boringssl/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8_x509.c

791 lines
22 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
* project 1999.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
#include <openssl/pkcs8.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
#include "../digest_extra/internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
/* Minor tweak to operation: zero private key data */
static int pkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
void *exarg) {
/* Since the structure must still be valid use ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE */
if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *key = (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *)*pval;
if (key->pkey && key->pkey->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING &&
key->pkey->value.octet_string) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(key->pkey->value.octet_string->data,
key->pkey->value.octet_string->length);
}
}
return 1;
}
ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey_cb) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkeyalg, X509_ALGOR),
ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey, ASN1_ANY),
ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO)
EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKCS82PKEY(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) {
uint8_t *der = NULL;
int der_len = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(p8, &der);
if (der_len < 0) {
return NULL;
}
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, der, (size_t)der_len);
EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_parse_private_key(&cbs);
if (ret == NULL || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
OPENSSL_free(der);
return NULL;
}
OPENSSL_free(der);
return ret;
}
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
CBB cbb;
uint8_t *der = NULL;
size_t der_len;
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
!EVP_marshal_private_key(&cbb, pkey) ||
!CBB_finish(&cbb, &der, &der_len) ||
der_len > LONG_MAX) {
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
const uint8_t *p = der;
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, (long)der_len);
if (p8 == NULL || p != der + der_len) {
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(der);
return p8;
err:
OPENSSL_free(der);
return NULL;
}
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS8_decrypt(X509_SIG *pkcs8, const char *pass,
int pass_len_in) {
size_t pass_len;
if (pass_len_in == -1 && pass != NULL) {
pass_len = strlen(pass);
} else {
pass_len = (size_t)pass_len_in;
}
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *ret = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
uint8_t *in = NULL;
/* Convert the legacy ASN.1 object to a byte string. */
int in_len = i2d_X509_SIG(pkcs8, &in);
if (in_len < 0) {
goto err;
}
CBS cbs;
CBS_init(&cbs, in, in_len);
pkey = PKCS8_parse_encrypted_private_key(&cbs, pass, pass_len);
if (pkey == NULL || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
goto err;
}
ret = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(pkey);
err:
OPENSSL_free(in);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return ret;
}
X509_SIG *PKCS8_encrypt(int pbe_nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const char *pass,
int pass_len_in, const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len,
int iterations, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf) {
size_t pass_len;
if (pass_len_in == -1 && pass != NULL) {
pass_len = strlen(pass);
} else {
pass_len = (size_t)pass_len_in;
}
/* Parse out the private key. */
EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8inf);
if (pkey == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
X509_SIG *ret = NULL;
uint8_t *der = NULL;
size_t der_len;
CBB cbb;
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 128) ||
!PKCS8_marshal_encrypted_private_key(&cbb, pbe_nid, cipher, pass,
pass_len, salt, salt_len, iterations,
pkey) ||
!CBB_finish(&cbb, &der, &der_len)) {
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
goto err;
}
/* Convert back to legacy ASN.1 objects. */
const uint8_t *ptr = der;
ret = d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &ptr, der_len);
if (ret == NULL || ptr != der + der_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
X509_SIG_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
err:
OPENSSL_free(der);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return ret;
}
struct pkcs12_context {
EVP_PKEY **out_key;
STACK_OF(X509) *out_certs;
const char *password;
size_t password_len;
};
/* PKCS12_handle_sequence parses a BER-encoded SEQUENCE of elements in a PKCS#12
* structure. */
static int PKCS12_handle_sequence(
CBS *sequence, struct pkcs12_context *ctx,
int (*handle_element)(CBS *cbs, struct pkcs12_context *ctx)) {
uint8_t *der_bytes = NULL;
size_t der_len;
CBS in;
