boringssl/crypto/pkcs8/p5_pbev2.c

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/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
* project 1999-2004.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
#include <openssl/pkcs8.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/cipher.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/nid.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
/* 1.2.840.113549.1.5.12 */
static const uint8_t kPBKDF2[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
0x0d, 0x01, 0x05, 0x0c};
/* 1.2.840.113549.1.5.13 */
static const uint8_t kPBES2[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
0x0d, 0x01, 0x05, 0x0d};
/* 1.2.840.113549.2.7 */
static const uint8_t kHMACWithSHA1[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86,
0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x07};
static const struct {
uint8_t oid[9];
uint8_t oid_len;
int nid;
const EVP_CIPHER *(*cipher_func)(void);
} kCipherOIDs[] = {
/* 1.2.840.113549.3.2 */
{{0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x03, 0x02},
8,
NID_rc2_cbc,
&EVP_rc2_cbc},
/* 1.2.840.113549.3.7 */
{{0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x03, 0x07},
8,
NID_des_ede3_cbc,
&EVP_des_ede3_cbc},
/* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.2 */
{{0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x01, 0x02},
9,
NID_aes_128_cbc,
&EVP_aes_128_cbc},
/* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.22 */
{{0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x01, 0x16},
9,
NID_aes_192_cbc,
&EVP_aes_192_cbc},
/* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.42 */
{{0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x01, 0x2a},
9,
NID_aes_256_cbc,
&EVP_aes_256_cbc},
};
static const EVP_CIPHER *cbs_to_cipher(const CBS *cbs) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCipherOIDs); i++) {
if (CBS_mem_equal(cbs, kCipherOIDs[i].oid, kCipherOIDs[i].oid_len)) {
return kCipherOIDs[i].cipher_func();
}
}
return NULL;
}
static int add_cipher_oid(CBB *out, int nid) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kCipherOIDs); i++) {
if (kCipherOIDs[i].nid == nid) {
CBB child;
return CBB_add_asn1(out, &child, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) &&
CBB_add_bytes(&child, kCipherOIDs[i].oid,
kCipherOIDs[i].oid_len) &&
CBB_flush(out);
}
}
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
return 0;
}
Rework PKCS{5,8,12} code. Avoid the X509_ALGOR dependency entirely. The public API is still using the legacy ASN.1 structures for now, but the conversions are lifted to the API boundary. Once we resolve that and the OID table dependency, this module will no longer block unshipping crypto/asn1 and friends from Chromium. This changes the calling convention around the two kinds of PBE suites we support. Each PBE suite provides a free-form encrypt_init function to setup an EVP_CIPHER_CTX and write the AlgorithmIdentifer to a CBB. It then provides a common decrypt_init function which sets up an EVP_CIPHER_CTX given a CBS of the parameter. The common encrypt code determines how to call which encrypt_init function. The common decrypt code parses the OID out of the AlgorithmIdentifer and then dispatches to decrypt_init. Note this means the encryption codepath no longer involves parsing back out a AlgorithmIdentifier it just serialized. We don't have a good story to access an already serialized piece of a CBB in progress (reallocs can invalidate the pointer in a CBS), so it's easier to cut this step out entirely. Also note this renames the "PBES1" schemes from PKCS#5 to PKCS#12. This makes it easier to get at the PKCS#12 key derivation hooks. Although PKCS#12 claims these are variants of PKCS#5's PBES1, they're not very related. PKCS#12 swaps out the key derivation and even defines its own AlgorithmIdentifier parameter structure (identical to the PKCS#5 PBES1 one). The only thing of PBES1 that survives is the CBC mode padding scheme, which is deep in EVP_CIPHER for us. (Of course, all this musing on layering is moot because we don't implement non-PKCS#12 PBES1 schemes anyway.) This also moves some of the random API features (default iteration count, default salt generation) out of the PBE suites and into the common code. BUG=54 Change-Id: Ie96924c73a229be2915be98eab680cadd17326db Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13069 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
static int pkcs5_pbe2_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
