/* * Wrapper for implementing the PQClean API. */ #include #include #include "api.h" #include "inner.h" #define NONCELEN 40 #include "randombytes.h" /* * Encoding formats (nnnn = log of degree, 9 for Falcon-512, 10 for Falcon-1024) * * private key: * header byte: 0101nnnn * private f (6 or 5 bits by element, depending on degree) * private g (6 or 5 bits by element, depending on degree) * private F (8 bits by element) * * public key: * header byte: 0000nnnn * public h (14 bits by element) * * signature: * header byte: 0011nnnn * nonce 40 bytes * value (12 bits by element) * * message + signature: * signature length (2 bytes, big-endian) * nonce 40 bytes * message * header byte: 0010nnnn * value (12 bits by element) * (signature length is 1+len(value), not counting the nonce) */ /* see api.h */ int PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair( uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) { union { uint8_t b[FALCON_KEYGEN_TEMP_10]; uint64_t dummy_u64; fpr dummy_fpr; } tmp; int8_t f[1024], g[1024], F[1024]; uint16_t h[1024]; unsigned char seed[48]; shake256_context rng; size_t u, v; /* * Generate key pair. */ randombytes(seed, sizeof seed); shake256_init(&rng); shake256_inject(&rng, seed, sizeof seed); shake256_flip(&rng); PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_keygen(&rng, f, g, F, NULL, h, 10, tmp.b); /* * Encode private key. */ sk[0] = 0x50 + 10; u = 1; v = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_trim_i8_encode( sk + u, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES - u, f, 10, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_max_fg_bits[10]); if (v == 0) { return -1; } u += v; v = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_trim_i8_encode( sk + u, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES - u, g, 10, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_max_fg_bits[10]); if (v == 0) { return -1; } u += v; v = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_trim_i8_encode( sk + u, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES - u, F, 10, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_max_FG_bits[10]); if (v == 0) { return -1; } u += v; if (u != PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES) { return -1; } /* * Encode public key. */ pk[0] = 0x00 + 10; v = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_modq_encode( pk + 1, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES - 1, h, 10); if (v != PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES - 1) { return -1; } return 0; } /* * Compute the signature. nonce[] receives the nonce and must have length * NONCELEN bytes. sigbuf[] receives the signature value (without nonce * or header byte), with *sigbuflen providing the maximum value length and * receiving the actual value length. * * If a signature could be computed but not encoded because it would * exceed the output buffer size, then a new signature is computed. If * the provided buffer size is too low, this could loop indefinitely, so * the caller must provide a size that can accommodate signatures with a * large enough probability. * * Return value: 0 on success, -1 on error. */ static int do_sign(uint8_t *nonce, uint8_t *sigbuf, size_t *sigbuflen, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) { union { uint8_t b[72 * 1024]; uint64_t dummy_u64; fpr dummy_fpr; } tmp; int8_t f[1024], g[1024], F[1024], G[1024]; union { int16_t sig[1024]; uint16_t hm[1024]; } r; unsigned char seed[48]; shake256_context sc; size_t u, v; /* * Decode the private key. */ if (sk[0] != 0x50 + 10) { return -1; } u = 1; v = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_trim_i8_decode( f, 10, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_max_fg_bits[10], sk + u, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES - u); if (v == 0) { return -1; } u += v; v = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_trim_i8_decode( g, 10, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_max_fg_bits[10], sk + u, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES - u); if (v == 0) { return -1; } u += v; v = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_trim_i8_decode( F, 10, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_max_FG_bits[10], sk + u, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES - u); if (v == 0) { return -1; } u += v; if (u != PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES) { return -1; } if (!PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_complete_private(G, f, g, F, 10, tmp.b)) { return -1; } /* * Create a random nonce (40 bytes). */ randombytes(nonce, NONCELEN); /* * Hash message nonce + message into a vector. */ shake256_init(&sc); shake256_inject(&sc, nonce, NONCELEN); shake256_inject(&sc, m, mlen); shake256_flip(&sc); PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_hash_to_point(&sc, r.hm, 10, tmp.b); /* * Initialize a RNG. */ randombytes(seed, sizeof