2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
|
|
|
|
* project 1999.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* ====================================================================
|
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
|
|
* are met:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
|
|
|
|
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
|
|
|
|
* distribution.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
|
|
|
|
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
|
|
|
|
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
|
|
|
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
|
|
|
|
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
|
|
|
|
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
|
|
|
|
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
|
|
|
|
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
|
|
|
|
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
|
|
|
|
* acknowledgment:
|
|
|
|
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
|
|
|
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
|
|
|
|
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
|
|
|
|
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
|
|
|
|
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
|
|
|
|
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
|
|
|
|
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
|
|
|
|
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
|
|
|
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
|
|
|
|
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
|
|
|
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
* ====================================================================
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
|
|
|
|
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
|
|
|
|
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_PKCS8_INTERNAL_H
|
|
|
|
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_PKCS8_INTERNAL_H
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <openssl/base.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if defined(__cplusplus)
|
|
|
|
extern "C" {
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// pkcs8_pbe_decrypt decrypts |in| using the PBE scheme described by
|
|
|
|
// |algorithm|, which should be a serialized AlgorithmIdentifier structure. On
|
|
|
|
// success, it sets |*out| to a newly-allocated buffer containing the decrypted
|
|
|
|
// result and returns one. Otherwise, it returns zero.
|
2017-03-14 06:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
int pkcs8_pbe_decrypt(uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, CBS *algorithm,
|
|
|
|
const char *pass, size_t pass_len, const uint8_t *in,
|
|
|
|
size_t in_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define PKCS12_KEY_ID 1
|
|
|
|
#define PKCS12_IV_ID 2
|
|
|
|
#define PKCS12_MAC_ID 3
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// pkcs12_key_gen runs the PKCS#12 key derivation function as specified in
|
|
|
|
// RFC 7292, appendix B. On success, it writes the resulting |out_len| bytes of
|
|
|
|
// key material to |out| and returns one. Otherwise, it returns zero. |id|
|
|
|
|
// should be one of the |PKCS12_*_ID| values.
|
2017-03-14 06:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
int pkcs12_key_gen(const char *pass, size_t pass_len, const uint8_t *salt,
|
|
|
|
size_t salt_len, uint8_t id, unsigned iterations,
|
|
|
|
size_t out_len, uint8_t *out, const EVP_MD *md);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-09 22:28:09 +01:00
|
|
|
// pkcs12_pbe_encrypt_init configures |ctx| for encrypting with a PBES1 scheme
|
|
|
|
// defined in PKCS#12. It writes the corresponding AlgorithmIdentifier to |out|.
|
|
|
|
int pkcs12_pbe_encrypt_init(CBB *out, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int alg,
|
|
|
|
unsigned iterations, const char *pass,
|
|
|
|
size_t pass_len, const uint8_t *salt,
|
|
|
|
size_t salt_len);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
struct pbe_suite {
|
|
|
|
int pbe_nid;
|
2017-03-14 04:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
uint8_t oid[10];
|
|
|
|
uint8_t oid_len;
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *(*cipher_func)(void);
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *(*md_func)(void);
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// decrypt_init initialize |ctx| for decrypting. The password is specified by
|
|
|
|
// |pass| and |pass_len|. |param| contains the serialized parameters field of
|
|
|
|
// the AlgorithmIdentifier.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// It returns one on success and zero on error.
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*decrypt_init)(const struct pbe_suite *suite, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *pass, size_t pass_len, CBS *param);
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
#define PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS 2048
|
|
|
|
#define PKCS5_SALT_LEN 8
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int PKCS5_pbe2_decrypt_init(const struct pbe_suite *suite, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *pass, size_t pass_len, CBS *param);
|
2015-08-21 19:09:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
// PKCS5_pbe2_encrypt_init configures |ctx| for encrypting with PKCS #5 PBES2,
|
|
|
|
// as defined in RFC 2998, with the specified parameters. It writes the
|
|
|
|
// corresponding AlgorithmIdentifier to |out|.
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int PKCS5_pbe2_encrypt_init(CBB *out, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
|
|
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned iterations,
|
Push password encoding back into pkcs12_key_gen.
With PKCS8_encrypt_pbe and PKCS8_decrypt_pbe gone in
3e8b782c0cc0d9621f622cf80ab1a9bcf442fa17, we can restore the old
arrangement where the password encoding was handled in pkcs12_key_gen.
This simplifies the interface for the follow-up crypto/asn1 split.
Note this change is *not* a no-op for PKCS#12 files which use PBES2.
Before, we would perform the PKCS#12 password encoding for all parts of
PKCS#12 processing. The new behavior is we only perform it for the parts
that go through the PKCS#12 KDF. For such a file, it would only be the
MAC.
I believe the specification supports our new behavior. Although RFC 7292
B.1 says something which implies that the transformation is about
converting passwords to byte strings and would thus be universal,
appendix B itself is prefaced with:
Note that this method for password privacy mode is not recommended
and is deprecated for new usage. The procedures and algorithms
defined in PKCS #5 v2.1 [13] [22] should be used instead.
Specifically, PBES2 should be used as encryption scheme, with PBKDF2
as the key derivation function.
"This method" refers to the key derivation and not the password
formatting, but it does give support to the theory that password
formatting is tied to PKCS#12 key derivation.
(Of course, if one believes PKCS#12's assertion that their inane
encoding (NUL-terminated UTF-16!) is because PKCS#5 failed to talk about
passwords as Unicode strings, one would think that PBES2 (also in
PKCS#5) would have the same issue and thus need PKCS#12 to valiantly
save the day with an encoding...)
This matches OpenSSL's behavior and that of recent versions of NSS. See
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268141. I was unable to
figure out what variants, if any, macOS accepts.
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9a1bb4d5e168e6e76b82241e4634b1103e620b9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14213
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2017-03-14 05:43:23 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *pass, size_t pass_len,
|
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len);
|
2016-12-27 07:44:24 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if defined(__cplusplus)
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
} // extern C
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_PKCS8_INTERNAL_H
|