2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
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2016-01-30 19:58:52 +00:00
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
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#include <openssl/asn1.h>
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2016-01-30 19:58:52 +00:00
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#include <openssl/digest.h>
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2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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2016-01-30 19:58:52 +00:00
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
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#include <openssl/obj.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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2016-01-30 19:58:52 +00:00
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int x509_digest_sign_algorithm(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, X509_ALGOR *algor) {
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const EVP_MD *digest = EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx);
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EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx->pctx);
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if (digest == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
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2016-03-11 19:39:46 +00:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_CONTEXT_NOT_INITIALISED);
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2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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2016-01-30 19:58:52 +00:00
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if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
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int pad_mode;
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if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(ctx->pctx, &pad_mode)) {
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return 0;
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}
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/* RSA-PSS has special signature algorithm logic. */
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if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
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return x509_rsa_ctx_to_pss(ctx, algor);
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2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
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}
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}
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/* Default behavior: look up the OID for the algorithm/hash pair and encode
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* that. */
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2016-01-30 19:58:52 +00:00
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int sign_nid;
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2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
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if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&sign_nid, EVP_MD_type(digest),
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2016-01-30 19:58:52 +00:00
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EVP_PKEY_id(pkey))) {
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Align with upstream's error strings, take two.
I messed up a few of these.
ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM doesn't exist. X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM does
exist as part of X509_PUBKEY_set, but the SPKI parser doesn't emit this. (I
don't mind the legacy code having really weird errors, but since EVP is now
limited to things we like, let's try to keep that clean.) To avoid churn in
Conscrypt, we'll keep defining X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM, but not actually
do anything with it anymore. Conscrypt was already aware of
EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM, so this should be fine. (I don't expect
EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM to go away. The SPKI parsers we like live in EVP
now.)
A few other ASN1_R_* values didn't quite match upstream, so make those match
again. Finally, I got some of the rsa_pss.c values wrong. Each of those
corresponds to an (overly specific) RSA_R_* value in upstream. However, those
were gone in BoringSSL since even the initial commit. We placed the RSA <-> EVP
glue in crypto/evp (so crypto/rsa wouldn't depend on crypto/evp) while upstream
placed them in crypto/rsa.
Since no one seemed to notice the loss of RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH, let's undo
all the cross-module errors inserted in crypto/rsa. Instead, since that kind of
specificity is not useful, funnel it all into X509_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS
(formerly EVP_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS, formerly RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS).
Reset the error codes for all affected modules.
(That our error code story means error codes are not stable across this kind of
refactoring is kind of a problem. Hopefully this will be the last of it.)
Change-Id: Ibfb3a0ac340bfc777bc7de6980ef3ddf0a8c84bc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7458
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-03-14 21:13:54 +00:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_DIGEST_AND_KEY_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
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2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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2016-01-30 19:58:52 +00:00
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/* RSA signature algorithms include an explicit NULL parameter. Others omit
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* it. */
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int paramtype =
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(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) ? V_ASN1_NULL : V_ASN1_UNDEF;
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2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
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X509_ALGOR_set0(algor, OBJ_nid2obj(sign_nid), paramtype, NULL);
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return 1;
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}
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2017-03-29 22:08:50 +01:00
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int x509_digest_verify_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, X509_ALGOR *sigalg) {
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if (!EVP_PKEY_verify_init(ctx)) {
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return 0;
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}
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2016-01-30 19:58:52 +00:00
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/* Convert the signature OID into digest and public key OIDs. */
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int sigalg_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm);
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2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
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int digest_nid, pkey_nid;
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2016-01-30 19:58:52 +00:00
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if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sigalg_nid, &digest_nid, &pkey_nid)) {
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Align with upstream's error strings, take two.
I messed up a few of these.
ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM doesn't exist. X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM does
exist as part of X509_PUBKEY_set, but the SPKI parser doesn't emit this. (I
don't mind the legacy code having really weird errors, but since EVP is now
limited to things we like, let's try to keep that clean.) To avoid churn in
Conscrypt, we'll keep defining X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM, but not actually
do anything with it anymore. Conscrypt was already aware of
EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM, so this should be fine. (I don't expect
EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM to go away. The SPKI parsers we like live in EVP
now.)
A few other ASN1_R_* values didn't quite match upstream, so make those match
again. Finally, I got some of the rsa_pss.c values wrong. Each of those
corresponds to an (overly specific) RSA_R_* value in upstream. However, those
were gone in BoringSSL since even the initial commit. We placed the RSA <-> EVP
glue in crypto/evp (so crypto/rsa wouldn't depend on crypto/evp) while upstream
placed them in crypto/rsa.
Since no one seemed to notice the loss of RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH, let's undo
all the cross-module errors inserted in crypto/rsa. Instead, since that kind of
specificity is not useful, funnel it all into X509_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS
(formerly EVP_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS, formerly RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS).
Reset the error codes for all affected modules.
(That our error code story means error codes are not stable across this kind of
refactoring is kind of a problem. Hopefully this will be the last of it.)
Change-Id: Ibfb3a0ac340bfc777bc7de6980ef3ddf0a8c84bc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7458
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-03-14 21:13:54 +00:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
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2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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2016-01-30 19:58:52 +00:00
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/* Check the public key OID matches the public key type. */
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2017-03-29 22:08:50 +01:00
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EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx);
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2016-01-30 19:58:52 +00:00
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if (pkey_nid != EVP_PKEY_id(pkey)) {
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2016-03-11 19:39:46 +00:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
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2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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/* NID_undef signals that there are custom parameters to set. */
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if (digest_nid == NID_undef) {
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2017-03-29 22:08:50 +01:00
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if (sigalg_nid == NID_rsassaPss) {
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return x509_rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, sigalg);
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2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
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}
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2017-03-29 22:08:50 +01:00
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if (sigalg_nid == NID_Ed25519) {
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if (sigalg->parameter != NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1; /* Nothing to configure. */
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}
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
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return 0;
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2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
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}
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/* Otherwise, initialize with the digest from the OID. */
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2016-01-30 19:58:52 +00:00
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const EVP_MD *digest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest_nid);
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2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
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if (digest == NULL) {
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Align with upstream's error strings, take two.
I messed up a few of these.
ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM doesn't exist. X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM does
exist as part of X509_PUBKEY_set, but the SPKI parser doesn't emit this. (I
don't mind the legacy code having really weird errors, but since EVP is now
limited to things we like, let's try to keep that clean.) To avoid churn in
Conscrypt, we'll keep defining X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM, but not actually
do anything with it anymore. Conscrypt was already aware of
EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM, so this should be fine. (I don't expect
EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM to go away. The SPKI parsers we like live in EVP
now.)
A few other ASN1_R_* values didn't quite match upstream, so make those match
again. Finally, I got some of the rsa_pss.c values wrong. Each of those
corresponds to an (overly specific) RSA_R_* value in upstream. However, those
were gone in BoringSSL since even the initial commit. We placed the RSA <-> EVP
glue in crypto/evp (so crypto/rsa wouldn't depend on crypto/evp) while upstream
placed them in crypto/rsa.
Since no one seemed to notice the loss of RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH, let's undo
all the cross-module errors inserted in crypto/rsa. Instead, since that kind of
specificity is not useful, funnel it all into X509_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS
(formerly EVP_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS, formerly RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS).
Reset the error codes for all affected modules.
(That our error code story means error codes are not stable across this kind of
refactoring is kind of a problem. Hopefully this will be the last of it.)
Change-Id: Ibfb3a0ac340bfc777bc7de6980ef3ddf0a8c84bc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7458
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-03-14 21:13:54 +00:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
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2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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2017-03-29 22:08:50 +01:00
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return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, digest);
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2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
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}
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