Delay creating s->session until resumption is resolved.
When not offering to resume a session, the client populates s->session with a
fresh SSL_SESSION before the ServerHello is processed and, in DTLS_ANY_VERSION,
before the version is even determined. Don't create a fresh SSL_SESSION until
we know we are doing a full handshake.
This brings ssl3_send_client_hello closer to ssl23_client_hello in behavior. It
also fixes ssl_version in the client in DTLS_ANY_VERSION.
SSLv23_client_method is largely unchanged. If no session is offered, s->session
continues to be NULL until the ServerHello is received. The one difference is
that s->session isn't populated until the entire ServerHello is received,
rather than just the first half, in the case of a fragmented ServerHello. Apart
from info_callback, no external hooks get called between those points, so this
shouldn't expose new missing NULL checks.
The other client methods change significantly to match SSLv23_client_method's
behavior. For TLS, any exposed missing NULL checks are also in
SSLv23_client_method (and version-specific methods are already weird), so that
should be safe. For DTLS, I've verified that accesses in d1_*.c either handle
NULL or are after the ServerHello.
Change-Id: Idcae6bd242480e28a57dbba76ce67f1ac1ae1d1d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2404
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
10 years ago |
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106107108109110111112113114115116117118119120121122123124125126127128129130131132133134135136137138139140141142143144145146147148149150151152153154155156157158159160161162163164165166167168169170171172173174175176177178179180181182183184185186187188189190191192193194195196197198199200201202203204205206207208209210211212213214215216217218219220221222223224225226227228229230231232233234235236237238239240241242243244245246247248249250251252253254255256257258259260261262263264265266267268269270271272273274275276277278279280281282283284285286287288289290291292293294295296297298299300301302303304305306307308309310311312313314315316317318319320321322323324325326327328329330331332333334335336337338339340341342343344345346347348349350351352353354355356357358359360361362363364365366367368369370371372373374375376377378379380381382383384385386387388389390391392393394395396397398399400401402403404405406407408409410411412413414415416417418419420421422423424425426427428429430431432433434435436437438439440441442443444445446447448449450451452453454455456457458459460461462463464465466467468469470471472473474475476477478479480481482483484485486487488489490491492493494495496497498499500501502503504505506507508509510511512513514515516517518519520521522523524525526527528529530531532533534535536537538539540541542543544545546547548549550551552553554555556557558559560561562563564565566567568569570571572573574575576577578579580581582583584585586587588589590591592593594595596597598599600601602603604605606607608609610611612613614615616617618619620621622623624625626627628629630631632633634635636637638639640641642643644645646647648649650651652653654655656657658659660661662663664665666667668669670671672673674675676677678679680681682683684685686687688689690691692693694695696697698699700701702703704705706707708709710711712713714715716717718719720721722723724725726727728729730731732733734735736737738739740741742743744745746747748749750751752753754755756757758759760761762763764765766767768769770771772773774775776777778779780781782783784785786787788789790791792793794795796797798799800801802803804805806807808809810811812813814815816817818819820821822823824825826827828829830831832833834835836837838839840841842843844845846847848849850851852853854855856857858859860861862863864865866867868869870871872873874875876877878879880881882883884885886887888889890891892893894895896897898899900901902903904905906907908909910911912913914915916917918919920921922923924925926927928929930931932933934935936937938939940941942943944945946947948949950951952953954955956957958959960961962963964965966967968969970971972973974975976977978979980981982983984985986987988989990991992993994995996997998999100010011002100310041005100610071008100910101011101210131014101510161017101810191020102110221023102410251026102710281029103010311032103310341035103610371038103910401041104210431044104510461047104810491050105110521053105410551056105710581059106010611062106310641065106610671068106910701071107210731074107510761077107810791080108110821083108410851086108710881089109010911092109310941095109610971098109911001101110211031104110511061107110811091110111111121113111411151116111711181119112011211122112311241125112611271128112911301131113211331134113511361137113811391140114111421143114411451146114711481149115011511152115311541155115611571158115911601161116211631164116511661167116811691170117111721173117411751176117711781179118011811182118311841185118611871188118911901191119211931194119511961197119811991200120112021203120412051206120712081209121012111212121312141215121612171218121912201221122212231224122512261227122812291230123112321233123412351236123712381239124012411242124312441245124612471248124912501251125212531254125512561257125812591260126112621263126412651266126712681269127012711272127312741275127612771278127912801281128212831284128512861287128812891290129112921293129412951296129712981299130013011302130313041305130613071308130913101311131213131314131513161317131813191320132113221323132413251326132713281329133013311332133313341335133613371338133913401341134213431344134513461347134813491350135113521353135413551356135713581359136013611362136313641365136613671368136913701371137213731374137513761377137813791380138113821383138413851386138713881389139013911392139313941395139613971398139914001401140214031404140514061407140814091410141114121413141414151416141714181419142014211422142314241425142614271428142914301431143214331434143514361437143814391440144114421443144414451446144714481449145014511452145314541455145614571458145914601461146214631464146514661467146814691470147114721473147414751476147714781479148014811482148314841485148614871488148914901491149214931494149514961497149814991500150115021503150415051506150715081509151015111512151315141515151615171518151915201521152215231524152515261527152815291530153115321533153415351536153715381539154015411542154315441545154615471548154915501551155215531554155515561557155815591560156115621563156415651