unsigned iterations, const uint8_t *pass_raw,
size_t pass_raw_len, const uint8_t *salt,
size_t salt_len, const uint8_t *iv,
size_t iv_len, int enc) {
if (iv_len != EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER_PARAMS);
return 0;
}
uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
int ret = PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1((const char *)pass_raw, pass_raw_len, salt,
salt_len, iterations,
EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher), key) &&
EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL /* engine */, key, iv, enc);
OPENSSL_cleanse(key, EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH);
return ret;
}
int PKCS5_pbe2_encrypt_init(CBB *out, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, unsigned iterations,
const uint8_t *pass_raw, size_t pass_raw_len,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len) {
int cipher_nid = EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher);
if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
Rework PKCS{5,8,12} code. Avoid the X509_ALGOR dependency entirely. The public API is still using the legacy ASN.1 structures for now, but the conversions are lifted to the API boundary. Once we resolve that and the OID table dependency, this module will no longer block unshipping crypto/asn1 and friends from Chromium. This changes the calling convention around the two kinds of PBE suites we support. Each PBE suite provides a free-form encrypt_init function to setup an EVP_CIPHER_CTX and write the AlgorithmIdentifer to a CBB. It then provides a common decrypt_init function which sets up an EVP_CIPHER_CTX given a CBS of the parameter. The common encrypt code determines how to call which encrypt_init function. The common decrypt code parses the OID out of the AlgorithmIdentifer and then dispatches to decrypt_init. Note this means the encryption codepath no longer involves parsing back out a AlgorithmIdentifier it just serialized. We don't have a good story to access an already serialized piece of a CBB in progress (reallocs can invalidate the pointer in a CBS), so it's easier to cut this step out entirely. Also note this renames the "PBES1" schemes from PKCS#5 to PKCS#12. This makes it easier to get at the PKCS#12 key derivation hooks. Although PKCS#12 claims these are variants of PKCS#5's PBES1, they're not very related. PKCS#12 swaps out the key derivation and even defines its own AlgorithmIdentifier parameter structure (identical to the PKCS#5 PBES1 one). The only thing of PBES1 that survives is the CBC mode padding scheme, which is deep in EVP_CIPHER for us. (Of course, all this musing on layering is moot because we don't implement non-PKCS#12 PBES1 schemes anyway.) This also moves some of the random API features (default iteration count, default salt generation) out of the PBE suites and into the common code. BUG=54 Change-Id: Ie96924c73a229be2915be98eab680cadd17326db Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13069 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
return 0;
}
/* Generate a random IV. */
uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
if (!RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher))) {
Rework PKCS{5,8,12} code. Avoid the X509_ALGOR dependency entirely. The public API is still using the legacy ASN.1 structures for now, but the conversions are lifted to the API boundary. Once we resolve that and the OID table dependency, this module will no longer block unshipping crypto/asn1 and friends from Chromium. This changes the calling convention around the two kinds of PBE suites we support. Each PBE suite provides a free-form encrypt_init function to setup an EVP_CIPHER_CTX and write the AlgorithmIdentifer to a CBB. It then provides a common decrypt_init function which sets up an EVP_CIPHER_CTX given a CBS of the parameter. The common encrypt code determines how to call which encrypt_init function. The common decrypt code parses the OID out of the AlgorithmIdentifer and then dispatches to decrypt_init. Note this means the encryption codepath no longer involves parsing back out a AlgorithmIdentifier it just serialized. We don't have a good story to access an already serialized piece of a CBB in progress (reallocs can invalidate the pointer in a CBS), so it's easier to cut this step out entirely. Also note this renames the "PBES1" schemes from PKCS#5 to PKCS#12. This makes it easier to get at the PKCS#12 key derivation hooks. Although PKCS#12 