int ret = 0;
/* Although a BER->DER conversion is done at the beginning of |PKCS12_parse|,
* the ASN.1 data gets wrapped in OCTETSTRINGs and/or encrypted and the
* conversion cannot see through those wrappings. So each time we step
* through one we need to convert to DER again. */
if (!CBS_asn1_ber_to_der(sequence, &der_bytes, &der_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
return 0;
}
if (der_bytes != NULL) {
CBS_init(&in, der_bytes, der_len);
} else {
CBS_init(&in, CBS_data(sequence), CBS_len(sequence));
}
CBS child;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&in, &child, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
CBS_len(&in) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
goto err;
}
while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) {
CBS element;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&child, &element, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
goto err;
}
if (!handle_element(&element, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(der_bytes);
return ret;
}
/* 1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.2 */
static const uint8_t kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag[] = {
0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x02};
/* 1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.3 */
static const uint8_t kCertBag[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d,
0x01, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x03};
/* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.22.1 */
static const uint8_t kX509Certificate[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x16, 0x01};
/* PKCS12_handle_safe_bag parses a single SafeBag element in a PKCS#12
* structure. */
static int PKCS12_handle_safe_bag(CBS *safe_bag, struct pkcs12_context *ctx) {
CBS bag_id, wrapped_value;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(safe_bag, &bag_id, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(safe_bag, &wrapped_value,
CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)
/* Ignore the bagAttributes field. */) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
return 0;
}
if (CBS_mem_equal(&bag_id, kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag,
sizeof(kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag))) {
/* See RFC 7292, section 4.2.2. */
if (*ctx->out_key) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_MULTIPLE_PRIVATE_KEYS_IN_PKCS12);
return 0;
}
EVP_PKEY *pkey = PKCS8_parse_encrypted_private_key(
&wrapped_value, ctx->password, ctx->password_len);
if (pkey == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (CBS_len(&wrapped_value) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return 0;
}
*ctx->out_key = pkey;
return 1;
}
if (CBS_mem_equal(&bag_id, kCertBag, sizeof(kCertBag))) {
/* See RFC 7292, section 4.2.3. */
CBS cert_bag, cert_type, wrapped_cert, cert;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_value, &cert_bag, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&cert_bag, &cert_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&cert_bag, &wrapped_cert,
CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_cert, &cert, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
return 0;
}
/* Skip unknown certificate types. */
if (!CBS_mem_equal(&cert_type, kX509Certificate,
sizeof(kX509Certificate))) {
return 1;
}
if (CBS_len(&cert) > LONG_MAX) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
return 0;
}
const uint8_t *inp = CBS_data(&cert);
X509 *x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &inp, (long)CBS_len(&cert));
if (!x509) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
return 0;
}
if (inp != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
X509_free(x509);
return 0;
}
if (0 == sk_X509_push(ctx->out_certs, x509)) {
X509_free(x509);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/* Unknown element type - ignore it. */
return 1;
}
/* 1.2.840.113549.1.7.1 */
static const uint8_t kPKCS7Data[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01};
/* 1.2.840.113549.1.7.6 */
static const uint8_t kPKCS7EncryptedData[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x06};
/* PKCS12_handle_content_info parses a single PKCS#7 ContentInfo element in a
* PKCS#12 structure. */
static int PKCS12_handle_content_info(CBS *content_info,
struct pkcs12_context *ctx) {
CBS content_type, wrapped_contents, contents;
int ret = 0;
uint8_t *storage = NULL;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(content_info, &content_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(content_info, &wrapped_contents,
CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0) ||
CBS_len(content_info) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
goto err;
}
if (CBS_mem_equal(&content_type, kPKCS7EncryptedData,
sizeof(kPKCS7EncryptedData))) {
/* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-13.
