, addr_idx);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ pk, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ wots_pk_addr, wots_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ leaf, pk, pub_seed, wots_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates an SPX key pair given a seed of length
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [PUB_SEED || root]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed) {
+ /* We do not need the auth path in key generation, but it simplifies the
+ code to have just one treehash routine that computes both root and path
+ in one function. */
+ unsigned char auth_path[SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t top_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ top_tree_addr, SPX_D - 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ top_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+
+ /* Initialize SK_SEED, SK_PRF and PUB_SEED from seed. */
+ memcpy(sk, seed, PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES);
+
+ memcpy(pk, sk + 2 * SPX_N, SPX_N);
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(pk, sk);
+
+ /* Compute root node of the top-most subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ sk + 3 * SPX_N, auth_path, sk, sk + 2 * SPX_N, 0, 0,
+ wots_gen_leaf, top_tree_addr);
+
+ memcpy(pk + SPX_N, sk + 3 * SPX_N, SPX_N);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates an SPX key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [PUB_SEED || root]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
+ unsigned char seed[PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES];
+ randombytes(seed, PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ pk, sk, seed);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed = sk;
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf = sk + SPX_N;
+ const unsigned char *pk = sk + 2 * SPX_N;
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed = pk;
+
+ unsigned char optrand[SPX_N];
+ unsigned char mhash[SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+ unsigned char root[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t i;
+ uint64_t tree;
+ uint32_t idx_leaf;
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ pub_seed, sk_seed);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+
+ /* Optionally, signing can be made non-deterministic using optrand.
+ This can help counter side-channel attacks that would benefit from
+ getting a large number of traces when the signer uses the same nodes. */
+ randombytes(optrand, SPX_N);
+ /* Compute the digest randomization value. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ sig, sk_prf, optrand, m, mlen);
+
+ /* Derive the message digest and leaf index from R, PK and M. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ mhash, &tree, &idx_leaf, sig, pk, m, mlen);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(wots_addr, tree);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ /* Sign the message hash using FORS. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ sig, root, mhash, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_FORS_BYTES;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_D; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(tree_addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(tree_addr, tree);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ /* Compute a WOTS signature. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ sig, root, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_WOTS_BYTES;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for the used WOTS leaf. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ root, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed, idx_leaf, 0,
+ wots_gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N;
+
+ /* Update the indices for the next layer. */
+ idx_leaf = (tree & ((1 << SPX_TREE_HEIGHT) - 1));
+ tree = tree >> SPX_TREE_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ *siglen = SPX_BYTES;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed = pk;
+ const unsigned char *pub_root = pk + SPX_N;
+ unsigned char mhash[SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+ unsigned char wots_pk[SPX_WOTS_BYTES];
+ unsigned char root[SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ unsigned int i;
+ uint64_t tree;
+ uint32_t idx_leaf;
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t wots_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ if (siglen != SPX_BYTES) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ pub_seed, NULL);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK);
+
+ /* Derive the message digest and leaf index from R || PK || M. */
+ /* The additional SPX_N is a result of the hash domain separator. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ mhash, &tree, &idx_leaf, sig, pk, m, mlen);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Layer correctly defaults to 0, so no need to set_layer_addr */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(wots_addr, tree);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ root, sig, mhash, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_FORS_BYTES;
+
+ /* For each subtree.. */
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_D; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(tree_addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(tree_addr, tree);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ wots_pk_addr, wots_addr);
+
+ /* The WOTS public key is only correct if the signature was correct. */
+ /* Initially, root is the FORS pk, but on subsequent iterations it is
+ the root of the subtree below the currently processed subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ wots_pk, sig, root, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_WOTS_BYTES;
+
+ /* Compute the leaf node using the WOTS public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ leaf, wots_pk, pub_seed, wots_pk_addr);
+
+ /* Compute the root node of this subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ root, leaf, idx_leaf, 0, sig, SPX_TREE_HEIGHT,
+ pub_seed, tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N;
+
+ /* Update the indices for the next layer. */
+ idx_leaf = (tree & ((1 << SPX_TREE_HEIGHT) - 1));
+ tree = tree >> SPX_TREE_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the root node equals the root node in the public key. */
+ if (memcmp(root, pub_root, SPX_N) != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
+ size_t siglen;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ sm, &siglen, m, mlen, sk);
+
+ memmove(sm + SPX_BYTES, m, mlen);
+ *smlen = siglen + mlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
+ /* The API caller does not necessarily know what size a signature should be
+ but SPHINCS+ signatures are always exactly SPX_BYTES. */
+ if (smlen < SPX_BYTES) {
+ memset(m, 0, smlen);
+ *mlen = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *mlen = smlen - SPX_BYTES;
+
+ if (PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ sm, SPX_BYTES, sm + SPX_BYTES, *mlen, pk)) {
+ memset(m, 0, smlen);
+ *mlen = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* If verification was successful, move the message to the right place. */
+ memmove(m, sm + SPX_BYTES, *mlen);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/thash.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/thash.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..37e6145b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/thash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifndef SPX_THASH_H
+#define SPX_THASH_H
+
+#include
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/thash_haraka_simple.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/thash_haraka_simple.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..609785cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/thash_haraka_simple.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+/**
+ * Takes an array of inblocks concatenated arrays of SPX_N bytes.
+ */
+static void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inblocks,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char outbuf[32];
+ unsigned char buf_tmp[64];
+
+ (void)pub_seed; /* Suppress an 'unused parameter' warning. */
+
+ if (inblocks == 1) {
+ /* F function */
+ /* Since SPX_N may be smaller than 32, we need a temporary buffer. */
+ memset(buf_tmp, 0, 64);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf_tmp, addr);
+ memcpy(buf_tmp + SPX_ADDR_BYTES, in, SPX_N);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka512(outbuf, buf_tmp);
+ memcpy(out, outbuf, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ /* All other tweakable hashes*/
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf, addr);
+ memcpy(buf + SPX_ADDR_BYTES, in, inblocks * SPX_N);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ out, SPX_N, buf, SPX_ADDR_BYTES + inblocks * SPX_N);
+ }
+}
+
+/* The wrappers below ensure that we use fixed-size buffers on the stack */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + 1 * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, 1, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + 2 * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, 2, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + SPX_WOTS_LEN * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, SPX_WOTS_LEN, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, SPX_FORS_TREES, pub_seed, addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/utils.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f278b046
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+/**
+ * Converts the value of 'in' to 'outlen' bytes in big-endian byte order.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned long long in) {
+
+ /* Iterate over out in decreasing order, for big-endianness. */
+ for (size_t i = outlen; i > 0; i--) {
+ out[i - 1] = in & 0xff;
+ in = in >> 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Converts the inlen bytes in 'in' from big-endian byte order to an integer.
+ */
+unsigned long long PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) {
+ unsigned long long retval = 0;
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < inlen; i++) {
+ retval |= ((unsigned long long)in[i]) << (8 * (inlen - 1 - i));
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an auth path.
+ * Expects address to be complete other than the tree_height and tree_index.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ const unsigned char *auth_path, uint32_t tree_height,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+ unsigned char buffer[2 * SPX_N];
+
+ /* If leaf_idx is odd (last bit = 1), current path element is a right child
+ and auth_path has to go left. Otherwise it is the other way around. */
+ if (leaf_idx & 1) {
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, leaf, SPX_N);
+ memcpy(buffer, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(buffer, leaf, SPX_N);
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ }
+ auth_path += SPX_N;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tree_height - 1; i++) {
+ leaf_idx >>= 1;
+ idx_offset >>= 1;
+ /* Set the address of the node we're creating. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(addr, i + 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ addr, leaf_idx + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Pick the right or left neighbor, depending on parity of the node. */
+ if (leaf_idx & 1) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ buffer + SPX_N, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+ memcpy(buffer, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ buffer, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ }
+ auth_path += SPX_N;
+ }
+
+ /* The last iteration is exceptional; we do not copy an auth_path node. */
+ leaf_idx >>= 1;
+ idx_offset >>= 1;
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(addr, tree_height);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ addr, leaf_idx + idx_offset);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ root, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * For a given leaf index, computes the authentication path and the resulting
+ * root node using Merkle's TreeHash algorithm.
+ * Expects the layer and tree parts of the tree_addr to be set, as well as the
+ * tree type (i.e. SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE or SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE).
+ * Applies the offset idx_offset to indices before building addresses, so that
+ * it is possible to continue counting indices across trees.