claims these are variants of PKCS#5's PBES1, they're not very related. PKCS#12 swaps out the key derivation and even defines its own AlgorithmIdentifier parameter structure (identical to the PKCS#5 PBES1 one). The only thing of PBES1 that survives is the CBC mode padding scheme, which is deep in EVP_CIPHER for us. (Of course, all this musing on layering is moot because we don't implement non-PKCS#12 PBES1 schemes anyway.) This also moves some of the random API features (default iteration count, default salt generation) out of the PBE suites and into the common code. BUG=54 Change-Id: Ie96924c73a229be2915be98eab680cadd17326db Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13069 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
return 0;
}
/* See RFC 2898, appendix A. */
CBB algorithm, oid, param, kdf, kdf_oid, kdf_param, salt_cbb, cipher_cbb,
iv_cbb;
Rework PKCS{5,8,12} code. Avoid the X509_ALGOR dependency entirely. The public API is still using the legacy ASN.1 structures for now, but the conversions are lifted to the API boundary. Once we resolve that and the OID table dependency, this module will no longer block unshipping crypto/asn1 and friends from Chromium. This changes the calling convention around the two kinds of PBE suites we support. Each PBE suite provides a free-form encrypt_init function to setup an EVP_CIPHER_CTX and write the AlgorithmIdentifer to a CBB. It then provides a common decrypt_init function which sets up an EVP_CIPHER_CTX given a CBS of the parameter. The common encrypt code determines how to call which encrypt_init function. The common decrypt code parses the OID out of the AlgorithmIdentifer and then dispatches to decrypt_init. Note this means the encryption codepath no longer involves parsing back out a AlgorithmIdentifier it just serialized. We don't have a good story to access an already serialized piece of a CBB in progress (reallocs can invalidate the pointer in a CBS), so it's easier to cut this step out entirely. Also note this renames the "PBES1" schemes from PKCS#5 to PKCS#12. This makes it easier to get at the PKCS#12 key derivation hooks. Although PKCS#12 claims these are variants of PKCS#5's PBES1, they're not very related. PKCS#12 swaps out the key derivation and even defines its own AlgorithmIdentifier parameter structure (identical to the PKCS#5 PBES1 one). The only thing of PBES1 that survives is the CBC mode padding scheme, which is deep in EVP_CIPHER for us. (Of course, all this musing on layering is moot because we don't implement non-PKCS#12 PBES1 schemes anyway.) This also moves some of the random API features (default iteration count, default salt generation) out of the PBE suites and into the common code. BUG=54 Change-Id: Ie96924c73a229be2915be98eab680cadd17326db Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13069 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
if (!CBB_add_asn1(out, &algorithm, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBB_add_asn1(&algorithm, &oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&oid, kPBES2, sizeof(kPBES2)) ||
!CBB_add_asn1(&algorithm, &param, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBB_add_asn1(&param, &kdf, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBB_add_asn1(&kdf, &kdf_oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&kdf_oid, kPBKDF2, sizeof(kPBKDF2)) ||
!CBB_add_asn1(&kdf, &kdf_param, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBB_add_asn1(&kdf_param, &salt_cbb, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&salt_cbb, salt, salt_len) ||
Rework PKCS{5,8,12} code. Avoid the X509_ALGOR dependency entirely. The public API is still using the legacy ASN.1 structures for now, but the conversions are lifted to the API boundary. Once we resolve that and the OID table dependency, this module will no longer block unshipping crypto/asn1 and friends from Chromium. This changes the calling convention around the two kinds of PBE suites we support. Each PBE suite provides a free-form encrypt_init function to setup an EVP_CIPHER_CTX and write the AlgorithmIdentifer to a CBB. It then provides a common decrypt_init function which sets up an EVP_CIPHER_CTX given a CBS of the parameter. The common encrypt code determines how to call which encrypt_init function. The common decrypt code parses the OID out of the AlgorithmIdentifer and then dispatches to decrypt_init. Note this means the encryption codepath no longer involves parsing back out a AlgorithmIdentifier