boringssl/ssl/test/runner/dtls.go

343 lines
10 KiB
Go
Raw Normal View History

// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// DTLS implementation.
//
// NOTE: This is a not even a remotely production-quality DTLS
// implementation. It is the bare minimum necessary to be able to
// achieve coverage on BoringSSL's implementation. Of note is that
// this implementation assumes the underlying net.PacketConn is not
// only reliable but also ordered. BoringSSL will be expected to deal
// with simulated loss, but there is no point in forcing the test
// driver to.
package main
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/cipher"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
)
func versionToWire(vers uint16, isDTLS bool) uint16 {
if isDTLS {
return ^(vers - 0x0201)
}
return vers
}
func wireToVersion(vers uint16, isDTLS bool) uint16 {
if isDTLS {
return ^vers + 0x0201
}
return vers
}
func (c *Conn) dtlsDoReadRecord(want recordType) (recordType, *block, error) {
Drop retransmits in DTLS tests. BoringSSL currently retransmits non-deterministically on an internal timer (rather than one supplied externally), so the tests currently fail flakily depending on timing. Valgrind is a common source for this. We still assume an in-order and reliable channel, but drop retransmits silently: - Handshake messages may arrive with old sequence numbers. - Retransmitted CCS records arrive from the previous epoch. - We may receive a retransmitted Finished after we believe the handshake has completed. (Aside: even in a real implementation, only Finished is possible here. Even with out-of-order delivery, retransmitted or reordered messages earlier in the handshake come in under a different epoch.) Note that because DTLS renego and a Finished retransmit are ambiguous at the record layer[*], this precludes us writing tests for DTLS renego. But DTLS renego should get removed anyway. As BoringSSL currently implements renego, this ambiguity is also a source of complexity in the real implementation. (See the SSL3_MT_FINISHED check in dtls1_read_bytes.) [*] As a further fun aside, it's also complex if dispatching renego vs Finished after handshake message reassembly. The spec doesn't directly say the sequence number is reset across renegos, but it says "The first message each side transmits in /each/ handshake always has message_seq = 0". This means that such an implementation needs the handshake message reassembly logic be aware that a Finished fragment with high sequence number is NOT an out-of-order fragment for the next handshake. Change-Id: I35d13560f82bcb5eeda62f4de1571d28c818cc36 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2770 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-01-08 18:44:37 +00:00
Again:
recordHeaderLen := dtlsRecordHeaderLen
if c.rawInput == nil {
c.rawInput = c.in.newBlock()
}
b := c.rawInput
// Read a new packet only if the current one is empty.
if len(b.data) == 0 {
// Pick some absurdly large buffer size.
b.resize(maxCiphertext + recordHeaderLen)
n, err := c.conn.Read(c.rawInput.data)
if err != nil {
return 0, nil, err
}
if c.config.Bugs.MaxPacketLength != 0 && n > c.config.Bugs.MaxPacketLength {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("dtls: exceeded maximum packet length")
}
c.rawInput.resize(n)
}
// Read out one record.
//
// A real DTLS implementation should be tolerant of errors,
// but this is test code. We should not be tolerant of our
// peer sending garbage.