+ */
+static void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ unsigned char *stack, unsigned int *heights,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset, uint32_t tree_height,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+ uint32_t idx;
+ uint32_t tree_idx;
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < (uint32_t)(1 << tree_height); idx++) {
+ /* Add the next leaf node to the stack. */
+ gen_leaf(stack + offset * SPX_N,
+ sk_seed, pub_seed, idx + idx_offset, tree_addr);
+ offset++;
+ heights[offset - 1] = 0;
+
+ /* If this is a node we need for the auth path.. */
+ if ((leaf_idx ^ 0x1) == idx) {
+ memcpy(auth_path, stack + (offset - 1)*SPX_N, SPX_N);
+ }
+
+ /* While the top-most nodes are of equal height.. */
+ while (offset >= 2 && heights[offset - 1] == heights[offset - 2]) {
+ /* Compute index of the new node, in the next layer. */
+ tree_idx = (idx >> (heights[offset - 1] + 1));
+
+ /* Set the address of the node we're creating. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ tree_addr, heights[offset - 1] + 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ tree_addr, tree_idx + (idx_offset >> (heights[offset - 1] + 1)));
+ /* Hash the top-most nodes from the stack together. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ stack + (offset - 2)*SPX_N, stack + (offset - 2)*SPX_N,
+ pub_seed, tree_addr);
+ offset--;
+ /* Note that the top-most node is now one layer higher. */
+ heights[offset - 1]++;
+
+ /* If this is a node we need for the auth path.. */
+ if (((leaf_idx >> heights[offset - 1]) ^ 0x1) == tree_idx) {
+ memcpy(auth_path + heights[offset - 1]*SPX_N,
+ stack + (offset - 1)*SPX_N, SPX_N);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(root, stack, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/* The wrappers below ensure that we use fixed-size buffers on the stack */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char stack[(SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1)*SPX_N];
+ unsigned int heights[SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash(
+ root, auth_path, stack, heights, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ leaf_idx, idx_offset, SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char stack[(SPX_TREE_HEIGHT + 1)*SPX_N];
+ unsigned int heights[SPX_TREE_HEIGHT + 1];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash(
+ root, auth_path, stack, heights, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ leaf_idx, idx_offset, SPX_TREE_HEIGHT, gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/utils.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/utils.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ca9cdd84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/utils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+#ifndef SPX_UTILS_H
+#define SPX_UTILS_H
+
+#include "params.h"
+#include
+#include
+
+/**
+ * Converts the value of 'in' to 'outlen' bytes in big-endian byte order.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned long long in);
+
+/**
+ * Converts the inlen bytes in 'in' from big-endian byte order to an integer.
+ */
+unsigned long long PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an auth path.
+ * Expects address to be complete other than the tree_height and tree_index.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ const unsigned char *auth_path, uint32_t tree_height,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * For a given leaf index, computes the authentication path and the resulting
+ * root node using Merkle's TreeHash algorithm.
+ * Expects the layer and tree parts of the tree_addr to be set, as well as the
+ * tree type (i.e. SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE or SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE).
+ * Applies the offset idx_offset to indices before building addresses, so that
+ * it is possible to continue counting indices across trees.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/wots.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/wots.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3f0d9161
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/wots.c
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "wots.h"
+
+// TODO clarify address expectations, and make them more uniform.
+// TODO i.e. do we expect types to be set already?
+// TODO and do we expect modifications or copies?
+
+/**
+ * Computes the starting value for a chain, i.e. the secret key.
+ * Expects the address to be complete up to the chain address.
+ */
+static void wots_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8]) {
+ /* Make sure that the hash address is actually zeroed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(wots_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Generate sk element. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_prf_addr(sk, sk_seed, wots_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the chaining function.
+ * out and in have to be n-byte arrays.
+ *
+ * Interprets in as start-th value of the chain.
+ * addr has to contain the address of the chain.
+ */
+static void gen_chain(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int start, unsigned int steps,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ /* Initialize out with the value at position 'start'. */
+ memcpy(out, in, SPX_N);
+
+ /* Iterate 'steps' calls to the hash function. */
+ for (i = start; i < (start + steps) && i < SPX_WOTS_W; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ out, out, pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * base_w algorithm as described in draft.
+ * Interprets an array of bytes as integers in base w.
+ * This only works when log_w is a divisor of 8.
+ */
+static void base_w(unsigned int *output, const size_t out_len,
+ const unsigned char *input) {
+ size_t in = 0;
+ size_t out = 0;
+ unsigned char total = 0;
+ unsigned int bits = 0;
+ size_t consumed;
+
+ for (consumed = 0; consumed < out_len; consumed++) {
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ total = input[in];
+ in++;
+ bits += 8;
+ }
+ bits -= SPX_WOTS_LOGW;
+ output[out] = (unsigned int)((total >> bits) & (SPX_WOTS_W - 1));
+ out++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Computes the WOTS+ checksum over a message (in base_w). */
+static void wots_checksum(unsigned int *csum_base_w,
+ const unsigned int *msg_base_w) {
+ unsigned int csum = 0;
+ unsigned char csum_bytes[(SPX_WOTS_LEN2 * SPX_WOTS_LOGW + 7) / 8];
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ /* Compute checksum. */
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN1; i++) {
+ csum += SPX_WOTS_W - 1 - msg_base_w[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Convert checksum to base_w. */
+ /* Make sure expected empty zero bits are the least significant bits. */
+ csum = csum << (8 - ((SPX_WOTS_LEN2 * SPX_WOTS_LOGW) % 8));
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ csum_bytes, sizeof(csum_bytes), csum);
+ base_w(csum_base_w, SPX_WOTS_LEN2, csum_bytes);
+}
+
+/* Takes a message and derives the matching chain lengths. */
+static void chain_lengths(unsigned int *lengths, const unsigned char *msg) {
+ base_w(lengths, SPX_WOTS_LEN1, msg);
+ wots_checksum(lengths + SPX_WOTS_LEN1, lengths);
+}
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32 byte sk_seed, expands it to WOTS private key
+ * elements and computes the corresponding public key.
+ * It requires the seed pub_seed (used to generate bitmasks and hash keys)
+ * and the address of this WOTS key pair.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ wots_gen_sk(pk + i * SPX_N, sk_seed, addr);
+ gen_chain(pk + i * SPX_N, pk + i * SPX_N,
+ 0, SPX_WOTS_W - 1, pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Takes a n-byte message and the 32-byte sk_see to compute a signature 'sig'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned int lengths[SPX_WOTS_LEN];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ chain_lengths(lengths, msg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ wots_gen_sk(sig + i * SPX_N, sk_seed, addr);
+ gen_chain(sig + i * SPX_N, sig + i * SPX_N, 0, lengths[i], pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature and an n-byte message, computes a WOTS public key.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned int lengths[SPX_WOTS_LEN];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ chain_lengths(lengths, msg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ gen_chain(pk + i * SPX_N, sig + i * SPX_N,
+ lengths[i], SPX_WOTS_W - 1 - lengths[i], pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/wots.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/wots.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4811bb71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-192s-simple/clean/wots.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#ifndef SPX_WOTS_H
+#define SPX_WOTS_H
+
+#include "params.h"
+#include
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32 byte seed for the private key, expands it to
+ * a full WOTS private key and computes the corresponding public key.
+ * It requires the seed pub_seed (used to generate bitmasks and hash keys)
+ * and the address of this WOTS key pair.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a n-byte message and the 32-byte seed for the private key to compute a
+ * signature that is placed at 'sig'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature and an n-byte message, computes a WOTS public key.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA192SSIMPLE_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/META.yml b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/META.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..af9dcc0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/META.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+name: SPHINCS+
+type: signature
+claimed-nist-level: 5
+length-public-key: 64
+length-signature: 49216
+testvectors-sha256: e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855
+principal-submitter: Andreas Hülsing
+auxiliary-submitters:
+ - Jean-Philippe Aumasson
+ - Daniel J. Bernstein,
+ - Christoph Dobraunig
+ - Maria Eichlseder
+ - Scott Fluhrer
+ - Stefan-Lukas Gazdag
+ - Panos Kampanakis
+ - Stefan Kölbl
+ - Tanja Lange
+ - Martin M. Lauridsen
+ - Florian Mendel
+ - Ruben Niederhagen
+ - Christian Rechberger
+ - Joost Rijneveld
+ - Peter Schwabe
+implementations:
+ - name: clean
+ version: https://github.com/sphincs/sphincsplus/commit/492ec4f1f6d3b3dc4b435783bbaaf4e41cdb6f32
+ length-secret-key: 128
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/LICENSE b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/LICENSE
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..670154e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/LICENSE
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+CC0 1.0 Universal
+
+Statement of Purpose
+
+The laws of most jurisdictions throughout the world automatically confer
+exclusive Copyright and Related Rights (defined below) upon the creator and
+subsequent owner(s) (each and all, an "owner") of an original work of
+authorship and/or a database (each, a "Work").
+
+Certain owners wish to permanently relinquish those rights to a Work for the
+purpose of contributing to a commons of creative, cultural and scientific
+works ("Commons") that the public can reliably and without fear of later
+claims of infringement build upon, modify, incorporate in other works, reuse
+and redistribute as freely as possible in any form whatsoever and for any
+purposes, including without limitation commercial purposes. These owners may
+contribute to the Commons to promote the ideal of a free culture and the
+further production of creative, cultural and scientific works, or to gain
+reputation or greater distribution for their Work in part through the use and
+efforts of others.
+
+For these and/or other purposes and motivations, and without any expectation
+of additional consideration or compensation, the person associating CC0 with a
+Work (the "Affirmer"), to the extent that he or she is an owner of Copyright
+and Related Rights in the Work, voluntarily elects to apply CC0 to the Work
+and publicly distribute the Work under its terms, with knowledge of his or her
+Copyright and Related Rights in the Work and the meaning and intended legal
+effect of CC0 on those rights.
