2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
|
|
|
|
* All rights reserved.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This package is an SSL implementation written
|
|
|
|
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
|
|
|
|
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
|
|
|
|
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
|
|
|
|
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
|
|
|
|
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
|
|
|
|
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
|
|
|
|
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
|
|
|
|
* the code are not to be removed.
|
|
|
|
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
|
|
|
|
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
|
|
|
|
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
|
|
|
|
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
|
|
* are met:
|
|
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
|
|
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
|
|
|
* must display the following acknowledgement:
|
|
|
|
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
|
|
|
|
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
|
|
|
|
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
|
|
|
|
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
|
|
|
|
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
|
|
|
|
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
|
|
|
|
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
|
|
|
|
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
|
|
|
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
|
|
|
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
|
|
|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
|
|
|
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
|
|
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
|
|
|
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
|
|
|
* SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
|
|
|
|
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
|
|
|
|
* copied and put under another distribution licence
|
|
|
|
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <openssl/base64.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <assert.h>
|
2014-07-31 23:23:51 +01:00
|
|
|
#include <limits.h>
|
2015-01-31 01:08:37 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const unsigned char data_bin2ascii[65] =
|
|
|
|
"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define conv_bin2ascii(a) (data_bin2ascii[(a) & 0x3f])
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* 64 char lines
|
|
|
|
* pad input with 0
|
|
|
|
* left over chars are set to =
|
|
|
|
* 1 byte => xx==
|
|
|
|
* 2 bytes => xxx=
|
|
|
|
* 3 bytes => xxxx
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define BIN_PER_LINE (64/4*3)
|
|
|
|
#define CHUNKS_PER_LINE (64/4)
|
|
|
|
#define CHAR_PER_LINE (64+1)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* 0xF0 is a EOLN
|
|
|
|
* 0xF1 is ignore but next needs to be 0xF0 (for \r\n processing).
|
|
|
|
* 0xF2 is EOF
|
|
|
|
* 0xE0 is ignore at start of line.
|
|
|
|
* 0xFF is error */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define B64_EOLN 0xF0
|
|
|
|
#define B64_CR 0xF1
|
|
|
|
#define B64_EOF 0xF2
|
|
|
|
#define B64_WS 0xE0
|
|
|
|
#define B64_ERROR 0xFF
|
|
|
|
#define B64_NOT_BASE64(a) (((a) | 0x13) == 0xF3)
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
static const uint8_t data_ascii2bin[128] = {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xE0, 0xF0, 0xFF,
|
|
|
|
0xFF, 0xF1, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
|
|
|
|
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xE0, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
|
|
|
|
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x3E, 0xFF, 0xF2, 0xFF, 0x3F,
|
|
|
|
0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x3A, 0x3B, 0x3C, 0x3D, 0xFF, 0xFF,
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06,
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12,
|
|
|
|
0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
|
|
|
|
0xFF, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F, 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24,
|
|
|
|
0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, 0x2A, 0x2B, 0x2C, 0x2D, 0x2E, 0x2F, 0x30,
|
|
|
|
0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
static uint8_t conv_ascii2bin(uint8_t a) {
|
|
|
|
if (a >= 128) {
|
|
|
|
return 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return data_ascii2bin[a];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->length = 48;
|
|
|
|
ctx->num = 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->line_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t total = 0;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*out_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (in_len == 0) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert(ctx->length <= sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
|
|
|
assert(ctx->num < ctx->length);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->length - ctx->num > in_len) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&ctx->enc_data[ctx->num], in, in_len);
|
|
|
|
ctx->num += in_len;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->num != 0) {
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t todo = ctx->length - ctx->num;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&ctx->enc_data[ctx->num], in, todo);
|
|
|
|
in += todo;
|
|
|
|
in_len -= todo;
|
|
|
|
size_t encoded = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->length);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->num = 0;
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
|
|
|
out += encoded;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
*(out++) = '\n';
|
|
|
|
*out = '\0';
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
|
|
|
total = encoded + 1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
while (in_len >= ctx->length) {
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t encoded = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, in, ctx->length);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
in += ctx->length;
|
|
|
|
in_len -= ctx->length;
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
|
|
|
out += encoded;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
*(out++) = '\n';
|
|
|
|
*out = '\0';
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
|
|
|
total += encoded + 1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
Avoid theoretical overflows in EVP_EncodeUpdate.
See also upstream's 172c6e1e14defe7d49d62f5fc9ea6a79b225424f, but note our
values have different types. In particular, because we put in_len in a size_t
and C implicitly requires that all valid buffers' lengths fit in a ptrdiff_t
(signed), the overflow was impossible, assuming EVP_ENCODE_CTX::length is
untouched externally.