if len(b.data) < recordHeaderLen {
return 0, nil, errors.New("dtls: failed to read record header")
}
typ := recordType(b.data[0])
vers := wireToVersion(uint16(b.data[1])<<8|uint16(b.data[2]), c.isDTLS)
if c.haveVers {
if vers != c.vers {
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
return 0, nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("dtls: received record with version %x when expecting version %x", vers, c.vers))
}
} else {
if expect := c.config.Bugs.ExpectInitialRecordVersion; expect != 0 && vers != expect {
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
return 0, nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("dtls: received record with version %x when expecting version %x", vers, expect))
}
}
seq := b.data[3:11]
Drop retransmits in DTLS tests. BoringSSL currently retransmits non-deterministically on an internal timer (rather than one supplied externally), so the tests currently fail flakily depending on timing. Valgrind is a common source for this. We still assume an in-order and reliable channel, but drop retransmits silently: - Handshake messages may arrive with old sequence numbers. - Retransmitted CCS records arrive from the previous epoch. - We may receive a retransmitted Finished after we believe the handshake has completed. (Aside: even in a real implementation, only Finished is possible here. Even with out-of-order delivery, retransmitted or reordered messages earlier in the handshake come in under a different epoch.) Note that because DTLS renego and a Finished retransmit are ambiguous at the record layer[*], this precludes us writing tests for DTLS renego. But DTLS renego should get removed anyway. As BoringSSL currently implements renego, this ambiguity is also a source of complexity in the real implementation. (See the SSL3_MT_FINISHED check in dtls1_read_bytes.) [*] As a further fun aside, it's also complex if dispatching renego vs Finished after handshake message reassembly. The spec doesn't directly say the sequence number is reset across renegos, but it says "The first message each side transmits in /each/ handshake always has message_seq = 0". This means that such an implementation needs the handshake message reassembly logic be aware that a Finished fragment with high sequence number is NOT an out-of-order fragment for the next handshake. Change-Id: I35d13560f82bcb5eeda62f4de1571d28c818cc36 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2770 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-01-08 18:44:37 +00:00
if !bytes.Equal(seq[:2], c.in.seq[:2]) {
// If the epoch didn't match, silently drop the record.
// BoringSSL retransmits on an internal timer, so it may flakily
// revisit the previous epoch if retransmiting ChangeCipherSpec
// and Finished.
goto Again
}
// For test purposes, we assume a reliable channel. Require
// that the explicit sequence number matches the incrementing
// one we maintain. A real implementation would maintain a
// replay window and such.
if !bytes.Equal(seq, c.in.seq[:]) {
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
return 0, nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("dtls: bad sequence number"))
}
n := int(b.data[11])<<8 | int(b.data[12])
if n > maxCiphertext || len(b.data) < recordHeaderLen+n {
c.sendAlert(alertRecordOverflow)
return 0, nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("dtls: oversized record received with length %d", n))
}
// Process message.
b, c.rawInput = c.in.splitBlock(b, recordHeaderLen+n)
ok, off, err := c.in.decrypt(b)
if !ok {
c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(err))
}
b.off = off
return typ, b, nil
}
func (c *Conn) dtlsWriteRecord(typ recordType, data []byte) (n int, err error) {
recordHeaderLen := dtlsRecordHeaderLen
maxLen := c.config.Bugs.MaxHandshakeRecordLength
if maxLen <= 0 {
maxLen = 1024
}
b := c.out.newBlock()
var header []byte
if typ == recordTypeHandshake {
// Handshake messages have to be modified to include
// fragment offset and length and with the header
// replicated. Save the header here.
//
// TODO(davidben): This assumes that data contains
// exactly one handshake message. This is incompatible
// with FragmentAcrossChangeCipherSpec. (Which is
// unfortunate because OpenSSL's DTLS implementation
// will probably accept such fragmentation and could
// do with a fix + tests.)
if len(data) < 4 {
// This should not happen.
panic(data)
}
header = data[:4]
data = data[4:]
}
firstRun := true
for firstRun || len(data) > 0 {
firstRun = false
m := len(data)
var fragment []byte
// Handshake messages get fragmented. Other records we
// pass-through as is. DTLS should be a packet
// interface.
if typ == recordTypeHandshake {
if m > maxLen {
m = maxLen
}
// Standard handshake header.
fragment = make([]byte, 0, 12+m)
fragment = append(fragment, header...)
// message_seq
fragment = append(fragment, byte(c.sendHandshakeSeq>>8), byte(c.sendHandshakeSeq))
// fragment_offset
fragment = append(fragment, byte(n>>16), byte(n>>8), byte(n))
// fragment_length
fragment = append(fragment, byte(m>>16), byte(m>>8), byte(m))
fragment = append(fragment, data[:m]...)
