boringssl/crypto/dsa/dsa.c

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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*
* The DSS routines are based on patches supplied by
* Steven Schoch <schoch@sheba.arc.nasa.gov>. */
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/ex_data.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include "internal.h"
extern const DSA_METHOD DSA_default_method;
DSA *DSA_new(void) { return DSA_new_method(NULL); }
DSA *DSA_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
DSA *dsa = (DSA *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DSA));
if (dsa == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_new_method, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
memset(dsa, 0, sizeof(DSA));
if (engine) {
dsa->meth = ENGINE_get_DSA_method(engine);
}
if (dsa->meth == NULL) {
dsa->meth = (DSA_METHOD*) &DSA_default_method;
}
METHOD_ref(dsa->meth);
dsa->write_params = 1;
dsa->references = 1;
if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DSA, dsa, &dsa->ex_data)) {
METHOD_unref(dsa->meth);
OPENSSL_free(dsa);
return NULL;
}
if (dsa->meth->init && !dsa->meth->init(dsa)) {
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DSA, dsa, &dsa->ex_data);
METHOD_unref(dsa->meth);
OPENSSL_free(dsa);
return NULL;
}
return dsa;
}
void DSA_free(DSA *dsa) {
if (dsa == NULL) {
return;
}
if (CRYPTO_add(&dsa->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA) > 0) {
return;
}
if (dsa->meth->finish) {
dsa->meth->finish(dsa);
}
METHOD_unref(dsa->meth);
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DSA, dsa, &dsa->ex_data);
if (dsa->p != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(dsa->p);
}
if (dsa->q != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(dsa->q);
}
if (dsa->g != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(dsa->g);
}
if (dsa->pub_key != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(dsa->pub_key);
}
if (dsa->priv_key != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(dsa->priv_key);
}
if (dsa->kinv != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(dsa->kinv);
}
if (dsa->r != NULL) {
BN_clear_free(dsa->r);
}
OPENSSL_free(dsa);
}
int DSA_up_ref(DSA *dsa) {
CRYPTO_add(&dsa->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA);
return 1;
}
int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *dsa, unsigned bits, const uint8_t *seed_in,
size_t seed_len, int *out_counter,
unsigned long *out_h, BN_GENCB *cb) {
if (dsa->meth->generate_parameters) {
return dsa->meth->generate_parameters(dsa, bits, seed_in, seed_len,
out_counter, out_h, cb);
}
return DSA_default_method.generate_parameters(dsa, bits, seed_in, seed_len,
out_counter, out_h, cb);
}
int DSA_generate_key(DSA *dsa) {
if (dsa->meth->keygen) {
return dsa->meth->keygen(dsa);
}
return DSA_default_method.keygen(dsa);
}
DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void) {
DSA_SIG *sig;
sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DSA_SIG));
if (!sig) {
return NULL;
}
sig->r = NULL;
sig->s = NULL;
return sig;
}
void DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *sig) {
if (!sig) {
return;
}
if (sig->r) {
BN_free(sig->r);
}
if (sig->s) {
BN_free(sig->s);
}
OPENSSL_free(sig);
}
DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, DSA *dsa) {
if (dsa->meth->sign) {
return dsa->meth->sign(digest, digest_len, dsa);
}
return DSA_default_method.sign(digest, digest_len, dsa);
}
int DSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
const DSA *dsa) {
int valid;
if (!DSA_do_check_signature(&valid, digest, digest_len, sig, dsa)) {
return -1;
}
return valid;
}
int DSA_do_check_signature(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *digest,
size_t digest_len, DSA_SIG *sig, const DSA *dsa) {
if (dsa->meth->verify) {
return dsa->meth->verify(out_valid, digest, digest_len, sig, dsa);
}
return DSA_default_method.verify(out_valid, digest, digest_len, sig, dsa);
}
int DSA_sign(int type, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
uint8_t *out_sig, unsigned int *out_siglen, DSA *dsa) {
DSA_SIG *s;
s = DSA_do_sign(digest, digest_len, dsa);
if (s == NULL) {
*out_siglen = 0;
return 0;
}
*out_siglen = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &out_sig);
DSA_SIG_free(s);
return 1;
}
int DSA_verify(int type, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len, const DSA *dsa) {
int valid;
if (!DSA_check_signature(&valid, digest, digest_len, sig, sig_len, dsa)) {
return -1;
}
return valid;
}
int DSA_check_signature(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *digest,
size_t digest_len, const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len,
const DSA *dsa) {
DSA_SIG *s = NULL;
int ret = 0;
Fix various certificate fingerprint issues. By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature. Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the certificate fingerprint for blacklists. 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits. If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits. 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency. Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure errors for some broken certificates. 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER. Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch. This will reject various cases including garbage after signature (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs (negative or with leading zeroes). CVE-2014-8275 (Imported from upstream's 85cfc188c06bd046420ae70dd6e302f9efe022a9 and 4c52816d35681c0533c25fdd3abb4b7c6962302d) Change-Id: Ic901aea8ea6457df27dc542a11c30464561e322b Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2783 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-01-08 20:26:55 +00:00