566156715681569157015711572157315741575157615771578157915801581158215831584158515861587158815891590159115921593159415951596159715981599160016011602160316041605160616071608160916101611161216131614161516161617161816191620162116221623162416251626162716281629163016311632163316341635163616371638163916401641164216431644164516461647164816491650165116521653165416551656165716581659166016611662166316641665166616671668166916701671167216731674167516761677167816791680168116821683168416851686168716881689169016911692169316941695169616971698169917001701170217031704170517061707170817091710171117121713171417151716171717181719172017211722172317241725172617271728172917301731173217331734173517361737173817391740174117421743174417451746174717481749175017511752175317541755175617571758175917601761176217631764176517661767176817691770177117721773177417751776177717781779178017811782178317841785178617871788178917901791179217931794179517961797179817991800180118021803180418051806180718081809181018111812181318141815181618171818181918201821182218231824182518261827182818291830183118321833183418351836183718381839184018411842184318441845184618471848184918501851185218531854185518561857185818591860186118621863186418651866186718681869187018711872187318741875187618771878187918801881188218831884188518861887188818891890189118921893189418951896189718981899190019011902190319041905190619071908190919101911191219131914191519161917191819191920192119221923192419251926192719281929193019311932193319341935193619371938193919401941194219431944194519461947194819491950195119521953195419551956195719581959196019611962196319641965196619671968196919701971197219731974197519761977197819791980198119821983198419851986198719881989199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022202320242025202620272028202920302031203220332034203520362037203820392040204120422043204420452046204720482049205020512052205320542055205620572058205920602061206220632064206520662067206820692070207120722073207420752076207720782079208020812082208320842085208620872088208920902091209220932094209520962097209820992100210121022103210421052106210721082109211021112112211321142115211621172118211921202121212221232124212521262127212821292130213121322133213421352136213721382139214021412142214321442145214621472148214921502151215221532154215521562157215821592160216121622163216421652166216721682169217021712172217321742175217621772178217921802181218221832184218521862187218821892190219121922193219421952196219721982199220022012202220322042205220622072208220922102211221222132214221522162217221822192220222122222223222422252226222722282229223022312232223322342235223622372238223922402241224222432244224522462247224822492250225122522253225422552256225722582259226022612262226322642265226622672268226922702271227222732274227522762277227822792280228122822283228422852286228722882289229022912292229322942295229622972298229923002301230223032304230523062307230823092310231123122313231423152316231723182319232023212322232323242325232623272328232923302331233223332334233523362337233823392340234123422343234423452346234723482349235023512352235323542355235623572358235923602361236223632364236523662367236823692370237123722373237423752376237723782379238023812382238323842385238623872388238923902391239223932394239523962397239823992400240124022403240424052406240724082409241024112412241324142415241624172418241924202421 |
- /* ssl/s3_clnt.c */
- /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
- #include <assert.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <string.h>
-
- #include <openssl/buf.h>
- #include <openssl/bytestring.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
- #include <openssl/obj.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/mem.h>
- #include <openssl/md5.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/x509.h>
-
- #include "internal.h"
- #include "../crypto/dh/internal.h"
-
-
- int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) {
- BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
- void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
- int ret = -1;
- int new_state, state, skip = 0;
-
- assert(s->handshake_func == ssl3_connect);
- assert(!s->server);
- assert(!SSL_IS_DTLS(s));
-
- ERR_clear_error();
- ERR_clear_system_error();
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL) {
- cb = s->info_callback;
- } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) {
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
- }
-
- s->in_handshake++;
-
- for (;;) {
- state = s->state;
-
- switch (s->state) {
- case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
- s->renegotiate = 1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
- /* fallthrough */
- case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
- if (cb != NULL) {
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
- }
-
- if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
- /* TODO(davidben): Some consumers clear |s->version| to break the
- * handshake in a callback. Remove this when they're using proper
- * APIs. */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_connect, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
- buf = BUF_MEM_new();
- if (buf == NULL ||
- !BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- s->init_buf = buf;
- buf = NULL;
- }
-
- if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s) ||
- !ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
-
- if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_connect, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
- s->shutdown = 0;
- ret = ssl3_send_client_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
- if (s->bbio != s->wbio) {
- s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
- }
-
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (s->hit) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE;
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
- /* receive renewed session ticket */
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- }
- } else {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
- if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
- ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
- } else {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
- } else {
- skip = 1;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- /* at this point we check that we have the
- * required stuff from the server */
- if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