+
+1. Copyright and Related Rights. A Work made available under CC0 may be
+protected by copyright and related or neighboring rights ("Copyright and
+Related Rights"). Copyright and Related Rights include, but are not limited
+to, the following:
+
+ i. the right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, display, communicate,
+ and translate a Work;
+
+ ii. moral rights retained by the original author(s) and/or performer(s);
+
+ iii. publicity and privacy rights pertaining to a person's image or likeness
+ depicted in a Work;
+
+ iv. rights protecting against unfair competition in regards to a Work,
+ subject to the limitations in paragraph 4(a), below;
+
+ v. rights protecting the extraction, dissemination, use and reuse of data in
+ a Work;
+
+ vi. database rights (such as those arising under Directive 96/9/EC of the
+ European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal
+ protection of databases, and under any national implementation thereof,
+ including any amended or successor version of such directive); and
+
+ vii. other similar, equivalent or corresponding rights throughout the world
+ based on applicable law or treaty, and any national implementations thereof.
+
+2. Waiver. To the greatest extent permitted by, but not in contravention of,
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+unconditionally waives, abandons, and surrenders all of Affirmer's Copyright
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+
+3. Public License Fallback. Should any part of the Waiver for any reason be
+judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, then the Waiver
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+invalidate the remainder of the License, and in such case Affirmer hereby
+affirms that he or she will not (i) exercise any of his or her remaining
+Copyright and Related Rights in the Work or (ii) assert any associated claims
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+
+4. Limitations and Disclaimers.
+
+ a. No trademark or patent rights held by Affirmer are waived, abandoned,
+ surrendered, licensed or otherwise affected by this document.
+
+ b. Affirmer offers the Work as-is and makes no representations or warranties
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+ discoverable, all to the greatest extent permissible under applicable law.
+
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+ or other rights required for any use of the Work.
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+For more information, please see
+
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/Makefile b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..65645c8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with GNU Make or BSD Make
+
+LIB=libsphincs-haraka-256f-robust_clean.a
+
+HEADERS = params.h address.h wots.h utils.h fors.h api.h hash.h thash.h haraka.h
+OBJECTS = address.o wots.o utils.o fors.o sign.o hash_haraka.o thash_haraka_robust.o haraka.o
+
+CFLAGS=-Wall -Wconversion -Wextra -Wpedantic -Werror -Wmissing-prototypes -std=c99 -I../../../common $(EXTRAFLAGS)
+
+all: $(LIB)
+
+%.o: %.c $(HEADERS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
+
+$(LIB): $(OBJECTS)
+ $(AR) -r $@ $(OBJECTS)
+
+clean:
+ $(RM) $(OBJECTS)
+ $(RM) $(LIB)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8473eee7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with Microsoft Visual Studio's nmake using the command:
+# nmake /f Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
+
+LIBRARY=libsphincs-haraka-256f-robust_clean.lib
+OBJECTS=address.obj wots.obj utils.obj fors.obj sign.obj hash_haraka.obj thash_haraka_robust.obj haraka.obj
+
+CFLAGS=/nologo /I ..\..\..\common /W4 /WX
+
+all: $(LIBRARY)
+
+# Make sure objects are recompiled if headers change.
+$(OBJECTS): *.h
+
+$(LIBRARY): $(OBJECTS)
+ LIB.EXE /NOLOGO /WX /OUT:$@ $**
+
+clean:
+ -DEL $(OBJECTS)
+ -DEL $(LIBRARY)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/address.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/address.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..11da5bb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/address.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ bytes + i * 4, 4, addr[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer) {
+ addr[0] = layer;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree) {
+ addr[1] = 0;
+ addr[2] = (uint32_t) (tree >> 32);
+ addr[3] = (uint32_t) tree;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type) {
+ addr[4] = type;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for OTS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair) {
+ addr[5] = keypair;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+ out[5] = in[5];
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain) {
+ addr[6] = chain;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash) {
+ addr[7] = hash;
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height) {
+ addr[6] = tree_height;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index) {
+ addr[7] = tree_index;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/address.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/address.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9a4abe1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/address.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+#ifndef SPX_ADDRESS_H
+#define SPX_ADDRESS_H
+
+#include
+
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS 0
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK 1
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE 2
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE 3
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK 4
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type);
+
+/* Copies the layer and tree part of one address into the other */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for WOTS and FORS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/api.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/api.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..85527e7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/api.h
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#ifndef PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_API_H
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_API_H
+
+#include
+#include
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_ALGNAME "SPHINCS+"
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES 64
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES 32
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES 16976
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES 48
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair given a seed.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/fors.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/fors.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ff62962b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/fors.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+static void fors_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ sk, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_sk_to_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ leaf, sk, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* Only copy the parts that must be kept in fors_leaf_addr. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_leaf_addr, fors_tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_leaf_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_leaf_addr, addr_idx);
+
+ fors_gen_sk(leaf, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, leaf, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Interprets m as SPX_FORS_HEIGHT-bit unsigned integers.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ * Assumes indices has space for SPX_FORS_TREES integers.
+ */
+static void message_to_indices(uint32_t *indices, const unsigned char *m) {
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ indices[i] = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < SPX_FORS_HEIGHT; j++) {
+ indices[i] ^= (((uint32_t)m[offset >> 3] >> (offset & 0x7)) & 0x1) << j;
+ offset++;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Include the secret key part that produces the selected leaf node. */
+ fors_gen_sk(sig, sk_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for this leaf node. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ indices[i], idx_offset, fors_gen_leaf, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Derive the leaf from the included secret key part. */
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, sig, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Derive the corresponding root node of this tree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, leaf, indices[i], idx_offset, sig,
+ SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/fors.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/fors.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e87300ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/fors.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_FORS_H
+#define SPX_FORS_H
+
+#include
+
+#include "params.h"
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..358d9ecb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+/*
+Plain C implementation of the Haraka256 and Haraka512 permutations.
+*/
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+#define HARAKAS_RATE 32
+
+static const unsigned char haraka_rc[40][16] = {
+ {0x9d, 0x7b, 0x81, 0x75, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xc5, 0xb2, 0x0a, 0xc0, 0x20, 0xe6, 0x4c, 0x70, 0x84, 0x06},
+ {0x17, 0xf7, 0x08, 0x2f, 0xa4, 0x6b, 0x0f, 0x64, 0x6b, 0xa0, 0xf3, 0x88, 0xe1, 0xb4, 0x66, 0x8b},
+ {0x14, 0x91, 0x02, 0x9f, 0x60, 0x9d, 0x02, 0xcf, 0x98, 0x84, 0xf2, 0x53, 0x2d, 0xde, 0x02, 0x34},
+ {0x79, 0x4f, 0x5b, 0xfd, 0xaf, 0xbc, 0xf3, 0xbb, 0x08, 0x4f, 0x7b, 0x2e, 0xe6, 0xea, 0xd6, 0x0e},
+ {0x44, 0x70, 0x39, 0xbe, 0x1c, 0xcd, 0xee, 0x79, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x72, 0x48, 0xcb, 0xb0, 0xcf, 0xcb},
+ {0x7b, 0x05, 0x8a, 0x2b, 0xed, 0x35, 0x53, 0x8d, 0xb7, 0x32, 0x90, 0x6e, 0xee, 0xcd, 0xea, 0x7e},
+ {0x1b, 0xef, 0x4f, 0xda, 0x61, 0x27, 0x41, 0xe2, 0xd0, 0x7c, 0x2e, 0x5e, 0x43, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x67},
+ {0x3b, 0x0b, 0xc7, 0x1f, 0xe2, 0xfd, 0x5f, 0x67, 0x07, 0xcc, 0xca, 0xaf, 0xb0, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x29},
+ {0xee, 0x65, 0xd4, 0xb9, 0xca, 0x8f, 0xdb, 0xec, 0xe9, 0x7f, 0x86, 0xe6, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x4d, 0xab},
+ {0x33, 0x7e, 0x03, 0xad, 0x4f, 0x40, 0x2a, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xcd, 0xb7, 0xd4, 0x84, 0xbf, 0x30, 0x1c},
+ {0x00, 0x98, 0xf6, 0x8d, 0x2e, 0x8b, 0x02, 0x69, 0xbf, 0x23, 0x17, 0x94, 0xb9, 0x0b, 0xcc, 0xb2},
+ {0x8a, 0x2d, 0x9d, 0x5c, 0xc8, 0x9e, 0xaa, 0x4a, 0x72, 0x55, 0x6f, 0xde, 0xa6, 0x78, 0x04, 0xfa},
+ {0xd4, 0x9f, 0x12, 0x29, 0x2e, 0x4f, 0xfa, 0x0e, 0x12, 0x2a, 0x77, 0x6b, 0x2b, 0x9f, 0xb4, 0xdf},
+ {0xee, 0x12, 0x6a, 0xbb, 0xae, 0x11, 0xd6, 0x32, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x49, 0xf4, 0x44, 0x03, 0xa1, 0x1e},
+ {0xa6, 0xec, 0xa8, 0x9c, 0xc9, 0x00, 0x96, 0x5f, 0x84, 0x00, 0x05, 0x4b, 0x88, 0x49, 0x04, 0xaf},