it just serialized. We don't have a good story to access an already serialized piece of a CBB in progress (reallocs can invalidate the pointer in a CBS), so it's easier to cut this step out entirely. Also note this renames the "PBES1" schemes from PKCS#5 to PKCS#12. This makes it easier to get at the PKCS#12 key derivation hooks. Although PKCS#12 claims these are variants of PKCS#5's PBES1, they're not very related. PKCS#12 swaps out the key derivation and even defines its own AlgorithmIdentifier parameter structure (identical to the PKCS#5 PBES1 one). The only thing of PBES1 that survives is the CBC mode padding scheme, which is deep in EVP_CIPHER for us. (Of course, all this musing on layering is moot because we don't implement non-PKCS#12 PBES1 schemes anyway.) This also moves some of the random API features (default iteration count, default salt generation) out of the PBE suites and into the common code. BUG=54 Change-Id: Ie96924c73a229be2915be98eab680cadd17326db Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13069 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
!CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&kdf_param, iterations) ||
/* Specify a key length for RC2. */
(cipher_nid == NID_rc2_cbc &&
!CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&kdf_param, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher))) ||
/* Omit the PRF. We use the default hmacWithSHA1. */
!CBB_add_asn1(&param, &cipher_cbb, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!add_cipher_oid(&cipher_cbb, cipher_nid) ||
/* RFC 2898 says RC2-CBC and RC5-CBC-Pad use a SEQUENCE with version and
* IV, but OpenSSL always uses an OCTET STRING IV, so we do the same. */
!CBB_add_asn1(&cipher_cbb, &iv_cbb, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&iv_cbb, iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) ||
Rework PKCS{5,8,12} code. Avoid the X509_ALGOR dependency entirely. The public API is still using the legacy ASN.1 structures for now, but the conversions are lifted to the API boundary. Once we resolve that and the OID table dependency, this module will no longer block unshipping crypto/asn1 and friends from Chromium. This changes the calling convention around the two kinds of PBE suites we support. Each PBE suite provides a free-form encrypt_init function to setup an EVP_CIPHER_CTX and write the AlgorithmIdentifer to a CBB. It then provides a common decrypt_init function which sets up an EVP_CIPHER_CTX given a CBS of the parameter. The common encrypt code determines how to call which encrypt_init function. The common decrypt code parses the OID out of the AlgorithmIdentifer and then dispatches to decrypt_init. Note this means the encryption codepath no longer involves parsing back out a AlgorithmIdentifier it just serialized. We don't have a good story to access an already serialized piece of a CBB in progress (reallocs can invalidate the pointer in a CBS), so it's easier to cut this step out entirely. Also note this renames the "PBES1" schemes from PKCS#5 to PKCS#12. This makes it easier to get at the PKCS#12 key derivation hooks. Although PKCS#12 claims these are variants of PKCS#5's PBES1, they're not very related. PKCS#12 swaps out the key derivation and even defines its own AlgorithmIdentifier parameter structure (identical to the PKCS#5 PBES1 one). The only thing of PBES1 that survives is the CBC mode padding scheme, which is deep in EVP_CIPHER for us. (Of course, all this musing on layering is moot because we don't implement non-PKCS#12 PBES1 schemes anyway.) This also moves some of the random API features (default iteration count, default salt generation) out of the PBE suites and into the common code. BUG=54 Change-Id: Ie96924c73a229be2915be98eab680cadd17326db Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13069 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
!CBB_flush(out)) {
return 0;
}
