2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 2002-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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2018-05-14 22:28:36 +01:00
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ==================================================================== */
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#include <openssl/aes.h>
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2015-10-26 23:21:37 +00:00
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#include <assert.h>
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2018-05-14 22:28:36 +01:00
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#include "../aes/internal.h"
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2017-04-13 19:38:40 +01:00
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#include "../modes/internal.h"
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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void AES_ctr128_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
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const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t ivec[AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
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uint8_t ecount_buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], unsigned int *num) {
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Fix undefined block128_f, etc., casts.
This one is a little thorny. All the various block cipher modes
functions and callbacks take a void *key. This allows them to be used
with multiple kinds of block ciphers.
However, the implementations of those callbacks are the normal typed
functions, like AES_encrypt. Those take AES_KEY *key. While, at the ABI
level, this is perfectly fine, C considers this undefined behavior.
If we wish to preserve this genericness, we could either instantiate
multiple versions of these mode functions or create wrappers of
AES_encrypt, etc., that take void *key.
The former means more code and is tedious without C++ templates (maybe
someday...). The latter would not be difficult for a compiler to
optimize out. C mistakenly allowed comparing function pointers for
equality, which means a compiler cannot replace pointers to wrapper
functions with the real thing. (That said, the performance-sensitive
bits already act in chunks, e.g. ctr128_f, so the function call overhead
shouldn't matter.)
But our only 128-bit block cipher is AES anyway, so I just switched
things to use AES_KEY throughout. AES is doing fine, and hopefully we
would have the sense not to pair a hypothetical future block cipher with
so many modes!
Change-Id: Ied3e843f0e3042a439f09e655b29847ade9d4c7d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/32107
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-09-23 02:37:01 +01:00
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CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, ecount_buf, num, AES_encrypt);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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void AES_ecb_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key,
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const int enc) {
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assert(in && out && key);
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assert((AES_ENCRYPT == enc) || (AES_DECRYPT == enc));
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if (AES_ENCRYPT == enc) {
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AES_encrypt(in, out, key);
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} else {
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AES_decrypt(in, out, key);
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}
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}
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void AES_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
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const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t *ivec, const int enc) {
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2018-05-14 22:28:36 +01:00
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if (hwaes_capable()) {
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aes_hw_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, enc);
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return;
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}
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2019-01-06 03:49:46 +00:00
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#if defined(AES_NOHW_CBC)
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2018-05-11 20:26:35 +01:00
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aes_nohw_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, enc);
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2018-05-14 22:28:36 +01:00
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#else
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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if (enc) {
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Fix undefined block128_f, etc., casts.
This one is a little thorny. All the various block cipher modes
functions and callbacks take a void *key. This allows them to be used
with multiple kinds of block ciphers.
However, the implementations of those callbacks are the normal typed
functions, like AES_encrypt. Those take AES_KEY *key. While, at the ABI
level, this is perfectly fine, C considers this undefined behavior.
If we wish to preserve this genericness, we could either instantiate
multiple versions of these mode functions or create wrappers of
AES_encrypt, etc., that take void *key.
The former means more code and is tedious without C++ templates (maybe
someday...). The latter would not be difficult for a compiler to
optimize out. C mistakenly allowed comparing function pointers for
equality, which means a compiler cannot replace pointers to wrapper
functions with the real thing. (That said, the performance-sensitive
bits already act in chunks, e.g. ctr128_f, so the function call overhead
shouldn't matter.)
But our only 128-bit block cipher is AES anyway, so I just switched
things to use AES_KEY throughout. AES is doing fine, and hopefully we
would have the sense not to pair a hypothetical future block cipher with
so many modes!
Change-Id: Ied3e843f0e3042a439f09e655b29847ade9d4c7d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/32107
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-09-23 02:37:01 +01:00
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CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, AES_encrypt);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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} else {
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Fix undefined block128_f, etc., casts.
This one is a little thorny. All the various block cipher modes
functions and callbacks take a void *key. This allows them to be used
with multiple kinds of block ciphers.
However, the implementations of those callbacks are the normal typed
functions, like AES_encrypt. Those take AES_KEY *key. While, at the ABI
level, this is perfectly fine, C considers this undefined behavior.