- } else {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
- ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- /* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
- * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
- } else {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
- }
-
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_cert_verify(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,
- SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
- if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A;
- }
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
- if (!s->enc_method->setup_key_block(s) ||
- !s->enc_method->change_cipher_state(
- s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A;
- } else {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_channel_id(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
- ret =
- ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
- s->enc_method->client_finished_label,
- s->enc_method->client_finished_label_len);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
-
- if (s->hit) {
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
- } else {
- /* This is a non-resumption handshake. If it involves ChannelID, then
- * record the handshake hashes at this point in the session so that
- * any resumption of this session with ChannelID can sign those
- * hashes. */
- if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) {
- ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- }
- if ((SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START) &&
- ssl3_can_false_start(s) &&
- /* No False Start on renegotiation (would complicate the state
- * machine). */
- s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0) {
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_FALSE_START;
- } else {
- /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- } else {
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE;
- }
- }
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE:
- /* At this point, the next message must be entirely behind a
- * ChangeCipherSpec. */
- if (!ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
- ret =
- ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (s->hit) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- } else {
- s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
- s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
- if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_FALSE_START:
- /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- } else {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.in_false_start = 1;
-
- ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
-
- case SSL_ST_OK:
- /* clean a few things up */
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
- if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
- BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
- s->init_buf = NULL;
- }
-
- /* Remove write buffering now. */
- ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->renegotiate = 0;
- s->new_session = 0;
- s->s3->tmp.in_false_start = 0;
-
- ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
-
- ret = 1;
- /* s->server=0; */
-
- if (cb != NULL) {
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
- }
-
- goto end;
-
- default:
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_connect, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
- if (cb != NULL && s->state != state) {
- new_state = s->state;
- s->state = state;
- cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
- s->state = new_state;
- }
- }
- skip = 0;
- }
-
- end:
- s->in_handshake--;
- if (buf != NULL) {
- BUF_MEM_free(buf);
- }
- if (cb != NULL) {
- cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
- }
- return ret;
- }
-
- int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *s) {
- uint8_t *buf, *p, *d;
- int i;
- unsigned long l;
-
- buf = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data;
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
- if (!s->s3->have_version) {
- uint16_t max_version = ssl3_get_max_client_version(s);
- /* Disabling all versions is silly: return an error. */
- if (max_version == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
- goto err;
- }
- s->version = max_version;
- s->client_version = max_version;
- }
-
- /* If the configured session was created at a version higher than our
- * maximum version, drop it. */
- if (s->session &&
- (s->session->session_id_length == 0 || s->session->not_resumable ||
- (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->session->ssl_version > s->version) ||
- (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->session->ssl_version < s->version))) {
- SSL_set_session(s, NULL);
- }
-
- /* else use the pre-loaded session */
- p = s->s3->client_random;
-
- /* If resending the ClientHello in DTLS after a HelloVerifyRequest, don't
- * renegerate the client_random. The random must be reused. */
- if ((!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !s->d1->send_cookie) &&
- !ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random))) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Do the message type and length last. Note: the final argument to
- * ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext below depends on the size of this prefix. */
- d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
-
- /* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from an SSLv2/v3
- * compatible client hello). The client_version field is the maximum
- * version we permit and it is also used in RSA encrypted premaster
- * secrets. Some servers can choke if we initially report a higher version
- * then renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This didn't
- * happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it but it can with TLS 1.1
- * or later if the server only supports 1.0.
- *
- * Possible scenario with previous logic:
- * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
- * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
- * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
- * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
- * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
- * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
- * know that is maximum server supports.
- * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
- * containing version 1.0.