+ {0xec, 0x93, 0xe5, 0x27, 0xe3, 0xc7, 0xa2, 0x78, 0x4f, 0x9c, 0x19, 0x9d, 0xd8, 0x5e, 0x02, 0x21},
+ {0x73, 0x01, 0xd4, 0x82, 0xcd, 0x2e, 0x28, 0xb9, 0xb7, 0xc9, 0x59, 0xa7, 0xf8, 0xaa, 0x3a, 0xbf},
+ {0x6b, 0x7d, 0x30, 0x10, 0xd9, 0xef, 0xf2, 0x37, 0x17, 0xb0, 0x86, 0x61, 0x0d, 0x70, 0x60, 0x62},
+ {0xc6, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0xf6, 0x53, 0x91, 0xc2, 0x81, 0x43, 0x04, 0x30, 0x21, 0xc2, 0x45, 0xca, 0x5a},
+ {0x3a, 0x94, 0xd1, 0x36, 0xe8, 0x92, 0xaf, 0x2c, 0xbb, 0x68, 0x6b, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x97, 0x23, 0x92},
+ {0xb4, 0x71, 0x10, 0xe5, 0x58, 0xb9, 0xba, 0x6c, 0xeb, 0x86, 0x58, 0x22, 0x38, 0x92, 0xbf, 0xd3},
+ {0x8d, 0x12, 0xe1, 0x24, 0xdd, 0xfd, 0x3d, 0x93, 0x77, 0xc6, 0xf0, 0xae, 0xe5, 0x3c, 0x86, 0xdb},
+ {0xb1, 0x12, 0x22, 0xcb, 0xe3, 0x8d, 0xe4, 0x83, 0x9c, 0xa0, 0xeb, 0xff, 0x68, 0x62, 0x60, 0xbb},
+ {0x7d, 0xf7, 0x2b, 0xc7, 0x4e, 0x1a, 0xb9, 0x2d, 0x9c, 0xd1, 0xe4, 0xe2, 0xdc, 0xd3, 0x4b, 0x73},
+ {0x4e, 0x92, 0xb3, 0x2c, 0xc4, 0x15, 0x14, 0x4b, 0x43, 0x1b, 0x30, 0x61, 0xc3, 0x47, 0xbb, 0x43},
+ {0x99, 0x68, 0xeb, 0x16, 0xdd, 0x31, 0xb2, 0x03, 0xf6, 0xef, 0x07, 0xe7, 0xa8, 0x75, 0xa7, 0xdb},
+ {0x2c, 0x47, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x23, 0x5e, 0x8e, 0x77, 0x59, 0x75, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x61, 0xf3, 0x6d},
+ {0xf9, 0x17, 0x86, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xe5, 0x1b, 0x6d, 0x77, 0x7d, 0xde, 0xd6, 0x17, 0x5a, 0xa7, 0xcd},
+ {0x5d, 0xee, 0x46, 0xa9, 0x9d, 0x06, 0x6c, 0x9d, 0xaa, 0xe9, 0xa8, 0x6b, 0xf0, 0x43, 0x6b, 0xec},
+ {0xc1, 0x27, 0xf3, 0x3b, 0x59, 0x11, 0x53, 0xa2, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x57, 0xf9, 0x50, 0x69, 0x1e, 0xcb},
+ {0xd9, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x60, 0x53, 0x03, 0xed, 0xe4, 0x9c, 0x61, 0xda, 0x00, 0x75, 0x0c, 0xee, 0x2c},
+ {0x50, 0xa3, 0xa4, 0x63, 0xbc, 0xba, 0xbb, 0x80, 0xab, 0x0c, 0xe9, 0x96, 0xa1, 0xa5, 0xb1, 0xf0},
+ {0x39, 0xca, 0x8d, 0x93, 0x30, 0xde, 0x0d, 0xab, 0x88, 0x29, 0x96, 0x5e, 0x02, 0xb1, 0x3d, 0xae},
+ {0x42, 0xb4, 0x75, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf3, 0x14, 0x88, 0x0b, 0xa4, 0x54, 0xd5, 0x38, 0x8f, 0xbb, 0x17},
+ {0xf6, 0x16, 0x0a, 0x36, 0x79, 0xb7, 0xb6, 0xae, 0xd7, 0x7f, 0x42, 0x5f, 0x5b, 0x8a, 0xbb, 0x34},
+ {0xde, 0xaf, 0xba, 0xff, 0x18, 0x59, 0xce, 0x43, 0x38, 0x54, 0xe5, 0xcb, 0x41, 0x52, 0xf6, 0x26},
+ {0x78, 0xc9, 0x9e, 0x83, 0xf7, 0x9c, 0xca, 0xa2, 0x6a, 0x02, 0xf3, 0xb9, 0x54, 0x9a, 0xe9, 0x4c},
+ {0x35, 0x12, 0x90, 0x22, 0x28, 0x6e, 0xc0, 0x40, 0xbe, 0xf7, 0xdf, 0x1b, 0x1a, 0xa5, 0x51, 0xae},
+ {0xcf, 0x59, 0xa6, 0x48, 0x0f, 0xbc, 0x73, 0xc1, 0x2b, 0xd2, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x3c, 0x61, 0xc1, 0xa0},
+ {0xa1, 0x9d, 0xc5, 0xe9, 0xfd, 0xbd, 0xd6, 0x4a, 0x88, 0x82, 0x28, 0x02, 0x03, 0xcc, 0x6a, 0x75}
+};
+
+static unsigned char rc[40][16];
+static unsigned char rc_sseed[40][16];
+
+static const unsigned char sbox[256] = {
+ 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe,
+ 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4,
+ 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7,
+ 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15, 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3,
+ 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x09,
+ 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3,
+ 0x2f, 0x84, 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe,
+ 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85,
+ 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8, 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92,
+ 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x0c,
+ 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19,
+ 0x73, 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14,
+ 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2,
+ 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79, 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5,
+ 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08, 0xba, 0x78, 0x25,
+ 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a,
+ 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86,
+ 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e,
+ 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42,
+ 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
+};
+
+#define XT(x) (((x) << 1) ^ ((((x) >> 7) & 1) * 0x1b))
+
+// Simulate _mm_aesenc_si128 instructions from AESNI
+static void aesenc(unsigned char *s, const unsigned char *rk) {
+ uint8_t i, t, u, v[4][4];
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ v[((i / 4) + 4 - (i % 4) ) % 4][i % 4] = sbox[s[i]];
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+ t = v[i][0];
+ u = v[i][0] ^ v[i][1] ^ v[i][2] ^ v[i][3];
+ v[i][0] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][0] ^ v[i][1]));
+ v[i][1] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][1] ^ v[i][2]));
+ v[i][2] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][2] ^ v[i][3]));
+ v[i][3] ^= (uint8_t)(u ^ XT(v[i][3] ^ t));
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) {
+ s[i] = v[i / 4][i % 4] ^ rk[i];
+ }
+}
+
+// Simulate _mm_unpacklo_epi32
+static void unpacklo32(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ memcpy(tmp, a, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 4, b, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 8, a + 4, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 12, b + 4, 4);
+ memcpy(t, tmp, 16);
+}
+
+// Simulate _mm_unpackhi_epi32
+static void unpackhi32(unsigned char *t, unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ memcpy(tmp, a + 8, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 4, b + 8, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 8, a + 12, 4);
+ memcpy(tmp + 12, b + 12, 4);
+ memcpy(t, tmp, 16);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_tweak_constants(
+ const unsigned char *pk_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ unsigned long long seed_length) {
+ unsigned char buf[40 * 16];
+
+ /* Use the standard constants to generate tweaked ones. */
+ memcpy(rc, haraka_rc, 40 * 16);
+
+ /* Constants for sk.seed */
+ if (sk_seed != NULL) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(buf, 40 * 16, sk_seed, seed_length);
+ memcpy(rc_sseed, buf, 40 * 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Constants for pk.seed */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(buf, 40 * 16, pk_seed, seed_length);
+ memcpy(rc, buf, 40 * 16);
+}
+
+static void haraka_S_absorb(unsigned char *s, unsigned int r,
+ const unsigned char *m, unsigned long long mlen,
+ unsigned char p) {
+ unsigned long long i;
+ unsigned char t[r];
+
+ while (mlen >= r) {
+ // XOR block to state
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ s[i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s, s);
+ mlen -= r;
+ m += r;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ t[i] = 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; ++i) {
+ t[i] = m[i];
+ }
+ t[i] = p;
+ t[r - 1] |= 128;
+ for (i = 0; i < r; ++i) {
+ s[i] ^= t[i];
+ }
+}
+
+static void haraka_S_squeezeblocks(unsigned char *h, unsigned long long nblocks,
+ unsigned char *s, unsigned int r) {
+ while (nblocks > 0) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s, s);
+ memcpy(h, s, HARAKAS_RATE);
+ h += r;
+ nblocks--;
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ s_inc[i] = 0;
+ }
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(uint8_t *s_inc, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Recall that s_inc[64] is the non-absorbed bytes xored into the state */
+ while (mlen + s_inc[64] >= HARAKAS_RATE) {
+ for (i = 0; i < (size_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64]); i++) {
+ /* Take the i'th byte from message
+ xor with the s_inc[64] + i'th byte of the state */
+ s_inc[s_inc[64] + i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ mlen -= (size_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64]);
+ m += HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64];
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s_inc, s_inc);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < mlen; i++) {
+ s_inc[s_inc[64] + i] ^= m[i];
+ }
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(mlen + s_inc[64]);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ /* After haraka_S_inc_absorb, we are guaranteed that s_inc[64] < HARAKAS_RATE,
+ so we can always use one more byte for p in the current state. */
+ s_inc[s_inc[64]] ^= 0x1F;
+ s_inc[HARAKAS_RATE - 1] ^= 128;
+ s_inc[64] = 0;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t *s_inc) {
+ uint8_t i;
+
+ /* First consume any bytes we still have sitting around */
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen && i < s_inc[64]; i++) {
+ /* There are s_inc[64] bytes left, so r - s_inc[64] is the first
+ available byte. We consume from there, i.e., up to r. */
+ out[i] = s_inc[(HARAKAS_RATE - s_inc[64] + i)];
+ }
+ out += i;
+ outlen -= i;
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(s_inc[64] - i);
+
+ /* Then squeeze the remaining necessary blocks */
+ while (outlen > 0) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(s_inc, s_inc);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen && i < HARAKAS_RATE; i++) {
+ out[i] = s_inc[i];
+ }
+ out += i;
+ outlen -= i;
+ s_inc[64] = (uint8_t)(HARAKAS_RATE - i);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned long long outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen) {
+ unsigned long long i;
+ unsigned char s[64];
+ unsigned char d[32];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ s[i] = 0;
+ }
+ haraka_S_absorb(s, 32, in, inlen, 0x1F);
+
+ haraka_S_squeezeblocks(out, outlen / 32, s, 32);
+ out += (outlen / 32) * 32;
+
+ if (outlen % 32) {
+ haraka_S_squeezeblocks(d, 1, s, 32);
+ for (i = 0; i < outlen % 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = d[i];
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[64], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 32, in + 32, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 48, in + 48, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 1]);
+ aesenc(s + 32, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 2]);
+ aesenc(s + 48, rc[4 * 2 * i + 4 * j + 3]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s, s, s + 16);
+ unpacklo32(s + 16, s + 32, s + 48);
+ unpackhi32(s + 32, s + 32, s + 48);
+ unpacklo32(s + 48, s, s + 32);
+ unpackhi32(s, s, s + 32);
+ unpackhi32(s + 32, s + 16, tmp);
+ unpacklo32(s + 16, s + 16, tmp);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(out, s, 64);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i;
+
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(buf, in);
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ buf[i] = buf[i] ^ in[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Truncated */
+ memcpy(out, buf + 8, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 8, buf + 24, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 16, buf + 32, 8);
+ memcpy(out + 24, buf + 48, 8);
+}
+
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[32], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j + 1]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s + 16, s, s + 16);
