#include "api.h" #include "randombytes.h" #include #include #define NTESTS 10 const unsigned char canary[8] = { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF }; /* allocate a bit more for all keys and messages and * make sure it is not touched by the implementations. */ static void write_canary(unsigned char *d) { for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) { d[i] = canary[i]; } } static int check_canary(const unsigned char *d) { for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) { if (d[i] != canary[i]) return -1; } return 0; } // https://stackoverflow.com/a/1489985/1711232 #define PASTER(x, y) x##_##y #define EVALUATOR(x, y) PASTER(x, y) #define NAMESPACE(fun) EVALUATOR(PQCLEAN_NAMESPACE, fun) #define crypto_kem_keypair NAMESPACE(crypto_kem_keypair) #define crypto_kem_enc NAMESPACE(crypto_kem_enc) #define crypto_kem_dec NAMESPACE(crypto_kem_dec) #define RETURNS_ZERO(f) \ if ((f) != 0) { \ puts(#f " returned non-zero returncode"); \ return -1; \ } static int test_keys(void) { /* * This is most likely going to be aligned by the compiler. * 16 extra bytes for canary * 1 extra byte for unalignment */ unsigned char key_a_aligned[CRYPTO_BYTES + 16 + 1]; unsigned char key_b_aligned[CRYPTO_BYTES + 16 + 1]; unsigned char pk_aligned[CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES + 16 + 1]; unsigned char sendb_aligned[CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + 16 + 1]; unsigned char sk_a_aligned[CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES + 16 + 1]; /* * Make sure all pointers are odd. * This ensures that the implementation does not assume anything about the * data alignment. For example this would catch if an implementation * directly uses these pointers to load into vector registers using movdqa. */ unsigned char *key_a = (unsigned char *) ((uintptr_t) key_a_aligned|(uintptr_t) 1); unsigned char *key_b = (unsigned char *) ((uintptr_t) key_b_aligned|(uintptr_t) 1); unsigned char *pk = (unsigned char *) ((uintptr_t) pk_aligned|(uintptr_t) 1); unsigned char *sendb = (unsigned char *) ((uintptr_t) sendb_aligned|(uintptr_t) 1); unsigned char *sk_a = (unsigned char *) ((uintptr_t) sk_a_aligned|(uintptr_t) 1); /* * Write 8 byte canary before and after the actual memory regions. * This is used to validate that the implementation does not assume * anything about the placement of data in memory * (e.g., assuming that the pk is always behind the sk) */ write_canary(key_a); write_canary(key_a + CRYPTO_BYTES + 8); write_canary(key_b); write_canary(key_b + CRYPTO_BYTES + 8); write_canary(pk); write_canary(pk + CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES + 8); write_canary(sendb); write_canary(sendb + CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + 8); write_canary(sk_a); write_canary(sk_a + CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES + 8); int i; for (i = 0; i < NTESTS; i++) { // Alice generates a public key RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_keypair(pk + 8, sk_a + 8)); // Bob derives a secret key and creates a response RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_enc(sendb + 8, key_b + 8, pk + 8)); // Alice uses Bobs response to get her secret key RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_dec(key_a + 8, sendb + 8, sk_a + 8)); if (memcmp(key_a + 8, key_b + 8, CRYPTO_BYTES) != 0) { printf("ERROR KEYS\n"); return -1; } // Validate that the implementation did not touch the canary if (check_canary(key_a) || check_canary(key_a + CRYPTO_BYTES + 8) || check_canary(key_b) || check_canary(key_b + CRYPTO_BYTES + 8 ) || check_canary(pk) || check_canary(pk + CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES + 8 ) || check_canary(sendb) || check_canary(sendb + CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + 8 ) || check_canary(sk_a) || check_canary(sk_a + CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES + 8 )) { printf("ERROR canary overwritten\n"); return -1; } } return 0; } static int test_invalid_sk_a(void) { unsigned char sk_a[CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES]; unsigned char key_a[CRYPTO_BYTES], key_b[CRYPTO_BYTES]; unsigned char pk[CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES]; unsigned char sendb[CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES]; int i; int returncode; for (i = 0; i < NTESTS; i++) { // Alice generates a public key RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_keypair(pk, sk_a)); // Bob derives a secret key and creates a response RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_enc(sendb, key_b, pk)); // Replace secret key with random values randombytes(sk_a, CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES); // Alice uses Bobs response to get her secret key if ((returncode = crypto_kem_dec(key_a, sendb, sk_a)) > 0) { printf("ERROR failing crypto_kem_dec returned %d instead of " "negative or zero code\n", returncode); return -1; } if (!memcmp(key_a, key_b, CRYPTO_BYTES)) { printf("ERROR invalid sk_a\n"); return 1; } } return 0; } static int test_invalid_ciphertext(void) { unsigned char sk_a[CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES]; unsigned char key_a[CRYPTO_BYTES], key_b[CRYPTO_BYTES]; unsigned char pk[CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES]; unsigned char sendb[CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES]; int i; size_t pos; int returncode; for (i = 0; i < NTESTS; i++) { randombytes((unsigned char *)&pos, sizeof(size_t)); // Alice generates a public key RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_keypair(pk, sk_a)); // Bob derives a secret key and creates a response RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_enc(sendb, key_b, pk)); // Change some byte in the ciphertext (i.e., encapsulated key) sendb[pos % CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES] ^= 23; // Alice uses Bobs response to get her secret key if ((returncode = crypto_kem_dec(key_a, sendb, sk_a)) > 0) { printf("ERROR crypto_kem_dec should either fail (negative " "returncode) or succeed (return 0) but returned %d\n", returncode); return -1; } if (!memcmp(key_a, key_b, CRYPTO_BYTES)) { printf("ERROR invalid ciphertext\n"); return 1; } } return 0; } int main(void) { int result = 0; result += test_keys(); result += test_invalid_sk_a(); result += test_invalid_ciphertext(); if (result != 0) { puts("Errors occurred"); } return result; }