} else {
fragment = data[:m]
}
// Send the fragment.
explicitIVLen := 0
explicitIVIsSeq := false
if cbc, ok := c.out.cipher.(cbcMode); ok {
// Block cipher modes have an explicit IV.
explicitIVLen = cbc.BlockSize()
} else if _, ok := c.out.cipher.(cipher.AEAD); ok {
explicitIVLen = 8
// The AES-GCM construction in TLS has an
// explicit nonce so that the nonce can be
// random. However, the nonce is only 8 bytes
// which is too small for a secure, random
// nonce. Therefore we use the sequence number
// as the nonce.
explicitIVIsSeq = true
} else if c.out.cipher != nil {
panic("Unknown cipher")
}
b.resize(recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen + len(fragment))
b.data[0] = byte(typ)
vers := c.vers
if vers == 0 {
// Some TLS servers fail if the record version is
// greater than TLS 1.0 for the initial ClientHello.
vers = VersionTLS10
}
vers = versionToWire(vers, c.isDTLS)
b.data[1] = byte(vers >> 8)
b.data[2] = byte(vers)
// DTLS records include an explicit sequence number.
copy(b.data[3:11], c.out.seq[0:])
b.data[11] = byte(len(fragment) >> 8)
b.data[12] = byte(len(fragment))
if explicitIVLen > 0 {
explicitIV := b.data[recordHeaderLen : recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen]
if explicitIVIsSeq {
copy(explicitIV, c.out.seq[:])
} else {
if _, err = io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), explicitIV); err != nil {
break
}
}
}
copy(b.data[recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen:], fragment)
c.out.encrypt(b, explicitIVLen)
// TODO(davidben): A real DTLS implementation needs to
// retransmit handshake messages. For testing
// purposes, we don't actually care.
_, err = c.conn.Write(b.data)
if err != nil {
break
}
n += m
data = data[m:]
}
c.out.freeBlock(b)
// Increment the handshake sequence number for the next
// handshake message.
if typ == recordTypeHandshake {
c.sendHandshakeSeq++
}
if typ == recordTypeChangeCipherSpec {
err = c.out.changeCipherSpec(c.config)
if err != nil {
// Cannot call sendAlert directly,
// because we already hold c.out.Mutex.
c.tmp[0] = alertLevelError
c.tmp[1] = byte(err.(alert))
c.writeRecord(recordTypeAlert, c.tmp[0:2])
return n, c.out.setErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "local error", Err: err})
}
}
return
}
func (c *Conn) dtlsDoReadHandshake() ([]byte, error) {
// Assemble a full handshake message. For test purposes, this
Drop retransmits in DTLS tests. BoringSSL currently retransmits non-deterministically on an internal timer (rather than one supplied externally), so the tests currently fail flakily depending on timing. Valgrind is a common source for this. We still assume an in-order and reliable channel, but drop retransmits silently: - Handshake messages may arrive with old sequence numbers. - Retransmitted CCS records arrive from the previous epoch. - We may receive a retransmitted Finished after we believe the handshake has completed. (Aside: even in a real implementation, only Finished is possible here. Even with out-of-order delivery, retransmitted or reordered messages earlier in the handshake come in under a different epoch.) Note that because DTLS renego and a Finished retransmit are ambiguous at the record layer[*], this precludes us writing tests for DTLS renego. But DTLS renego should get removed anyway. As BoringSSL currently implements renego, this ambiguity is also a source of complexity in the real implementation. (See the SSL3_MT_FINISHED check in dtls1_read_bytes.) [*] As a further fun aside, it's also complex if dispatching renego vs Finished after handshake message reassembly. The spec doesn't directly say the sequence number is reset across renegos, but it says "The first message each side transmits in /each/ handshake always has message_seq = 0". This means that such an implementation needs the handshake message reassembly logic be aware that a Finished fragment with high sequence number is NOT an out-of-order fragment for the next handshake. Change-Id: I35d13560f82bcb5eeda62f4de1571d28c818cc36 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2770 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-01-08 18:44:37 +00:00
// implementation assumes fragments arrive in order, but tolerates
// retransmits. It may need to be cleverer if we ever test BoringSSL's
// retransmit behavior.
for len(c.handMsg) < 4+c.handMsgLen {
// Get a new handshake record if the previous has been
// exhausted.