+ memcpy(s, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ s[i];
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in) {
+ int i, j;
+
+ unsigned char s[32], tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(s, in, 16);
+ memcpy(s + 16, in + 16, 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+ // aes round(s)
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
+ aesenc(s, rc_sseed[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j]);
+ aesenc(s + 16, rc_sseed[2 * 2 * i + 2 * j + 1]);
+ }
+
+ // mixing
+ unpacklo32(tmp, s, s + 16);
+ unpackhi32(s + 16, s, s + 16);
+ memcpy(s, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Feed-forward */
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ out[i] = in[i] ^ s[i];
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/haraka.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/haraka.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..aa62643a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/haraka.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_HARAKA_H
+#define SPX_HARAKA_H
+
+/* Tweak constants with seed */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_tweak_constants(
+ const unsigned char *pk_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ unsigned long long seed_length);
+
+/* Haraka Sponge */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(uint8_t *s_inc, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, uint8_t *s_inc);
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned long long outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen);
+
+/* Applies the 512-bit Haraka permutation to in. */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512_perm(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-512 */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-256 */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+/* Implementation of Haraka-256 using sk.seed constants */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/hash.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/hash.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a199b764
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/hash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifndef SPX_HASH_H
+#define SPX_HASH_H
+
+#include
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf, const unsigned char *optrand,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ unsigned char *digest, uint64_t *tree, uint32_t *leaf_idx,
+ const unsigned char *R, const unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/hash_haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/hash_haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..dd73be43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/hash_haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_tweak_constants(pub_seed, sk_seed, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Computes PRF(key, addr), given a secret key of SPX_N bytes and an address
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *key, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES];
+ /* Since SPX_N may be smaller than 32, we need a temporary buffer. */
+ unsigned char outbuf[32];
+
+ (void)key; /* Suppress an 'unused parameter' warning. */
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf, addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256_sk(outbuf, buf);
+ memcpy(out, outbuf, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the message-dependent randomness R, using a secret seed and an
+ * optional randomization value as well as the message.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf, const unsigned char *optrand,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) {
+ uint8_t s_inc[65];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, sk_prf, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, optrand, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, m, mlen);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(R, SPX_N, s_inc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the message hash using R, the public key, and the message.
+ * Outputs the message digest and the index of the leaf. The index is split in
+ * the tree index and the leaf index, for convenient copying to an address.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ unsigned char *digest, uint64_t *tree, uint32_t *leaf_idx,
+ const unsigned char *R, const unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen) {
+#define SPX_TREE_BITS (SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * (SPX_D - 1))
+#define SPX_TREE_BYTES ((SPX_TREE_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_LEAF_BITS SPX_TREE_HEIGHT
+#define SPX_LEAF_BYTES ((SPX_LEAF_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_DGST_BYTES (SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES + SPX_TREE_BYTES + SPX_LEAF_BYTES)
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_DGST_BYTES];
+ unsigned char *bufp = buf;
+ uint8_t s_inc[65];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_init(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, R, SPX_N);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, pk, SPX_PK_BYTES);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_absorb(s_inc, m, mlen);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_finalize(s_inc);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S_inc_squeeze(buf, SPX_DGST_BYTES, s_inc);
+
+ memcpy(digest, bufp, SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES);
+ bufp += SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES;
+
+ *tree = PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(bufp, SPX_TREE_BYTES);
+ *tree &= (~(uint64_t)0) >> (64 - SPX_TREE_BITS);
+ bufp += SPX_TREE_BYTES;
+
+ *leaf_idx = (uint32_t)PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ bufp, SPX_LEAF_BYTES);
+ *leaf_idx &= (~(uint32_t)0) >> (32 - SPX_LEAF_BITS);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/params.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/params.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c2ad0531
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/params.h
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#ifndef SPX_PARAMS_H
+#define SPX_PARAMS_H
+
+/* Hash output length in bytes. */
+#define SPX_N 32
+/* Height of the hypertree. */
+#define SPX_FULL_HEIGHT 68
+/* Number of subtree layer. */
+#define SPX_D 17
+/* FORS tree dimensions. */
+#define SPX_FORS_HEIGHT 10
+#define SPX_FORS_TREES 30
+/* Winternitz parameter, */
+#define SPX_WOTS_W 16
+
+/* The hash function is defined by linking a different hash.c file, as opposed
+ to setting a #define constant. */
+
+/* For clarity */
+#define SPX_ADDR_BYTES 32
+
+/* WOTS parameters. */
+#define SPX_WOTS_LOGW 4
+
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN1 (8 * SPX_N / SPX_WOTS_LOGW)
+
+/* SPX_WOTS_LEN2 is floor(log(len_1 * (w - 1)) / log(w)) + 1; we precompute */
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN2 3
+
+#define SPX_WOTS_LEN (SPX_WOTS_LEN1 + SPX_WOTS_LEN2)
+#define SPX_WOTS_BYTES (SPX_WOTS_LEN * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_WOTS_PK_BYTES SPX_WOTS_BYTES
+
+/* Subtree size. */
+#define SPX_TREE_HEIGHT (SPX_FULL_HEIGHT / SPX_D)
+
+/* FORS parameters. */
+#define SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES ((SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES + 7) / 8)
+#define SPX_FORS_BYTES ((SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1) * SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_FORS_PK_BYTES SPX_N
+
+/* Resulting SPX sizes. */
+#define SPX_BYTES (SPX_N + SPX_FORS_BYTES + SPX_D * SPX_WOTS_BYTES +\
+ SPX_FULL_HEIGHT * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_PK_BYTES (2 * SPX_N)
+#define SPX_SK_BYTES (2 * SPX_N + SPX_PK_BYTES)
+
+/* Optionally, signing can be made non-deterministic using optrand.
+ This can help counter side-channel attacks that would benefit from
+ getting a large number of traces when the signer uses the same nodes. */
+#define SPX_OPTRAND_BYTES 32
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/sign.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..984ae28a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "api.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "randombytes.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "wots.h"
+
+/**
+ * Computes the leaf at a given address. First generates the WOTS key pair,
+ * then computes leaf by hashing horizontally.
+ */
+static void wots_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+ unsigned char pk[SPX_WOTS_BYTES];
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t wots_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, addr_idx);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ pk, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ wots_pk_addr, wots_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ leaf, pk, pub_seed, wots_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void) {
+ return PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates an SPX key pair given a seed of length
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [PUB_SEED || root]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed) {
+ /* We do not need the auth path in key generation, but it simplifies the
+ code to have just one treehash routine that computes both root and path
+ in one function. */
+ unsigned char auth_path[SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t top_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ top_tree_addr, SPX_D - 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ top_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+
+ /* Initialize SK_SEED, SK_PRF and PUB_SEED from seed. */
+ memcpy(sk, seed, PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES);
+
+ memcpy(pk, sk + 2 * SPX_N, SPX_N);
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(pk, sk);
+
+ /* Compute root node of the top-most subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ sk + 3 * SPX_N, auth_path, sk, sk + 2 * SPX_N, 0, 0,
+ wots_gen_leaf, top_tree_addr);
+
+ memcpy(pk + SPX_N, sk + 3 * SPX_N, SPX_N);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates an SPX key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [PUB_SEED || root]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
+ unsigned char seed[PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES];
+ randombytes(seed, PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ pk, sk, seed);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed = sk;
+ const unsigned char *sk_prf = sk + SPX_N;
+ const unsigned char *pk = sk + 2 * SPX_N;
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed = pk;
+
+ unsigned char optrand[SPX_N];
+ unsigned char mhash[SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+ unsigned char root[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t i;
+ uint64_t tree;
+ uint32_t idx_leaf;
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ pub_seed, sk_seed);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+
+ /* Optionally, signing can be made non-deterministic using optrand.
