2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
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#include <openssl/rsa.h>
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2015-01-31 01:08:37 +00:00
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#include <string.h>
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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2017-05-03 19:50:51 +01:00
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#include "../../internal.h"
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2015-01-31 01:08:37 +00:00
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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#define BN_BLINDING_COUNTER 32
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struct bn_blinding_st {
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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BIGNUM *A; // The base blinding factor, Montgomery-encoded.
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BIGNUM *Ai; // The inverse of the blinding factor, Montgomery-encoded.
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2016-03-21 21:25:39 +00:00
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unsigned counter;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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};
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Require the public exponent to be available in RSA blinding.
Require the public exponent to be available unless
|RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING| is set on the key. Also, document this.
If the public exponent |e| is not available, then we could compute it
from |p|, |q|, and |d|. However, there's no reasonable situation in
which we'd have |p| or |q| but not |e|; either we have all the CRT
parameters, or we have (e, d, n), or we have only (d, n). The
calculation to compute |e| exposes the private key to risk of side
channel attacks.
Also, it was particularly wasteful to compute |e| for each
|BN_BLINDING| created, instead of just once before the first
|BN_BLINDING| was created.
|BN_BLINDING| now no longer needs to contain a duplicate copy of |e|,
so it is now more space-efficient.
Note that the condition |b->e != NULL| in |bn_blinding_update| was
always true since commit cbf56a5683ddda831ff91c46ea48d1fba545db66.
Change-Id: Ic2fd6980e0d359dcd53772a7c31bdd0267e316b4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7594
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-03-27 06:42:31 +01:00
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static int bn_blinding_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b, const BIGNUM *e,
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const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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Require the public exponent to be available in RSA blinding.
Require the public exponent to be available unless
|RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING| is set on the key. Also, document this.
If the public exponent |e| is not available, then we could compute it
from |p|, |q|, and |d|. However, there's no reasonable situation in
which we'd have |p| or |q| but not |e|; either we have all the CRT
parameters, or we have (e, d, n), or we have only (d, n). The
calculation to compute |e| exposes the private key to risk of side
channel attacks.
Also, it was particularly wasteful to compute |e| for each
|BN_BLINDING| created, instead of just once before the first
|BN_BLINDING| was created.
|BN_BLINDING| now no longer needs to contain a duplicate copy of |e|,
so it is now more space-efficient.
Note that the condition |b->e != NULL| in |bn_blinding_update| was
always true since commit cbf56a5683ddda831ff91c46ea48d1fba545db66.
Change-Id: Ic2fd6980e0d359dcd53772a7c31bdd0267e316b4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7594
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-03-27 06:42:31 +01:00
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BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(void) {
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2016-03-21 21:25:39 +00:00
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BN_BLINDING *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BN_BLINDING));
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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if (ret == NULL) {
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2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return NULL;
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}
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2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
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OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(BN_BLINDING));
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2016-03-21 21:25:39 +00:00
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ret->A = BN_new();
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if (ret->A == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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ret->Ai = BN_new();
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if (ret->Ai == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// The blinding values need to be created before this blinding can be used.
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2016-03-21 21:25:39 +00:00
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ret->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER - 1;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return ret;
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err:
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2015-04-22 21:09:09 +01:00
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BN_BLINDING_free(ret);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return NULL;
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}
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void BN_BLINDING_free(BN_BLINDING *r) {
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if (r == NULL) {
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return;
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}
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2015-04-22 21:09:09 +01:00
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BN_free(r->A);
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BN_free(r->Ai);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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OPENSSL_free(r);
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}
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Require the public exponent to be available in RSA blinding.
Require the public exponent to be available unless
|RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING| is set on the key. Also, document this.
If the public exponent |e| is not available, then we could compute it
from |p|, |q|, and |d|. However, there's no reasonable situation in
which we'd have |p| or |q| but not |e|; either we have all the CRT
parameters, or we have (e, d, n), or we have only (d, n). The
calculation to compute |e| exposes the private key to risk of side
channel attacks.
