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https://github.com/henrydcase/pqc.git
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382 lines
10 KiB
C
382 lines
10 KiB
C
/*
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* Wrapper for implementing the PQClean API.
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*/
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#include <stddef.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include "api.h"
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#include "inner.h"
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#define NONCELEN 40
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#include "randombytes.h"
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/*
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* Encoding formats (nnnn = log of degree, 9 for Falcon-512, 10 for Falcon-1024)
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*
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* private key:
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* header byte: 0101nnnn
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* private f (6 or 5 bits by element, depending on degree)
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* private g (6 or 5 bits by element, depending on degree)
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* private F (8 bits by element)
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*
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* public key:
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* header byte: 0000nnnn
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* public h (14 bits by element)
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*
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* signature:
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* header byte: 0011nnnn
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* nonce 40 bytes
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* value (12 bits by element)
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*
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* message + signature:
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* signature length (2 bytes, big-endian)
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* nonce 40 bytes
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* message
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* header byte: 0010nnnn
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* value (12 bits by element)
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* (signature length is 1+len(value), not counting the nonce)
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*/
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/* see api.h */
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int
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PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_crypto_sign_keypair(
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uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *sk) {
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union {
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uint8_t b[FALCON_KEYGEN_TEMP_10];
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uint64_t dummy_u64;
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fpr dummy_fpr;
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} tmp;
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int8_t f[1024], g[1024], F[1024];
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uint16_t h[1024];
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unsigned char seed[48];
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inner_shake256_context rng;
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size_t u, v;
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/*
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* Generate key pair.
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*/
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randombytes(seed, sizeof seed);
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inner_shake256_init(&rng);
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inner_shake256_inject(&rng, seed, sizeof seed);
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inner_shake256_flip(&rng);
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PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_keygen(&rng, f, g, F, NULL, h, 10, tmp.b);
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/*
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* Encode private key.
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*/
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sk[0] = 0x50 + 10;
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u = 1;
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v = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_trim_i8_encode(
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sk + u, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES - u,
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f, 10, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_max_fg_bits[10]);
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if (v == 0) {
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return -1;
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}
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u += v;
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v = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_trim_i8_encode(
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sk + u, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES - u,
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g, 10, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_max_fg_bits[10]);
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if (v == 0) {
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return -1;
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}
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u += v;
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v = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_trim_i8_encode(
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sk + u, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES - u,
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F, 10, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_max_FG_bits[10]);
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if (v == 0) {
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return -1;
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}
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u += v;
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if (u != PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES) {
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return -1;
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}
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/*
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* Encode public key.
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*/
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pk[0] = 0x00 + 10;
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v = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_modq_encode(
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pk + 1, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES - 1,
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h, 10);
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if (v != PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES - 1) {
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return -1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Compute the signature. nonce[] receives the nonce and must have length
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* NONCELEN bytes. sigbuf[] receives the signature value (without nonce
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* or header byte), with *sigbuflen providing the maximum value length and
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* receiving the actual value length.
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*
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* If a signature could be computed but not encoded because it would
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* exceed the output buffer size, then a new signature is computed. If
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* the provided buffer size is too low, this could loop indefinitely, so
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* the caller must provide a size that can accommodate signatures with a
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* large enough probability.
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*
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* Return value: 0 on success, -1 on error.
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*/
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static int
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do_sign(uint8_t *nonce, uint8_t *sigbuf, size_t *sigbuflen,
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const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
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union {
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uint8_t b[72 * 1024];
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uint64_t dummy_u64;
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fpr dummy_fpr;
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} tmp;
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int8_t f[1024], g[1024], F[1024], G[1024];
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union {
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int16_t sig[1024];
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uint16_t hm[1024];
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} r;
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unsigned char seed[48];
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inner_shake256_context sc;
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size_t u, v;
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/*
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* Decode the private key.
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*/
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if (sk[0] != 0x50 + 10) {
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return -1;
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}
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u = 1;
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v = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_trim_i8_decode(
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f, 10, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_max_fg_bits[10],
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sk + u, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES - u);
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if (v == 0) {
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return -1;
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}
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u += v;
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v = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_trim_i8_decode(
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g, 10, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_max_fg_bits[10],
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sk + u, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES - u);
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if (v == 0) {
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return -1;
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}
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u += v;
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v = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_trim_i8_decode(
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F, 10, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_max_FG_bits[10],
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sk + u, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES - u);
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if (v == 0) {
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return -1;
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}
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u += v;
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if (u != PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES) {
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return -1;
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}
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if (!PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_complete_private(G, f, g, F, 10, tmp.b)) {
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return -1;
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}
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/*
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* Create a random nonce (40 bytes).
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*/
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randombytes(nonce, NONCELEN);
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/*
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* Hash message nonce + message into a vector.
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*/
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inner_shake256_init(&sc);
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inner_shake256_inject(&sc, nonce, NONCELEN);
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inner_shake256_inject(&sc, m, mlen);
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inner_shake256_flip(&sc);
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PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_hash_to_point_ct(&sc, r.hm, 10, tmp.b);
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/*
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* Initialize a RNG.
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*/
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randombytes(seed, sizeof seed);
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inner_shake256_init(&sc);
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inner_shake256_inject(&sc, seed, sizeof seed);
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inner_shake256_flip(&sc);
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/*
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* Compute and return the signature. This loops until a signature
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* value is found that fits in the provided buffer.