+ This can help counter side-channel attacks that would benefit from
+ getting a large number of traces when the signer uses the same nodes. */
+ randombytes(optrand, SPX_N);
+ /* Compute the digest randomization value. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_gen_message_random(
+ sig, sk_prf, optrand, m, mlen);
+
+ /* Derive the message digest and leaf index from R, PK and M. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ mhash, &tree, &idx_leaf, sig, pk, m, mlen);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(wots_addr, tree);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ /* Sign the message hash using FORS. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ sig, root, mhash, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_FORS_BYTES;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_D; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(tree_addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(tree_addr, tree);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ /* Compute a WOTS signature. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ sig, root, sk_seed, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_WOTS_BYTES;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for the used WOTS leaf. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ root, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed, idx_leaf, 0,
+ wots_gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N;
+
+ /* Update the indices for the next layer. */
+ idx_leaf = (tree & ((1 << SPX_TREE_HEIGHT) - 1));
+ tree = tree >> SPX_TREE_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ *siglen = SPX_BYTES;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed = pk;
+ const unsigned char *pub_root = pk + SPX_N;
+ unsigned char mhash[SPX_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
+ unsigned char wots_pk[SPX_WOTS_BYTES];
+ unsigned char root[SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ unsigned int i;
+ uint64_t tree;
+ uint32_t idx_leaf;
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t wots_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ if (siglen != SPX_BYTES) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* This hook allows the hash function instantiation to do whatever
+ preparation or computation it needs, based on the public seed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_initialize_hash_function(
+ pub_seed, NULL);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_type(
+ wots_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK);
+
+ /* Derive the message digest and leaf index from R || PK || M. */
+ /* The additional SPX_N is a result of the hash domain separator. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_hash_message(
+ mhash, &tree, &idx_leaf, sig, pk, m, mlen);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Layer correctly defaults to 0, so no need to set_layer_addr */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(wots_addr, tree);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ root, sig, mhash, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_FORS_BYTES;
+
+ /* For each subtree.. */
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_D; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(tree_addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(tree_addr, tree);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ wots_addr, tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ wots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ wots_pk_addr, wots_addr);
+
+ /* The WOTS public key is only correct if the signature was correct. */
+ /* Initially, root is the FORS pk, but on subsequent iterations it is
+ the root of the subtree below the currently processed subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ wots_pk, sig, root, pub_seed, wots_addr);
+ sig += SPX_WOTS_BYTES;
+
+ /* Compute the leaf node using the WOTS public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ leaf, wots_pk, pub_seed, wots_pk_addr);
+
+ /* Compute the root node of this subtree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ root, leaf, idx_leaf, 0, sig, SPX_TREE_HEIGHT,
+ pub_seed, tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_TREE_HEIGHT * SPX_N;
+
+ /* Update the indices for the next layer. */
+ idx_leaf = (tree & ((1 << SPX_TREE_HEIGHT) - 1));
+ tree = tree >> SPX_TREE_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the root node equals the root node in the public key. */
+ if (memcmp(root, pub_root, SPX_N) != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
+ size_t siglen;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ sm, &siglen, m, mlen, sk);
+
+ memmove(sm + SPX_BYTES, m, mlen);
+ *smlen = siglen + mlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
+ /* The API caller does not necessarily know what size a signature should be
+ but SPHINCS+ signatures are always exactly SPX_BYTES. */
+ if (smlen < SPX_BYTES) {
+ memset(m, 0, smlen);
+ *mlen = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *mlen = smlen - SPX_BYTES;
+
+ if (PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ sm, SPX_BYTES, sm + SPX_BYTES, *mlen, pk)) {
+ memset(m, 0, smlen);
+ *mlen = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* If verification was successful, move the message to the right place. */
+ memmove(m, sm + SPX_BYTES, *mlen);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/thash.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/thash.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..14927a8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/thash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifndef SPX_THASH_H
+#define SPX_THASH_H
+
+#include
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/thash_haraka_robust.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/thash_haraka_robust.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f3d7feb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/thash_haraka_robust.c
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+
+#include "haraka.h"
+
+/**
+ * Takes an array of inblocks concatenated arrays of SPX_N bytes.
+ */
+static void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned char *buf,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inblocks,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char *bitmask = buf + SPX_ADDR_BYTES;
+ unsigned char outbuf[32];
+ unsigned char buf_tmp[64];
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ (void)pub_seed; /* Suppress an 'unused parameter' warning. */
+
+ if (inblocks == 1) {
+ /* F function */
+ /* Since SPX_N may be smaller than 32, we need a temporary buffer. */
+ memset(buf_tmp, 0, 64);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf_tmp, addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka256(outbuf, buf_tmp);
+ for (i = 0; i < inblocks * SPX_N; i++) {
+ buf_tmp[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + i] = in[i] ^ outbuf[i];
+ }
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka512(outbuf, buf_tmp);
+ memcpy(out, outbuf, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ /* All other tweakable hashes*/
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(buf, addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ bitmask, inblocks * SPX_N, buf, SPX_ADDR_BYTES);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < inblocks * SPX_N; i++) {
+ buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + i] = in[i] ^ bitmask[i];
+ }
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_haraka_S(
+ out, SPX_N, buf, SPX_ADDR_BYTES + inblocks * SPX_N);
+ }
+}
+
+/* The wrappers below ensure that we use fixed-size buffers on the stack */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + 1 * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, 1, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + 2 * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, 2, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_WOTS_LEN(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + SPX_WOTS_LEN * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, SPX_WOTS_LEN, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char buf[SPX_ADDR_BYTES + SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash(
+ out, buf, in, SPX_FORS_TREES, pub_seed, addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/utils.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..15c0de94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+/**
+ * Converts the value of 'in' to 'outlen' bytes in big-endian byte order.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned long long in) {
+
+ /* Iterate over out in decreasing order, for big-endianness. */
+ for (size_t i = outlen; i > 0; i--) {
+ out[i - 1] = in & 0xff;
+ in = in >> 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Converts the inlen bytes in 'in' from big-endian byte order to an integer.
+ */
+unsigned long long PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) {
+ unsigned long long retval = 0;
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < inlen; i++) {
+ retval |= ((unsigned long long)in[i]) << (8 * (inlen - 1 - i));
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an auth path.
+ * Expects address to be complete other than the tree_height and tree_index.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ const unsigned char *auth_path, uint32_t tree_height,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+ unsigned char buffer[2 * SPX_N];
+
+ /* If leaf_idx is odd (last bit = 1), current path element is a right child
+ and auth_path has to go left. Otherwise it is the other way around. */
+ if (leaf_idx & 1) {
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, leaf, SPX_N);
+ memcpy(buffer, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(buffer, leaf, SPX_N);
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ }
+ auth_path += SPX_N;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tree_height - 1; i++) {
+ leaf_idx >>= 1;
+ idx_offset >>= 1;
+ /* Set the address of the node we're creating. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(addr, i + 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ addr, leaf_idx + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Pick the right or left neighbor, depending on parity of the node. */
+ if (leaf_idx & 1) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ buffer + SPX_N, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+ memcpy(buffer, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ } else {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ buffer, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+ memcpy(buffer + SPX_N, auth_path, SPX_N);
+ }
+ auth_path += SPX_N;
+ }
+
+ /* The last iteration is exceptional; we do not copy an auth_path node. */
+ leaf_idx >>= 1;
+ idx_offset >>= 1;
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(addr, tree_height);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ addr, leaf_idx + idx_offset);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ root, buffer, pub_seed, addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * For a given leaf index, computes the authentication path and the resulting
+ * root node using Merkle's TreeHash algorithm.
+ * Expects the layer and tree parts of the tree_addr to be set, as well as the
+ * tree type (i.e. SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE or SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE).
+ * Applies the offset idx_offset to indices before building addresses, so that
+ * it is possible to continue counting indices across trees.