- *
- * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the maximum version
- * we support in client hello and then rely on the checking of version to
- * ensure the servers isn't being inconsistent: for example initially
- * negotiating with TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by
- * using client_version in client hello and not resetting it to the
- * negotiated version. */
- *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
- *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
-
- /* Random stuff */
- memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- /* Session ID */
- if (s->new_session || s->session == NULL) {
- i = 0;
- } else {
- i = s->session->session_id_length;
- }
- *(p++) = i;
- if (i != 0) {
- if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
- p += i;
- }
-
- /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
- memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
- p += s->d1->cookie_len;
- }
-
- /* Ciphers supported */
- i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &p[2]);
- if (i == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_hello,
- SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(i, p);
- p += i;
-
- /* COMPRESSION */
- *(p++) = 1;
- *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
-
- /* TLS extensions*/
- if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_hello, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- goto err;
- }
-
- p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
- p - buf);
- if (p == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- l = p - d;
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
- goto err;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
-
- err:
- return -1;
- }
-
- int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) {
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) * sk;
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
- CERT *ct = s->cert;
- int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok;
- long n;
- CBS server_hello, server_random, session_id;
- uint16_t server_version, cipher_suite;
- uint8_t compression_method;
- uint32_t mask_ssl;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO,
- 20000, /* ?? */
- ssl_hash_message, &ok);
-
- if (!ok) {
- uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
- if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL &&
- ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) {
- /* Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure alert
- * in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client behavior and
- * gives a better error on a (probable) failure to negotiate initial
- * parameters. Note: this error code comes after the original one.
- *
- * See https://crbug.com/446505. */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello,
- SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO);
- }
- return n;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&server_hello, s->init_msg, n);
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &server_version) ||
- !CBS_get_bytes(&server_hello, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id) ||
- CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE ||
- !CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &cipher_suite) ||
- !CBS_get_u8(&server_hello, &compression_method)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (!s->s3->have_version) {
- if (!ssl3_is_version_enabled(s, server_version)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
- s->version = server_version;
- /* Mark the version as fixed so the record-layer version is not clamped
- * to TLS 1.0. */
- s->s3->have_version = 1;
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->version = server_version;
- s->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(server_version);
- assert(s->enc_method != NULL);
- /* At this point, the connection's version is known and s->version is
- * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */
- s->s3->have_version = 1;
- } else if (server_version != s->version) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Copy over the server random. */
- memcpy(s->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-
- assert(s->session == NULL || s->session->session_id_length > 0);
- if (s->session != NULL && CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, s->session->session_id,
- s->session->session_id_length)) {
- if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length ||
- memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
- /* actually a client application bug */
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello,
- SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->hit = 1;
- } else {
- /* The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to
- * fill out. */
- s->hit = 0;
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* Note: session_id could be empty. */
- s->session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id);
- memcpy(s->session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id), CBS_len(&session_id));
- }
-
- c = ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
- if (c == NULL) {
- /* unknown cipher */
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* ct->mask_ssl was computed from client capabilities. Now
- * that the final version is known, compute a new mask_ssl. */
- if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) {
- mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
- } else {
- mask_ssl = 0;
- }
- /* If the cipher is disabled then we didn't sent it in the ClientHello, so if
- * the server selected it, it's an error. */
- if ((c->algorithm_ssl & mask_ssl) ||
- (c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k) ||
- (c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
- if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, NULL, c)) {
- /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->hit) {
- if (s->session->cipher != c) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello,
- SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (s->session->ssl_version != s->version) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello,
- SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
-
- /* Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
- * authentication. */
- if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
- !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported. */
- if (compression_method != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello,
- SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* TLS extensions */
- if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &server_hello)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */
- if (CBS_len(&server_hello) != 0) {
- /* wrong packet length */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- return 1;
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- return -1;
- }
-
- int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) {
- int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
- unsigned long n;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
- SESS_CERT *sc;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- CBS cbs, certificate_list;
- const uint8_t *data;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
- SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, s->max_cert_list,
- ssl_hash_message, &ok);
-
- if (!ok) {
- return n;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, n);
-
- sk = sk_X509_new_null();
- if (sk == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_list) ||
- CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) {
- CBS certificate;
- if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate,
- SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- data = CBS_data(&certificate);
- x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&certificate));
- if (x == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate,
- SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- x = NULL;
- }
-
- i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
- if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
- al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate,
- SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
-
- sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
- if (sc == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert) {
- ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
- }
- s->session->sess_cert = sc;
-
- sc->cert_chain = sk;
- /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate, which
- * we don't include in s3_srvr.c */
- x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
- sk = NULL;
- /* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/
-
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
-
- if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
- x = NULL;
- al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate,
- SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- i = ssl_cert_type(pkey);
- if (i < 0) {
- x = NULL;
- al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- int exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
- if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
- x = NULL;
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate,
- SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- sc->peer_cert_type = i;
- /* Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple of lines
- * ago. */
- if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) {
- X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
- }
- sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = X509_up_ref(x);
- sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
-
- if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- }
- s->session->peer = X509_up_ref(x);
-
- s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
-
- x = NULL;
- ret = 1;
-
- if (0) {
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- }
-
- err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- X509_free(x);
- sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
- return ret;
- }
-
- int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) {
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
- int al, ok;
- long n, alg_k, alg_a;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
- DH *dh = NULL;
- EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
- EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
- CBS server_key_exchange, server_key_exchange_orig, parameter;
-
- /* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
- * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, -1, s->max_cert_list,
- ssl_hash_message, &ok);
- if (!ok) {
- return n;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
- omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to
- avoid problems later.*/
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK) {
- /* PSK ciphersuites that also send a Certificate would have already
- * initialized |sess_cert|. */
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- /* TODO(davidben): This should be reset in one place with the rest of the
- * handshake state. */
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint = NULL;
- }
- }
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* Retain a copy of the original CBS to compute the signature over. */
- CBS_init(&server_key_exchange, s->init_msg, n);
- server_key_exchange_orig = server_key_exchange;
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
- if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
- DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
- }
- if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
- EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
- }
- } else {
- s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-
- if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
- CBS psk_identity_hint;
-
- /* Each of the PSK key exchanges begins with a psk_identity_hint. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange,
- &psk_identity_hint)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
- * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of a PSK
- * identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK identity.
- * Also do not allow NULL characters; identities are saved as C strings.
- *
- * TODO(davidben): Should invalid hints be ignored? It's a hint rather than
- * a specific identity. */
- if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN ||
- CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity_hint)) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Save the identity hint as a C string. */
- if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity_hint, &s->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
- CBS dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_p) ||
- CBS_len(&dh_p) == 0 ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_g) ||
- CBS_len(&dh_g) == 0 ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_Ys) ||
- CBS_len(&dh_Ys) == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- dh = DH_new();
- if (dh == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_p), CBS_len(&dh_p), NULL)) == NULL ||
- (dh->g = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_g), CBS_len(&dh_g), NULL)) == NULL ||
- (dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Ys), CBS_len(&dh_Ys), NULL)) ==
- NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (DH_size(dh) < 512 / 8) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange,
- SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) {
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
- }
- /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
-
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
- dh = NULL;
- } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
- uint16_t curve_id;
- int curve_nid = 0;
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- CBS point;
-
- /* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH public
- * key. Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
- * invalid curve. */
- if (!tls1_check_curve(s, &server_key_exchange, &curve_id)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(curve_id);
- if (curve_nid == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange,
- SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
- if (ecdh == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
-
- /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &point)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
- ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, CBS_data(&point),
- CBS_len(&point), bn_ctx)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
- * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA and
- * ECDSA. */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) {
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
- } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
- pkey =
- X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
- }
- /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
- EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
- ecdh = NULL;
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- bn_ctx = NULL;
- EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
- srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
- } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* At this point, |server_key_exchange| contains the signature, if any, while
- * |server_key_exchange_orig| contains the entire message. From that, derive
- * a CBS containing just the parameter. */
- CBS_init(¶meter, CBS_data(&server_key_exchange_orig),
- CBS_len(&server_key_exchange_orig) - CBS_len(&server_key_exchange));
-
- /* if it was signed, check the signature */
- if (pkey != NULL) {
- CBS signature;
-
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, &al, s, &server_key_exchange, pkey)) {
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- md = EVP_md5_sha1();
- } else {
- md = EVP_sha1();
- }
-
- /* The last field in |server_key_exchange| is the signature. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &signature) ||
- CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) ||
- !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
- !EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, CBS_data(¶meter),
- CBS_len(¶meter)) ||
- !EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, CBS_data(&signature),
- CBS_len(&signature))) {
- /* bad signature */
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else {
- if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
- /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
- if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
- /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- }
- goto err;
- }
- /* still data left over */