seed); shake256_init(&sc); shake256_inject(&sc, seed, sizeof seed); shake256_flip(&sc); /* * Compute and return the signature. This loops until a signature * value is found that fits in the provided buffer. */ for (;;) { PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_sign_dyn(r.sig, &sc, f, g, F, G, r.hm, 10, tmp.b); v = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_comp_encode(sigbuf, *sigbuflen, r.sig, 10); if (v != 0) { *sigbuflen = v; return 0; } } } /* * Verify a sigature. The nonce has size NONCELEN bytes. sigbuf[] * (of size sigbuflen) contains the signature value, not including the * header byte or nonce. Return value is 0 on success, -1 on error. */ static int do_verify( const uint8_t *nonce, const uint8_t *sigbuf, size_t sigbuflen, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk) { union { uint8_t b[2 * 1024]; uint64_t dummy_u64; fpr dummy_fpr; } tmp; uint16_t h[1024], hm[1024]; int16_t sig[1024]; shake256_context sc; /* * Decode public key. */ if (pk[0] != 0x00 + 10) { return -1; } if (PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_modq_decode(h, 10, pk + 1, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES - 1) != PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES - 1) { return -1; } PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_to_ntt_monty(h, 10); /* * Decode signature. */ if (sigbuflen == 0) { return -1; } if (PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_comp_decode(sig, 10, sigbuf, sigbuflen) != sigbuflen) { return -1; } /* * Hash nonce + message into a vector. */ shake256_init(&sc); shake256_inject(&sc, nonce, NONCELEN); shake256_inject(&sc, m, mlen); shake256_flip(&sc); PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_hash_to_point(&sc, hm, 10, tmp.b); /* * Verify signature. */ if (!PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_verify_raw(hm, sig, h, 10, tmp.b)) { return -1; } return 0; } /* see api.h */ int PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature( uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) { /* * The PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES constant is used for * the signed message object (as produced by crypto_sign()) * and includes a two-byte length value, so we take care here * to only generate signatures that are two bytes shorter than * the maximum. This is done to ensure that crypto_sign() * and crypto_sign_signature() produce the exact same signature * value, if used on the same message, with the same private key, * and using the same output from randombytes() (this is for * reproducibility of tests). */ size_t vlen; vlen = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES - NONCELEN - 3; if (do_sign(sig + 1, sig + 1 + NONCELEN, &vlen, m, mlen, sk) < 0) { return -1; } sig[0] = 0x30 + 10; *siglen = 1 + NONCELEN + vlen; return 0; } /* see api.h */ int PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify( const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk) { if (siglen < 1 + NONCELEN) { return -1; } if (sig[0] != 0x30 + 10) { return -1; } return do_verify(sig + 1, sig + 1 + NONCELEN, siglen - 1 - NONCELEN, m, mlen, pk); } /* see api.h */ int PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_crypto_sign( uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen, const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) { uint8_t *pm, *sigbuf; size_t sigbuflen; /* * Move the message to its final location; this is a memmove() so * it handles overlaps properly. */ memmove(sm + 2 + NONCELEN, m, mlen); pm = sm + 2 + NONCELEN; sigbuf = pm + 1 + mlen; sigbuflen = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES - NONCELEN - 3; if (do_sign(sm + 2, sigbuf, &sigbuflen, pm, mlen, sk) < 0) { return -1; } pm[mlen] = 0x20 + 10; sigbuflen ++; sm[0] = (uint8_t)(sigbuflen >> 8); sm[1] = (uint8_t)sigbuflen; *smlen = mlen + 2 + NONCELEN + sigbuflen; return 0; } /* see api.h */ int PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open( uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen, const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk) { const uint8_t *sigbuf; size_t pmlen, sigbuflen; if (smlen < 3 + NONCELEN) { return -1; } sigbuflen = ((size_t)sm[0] << 8) | (size_t)sm[1]; if (sigbuflen < 2 || sigbuflen > (smlen - NONCELEN - 2)) { return -1; } sigbuflen --; pmlen = smlen - NONCELEN - 3 - sigbuflen; if (sm[2 + NONCELEN + pmlen] != 0x20 + 10) { return -1; } sigbuf = sm + 2 + NONCELEN + pmlen + 1; /* * The 2-byte length header and the one-byte signature header * have been verified. Nonce is at sm+2, followed by the message * itself. Message length is in pmlen. sigbuf/sigbuflen point to * the signature value (excluding the header byte). */ if (do_verify(sm + 2, sigbuf, sigbuflen, sm + 2 + NONCELEN, pmlen, pk) < 0) { return -1; } /* * Signature is correct, we just have to copy/move the message * to its final destination. The memmove() properly handles * overlaps. */ memmove(m, sm + 2 + NONCELEN, pmlen); *mlen = pmlen; return 0; }