More importantly, this function is stuck taking an int output and has no return
value, so the only plausible contract is the caller is responsible for ensuring
the length fits anyway. Indeed, callers all call EVP_EncodeUpdate in bounded
chunks, so upstream's analysis is off.
Anyway, in theory that logic could locally overflow, so tweak it slightly. Tidy
up some of the variable names while I'm here.
Change-Id: Ifa78707cc26c11e0d67019918a028531b3d6738c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-05-03 14:19:36 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
if (in_len != 0) {
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&ctx->enc_data[0], in, in_len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->num = in_len;
|
|
|
|
*out_len = total;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void EVP_EncodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->num != 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->num);
|
|
|
|
out[ret++] = '\n';
|
|
|
|
out[ret] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
ctx->num = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out_len = ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
size_t EVP_EncodeBlock(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src, size_t src_len) {
|
2014-07-16 18:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
uint32_t l;
|
|
|
|
size_t remaining = src_len, ret = 0;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-16 18:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
while (remaining) {
|
|
|
|
if (remaining >= 3) {
|
|
|
|
l = (((uint32_t)src[0]) << 16L) | (((uint32_t)src[1]) << 8L) | src[2];
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
*(dst++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 18L);
|
|
|
|
*(dst++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 12L);
|
|
|
|
*(dst++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 6L);
|
|
|
|
*(dst++) = conv_bin2ascii(l);
|
2014-07-16 18:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
remaining -= 3;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2014-07-16 18:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
l = ((uint32_t)src[0]) << 16L;
|
|
|
|
if (remaining == 2) {
|
|
|
|
l |= ((uint32_t)src[1] << 8L);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*(dst++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 18L);
|
|
|
|
*(dst++) = conv_bin2ascii(l >> 12L);
|
2014-07-16 18:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
*(dst++) = (remaining == 1) ? '=' : conv_bin2ascii(l >> 6L);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
*(dst++) = '=';
|
2014-07-16 18:16:06 +01:00
|
|
|
remaining = 0;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret += 4;
|
|
|
|
src += 3;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*dst = '\0';
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
int EVP_DecodedLength(size_t *out_len, size_t len) {
|
|
|
|
if (len % 4 != 0) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out_len = (len / 4) * 3;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int EVP_DecodeBase64(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
|
|
|
|
uint8_t a, b, c, d;
|
|
|
|
size_t pad_len = 0, len = 0, max_len, i;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t l;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_DecodedLength(&max_len, in_len) || max_out < max_len) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < in_len; i += 4) {
|
|
|
|
a = conv_ascii2bin(*(in++));
|
|
|
|
b = conv_ascii2bin(*(in++));
|
|
|
|
if (i + 4 == in_len && in[1] == '=') {
|
|
|
|
if (in[0] == '=') {
|
|
|
|
pad_len = 2;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
pad_len = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pad_len < 2) {
|
|
|
|
c = conv_ascii2bin(*(in++));
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
c = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pad_len < 1) {
|
|
|
|
d = conv_ascii2bin(*(in++));
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
d = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((a & 0x80) || (b & 0x80) || (c & 0x80) || (d & 0x80)) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l = ((((uint32_t)a) << 18L) | (((uint32_t)b) << 12L) |
|
|
|
|
(((uint32_t)c) << 6L) | (((uint32_t)d)));
|
|
|
|
*(out++) = (uint8_t)(l >> 16L) & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
if (pad_len < 2) {
|
|
|
|
*(out++) = (uint8_t)(l >> 8L) & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pad_len < 1) {
|
|
|
|
*(out++) = (uint8_t)(l) & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len += 3 - pad_len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out_len = len;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->length = 30;
|
|
|
|
ctx->num = 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->line_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->expect_nl = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *out_len,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
|
|
|
|
int seof = -1, eof = 0, rv = -1, v, tmp, exp_nl;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *d;
|
|
|
|
unsigned i, n, ln, ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n = ctx->num;
|
|
|
|
d = ctx->enc_data;
|
|
|
|
ln = ctx->line_num;
|
|
|
|
exp_nl = ctx->expect_nl;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* last line of input. */
|
|
|
|
if (in_len == 0 || (n == 0 && conv_ascii2bin(in[0]) == B64_EOF)) {
|
|
|
|
rv = 0;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We parse the input data */
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
|
|
|
|
/* If the current line is > 80 characters, scream alot */
|
|
|
|
if (ln >= 80) {
|
|
|
|
rv = -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get char and put it into the buffer */
|
|
|
|
tmp = *(in++);
|
|
|
|
v = conv_ascii2bin(tmp);
|
|
|
|
/* only save the good data :-) */
|
|