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*/
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for (;;) {
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PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_sign_dyn(r.sig, &sc, f, g, F, G, r.hm, 10, tmp.b);
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v = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_comp_encode(sigbuf, *sigbuflen, r.sig, 10);
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if (v != 0) {
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*sigbuflen = v;
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return 0;
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}
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}
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}
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/*
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* Verify a sigature. The nonce has size NONCELEN bytes. sigbuf[]
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* (of size sigbuflen) contains the signature value, not including the
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* header byte or nonce. Return value is 0 on success, -1 on error.
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*/
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static int
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do_verify(
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const uint8_t *nonce, const uint8_t *sigbuf, size_t sigbuflen,
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const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
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union {
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uint8_t b[2 * 1024];
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uint64_t dummy_u64;
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fpr dummy_fpr;
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} tmp;
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uint16_t h[1024], hm[1024];
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int16_t sig[1024];
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inner_shake256_context sc;
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/*
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* Decode public key.
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*/
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if (pk[0] != 0x00 + 10) {
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return -1;
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}
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if (PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_modq_decode(h, 10,
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pk + 1, PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES - 1)
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!= PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES - 1) {
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return -1;
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}
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PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_to_ntt_monty(h, 10);
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/*
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* Decode signature.
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*/
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if (sigbuflen == 0) {
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return -1;
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}
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if (PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_comp_decode(sig, 10, sigbuf, sigbuflen) != sigbuflen) {
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return -1;
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}
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/*
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* Hash nonce + message into a vector.
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*/
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inner_shake256_init(&sc);
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inner_shake256_inject(&sc, nonce, NONCELEN);
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inner_shake256_inject(&sc, m, mlen);
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inner_shake256_flip(&sc);
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PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_hash_to_point_ct(&sc, hm, 10, tmp.b);
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/*
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* Verify signature.
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*/
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if (!PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_verify_raw(hm, sig, h, 10, tmp.b)) {
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return -1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/* see api.h */
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int
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PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_crypto_sign_signature(
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uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen,
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const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
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/*
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* The PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES constant is used for
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* the signed message object (as produced by crypto_sign())
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* and includes a two-byte length value, so we take care here
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* to only generate signatures that are two bytes shorter than
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* the maximum. This is done to ensure that crypto_sign()
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* and crypto_sign_signature() produce the exact same signature
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* value, if used on the same message, with the same private key,
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* and using the same output from randombytes() (this is for
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* reproducibility of tests).
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*/
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size_t vlen;
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vlen = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES - NONCELEN - 3;
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if (do_sign(sig + 1, sig + 1 + NONCELEN, &vlen, m, mlen, sk) < 0) {
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return -1;
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}
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sig[0] = 0x30 + 10;
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*siglen = 1 + NONCELEN + vlen;
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return 0;
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}
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/* see api.h */
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int
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PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_crypto_sign_verify(
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const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen,
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const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
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if (siglen < 1 + NONCELEN) {
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return -1;
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}
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if (sig[0] != 0x30 + 10) {
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return -1;
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}
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return do_verify(sig + 1,
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sig + 1 + NONCELEN, siglen - 1 - NONCELEN, m, mlen, pk);
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}
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/* see api.h */
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int
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PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_crypto_sign(
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uint8_t *sm, size_t *smlen,
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const uint8_t *m, size_t mlen, const uint8_t *sk) {
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uint8_t *pm, *sigbuf;
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size_t sigbuflen;
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/*
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* Move the message to its final location; this is a memmove() so
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* it handles overlaps properly.
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*/
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memmove(sm + 2 + NONCELEN, m, mlen);
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pm = sm + 2 + NONCELEN;
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sigbuf = pm + 1 + mlen;
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sigbuflen = PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_CRYPTO_BYTES - NONCELEN - 3;
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if (do_sign(sm + 2, sigbuf, &sigbuflen, pm, mlen, sk) < 0) {
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return -1;
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}
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pm[mlen] = 0x20 + 10;
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sigbuflen ++;
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sm[0] = (uint8_t)(sigbuflen >> 8);
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sm[1] = (uint8_t)sigbuflen;
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*smlen = mlen + 2 + NONCELEN + sigbuflen;
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return 0;
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}
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/* see api.h */
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int
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PQCLEAN_FALCON1024_CLEAN_crypto_sign_open(
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uint8_t *m, size_t *mlen,
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const uint8_t *sm, size_t smlen, const uint8_t *pk) {
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const uint8_t *sigbuf;
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size_t pmlen, sigbuflen;
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if (smlen < 3 + NONCELEN) {
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return -1;
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}
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sigbuflen = ((size_t)sm[0] << 8) | (size_t)sm[1];
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if (sigbuflen < 2 || sigbuflen > (smlen - NONCELEN - 2)) {
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return -1;
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}
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sigbuflen --;
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pmlen = smlen - NONCELEN - 3 - sigbuflen;
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if (sm[2 + NONCELEN + pmlen] != 0x20 + 10) {
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return -1;
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}
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sigbuf = sm + 2 + NONCELEN + pmlen + 1;
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/*
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* The 2-byte length header and the one-byte signature header
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* have been verified. Nonce is at sm+2, followed by the message
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* itself. Message length is in pmlen. sigbuf/sigbuflen point to
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* the signature value (excluding the header byte).
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*/
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if (do_verify(sm + 2, sigbuf, sigbuflen,
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sm + 2 + NONCELEN, pmlen, pk) < 0) {
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return -1;
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}
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/*
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* Signature is correct, we just have to copy/move the message
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* to its final destination. The memmove() properly handles
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* overlaps.
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*/
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memmove(m, sm + 2 + NONCELEN, pmlen);
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*mlen = pmlen;
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return 0;
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}
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