#include "SABER_indcpa.h" #include "SABER_params.h" #include "fips202.h" #include "randombytes.h" #include "verify.h" #include #include #include int PQCLEAN_SABER_CLEAN_crypto_kem_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk) { int i; PQCLEAN_SABER_CLEAN_indcpa_kem_keypair(pk, sk); // sk[0:SABER_INDCPA_SECRETKEYBYTES-1] <-- sk for (i = 0; i < SABER_INDCPA_PUBLICKEYBYTES; i++) { sk[i + SABER_INDCPA_SECRETKEYBYTES] = pk[i]; // sk[SABER_INDCPA_SECRETKEYBYTES:SABER_INDCPA_SECRETKEYBYTES+SABER_INDCPA_SECRETKEYBYTES-1] <-- pk } sha3_256(sk + SABER_SECRETKEYBYTES - 64, pk, SABER_INDCPA_PUBLICKEYBYTES); // Then hash(pk) is appended. randombytes(sk + SABER_SECRETKEYBYTES - SABER_KEYBYTES, SABER_KEYBYTES ); // Remaining part of sk contains a pseudo-random number. // This is output when check in crypto_kem_dec() fails. return (0); } int PQCLEAN_SABER_CLEAN_crypto_kem_enc(unsigned char *ct, unsigned char *ss, const unsigned char *pk) { unsigned char kr[64]; // Will contain key, coins unsigned char buf[64]; randombytes(buf, 32); sha3_256(buf, buf, 32); // BUF[0:31] <-- random message (will be used as the key for client) Note: hash doesnot release system RNG output sha3_256(buf + 32, pk, SABER_INDCPA_PUBLICKEYBYTES); // BUF[32:63] <-- Hash(public key); Multitarget countermeasure for coins + contributory KEM sha3_512(kr, buf, 64); // kr[0:63] <-- Hash(buf[0:63]); // K^ <-- kr[0:31] // noiseseed (r) <-- kr[32:63]; PQCLEAN_SABER_CLEAN_indcpa_kem_enc(buf, kr + 32, pk, ct); // buf[0:31] contains message; kr[32:63] contains randomness r; sha3_256(kr + 32, ct, SABER_BYTES_CCA_DEC); sha3_256(ss, kr, 64); // hash concatenation of pre-k and h(c) to k return (0); } int PQCLEAN_SABER_CLEAN_crypto_kem_dec(unsigned char *ss, const unsigned char *ct, const unsigned char *sk) { int i, fail; unsigned char cmp[SABER_BYTES_CCA_DEC]; unsigned char buf[64]; unsigned char kr[64]; // Will contain key, coins const unsigned char *pk = sk + SABER_INDCPA_SECRETKEYBYTES; PQCLEAN_SABER_CLEAN_indcpa_kem_dec(sk, ct, buf); // buf[0:31] <-- message // Multitarget countermeasure for coins + contributory KEM for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { // Save hash by storing h(pk) in sk buf[32 + i] = sk[SABER_SECRETKEYBYTES - 64 + i]; } sha3_512(kr, buf, 64); PQCLEAN_SABER_CLEAN_indcpa_kem_enc(buf, kr + 32, pk, cmp); fail = PQCLEAN_SABER_CLEAN_verify(ct, cmp, SABER_BYTES_CCA_DEC); sha3_256(kr + 32, ct, SABER_BYTES_CCA_DEC); // overwrite coins in kr with h(c) PQCLEAN_SABER_CLEAN_cmov(kr, sk + SABER_SECRETKEYBYTES - SABER_KEYBYTES, SABER_KEYBYTES, fail); sha3_256(ss, kr, 64); // hash concatenation of pre-k and h(c) to k return (0); }