- if (CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) > 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange,
- SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return 1;
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- if (rsa != NULL) {
- RSA_free(rsa);
- }
- if (dh != NULL) {
- DH_free(dh);
- }
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
- if (ecdh != NULL) {
- EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
- }
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return -1;
- }
-
- static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) {
- return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
- }
-
- int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) {
- int ok, ret = 0;
- unsigned long n;
- X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
- CBS cbs;
- CBS certificate_types;
- CBS certificate_authorities;
- const uint8_t *data;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B, -1, s->max_cert_list,
- ssl_hash_message, &ok);
-
- if (!ok) {
- return n;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- /* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we wont be
- * doing client auth. */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
- !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
- goto err;
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request,
- SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, n);
-
- ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
- if (ca_sk == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* get the certificate types */
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_types)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_stow(&certificate_types, &s->s3->tmp.certificate_types,
- &s->s3->tmp.num_certificate_types)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request,
- SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* get the CA RDNs */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_authorities)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
-
- while (CBS_len(&certificate_authorities) > 0) {
- CBS distinguished_name;
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_authorities,
- &distinguished_name)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request,
- SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- data = CBS_data(&distinguished_name);
-
- xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&distinguished_name));
- if (xn == NULL) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_skip(&distinguished_name, data - CBS_data(&distinguished_name))) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (CBS_len(&distinguished_name) != 0) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request,
- SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
- s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
- if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL) {
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
- }
- s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
- ca_sk = NULL;
-
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
- if (ca_sk != NULL) {
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
- }
- return ret;
- }
-
- int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) {
- int ok, al;
- long n;
- CBS new_session_ticket, ticket;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(
- s, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
- SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, ssl_hash_message, &ok);
-
- if (!ok) {
- return n;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&new_session_ticket, s->init_msg, n);
-
- if (!CBS_get_u32(&new_session_ticket,
- &s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&new_session_ticket, &ticket) ||
- CBS_len(&new_session_ticket) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_new_session_ticket, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_stow(&ticket, &s->session->tlsext_tick,
- &s->session->tlsext_ticklen)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_new_session_ticket, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Generate a session ID for this session based on the session ticket. We use
- * the session ID mechanism for detecting ticket resumption. This also fits in
- * with assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL.*/
- if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), s->session->session_id,
- &s->session->session_id_length, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- return 1;
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- return -1;
- }
-
- int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s) {
- int ok, al;
- long n;
- CBS certificate_status, ocsp_response;
- uint8_t status_type;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(
- s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
- -1, 16384, ssl_hash_message, &ok);
-
- if (!ok) {
- return n;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
- /* A server may send status_request in ServerHello and then change
- * its mind about sending CertificateStatus. */
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- return 1;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&certificate_status, s->init_msg, n);
- if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_status, &status_type) ||
- status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp ||
- !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_status, &ocsp_response) ||
- CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 ||
- CBS_len(&certificate_status) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_status, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_stow(&ocsp_response, &s->session->ocsp_response,
- &s->session->ocsp_response_length)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_status, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- return 1;
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return -1;
- }
-
- int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s) {
- int ok;
- long n;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE,
- 30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */
- ssl_hash_message, &ok);
-
- if (!ok) {
- return n;
- }
-
- if (n > 0) {
- /* should contain no data */
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_done, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
-
- int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) {
- uint8_t *p;
- int n = 0;
- uint32_t alg_k;
- uint32_t alg_a;
- uint8_t *q;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
- const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
- uint8_t *encodedPoint = NULL;
- int encoded_pt_len = 0;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
- unsigned int psk_len = 0;
- uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
- uint8_t *pms = NULL;
- size_t pms_len = 0;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
-
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
- /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
- char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
- size_t identity_len;
-
- if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
- psk_len =
- s->psk_client_callback(s, s->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint, identity,
- sizeof(identity), psk, sizeof(psk));
- if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- } else if (psk_len == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- identity_len = OPENSSL_strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity));
- if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
- }
-
- s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
- if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Write out psk_identity. */
- s2n(identity_len, p);
- memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
- p += identity_len;
- n = 2 + identity_len;
- }
-
- /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |pms| and |pms_len|. */
- if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
- RSA *rsa;
- size_t enc_pms_len;
-
- pms_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
- pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len);
- if (pms == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
- if (pkey == NULL ||
- pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA ||
- pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- if (pkey != NULL) {
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- }