Also, it was particularly wasteful to compute |e| for each
|BN_BLINDING| created, instead of just once before the first
|BN_BLINDING| was created.
|BN_BLINDING| now no longer needs to contain a duplicate copy of |e|,
so it is now more space-efficient.
Note that the condition |b->e != NULL| in |bn_blinding_update| was
always true since commit cbf56a5683ddda831ff91c46ea48d1fba545db66.
Change-Id: Ic2fd6980e0d359dcd53772a7c31bdd0267e316b4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7594
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-03-27 06:42:31 +01:00
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static int bn_blinding_update(BN_BLINDING *b, const BIGNUM *e,
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const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx) {
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2016-03-20 10:33:11 +00:00
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if (++b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER) {
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// re-create blinding parameters
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Require the public exponent to be available in RSA blinding.
Require the public exponent to be available unless
|RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING| is set on the key. Also, document this.
If the public exponent |e| is not available, then we could compute it
from |p|, |q|, and |d|. However, there's no reasonable situation in
which we'd have |p| or |q| but not |e|; either we have all the CRT
parameters, or we have (e, d, n), or we have only (d, n). The
calculation to compute |e| exposes the private key to risk of side
channel attacks.
Also, it was particularly wasteful to compute |e| for each
|BN_BLINDING| created, instead of just once before the first
|BN_BLINDING| was created.
|BN_BLINDING| now no longer needs to contain a duplicate copy of |e|,
so it is now more space-efficient.
Note that the condition |b->e != NULL| in |bn_blinding_update| was
always true since commit cbf56a5683ddda831ff91c46ea48d1fba545db66.
Change-Id: Ic2fd6980e0d359dcd53772a7c31bdd0267e316b4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7594
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-03-27 06:42:31 +01:00
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if (!bn_blinding_create_param(b, e, mont, ctx)) {
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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goto err;
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}
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2016-03-20 10:33:11 +00:00
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b->counter = 0;
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2016-01-25 09:41:56 +00:00
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} else {
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2016-03-18 02:10:04 +00:00
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if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(b->A, b->A, b->A, mont, ctx) ||
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!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(b->Ai, b->Ai, b->Ai, mont, ctx)) {
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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goto err;
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}
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}
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2016-03-20 10:33:11 +00:00
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return 1;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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err:
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2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// |A| and |Ai| may be in an inconsistent state so they both need to be
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// replaced the next time this blinding is used. Note that this is only
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// sufficient because support for |BN_BLINDING_NO_UPDATE| and
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// |BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE| was previously dropped.
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2016-03-20 10:33:11 +00:00
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b->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER - 1;
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return 0;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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|
|
Require the public exponent to be available in RSA blinding.
Require the public exponent to be available unless
|RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING| is set on the key. Also, document this.
If the public exponent |e| is not available, then we could compute it
from |p|, |q|, and |d|. However, there's no reasonable situation in
which we'd have |p| or |q| but not |e|; either we have all the CRT
parameters, or we have (e, d, n), or we have only (d, n). The
calculation to compute |e| exposes the private key to risk of side
channel attacks.
Also, it was particularly wasteful to compute |e| for each
|BN_BLINDING| created, instead of just once before the first
|BN_BLINDING| was created.
|BN_BLINDING| now no longer needs to contain a duplicate copy of |e|,
so it is now more space-efficient.
Note that the condition |b->e != NULL| in |bn_blinding_update| was
always true since commit cbf56a5683ddda831ff91c46ea48d1fba545db66.
Change-Id: Ic2fd6980e0d359dcd53772a7c31bdd0267e316b4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7594
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-03-27 06:42:31 +01:00
|
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int BN_BLINDING_convert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, const BIGNUM *e,
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const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx) {
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// |n| is not Montgomery-encoded and |b->A| is. |BN_mod_mul_montgomery|
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// cancels one Montgomery factor, so the resulting value of |n| is unencoded.
|
Require the public exponent to be available in RSA blinding.
Require the public exponent to be available unless
|RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING| is set on the key. Also, document this.