+ */
+static void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ unsigned char *stack, unsigned int *heights,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset, uint32_t tree_height,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+ uint32_t idx;
+ uint32_t tree_idx;
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < (uint32_t)(1 << tree_height); idx++) {
+ /* Add the next leaf node to the stack. */
+ gen_leaf(stack + offset * SPX_N,
+ sk_seed, pub_seed, idx + idx_offset, tree_addr);
+ offset++;
+ heights[offset - 1] = 0;
+
+ /* If this is a node we need for the auth path.. */
+ if ((leaf_idx ^ 0x1) == idx) {
+ memcpy(auth_path, stack + (offset - 1)*SPX_N, SPX_N);
+ }
+
+ /* While the top-most nodes are of equal height.. */
+ while (offset >= 2 && heights[offset - 1] == heights[offset - 2]) {
+ /* Compute index of the new node, in the next layer. */
+ tree_idx = (idx >> (heights[offset - 1] + 1));
+
+ /* Set the address of the node we're creating. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ tree_addr, heights[offset - 1] + 1);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ tree_addr, tree_idx + (idx_offset >> (heights[offset - 1] + 1)));
+ /* Hash the top-most nodes from the stack together. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_2(
+ stack + (offset - 2)*SPX_N, stack + (offset - 2)*SPX_N,
+ pub_seed, tree_addr);
+ offset--;
+ /* Note that the top-most node is now one layer higher. */
+ heights[offset - 1]++;
+
+ /* If this is a node we need for the auth path.. */
+ if (((leaf_idx >> heights[offset - 1]) ^ 0x1) == tree_idx) {
+ memcpy(auth_path + heights[offset - 1]*SPX_N,
+ stack + (offset - 1)*SPX_N, SPX_N);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(root, stack, SPX_N);
+}
+
+/* The wrappers below ensure that we use fixed-size buffers on the stack */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char stack[(SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1)*SPX_N];
+ unsigned int heights[SPX_FORS_HEIGHT + 1];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash(
+ root, auth_path, stack, heights, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ leaf_idx, idx_offset, SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]) {
+
+ unsigned char stack[(SPX_TREE_HEIGHT + 1)*SPX_N];
+ unsigned int heights[SPX_TREE_HEIGHT + 1];
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash(
+ root, auth_path, stack, heights, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ leaf_idx, idx_offset, SPX_TREE_HEIGHT, gen_leaf, tree_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/utils.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/utils.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..570f925a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/utils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+#ifndef SPX_UTILS_H
+#define SPX_UTILS_H
+
+#include "params.h"
+#include
+#include
+
+/**
+ * Converts the value of 'in' to 'outlen' bytes in big-endian byte order.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, unsigned long long in);
+
+/**
+ * Converts the inlen bytes in 'in' from big-endian byte order to an integer.
+ */
+unsigned long long PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_bytes_to_ull(
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an auth path.
+ * Expects address to be complete other than the tree_height and tree_index.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ const unsigned char *auth_path, uint32_t tree_height,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * For a given leaf index, computes the authentication path and the resulting
+ * root node using Merkle's TreeHash algorithm.
+ * Expects the layer and tree parts of the tree_addr to be set, as well as the
+ * tree type (i.e. SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE or SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE).
+ * Applies the offset idx_offset to indices before building addresses, so that
+ * it is possible to continue counting indices across trees.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_treehash_TREE_HEIGHT(
+ unsigned char *root, unsigned char *auth_path,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t leaf_idx, uint32_t idx_offset,
+ void (*gen_leaf)(
+ unsigned char * /* leaf */,
+ const unsigned char * /* sk_seed */,
+ const unsigned char * /* pub_seed */,
+ uint32_t /* addr_idx */, const uint32_t[8] /* tree_addr */),
+ uint32_t tree_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/wots.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/wots.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..855d0c98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/wots.c
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "wots.h"
+
+// TODO clarify address expectations, and make them more uniform.
+// TODO i.e. do we expect types to be set already?
+// TODO and do we expect modifications or copies?
+
+/**
+ * Computes the starting value for a chain, i.e. the secret key.
+ * Expects the address to be complete up to the chain address.
+ */
+static void wots_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t wots_addr[8]) {
+ /* Make sure that the hash address is actually zeroed. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(wots_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Generate sk element. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_prf_addr(sk, sk_seed, wots_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the chaining function.
+ * out and in have to be n-byte arrays.
+ *
+ * Interprets in as start-th value of the chain.
+ * addr has to contain the address of the chain.
+ */
+static void gen_chain(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int start, unsigned int steps,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ /* Initialize out with the value at position 'start'. */
+ memcpy(out, in, SPX_N);
+
+ /* Iterate 'steps' calls to the hash function. */
+ for (i = start; i < (start + steps) && i < SPX_WOTS_W; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(addr, i);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ out, out, pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * base_w algorithm as described in draft.
+ * Interprets an array of bytes as integers in base w.
+ * This only works when log_w is a divisor of 8.
+ */
+static void base_w(unsigned int *output, const size_t out_len,
+ const unsigned char *input) {
+ size_t in = 0;
+ size_t out = 0;
+ unsigned char total = 0;
+ unsigned int bits = 0;
+ size_t consumed;
+
+ for (consumed = 0; consumed < out_len; consumed++) {
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ total = input[in];
+ in++;
+ bits += 8;
+ }
+ bits -= SPX_WOTS_LOGW;
+ output[out] = (unsigned int)((total >> bits) & (SPX_WOTS_W - 1));
+ out++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Computes the WOTS+ checksum over a message (in base_w). */
+static void wots_checksum(unsigned int *csum_base_w,
+ const unsigned int *msg_base_w) {
+ unsigned int csum = 0;
+ unsigned char csum_bytes[(SPX_WOTS_LEN2 * SPX_WOTS_LOGW + 7) / 8];
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ /* Compute checksum. */
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN1; i++) {
+ csum += SPX_WOTS_W - 1 - msg_base_w[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Convert checksum to base_w. */
+ /* Make sure expected empty zero bits are the least significant bits. */
+ csum = csum << (8 - ((SPX_WOTS_LEN2 * SPX_WOTS_LOGW) % 8));
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ csum_bytes, sizeof(csum_bytes), csum);
+ base_w(csum_base_w, SPX_WOTS_LEN2, csum_bytes);
+}
+
+/* Takes a message and derives the matching chain lengths. */
+static void chain_lengths(unsigned int *lengths, const unsigned char *msg) {
+ base_w(lengths, SPX_WOTS_LEN1, msg);
+ wots_checksum(lengths + SPX_WOTS_LEN1, lengths);
+}
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32 byte sk_seed, expands it to WOTS private key
+ * elements and computes the corresponding public key.
+ * It requires the seed pub_seed (used to generate bitmasks and hash keys)
+ * and the address of this WOTS key pair.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ wots_gen_sk(pk + i * SPX_N, sk_seed, addr);
+ gen_chain(pk + i * SPX_N, pk + i * SPX_N,
+ 0, SPX_WOTS_W - 1, pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Takes a n-byte message and the 32-byte sk_see to compute a signature 'sig'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned int lengths[SPX_WOTS_LEN];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ chain_lengths(lengths, msg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ wots_gen_sk(sig + i * SPX_N, sk_seed, addr);
+ gen_chain(sig + i * SPX_N, sig + i * SPX_N, 0, lengths[i], pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature and an n-byte message, computes a WOTS public key.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ unsigned int lengths[SPX_WOTS_LEN];
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ chain_lengths(lengths, msg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_WOTS_LEN; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(addr, i);
+ gen_chain(pk + i * SPX_N, sig + i * SPX_N,
+ lengths[i], SPX_WOTS_W - 1 - lengths[i], pub_seed, addr);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/wots.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/wots.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8eaaaba3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-robust/clean/wots.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#ifndef SPX_WOTS_H
+#define SPX_WOTS_H
+
+#include "params.h"
+#include
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32 byte seed for the private key, expands it to
+ * a full WOTS private key and computes the corresponding public key.
+ * It requires the seed pub_seed (used to generate bitmasks and hash keys)
+ * and the address of this WOTS key pair.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_gen_pk(
+ unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a n-byte message and the 32-byte seed for the private key to compute a
+ * signature that is placed at 'sig'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature and an n-byte message, computes a WOTS public key.
+ *
+ * Writes the computed public key to 'pk'.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FROBUST_CLEAN_wots_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/META.yml b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/META.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..af9dcc0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/META.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+name: SPHINCS+
+type: signature
+claimed-nist-level: 5
+length-public-key: 64
+length-signature: 49216
+testvectors-sha256: e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855
+principal-submitter: Andreas Hülsing
+auxiliary-submitters:
+ - Jean-Philippe Aumasson
+ - Daniel J. Bernstein,
+ - Christoph Dobraunig
+ - Maria Eichlseder
+ - Scott Fluhrer
+ - Stefan-Lukas Gazdag
+ - Panos Kampanakis
+ - Stefan Kölbl
+ - Tanja Lange
+ - Martin M. Lauridsen
+ - Florian Mendel
+ - Ruben Niederhagen
+ - Christian Rechberger
+ - Joost Rijneveld
+ - Peter Schwabe
+implementations:
+ - name: clean
+ version: https://github.com/sphincs/sphincsplus/commit/492ec4f1f6d3b3dc4b435783bbaaf4e41cdb6f32
+ length-secret-key: 128
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/LICENSE b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/LICENSE
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..670154e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/LICENSE
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+CC0 1.0 Universal
+
+Statement of Purpose
+
+The laws of most jurisdictions throughout the world automatically confer
+exclusive Copyright and Related Rights (defined below) upon the creator and
+subsequent owner(s) (each and all, an "owner") of an original work of
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+Certain owners wish to permanently relinquish those rights to a Work for the
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+contribute to the Commons to promote the ideal of a free culture and the
+further production of creative, cultural and scientific works, or to gain
+reputation or greater distribution for their Work in part through the use and
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+
+For these and/or other purposes and motivations, and without any expectation
+of additional consideration or compensation, the person associating CC0 with a
+Work (the "Affirmer"), to the extent that he or she is an owner of Copyright
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+
+ vii. other similar, equivalent or corresponding rights throughout the world
+ based on applicable law or treaty, and any national implementations thereof.