uint8_t *der = NULL;
s = DSA_SIG_new();
if (s == NULL) {
goto err;
}
Fix various certificate fingerprint issues. By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature. Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the certificate fingerprint for blacklists. 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits. If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits. 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency. Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure errors for some broken certificates. 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER. Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch. This will reject various cases including garbage after signature (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs (negative or with leading zeroes). CVE-2014-8275 (Imported from upstream's 85cfc188c06bd046420ae70dd6e302f9efe022a9 and 4c52816d35681c0533c25fdd3abb4b7c6962302d) Change-Id: Ic901aea8ea6457df27dc542a11c30464561e322b Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2783 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-01-08 20:26:55 +00:00
const uint8_t *sigp = sig;
if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s, &sigp, sig_len) == NULL || sigp != sig + sig_len) {
goto err;
}
/* Ensure that the signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage. */
int der_len = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &der);
if (der_len < 0 || (size_t)der_len != sig_len || memcmp(sig, der, sig_len)) {
goto err;
}
ret = DSA_do_check_signature(out_valid, digest, digest_len, s, dsa);
err:
Fix various certificate fingerprint issues. By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature. Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the certificate fingerprint for blacklists. 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits. If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits. 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency. Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure errors for some broken certificates. 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER. Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch. This will reject various cases including garbage after signature (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs (negative or with leading zeroes). CVE-2014-8275 (Imported from upstream's 85cfc188c06bd046420ae70dd6e302f9efe022a9 and 4c52816d35681c0533c25fdd3abb4b7c6962302d) Change-Id: Ic901aea8ea6457df27dc542a11c30464561e322b Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2783 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-01-08 20:26:55 +00:00
if (der != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(der);
}
if (s) {
DSA_SIG_free(s);
}
return ret;
}
int DSA_size(const DSA *dsa) {
int ret, i;
ASN1_INTEGER bs;
unsigned char buf[4]; /* 4 bytes looks really small.
However, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER() will not look
beyond the first byte, as long as the second
parameter is NULL. */
i = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
bs.length = (i + 7) / 8;
bs.data = buf;
bs.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
/* If the top bit is set the asn1 encoding is 1 larger. */
buf[0] = 0xff;
i = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&bs, NULL);
i += i; /* r and s */
ret = ASN1_object_size(1, i, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
return ret;
}
int DSA_sign_setup(const DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **out_kinv,
BIGNUM **out_r) {
if (dsa->meth->sign_setup) {
return dsa->meth->sign_setup(dsa, ctx, out_kinv, out_r, NULL, 0);
}
return DSA_default_method.sign_setup(dsa, ctx, out_kinv, out_r, NULL, 0);
}
int DSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DSA, argl, argp, new_func,
dup_func, free_func);
}
int DSA_set_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx, void *arg) {
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg);
}
void *DSA_get_ex_data(const DSA *d, int idx) {
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx);
}
DH *DSA_dup_DH(const DSA *r) {
DH *ret = NULL;
if (r == NULL) {
goto err;
}
ret = DH_new();
if (ret == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (r->q != NULL) {
ret->priv_length = BN_num_bits(r->q);
if ((ret->q = BN_dup(r->q)) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if ((r->p != NULL && (ret->p = BN_dup(r->p)) == NULL) ||
(r->g != NULL && (ret->g = BN_dup(r->g)) == NULL) ||
(r->pub_key != NULL && (ret->pub_key = BN_dup(r->pub_key)) == NULL) ||
(r->priv_key != NULL && (ret->priv_key = BN_dup(r->priv_key)) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
return ret;
err:
if (ret != NULL) {
DH_free(ret);
}
return NULL;
}