If we wish to preserve this genericness, we could either instantiate
multiple versions of these mode functions or create wrappers of
AES_encrypt, etc., that take void *key.
The former means more code and is tedious without C++ templates (maybe
someday...). The latter would not be difficult for a compiler to
optimize out. C mistakenly allowed comparing function pointers for
equality, which means a compiler cannot replace pointers to wrapper
functions with the real thing. (That said, the performance-sensitive
bits already act in chunks, e.g. ctr128_f, so the function call overhead
shouldn't matter.)
But our only 128-bit block cipher is AES anyway, so I just switched
things to use AES_KEY throughout. AES is doing fine, and hopefully we
would have the sense not to pair a hypothetical future block cipher with
so many modes!
Change-Id: Ied3e843f0e3042a439f09e655b29847ade9d4c7d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/32107
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-09-23 02:37:01 +01:00
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CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, key, ivec, AES_decrypt);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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2018-05-14 22:28:36 +01:00
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#endif
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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void AES_ofb128_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t length,
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const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t *ivec, int *num) {
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2016-04-16 20:20:07 +01:00
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unsigned num_u = (unsigned)(*num);
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Fix undefined block128_f, etc., casts.
This one is a little thorny. All the various block cipher modes
functions and callbacks take a void *key. This allows them to be used
with multiple kinds of block ciphers.
However, the implementations of those callbacks are the normal typed
functions, like AES_encrypt. Those take AES_KEY *key. While, at the ABI
level, this is perfectly fine, C considers this undefined behavior.
If we wish to preserve this genericness, we could either instantiate
multiple versions of these mode functions or create wrappers of
AES_encrypt, etc., that take void *key.
The former means more code and is tedious without C++ templates (maybe
someday...). The latter would not be difficult for a compiler to
optimize out. C mistakenly allowed comparing function pointers for
equality, which means a compiler cannot replace pointers to wrapper
functions with the real thing. (That said, the performance-sensitive
bits already act in chunks, e.g. ctr128_f, so the function call overhead
shouldn't matter.)
But our only 128-bit block cipher is AES anyway, so I just switched
things to use AES_KEY throughout. AES is doing fine, and hopefully we
would have the sense not to pair a hypothetical future block cipher with
so many modes!
Change-Id: Ied3e843f0e3042a439f09e655b29847ade9d4c7d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/32107
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-09-23 02:37:01 +01:00
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CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, &num_u, AES_encrypt);
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2016-04-16 20:20:07 +01:00
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*num = (int)num_u;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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void AES_cfb128_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t length,
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const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t *ivec, int *num,
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int enc) {
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2016-04-16 20:20:07 +01:00
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unsigned num_u = (unsigned)(*num);
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Fix undefined block128_f, etc., casts.
This one is a little thorny. All the various block cipher modes
functions and callbacks take a void *key. This allows them to be used
with multiple kinds of block ciphers.
However, the implementations of those callbacks are the normal typed
functions, like AES_encrypt. Those take AES_KEY *key. While, at the ABI
level, this is perfectly fine, C considers this undefined behavior.
If we wish to preserve this genericness, we could either instantiate
multiple versions of these mode functions or create wrappers of
AES_encrypt, etc., that take void *key.
The former means more code and is tedious without C++ templates (maybe
someday...). The latter would not be difficult for a compiler to
optimize out. C mistakenly allowed comparing function pointers for
equality, which means a compiler cannot replace pointers to wrapper
functions with the real thing. (That said, the performance-sensitive
bits already act in chunks, e.g. ctr128_f, so the function call overhead
shouldn't matter.)
But our only 128-bit block cipher is AES anyway, so I just switched
things to use AES_KEY throughout. AES is doing fine, and hopefully we
would have the sense not to pair a hypothetical future block cipher with
so many modes!
Change-Id: Ied3e843f0e3042a439f09e655b29847ade9d4c7d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/32107
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-09-23 02:37:01 +01:00
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CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, length, key, ivec, &num_u, enc, AES_encrypt);
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2016-04-16 20:20:07 +01:00
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*num = (int)num_u;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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}
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