- goto err;
- }
-
- rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-
- pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (!RAND_bytes(&pms[2], SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - 2)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->session->master_key_length = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
-
- q = p;
- /* In TLS and beyond, reserve space for the length prefix. */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
- p += 2;
- n += 2;
- }
- if (!RSA_encrypt(rsa, &enc_pms_len, p, RSA_size(rsa), pms, pms_len,
- RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
- goto err;
- }
- n += enc_pms_len;
-
- /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
- if (!ssl_ctx_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s->ctx, p, enc_pms_len, pms,
- pms_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Fill in the length prefix. */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
- s2n(enc_pms_len, q);
- }
- } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
- DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
- SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
- int dh_len;
- size_t pub_len;
-
- if (scert == NULL) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (scert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- dh_srvr = scert->peer_dh_tmp;
-
- /* generate a new random key */
- dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr);
- if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- DH_free(dh_clnt);
- goto err;
- }
-
- pms_len = DH_size(dh_clnt);
- pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len);
- if (pms == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- DH_free(dh_clnt);
- goto err;
- }
-
- dh_len = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
- if (dh_len <= 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- DH_free(dh_clnt);
- goto err;
- }
- pms_len = dh_len;
-
- /* send off the data */
- pub_len = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
- s2n(pub_len, p);
- BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
- n += 2 + pub_len;
-
- DH_free(dh_clnt);
- } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
- const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
- EC_KEY *tkey;
- int field_size = 0, ecdh_len;
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
-
- srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
- srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
- if (srvr_group == NULL || srvr_ecpoint == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new();
- if (clnt_ecdh == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
- if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
- if (field_size <= 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- pms_len = (field_size + 7) / 8;
- pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len);
- if (pms == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ecdh_len = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pms_len, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
- if (ecdh_len <= 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- pms_len = ecdh_len;
-
- /* First check the size of encoding and allocate memory accordingly. */
- encoded_pt_len =
- EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
-
- encodedPoint =
- (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(uint8_t));
- bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if (encodedPoint == NULL || bn_ctx == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Encode the public key */
- encoded_pt_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(
- srvr_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
-
- *p = encoded_pt_len; /* length of encoded point */
- /* Encoded point will be copied here */
- p += 1;
- n += 1;
- /* copy the point */
- memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len);
- /* increment n to account for length field */
- n += encoded_pt_len;
-
- /* Free allocated memory */
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- bn_ctx = NULL;
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- encodedPoint = NULL;
- EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
- clnt_ecdh = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
- srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
- } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
- /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as
- * the pre-shared key. */
- pms_len = psk_len;
- pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len);
- if (pms == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- memset(pms, 0, pms_len);
- } else {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* For a PSK cipher suite, other_secret is combined with the pre-shared
- * key. */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) {
- CBB cbb, child;
- uint8_t *new_pms;
- size_t new_pms_len;
-
- if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 2 + psk_len + 2 + pms_len)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&child, pms, pms_len) ||
- !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &child) ||
- !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) ||
- !CBB_finish(&cbb, &new_pms, &new_pms_len)) {
- CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len);
- OPENSSL_free(pms);
- pms = new_pms;
- pms_len = new_pms_len;
- }
-
- /* The message must be added to the finished hash before calculating the
- * master secret. */
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
- goto err;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
-
- s->session->master_key_length = s->enc_method->generate_master_secret(
- s, s->session->master_key, pms, pms_len);
- if (s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
- goto err;
- }
- s->session->extended_master_secret = s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret;
- OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len);
- OPENSSL_free(pms);
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
- return s->method->do_write(s);
-
- err:
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- if (encodedPoint != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- }
- if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) {
- EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
- }
- EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
- if (pms) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len);
- OPENSSL_free(pms);
- }
- return -1;
- }
-
- int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL *s) {
- uint8_t *buf, *p;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
- uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- size_t digest_length;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
- size_t signature_length = 0;
- unsigned long n = 0;
-
- buf = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
- pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
-
- /* Write out the digest type if needbe. */
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- md = tls1_choose_signing_digest(s, pkey);
- if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_cert_verify, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- p += 2;
- n += 2;
- }
-
- /* Compute the digest. */
- if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(s, digest, &digest_length, &md, pkey)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary. */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
- !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Sign the digest. */
- pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
- if (pctx == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Initialize the EVP_PKEY_CTX and determine the size of the signature. */
- if (!EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) ||
- !EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, NULL, &signature_length, digest, digest_length)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_cert_verify, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (p + 2 + signature_length > buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_cert_verify, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, &p[2], &signature_length, digest, digest_length)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_cert_verify, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- s2n(signature_length, p);
- n += signature_length + 2;