|
|
if (!B64_NOT_BASE64(v)) {
|
|
|
|
assert(n < sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
|
|
|
|
d[n++] = tmp;
|
|
|
|
ln++;
|
|
|
|
} else if (v == B64_ERROR) {
|
|
|
|
rv = -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* have we seen a '=' which is 'definitly' the last
|
|
|
|
* input line. seof will point to the character that
|
|
|
|
* holds it. and eof will hold how many characters to
|
|
|
|
* chop off. */
|
|
|
|
if (tmp == '=') {
|
|
|
|
if (seof == -1) {
|
|
|
|
seof = n;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
eof++;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
if (eof > 2) {
|
|
|
|
/* There are, at most, two equals signs at the end of base64 data. */
|
|
|
|
rv = -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (v == B64_CR) {
|
|
|
|
ln = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (exp_nl) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* eoln */
|
|
|
|
if (v == B64_EOLN) {
|
|
|
|
ln = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (exp_nl) {
|
|
|
|
exp_nl = 0;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
exp_nl = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we are at the end of input and it looks like a
|
|
|
|
* line, process it. */
|
|
|
|
if ((i + 1) == in_len && (((n & 3) == 0) || eof)) {
|
|
|
|
v = B64_EOF;
|
|
|
|
/* In case things were given us in really small
|
|
|
|
records (so two '=' were given in separate
|
|
|
|
updates), eof may contain the incorrect number
|
|
|
|
of ending bytes to skip, so let's redo the count */
|
|
|
|
eof = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (d[n - 1] == '=') {
|
|
|
|
eof++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (d[n - 2] == '=') {
|
|
|
|
eof++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* There will never be more than two '=' */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((v == B64_EOF && (n & 3) == 0) || n >= 64) {
|
|
|
|
/* This is needed to work correctly on 64 byte input
|
|
|
|
* lines. We process the line and then need to
|
|
|
|
* accept the '\n' */
|
|
|
|
if (v != B64_EOF && n >= 64) {
|
|
|
|
exp_nl = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (n > 0) {
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
/* TODO(davidben): Switch this to EVP_DecodeBase64. */
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
v = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
|
|
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (v < 0) {
|
|
|
|
rv = 0;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-03-19 21:42:08 +00:00
|
|
|
if (eof > v) {
|
|
|
|
rv = -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
ret += (v - eof);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
eof = 1;
|
|
|
|
v = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This is the case where we have had a short
|
|
|
|
* but valid input line */
|
|
|
|
if (v < (int)ctx->length && eof) {
|
|
|
|
rv = 0;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ctx->length = v;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (seof >= 0) {
|
|
|
|
rv = 0;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out += v;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rv = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
*out_len = ret;
|
|
|
|
ctx->num = n;
|
|
|
|
ctx->line_num = ln;
|
|
|
|
ctx->expect_nl = exp_nl;
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int EVP_DecodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, int *outl) {
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*outl = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->num != 0) {
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
/* TODO(davidben): Switch this to EVP_DecodeBase64. */
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
i = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, ctx->enc_data, ctx->num);
|
|
|
|
if (i < 0) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->num = 0;
|
|
|
|
*outl = i;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-31 23:23:51 +01:00
|
|
|
int EVP_DecodeBlock(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src, size_t src_len) {
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t dst_len;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* trim white space from the start of the line. */
|
|
|
|
while (conv_ascii2bin(*src) == B64_WS && src_len > 0) {
|
|
|
|
src++;
|
|
|
|
src_len--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* strip off stuff at the end of the line
|
|
|
|
* ascii2bin values B64_WS, B64_EOLN, B64_EOLN and B64_EOF */
|
|
|
|
while (src_len > 3 && B64_NOT_BASE64(conv_ascii2bin(src[src_len - 1]))) {
|
|
|
|
src_len--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!EVP_DecodedLength(&dst_len, src_len) || dst_len > INT_MAX) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!EVP_DecodeBase64(dst, &dst_len, dst_len, src, src_len)) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
/* EVP_DecodeBlock does not take padding into account, so put the
|
|
|
|
* NULs back in... so the caller can strip them back out. */
|
|
|
|
while (dst_len % 3 != 0) {
|
|
|
|
dst[dst_len++] = '\0';
|
2014-07-31 23:23:51 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
assert(dst_len <= INT_MAX);
|
2014-07-31 23:23:51 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-24 05:49:21 +01:00
|
|
|
return dst_len;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-08-13 18:31:04 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int EVP_EncodedLength(size_t *out_len, size_t len) {
|
|
|
|
if (len + 2 < len) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len += 2;
|
|
|
|
len /= 3;
|
|
|
|
if (((len << 2) >> 2) != len) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len <<= 2;
|
|
|
|
if (len + 1 < len) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len++;
|
|
|
|
*out_len = len;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|