*
* PKCS#7 encrypted data inside a PKCS#12 structure is generally an
* encrypted certificate bag and it's generally encrypted with 40-bit
* RC2-CBC. */
CBS version_bytes, eci, contents_type, ai, encrypted_contents;
uint8_t *out;
size_t out_len;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_contents, &contents, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &version_bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
/* EncryptedContentInfo, see
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-10.1 */
!CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &eci, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&eci, &contents_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
/* AlgorithmIdentifier, see
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.1.2 */
!CBS_get_asn1(&eci, &ai, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBS_get_asn1_implicit_string(
&eci, &encrypted_contents, &storage,
CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_mem_equal(&contents_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
goto err;
}
if (!pkcs8_pbe_decrypt(&out, &out_len, &ai, ctx->password,
ctx->password_len, CBS_data(&encrypted_contents),
CBS_len(&encrypted_contents))) {
goto err;
}
CBS safe_contents;
CBS_init(&safe_contents, out, out_len);
ret = PKCS12_handle_sequence(&safe_contents, ctx, PKCS12_handle_safe_bag);
OPENSSL_free(out);
} else if (CBS_mem_equal(&content_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data))) {
CBS octet_string_contents;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_contents, &octet_string_contents,
CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
goto err;
}
ret = PKCS12_handle_sequence(&octet_string_contents, ctx,
PKCS12_handle_safe_bag);
} else {
/* Unknown element type - ignore it. */
ret = 1;
}
err:
OPENSSL_free(storage);
return ret;
}
int PKCS12_get_key_and_certs(EVP_PKEY **out_key, STACK_OF(X509) *out_certs,
CBS *ber_in, const char *password) {
uint8_t *der_bytes = NULL;
size_t der_len;
CBS in, pfx, mac_data, authsafe, content_type, wrapped_authsafes, authsafes;
uint64_t version;
int ret = 0;
struct pkcs12_context ctx;
const size_t original_out_certs_len = sk_X509_num(out_certs);
/* The input may be in BER format. */
if (!CBS_asn1_ber_to_der(ber_in, &der_bytes, &der_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
return 0;
}
if (der_bytes != NULL) {
CBS_init(&in, der_bytes, der_len);
} else {
CBS_init(&in, CBS_data(ber_in), CBS_len(ber_in));
}
*out_key = NULL;
OPENSSL_memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
/* See ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-12/pkcs-12v1.pdf, section
* four. */
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&in, &pfx, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
CBS_len(&in) != 0 ||
!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&pfx, &version)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
goto err;
}
if (version < 3) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_VERSION);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&pfx, &authsafe, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
goto err;
}
if (CBS_len(&pfx) == 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_MISSING_MAC);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&pfx, &mac_data, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
goto err;
}
/* authsafe is a PKCS#7 ContentInfo. See
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-7. */
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&authsafe, &content_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&authsafe, &wrapped_authsafes,
CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
goto err;
}
/* The content type can either be data or signedData. The latter indicates
* that it's signed by a public key, which isn't supported. */
if (!CBS_mem_equal(&content_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_PKCS12_PUBLIC_KEY_INTEGRITY_NOT_SUPPORTED);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_authsafes, &authsafes, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
goto err;
}
ctx.out_key = out_key;
ctx.out_certs = out_certs;
ctx.password = password;
ctx.password_len = password != NULL ? strlen(password) : 0;
/* Verify the MAC. */
{
CBS mac, salt, expected_mac;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&mac_data, &mac, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
goto err;
}
const EVP_MD *md = EVP_parse_digest_algorithm(&mac);