if c.hand.Len() == 0 {
if err := c.in.err; err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := c.readRecord(recordTypeHandshake); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
// Read the next fragment. It must fit entirely within
// the record.
if c.hand.Len() < 12 {
return nil, errors.New("dtls: bad handshake record")
}
header := c.hand.Next(12)
fragN := int(header[1])<<16 | int(header[2])<<8 | int(header[3])
fragSeq := uint16(header[4])<<8 | uint16(header[5])
fragOff := int(header[6])<<16 | int(header[7])<<8 | int(header[8])
fragLen := int(header[9])<<16 | int(header[10])<<8 | int(header[11])
if c.hand.Len() < fragLen {
return nil, errors.New("dtls: fragment length too long")
}
fragment := c.hand.Next(fragLen)
Drop retransmits in DTLS tests. BoringSSL currently retransmits non-deterministically on an internal timer (rather than one supplied externally), so the tests currently fail flakily depending on timing. Valgrind is a common source for this. We still assume an in-order and reliable channel, but drop retransmits silently: - Handshake messages may arrive with old sequence numbers. - Retransmitted CCS records arrive from the previous epoch. - We may receive a retransmitted Finished after we believe the handshake has completed. (Aside: even in a real implementation, only Finished is possible here. Even with out-of-order delivery, retransmitted or reordered messages earlier in the handshake come in under a different epoch.) Note that because DTLS renego and a Finished retransmit are ambiguous at the record layer[*], this precludes us writing tests for DTLS renego. But DTLS renego should get removed anyway. As BoringSSL currently implements renego, this ambiguity is also a source of complexity in the real implementation. (See the SSL3_MT_FINISHED check in dtls1_read_bytes.) [*] As a further fun aside, it's also complex if dispatching renego vs Finished after handshake message reassembly. The spec doesn't directly say the sequence number is reset across renegos, but it says "The first message each side transmits in /each/ handshake always has message_seq = 0". This means that such an implementation needs the handshake message reassembly logic be aware that a Finished fragment with high sequence number is NOT an out-of-order fragment for the next handshake. Change-Id: I35d13560f82bcb5eeda62f4de1571d28c818cc36 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2770 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-01-08 18:44:37 +00:00
if fragSeq < c.recvHandshakeSeq {
// BoringSSL retransmits based on an internal timer, so
// it may flakily retransmit part of a handshake
// message. Ignore those fragments.
//
// TODO(davidben): Revise this if BoringSSL's retransmit
// logic is made more deterministic.
continue
} else if fragSeq > c.recvHandshakeSeq {
return nil, errors.New("dtls: handshake messages sent out of order")
}
// Check that the length is consistent.
if c.handMsg == nil {
c.handMsgLen = fragN
if c.handMsgLen > maxHandshake {
return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertInternalError))
}
// Start with the TLS handshake header,
// without the DTLS bits.
c.handMsg = append([]byte{}, header[:4]...)
} else if fragN != c.handMsgLen {
return nil, errors.New("dtls: bad handshake length")
}
// Add the fragment to the pending message.
if 4+fragOff != len(c.handMsg) {
return nil, errors.New("dtls: bad fragment offset")
}
if fragOff+fragLen > c.handMsgLen {
return nil, errors.New("dtls: bad fragment length")
}
c.handMsg = append(c.handMsg, fragment...)
}
c.recvHandshakeSeq++
ret := c.handMsg
c.handMsg, c.handMsgLen = nil, 0
return ret, nil
}
// DTLSServer returns a new DTLS server side connection
// using conn as the underlying transport.
// The configuration config must be non-nil and must have
// at least one certificate.
func DTLSServer(conn net.Conn, config *Config) *Conn {
c := &Conn{config: config, isDTLS: true, conn: conn}
c.init()
return c
}
// DTLSClient returns a new DTLS client side connection
// using conn as the underlying transport.
// The config cannot be nil: users must set either ServerHostname or
// InsecureSkipVerify in the config.
func DTLSClient(conn net.Conn, config *Config) *Conn {
c := &Conn{config: config, isClient: true, isDTLS: true, conn: conn}
c.init()
return c
}