+
+2. Waiver. To the greatest extent permitted by, but not in contravention of,
+applicable law, Affirmer hereby overtly, fully, permanently, irrevocably and
+unconditionally waives, abandons, and surrenders all of Affirmer's Copyright
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+the Waiver for the benefit of each member of the public at large and to the
+detriment of Affirmer's heirs and successors, fully intending that such Waiver
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+any other legal or equitable action to disrupt the quiet enjoyment of the Work
+by the public as contemplated by Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+3. Public License Fallback. Should any part of the Waiver for any reason be
+judged legally invalid or ineffective under applicable law, then the Waiver
+shall be preserved to the maximum extent permitted taking into account
+Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose. In addition, to the extent the Waiver
+is so judged Affirmer hereby grants to each affected person a royalty-free,
+non transferable, non sublicensable, non exclusive, irrevocable and
+unconditional license to exercise Affirmer's Copyright and Related Rights in
+the Work (i) in all territories worldwide, (ii) for the maximum duration
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+promotional purposes (the "License"). The License shall be deemed effective as
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+License for any reason be judged legally invalid or ineffective under
+applicable law, such partial invalidity or ineffectiveness shall not
+invalidate the remainder of the License, and in such case Affirmer hereby
+affirms that he or she will not (i) exercise any of his or her remaining
+Copyright and Related Rights in the Work or (ii) assert any associated claims
+and causes of action with respect to the Work, in either case contrary to
+Affirmer's express Statement of Purpose.
+
+4. Limitations and Disclaimers.
+
+ a. No trademark or patent rights held by Affirmer are waived, abandoned,
+ surrendered, licensed or otherwise affected by this document.
+
+ b. Affirmer offers the Work as-is and makes no representations or warranties
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+ discoverable, all to the greatest extent permissible under applicable law.
+
+ c. Affirmer disclaims responsibility for clearing rights of other persons
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+ disclaims responsibility for obtaining any necessary consents, permissions
+ or other rights required for any use of the Work.
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+ d. Affirmer understands and acknowledges that Creative Commons is not a
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+
+For more information, please see
+
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/Makefile b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a573a3c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with GNU Make or BSD Make
+
+LIB=libsphincs-haraka-256f-simple_clean.a
+
+HEADERS = params.h address.h wots.h utils.h fors.h api.h hash.h thash.h haraka.h
+OBJECTS = address.o wots.o utils.o fors.o sign.o hash_haraka.o thash_haraka_simple.o haraka.o
+
+CFLAGS=-Wall -Wconversion -Wextra -Wpedantic -Werror -Wmissing-prototypes -std=c99 -I../../../common $(EXTRAFLAGS)
+
+all: $(LIB)
+
+%.o: %.c $(HEADERS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
+
+$(LIB): $(OBJECTS)
+ $(AR) -r $@ $(OBJECTS)
+
+clean:
+ $(RM) $(OBJECTS)
+ $(RM) $(LIB)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..716d1c85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# This Makefile can be used with Microsoft Visual Studio's nmake using the command:
+# nmake /f Makefile.Microsoft_nmake
+
+LIBRARY=libsphincs-haraka-256f-simple_clean.lib
+OBJECTS=address.obj wots.obj utils.obj fors.obj sign.obj hash_haraka.obj thash_haraka_simple.obj haraka.obj
+
+CFLAGS=/nologo /I ..\..\..\common /W4 /WX
+
+all: $(LIBRARY)
+
+# Make sure objects are recompiled if headers change.
+$(OBJECTS): *.h
+
+$(LIBRARY): $(OBJECTS)
+ LIB.EXE /NOLOGO /WX /OUT:$@ $**
+
+clean:
+ -DEL $(OBJECTS)
+ -DEL $(LIBRARY)
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/address.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/address.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1ce4c0d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/address.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "params.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_ull_to_bytes(
+ bytes + i * 4, 4, addr[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer) {
+ addr[0] = layer;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree) {
+ addr[1] = 0;
+ addr[2] = (uint32_t) (tree >> 32);
+ addr[3] = (uint32_t) tree;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type) {
+ addr[4] = type;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for OTS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair) {
+ addr[5] = keypair;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]) {
+ out[0] = in[0];
+ out[1] = in[1];
+ out[2] = in[2];
+ out[3] = in[3];
+ out[5] = in[5];
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain) {
+ addr[6] = chain;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash) {
+ addr[7] = hash;
+}
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height) {
+ addr[6] = tree_height;
+}
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index) {
+ addr[7] = tree_index;
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/address.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/address.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0fd30570
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/address.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+#ifndef SPX_ADDRESS_H
+#define SPX_ADDRESS_H
+
+#include
+
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTS 0
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_WOTSPK 1
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_HASHTREE 2
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE 3
+#define SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK 4
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_addr_to_bytes(
+ unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_layer_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t layer);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint64_t tree);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t type);
+
+/* Copies the layer and tree part of one address into the other */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_subtree_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for WOTS and FORS addresses. */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t keypair);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_chain_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t chain);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_hash_addr(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t hash);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ uint32_t out[8], const uint32_t in[8]);
+
+/* These functions are used for all hash tree addresses (including FORS). */
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_height);
+
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ uint32_t addr[8], uint32_t tree_index);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/api.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/api.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..08b4ca36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/api.h
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#ifndef PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_API_H
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_API_H
+
+#include
+#include
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_ALGNAME "SPHINCS+"
+
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES 64
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES 32
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES 16976
+#define PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SEEDBYTES 48
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a secret key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_secretkeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a public key, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_publickeybytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of a signature, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_bytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of the seed required to generate a key pair, in bytes
+ */
+size_t PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seedbytes(void);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair given a seed.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_seed_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk, const uint8_t *seed);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a SPHINCS+ key pair.
+ * Format sk: [SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED]
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
+ uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing a detached signature.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
+ uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a detached signature and message under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
+ const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+/**
+ * Returns an array containing the signature followed by the message.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
+ uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
+ const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk);
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given signature-message pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
+ uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
+ const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/fors.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/fors.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..024fb4fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/fors.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+#include "address.h"
+#include "fors.h"
+#include "hash.h"
+#include "thash.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+
+static void fors_gen_sk(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_prf_addr(
+ sk, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_sk_to_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8]) {
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_1(
+ leaf, sk, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+static void fors_gen_leaf(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ uint32_t addr_idx, const uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t fors_leaf_addr[8] = {0};
+
+ /* Only copy the parts that must be kept in fors_leaf_addr. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_leaf_addr, fors_tree_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_leaf_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_leaf_addr, addr_idx);
+
+ fors_gen_sk(leaf, sk_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, leaf, pub_seed, fors_leaf_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Interprets m as SPX_FORS_HEIGHT-bit unsigned integers.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ * Assumes indices has space for SPX_FORS_TREES integers.
+ */
+static void message_to_indices(uint32_t *indices, const unsigned char *m) {
+ unsigned int i, j;
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ indices[i] = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < SPX_FORS_HEIGHT; j++) {
+ indices[i] ^= (((uint32_t)m[offset >> 3] >> (offset & 0x7)) & 0x1) << j;
+ offset++;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Include the secret key part that produces the selected leaf node. */
+ fors_gen_sk(sig, sk_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Compute the authentication path for this leaf node. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_treehash_FORS_HEIGHT(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, sig, sk_seed, pub_seed,
+ indices[i], idx_offset, fors_gen_leaf, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]) {
+ uint32_t indices[SPX_FORS_TREES];
+ unsigned char roots[SPX_FORS_TREES * SPX_N];
+ unsigned char leaf[SPX_N];
+ uint32_t fors_tree_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t fors_pk_addr[8] = {0};
+ uint32_t idx_offset;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_tree_addr, fors_addr);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_copy_keypair_addr(
+ fors_pk_addr, fors_addr);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_tree_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_type(
+ fors_pk_addr, SPX_ADDR_TYPE_FORSPK);
+
+ message_to_indices(indices, m);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SPX_FORS_TREES; i++) {
+ idx_offset = i * (1 << SPX_FORS_HEIGHT);
+
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_height(
+ fors_tree_addr, 0);
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_set_tree_index(
+ fors_tree_addr, indices[i] + idx_offset);
+
+ /* Derive the leaf from the included secret key part. */
+ fors_sk_to_leaf(leaf, sig, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N;
+
+ /* Derive the corresponding root node of this tree. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_compute_root(
+ roots + i * SPX_N, leaf, indices[i], idx_offset, sig,
+ SPX_FORS_HEIGHT, pub_seed, fors_tree_addr);
+ sig += SPX_N * SPX_FORS_HEIGHT;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash horizontally across all tree roots to derive the public key. */
+ PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_thash_FORS_TREES(
+ pk, roots, pub_seed, fors_pk_addr);
+}
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/fors.h b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/fors.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c9ea37a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/fors.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#ifndef SPX_FORS_H
+#define SPX_FORS_H
+
+#include
+
+#include "params.h"
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message m, deriving the secret key from sk_seed and the FTS address.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_sign(
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *sk_seed, const unsigned char *pub_seed,
+ const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Derives the FORS public key from a signature.
+ * This can be used for verification by comparing to a known public key, or to
+ * subsequently verify a signature on the derived public key. The latter is the
+ * typical use-case when used as an FTS below an OTS in a hypertree.
+ * Assumes m contains at least SPX_FORS_HEIGHT * SPX_FORS_TREES bits.
+ */
+void PQCLEAN_SPHINCSHARAKA256FSIMPLE_CLEAN_fors_pk_from_sig(
+ unsigned char *pk,
+ const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *m,
+ const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t fors_addr[8]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/haraka.c b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/haraka.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..be939df5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_sign/sphincs-haraka-256f-simple/clean/haraka.c
@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+/*
+Plain C implementation of the Haraka256 and Haraka512 permutations.
+*/
+#include
+#include
+#include