if (md == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&mac, &expected_mac, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&mac_data, &salt, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
goto err;
}
/* The iteration count is optional and the default is one. */
uint64_t iterations = 1;
if (CBS_len(&mac_data) > 0) {
if (!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&mac_data, &iterations) ||
iterations > UINT_MAX) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
goto err;
}
}
uint8_t hmac_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
if (!pkcs12_key_gen(ctx.password, ctx.password_len, CBS_data(&salt),
CBS_len(&salt), PKCS12_MAC_ID, iterations,
EVP_MD_size(md), hmac_key, md)) {
goto err;
}
uint8_t hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned hmac_len;
if (NULL == HMAC(md, hmac_key, EVP_MD_size(md), CBS_data(&authsafes),
CBS_len(&authsafes), hmac, &hmac_len)) {
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_mem_equal(&expected_mac, hmac, hmac_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_INCORRECT_PASSWORD);
goto err;
}
}
/* authsafes contains a series of PKCS#7 ContentInfos. */
if (!PKCS12_handle_sequence(&authsafes, &ctx, PKCS12_handle_content_info)) {
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(der_bytes);
if (!ret) {
EVP_PKEY_free(*out_key);
*out_key = NULL;
while (sk_X509_num(out_certs) > original_out_certs_len) {
X509 *x509 = sk_X509_pop(out_certs);
X509_free(x509);
}
}
return ret;
}
void PKCS12_PBE_add(void) {}
struct pkcs12_st {
uint8_t *ber_bytes;
size_t ber_len;
};
PKCS12 *d2i_PKCS12(PKCS12 **out_p12, const uint8_t **ber_bytes,
size_t ber_len) {
PKCS12 *p12;
p12 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(PKCS12));
if (!p12) {
return NULL;
}
p12->ber_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(ber_len);
if (!p12->ber_bytes) {
OPENSSL_free(p12);
return NULL;
}
OPENSSL_memcpy(p12->ber_bytes, *ber_bytes, ber_len);
p12->ber_len = ber_len;
*ber_bytes += ber_len;
if (out_p12) {
PKCS12_free(*out_p12);
*out_p12 = p12;
}
return p12;
}
PKCS12* d2i_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bio, PKCS12 **out_p12) {
size_t used = 0;
BUF_MEM *buf;
const uint8_t *dummy;
static const size_t kMaxSize = 256 * 1024;
PKCS12 *ret = NULL;
buf = BUF_MEM_new();
if (buf == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (BUF_MEM_grow(buf, 8192) == 0) {
goto out;
}
for (;;) {
int n = BIO_read(bio, &buf->data[used], buf->length - used);
if (n < 0) {
if (used == 0) {
goto out;
}
/* Workaround a bug in node.js. It uses a memory BIO for this in the wrong
* mode. */
n = 0;
}
if (n == 0) {
break;
}
used += n;
if (used < buf->length) {
continue;
}
if (buf->length > kMaxSize ||
BUF_MEM_grow(buf, buf->length * 2) == 0) {
goto out;
}
}
dummy = (uint8_t*) buf->data;
ret = d2i_PKCS12(out_p12, &dummy, used);
out:
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
return ret;
}
PKCS12* d2i_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS12 **out_p12) {
BIO *bio;
PKCS12 *ret;
bio = BIO_new_fp(fp, 0 /* don't take ownership */);
if (!bio) {
return NULL;
}
ret = d2i_PKCS12_bio(bio, out_p12);
BIO_free(bio);
return ret;
}
int PKCS12_parse(const PKCS12 *p12, const char *password, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey,
X509 **out_cert, STACK_OF(X509) **out_ca_certs) {
CBS ber_bytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *ca_certs = NULL;
char ca_certs_alloced = 0;
if (out_ca_certs != NULL && *out_ca_certs != NULL) {
ca_certs = *out_ca_certs;
}
if (!ca_certs) {
ca_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
if (ca_certs == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
ca_certs_alloced = 1;
}
CBS_init(&ber_bytes, p12->ber_bytes, p12->ber_len);
if (!PKCS12_get_key_and_certs(out_pkey, ca_certs, &ber_bytes, password)) {
if (ca_certs_alloced) {
sk_X509_free(ca_certs);
}
return 0;
}
*out_cert = NULL;
if (sk_X509_num(ca_certs) > 0) {
*out_cert = sk_X509_shift(ca_certs);
}
if (out_ca_certs) {
*out_ca_certs = ca_certs;
} else {
sk_X509_pop_free(ca_certs, X509_free);
}
return 1;
}
int PKCS12_verify_mac(const PKCS12 *p12, const char *password,
int password_len) {
if (password == NULL) {
if (password_len != 0) {
return 0;
}
} else if (password_len != -1 &&
(password[password_len] != 0 ||
OPENSSL_memchr(password, 0, password_len) != NULL)) {
return 0;
}
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL;
if (!PKCS12_parse(p12, password, &pkey, &cert, NULL)) {
ERR_clear_error();
return 0;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
X509_free(cert);
return 1;
}
void PKCS12_free(PKCS12 *p12) {
if (p12 == NULL) {
return;
}
OPENSSL_free(p12->ber_bytes);
OPENSSL_free(p12);
}