Rework PKCS{5,8,12} code. Avoid the X509_ALGOR dependency entirely. The public API is still using the legacy ASN.1 structures for now, but the conversions are lifted to the API boundary. Once we resolve that and the OID table dependency, this module will no longer block unshipping crypto/asn1 and friends from Chromium. This changes the calling convention around the two kinds of PBE suites we support. Each PBE suite provides a free-form encrypt_init function to setup an EVP_CIPHER_CTX and write the AlgorithmIdentifer to a CBB. It then provides a common decrypt_init function which sets up an EVP_CIPHER_CTX given a CBS of the parameter. The common encrypt code determines how to call which encrypt_init function. The common decrypt code parses the OID out of the AlgorithmIdentifer and then dispatches to decrypt_init. Note this means the encryption codepath no longer involves parsing back out a AlgorithmIdentifier it just serialized. We don't have a good story to access an already serialized piece of a CBB in progress (reallocs can invalidate the pointer in a CBS), so it's easier to cut this step out entirely. Also note this renames the "PBES1" schemes from PKCS#5 to PKCS#12. This makes it easier to get at the PKCS#12 key derivation hooks. Although PKCS#12 claims these are variants of PKCS#5's PBES1, they're not very related. PKCS#12 swaps out the key derivation and even defines its own AlgorithmIdentifier parameter structure (identical to the PKCS#5 PBES1 one). The only thing of PBES1 that survives is the CBC mode padding scheme, which is deep in EVP_CIPHER for us. (Of course, all this musing on layering is moot because we don't implement non-PKCS#12 PBES1 schemes anyway.) This also moves some of the random API features (default iteration count, default salt generation) out of the PBE suites and into the common code. BUG=54 Change-Id: Ie96924c73a229be2915be98eab680cadd17326db Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13069 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
return pkcs5_pbe2_cipher_init(ctx, cipher, iterations, pass_raw, pass_raw_len,
salt, salt_len, iv,
EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher), 1 /* encrypt */);
}
Rework PKCS{5,8,12} code. Avoid the X509_ALGOR dependency entirely. The public API is still using the legacy ASN.1 structures for now, but the conversions are lifted to the API boundary. Once we resolve that and the OID table dependency, this module will no longer block unshipping crypto/asn1 and friends from Chromium. This changes the calling convention around the two kinds of PBE suites we support. Each PBE suite provides a free-form encrypt_init function to setup an EVP_CIPHER_CTX and write the AlgorithmIdentifer to a CBB. It then provides a common decrypt_init function which sets up an EVP_CIPHER_CTX given a CBS of the parameter. The common encrypt code determines how to call which encrypt_init function. The common decrypt code parses the OID out of the AlgorithmIdentifer and then dispatches to decrypt_init. Note this means the encryption codepath no longer involves parsing back out a AlgorithmIdentifier it just serialized. We don't have a good story to access an already serialized piece of a CBB in progress (reallocs can invalidate the pointer in a CBS), so it's easier to cut this step out entirely. Also note this renames the "PBES1" schemes from PKCS#5 to PKCS#12. This makes it easier to get at the PKCS#12 key derivation hooks. Although PKCS#12 claims these are variants of PKCS#5's PBES1, they're not very related. PKCS#12 swaps out the key derivation and even defines its own AlgorithmIdentifier parameter structure (identical to the PKCS#5 PBES1 one). The only thing of PBES1 that survives is the CBC mode padding scheme, which is deep in EVP_CIPHER for us. (Of course, all this musing on layering is moot because we don't implement non-PKCS#12 PBES1 schemes anyway.) This also moves some of the random API features (default iteration count, default salt generation) out of the PBE suites and into the common code. BUG=54 Change-Id: Ie96924c73a229be2915be98eab680cadd17326db Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13069 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
int PKCS5_pbe2_decrypt_init(const struct pbe_suite *suite, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
const uint8_t *pass_raw, size_t pass_raw_len,
CBS *param) {
CBS pbe_param, kdf, kdf_obj, enc_scheme, enc_obj;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(param, &pbe_param, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
CBS_len(param) != 0 ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&pbe_param, &kdf, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&pbe_param, &enc_scheme, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
CBS_len(&pbe_param) != 0 ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&kdf, &kdf_obj, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&enc_scheme, &enc_obj, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* Only PBKDF2 is supported. */