-
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
- goto err;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
- }
-
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- return ssl_do_write(s);
-
- err:
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* ssl3_has_client_certificate returns true if a client certificate is
- * configured. */
- static int ssl3_has_client_certificate(SSL *s) {
- return s->cert && s->cert->key->x509 && s->cert->key->privatekey;
- }
-
- int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) {
- X509 *x509 = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- int i;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
- /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
- if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
- i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
- if (i < 0) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- return -1;
- }
- if (i == 0) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- }
-
- if (ssl3_has_client_certificate(s)) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
- } else {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
- }
- }
-
- /* We need to get a client cert */
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
- /* If we get an error, we need to:
- * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
- * We then get retried later */
- i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
- if (i < 0) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- return -1;
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- if (i == 1 && pkey != NULL && x509 != NULL) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
- if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) {
- i = 0;
- }
- } else if (i == 1) {
- i = 0;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_certificate,
- SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
- }
-
- if (x509 != NULL) {
- X509_free(x509);
- }
- if (pkey != NULL) {
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- }
- if (i && !ssl3_has_client_certificate(s)) {
- i = 0;
- }
- if (i == 0) {
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
- return 1;
- } else {
- s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
- }
- }
-
- /* Ok, we have a cert */
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
- }
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
- CERT_PKEY *cert_pkey = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key;
- if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cert_pkey)) {
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
- }
-
- #define has_bits(i, m) (((i) & (m)) == (m))
-
- int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) {
- int i, idx;
- long alg_k, alg_a;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- SESS_CERT *sc;
- DH *dh;
-
- /* we don't have a certificate */
- if (!ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
- return 1;
- }
-
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
- sc = s->session->sess_cert;
- if (sc == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
-
- /* This is the passed certificate */
-
- idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
- if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
- if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
- /* check failed */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
- goto f_err;
- } else {
- return 1;
- }
- } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm,
- SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
- i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-
- /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
- if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm,
- SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm,
- SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) &&
- !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKT_EXCH) || dh != NULL)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- return 1;
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- err:
- return 0;
- }
-
- int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s) {
- unsigned int len, padding_len;
- uint8_t *d, *p;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
- len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
- padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
-
- d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
- *(p++) = len;
- memcpy(p, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
- p += len;
- *(p++) = padding_len;
- memset(p, 0, padding_len);
- p += padding_len;
-
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, p - d)) {
- return -1;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
- }
-
- return ssl_do_write(s);
- }
-
- int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *s) {
- uint8_t *d;
- int ret = -1, public_key_len;
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
- size_t sig_len;
- ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- uint8_t *public_key = NULL, *derp, *der_sig = NULL;
-
- if (s->state != SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A) {
- return ssl_do_write(s);
- }
-
- if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private && s->ctx->channel_id_cb) {
- EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
- s->ctx->channel_id_cb(s, &key);
- if (key != NULL) {
- s->tlsext_channel_id_private = key;
- }
- }
-
- if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
- return -1;
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
-
- d = ssl_handshake_start(s);
- if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) {
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new, d);
- } else {
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, d);
- }
- s2n(TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, d);
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-
- public_key_len = i2d_PublicKey(s->tlsext_channel_id_private, NULL);
- if (public_key_len <= 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id,
- SSL_R_CANNOT_SERIALIZE_PUBLIC_KEY);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* i2d_PublicKey will produce an ANSI X9.62 public key which, for a
- * P-256 key, is 0x04 (meaning uncompressed) followed by the x and y
- * field elements as 32-byte, big-endian numbers. */
- if (public_key_len != 65) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256);
- goto err;
- }
- public_key = OPENSSL_malloc(public_key_len);
- if (!public_key) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- derp = public_key;
- i2d_PublicKey(s->tlsext_channel_id_private, &derp);
-
- if (EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL,
- s->tlsext_channel_id_private) != 1) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id,
- SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNINIT_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, NULL, &sig_len)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id,
- SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- der_sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len);
- if (!der_sig) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, der_sig, &sig_len)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id,
- SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- derp = der_sig;
- sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, (const uint8_t **)&derp, sig_len);
- if (sig == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_D2I_ECDSA_SIG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* The first byte of public_key will be 0x4, denoting an uncompressed key. */
- memcpy(d, public_key + 1, 64);
- d += 64;
- if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(d, 32, sig->r) ||
- !BN_bn2bin_padded(d + 32, 32, sig->s)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
- 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE)) {
- goto err;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B;
-
- ret = ssl_do_write(s);
-
- err:
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- if (public_key) {
- OPENSSL_free(public_key);
- }
- if (der_sig) {
- OPENSSL_free(der_sig);
- }
- if (sig) {
- ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
- }
-
- return ret;
- }
-
- int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) {
- int i = 0;
- if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) {
- i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
- }
- return i;
- }
|