If the public exponent |e| is not available, then we could compute it
from |p|, |q|, and |d|. However, there's no reasonable situation in
which we'd have |p| or |q| but not |e|; either we have all the CRT
parameters, or we have (e, d, n), or we have only (d, n). The
calculation to compute |e| exposes the private key to risk of side
channel attacks.
Also, it was particularly wasteful to compute |e| for each
|BN_BLINDING| created, instead of just once before the first
|BN_BLINDING| was created.
|BN_BLINDING| now no longer needs to contain a duplicate copy of |e|,
so it is now more space-efficient.
Note that the condition |b->e != NULL| in |bn_blinding_update| was
always true since commit cbf56a5683ddda831ff91c46ea48d1fba545db66.
Change-Id: Ic2fd6980e0d359dcd53772a7c31bdd0267e316b4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7594
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-03-27 06:42:31 +01:00
|
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if (!bn_blinding_update(b, e, mont, ctx) ||
|
2016-03-18 02:10:04 +00:00
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!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(n, n, b->A, mont, ctx)) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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2016-03-21 21:25:39 +00:00
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return 1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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|
2016-03-18 02:10:04 +00:00
|
|
|
int BN_BLINDING_invert(BIGNUM *n, const BN_BLINDING *b, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
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|
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BN_CTX *ctx) {
|
2017-08-18 19:06:02 +01:00
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// |n| is not Montgomery-encoded and |b->A| is. |BN_mod_mul_montgomery|
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// cancels one Montgomery factor, so the resulting value of |n| is unencoded.
|
2016-03-18 02:10:04 +00:00
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|
|
return BN_mod_mul_montgomery(n, n, b->Ai, mont, ctx);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Require the public exponent to be available in RSA blinding.
Require the public exponent to be available unless
|RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING| is set on the key. Also, document this.
If the public exponent |e| is not available, then we could compute it
from |p|, |q|, and |d|. However, there's no reasonable situation in
which we'd have |p| or |q| but not |e|; either we have all the CRT
parameters, or we have (e, d, n), or we have only (d, n). The
calculation to compute |e| exposes the private key to risk of side
channel attacks.
Also, it was particularly wasteful to compute |e| for each
|BN_BLINDING| created, instead of just once before the first
|BN_BLINDING| was created.
|BN_BLINDING| now no longer needs to contain a duplicate copy of |e|,
so it is now more space-efficient.
Note that the condition |b->e != NULL| in |bn_blinding_update| was
always true since commit cbf56a5683ddda831ff91c46ea48d1fba545db66.
Change-Id: Ic2fd6980e0d359dcd53772a7c31bdd0267e316b4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7594
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-03-27 06:42:31 +01:00
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static int bn_blinding_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b, const BIGNUM *e,
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const BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx) {
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2018-03-03 00:17:23 +00:00
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int no_inverse;
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if (!BN_rand_range_ex(b->A, 1, &mont->N) ||
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// Compute |b->A|^-1 in Montgomery form. Note |BN_from_montgomery| +
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// |BN_mod_inverse_blinded| is equivalent to, but more efficient than,
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// |BN_mod_inverse_blinded| + |BN_to_montgomery|.
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//
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// We do not retry if |b->A| has no inverse. Finding a non-invertible
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// value of |b->A| is equivalent to factoring |mont->N|. There is
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// negligible probability of stumbling on one at random.
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!BN_from_montgomery(b->Ai, b->A, mont, ctx) ||
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!BN_mod_inverse_blinded(b->Ai, &no_inverse, b->Ai, mont, ctx) ||
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// TODO(davidben): |BN_mod_exp_mont| internally computes the result in
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// Montgomery form. Save a pair of Montgomery reductions and a
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// multiplication by returning that value directly.
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!BN_mod_exp_mont(b->A, b->A, e, &mont->N, ctx, mont) ||
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!BN_to_montgomery(b->A, b->A, mont, ctx)) {
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2016-03-21 21:25:39 +00:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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2016-03-21 21:25:39 +00:00
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return 1;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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