if (!CBS_mem_equal(&kdf_obj, kPBKDF2, sizeof(kPBKDF2))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_DERIVATION_FUNCTION);
return 0;
}
/* See if we recognise the encryption algorithm. */
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = cbs_to_cipher(&enc_obj);
if (cipher == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
return 0;
}
/* Parse the KDF parameters. */
CBS pbkdf2_params, salt;
uint64_t iterations;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&kdf, &pbkdf2_params, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
CBS_len(&kdf) != 0 ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&pbkdf2_params, &salt, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&pbkdf2_params, &iterations)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (iterations == 0 || iterations > UINT_MAX) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_ITERATION_COUNT);
return 0;
}
/* The optional keyLength parameter, if present, must match the key length of
* the cipher. */
if (CBS_peek_asn1_tag(&pbkdf2_params, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER)) {
uint64_t key_len;
if (!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&pbkdf2_params, &key_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if (key_len != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH);
return 0;
}
}
if (CBS_len(&pbkdf2_params) != 0) {
CBS prf;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&pbkdf2_params, &prf, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
CBS_len(&pbkdf2_params) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* We only support hmacWithSHA1. It is the DEFAULT, so DER requires it be
* omitted, but we match OpenSSL in tolerating it being present. */
if (!CBS_mem_equal(&prf, kHMACWithSHA1, sizeof(kHMACWithSHA1))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF);
return 0;
}
}
/* Parse the encryption scheme parameters. Note OpenSSL does not match the
* specification. Per RFC 2898, this should depend on the encryption scheme.
* In particular, RC2-CBC uses a SEQUENCE with version and IV. We align with
* OpenSSL. */
CBS iv;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&enc_scheme, &iv, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
CBS_len(&enc_scheme) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF);
return 0;
}
Rework PKCS{5,8,12} code. Avoid the X509_ALGOR dependency entirely. The public API is still using the legacy ASN.1 structures for now, but the conversions are lifted to the API boundary. Once we resolve that and the OID table dependency, this module will no longer block unshipping crypto/asn1 and friends from Chromium. This changes the calling convention around the two kinds of PBE suites we support. Each PBE suite provides a free-form encrypt_init function to setup an EVP_CIPHER_CTX and write the AlgorithmIdentifer to a CBB. It then provides a common decrypt_init function which sets up an EVP_CIPHER_CTX given a CBS of the parameter. The common encrypt code determines how to call which encrypt_init function. The common decrypt code parses the OID out of the AlgorithmIdentifer and then dispatches to decrypt_init. Note this means the encryption codepath no longer involves parsing back out a AlgorithmIdentifier it just serialized. We don't have a good story to access an already serialized piece of a CBB in progress (reallocs can invalidate the pointer in a CBS), so it's easier to cut this step out entirely. Also note this renames the "PBES1" schemes from PKCS#5 to PKCS#12. This makes it easier to get at the PKCS#12 key derivation hooks. Although PKCS#12 claims these are variants of PKCS#5's PBES1, they're not very related. PKCS#12 swaps out the key derivation and even defines its own AlgorithmIdentifier parameter structure (identical to the PKCS#5 PBES1 one). The only thing of PBES1 that survives is the CBC mode padding scheme, which is deep in EVP_CIPHER for us. (Of course, all this musing on layering is moot because we don't implement non-PKCS#12 PBES1 schemes anyway.) This also moves some of the random API features (default iteration count, default salt generation) out of the PBE suites and into the common code. BUG=54 Change-Id: Ie96924c73a229be2915be98eab680cadd17326db Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/13069 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2016-12-30 07:17:24 +00:00
return pkcs5_pbe2_cipher_init(ctx, cipher, (unsigned)iterations, pass_raw,
pass_raw_len, CBS_data(&salt), CBS_len(&salt),
CBS_data(&iv), CBS_len(&iv), 0 /* decrypt */);
}