2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
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* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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*
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* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
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* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license.
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*
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* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
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* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
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* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
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*
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* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
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* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
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* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
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*
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* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
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* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
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* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
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* to make use of the Contribution.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
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* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
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* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
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* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
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* OTHERWISE. */
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <openssl/engine.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/obj.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
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struct handshake_digest {
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long mask;
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const EVP_MD *(*md_func)(void);
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};
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2014-08-30 19:43:27 +01:00
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static const struct handshake_digest ssl_handshake_digests[SSL_MAX_DIGEST] = {
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2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
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{SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5, EVP_md5},
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{SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA, EVP_sha1},
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{SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256, EVP_sha256},
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{SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384, EVP_sha384},
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2014-08-30 19:43:27 +01:00
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};
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
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#define CIPHER_ADD 1
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#define CIPHER_KILL 2
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#define CIPHER_DEL 3
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#define CIPHER_ORD 4
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#define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5
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typedef struct cipher_order_st {
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const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
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int active;
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int dead;
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int in_group;
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struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev;
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} CIPHER_ORDER;
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static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] =
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{
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{0, SSL_TXT_ALL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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/* "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in
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ALL!) */
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{0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, 0, SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
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0},
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/* key exchange aliases
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* (some of those using only a single bit here combine
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* multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs,
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* e.g. kEDH combines DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA) */
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{0, SSL_TXT_kRSA, 0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_kEDH, 0, SSL_kEDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_DH, 0, SSL_kEDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_kEECDH, 0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_ECDH, 0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_kPSK, 0, SSL_kPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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/* server authentication aliases */
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{0, SSL_TXT_aRSA, 0, 0, SSL_aRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_aNULL, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_aECDSA, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_ECDSA, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_aPSK, 0, 0, SSL_aPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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/* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */
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{0, SSL_TXT_EDH, 0, SSL_kEDH, ~SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_EECDH, 0, SSL_kEECDH, ~SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_RSA, 0, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_ADH, 0, SSL_kEDH, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_AECDH, 0, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_PSK, 0, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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/* symmetric encryption aliases */
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{0, SSL_TXT_3DES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_3DES, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_RC4, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_AES128, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_AES256, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_AES, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_AES_GCM, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
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0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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/* MAC aliases */
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{0, SSL_TXT_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_SHA, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_SHA384, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA384, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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/* protocol version aliases */
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{0, SSL_TXT_SSLV3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SSLV3, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_TLSV1, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_TLSV1_2, 0, 0, 0, 0},
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/* strength classes */
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{0, SSL_TXT_MEDIUM, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MEDIUM, 0, 0, 0},
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{0, SSL_TXT_HIGH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH, 0, 0, 0},
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/* FIPS 140-2 approved ciphersuite */
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{0, SSL_TXT_FIPS, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_FIPS, 0, 0, 0},
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};
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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/* ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead sets |*aead| to point to the correct EVP_AEAD object
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* for |s->cipher|. It returns 1 on success and 0 on error. */
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2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
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int ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_AEAD **aead) {
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const SSL_CIPHER *c = s->cipher;
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*aead = NULL;
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if (c == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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if ((c->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD) == 0 &&
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(c->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_STATEFUL_AEAD) == 0) {
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return 0;
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}
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switch (c->algorithm_enc) {
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case SSL_AES128GCM:
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*aead = EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm();
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return 1;
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case SSL_AES256GCM:
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*aead = EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm();
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return 1;
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case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
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*aead = EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305();
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return 1;
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case SSL_RC4:
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if (c->algorithm_mac != SSL_MD5) {
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return 0;
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}
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*aead = EVP_aead_rc4_md5_tls();
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return 1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
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2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
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const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type,
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int *mac_secret_size) {
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const SSL_CIPHER *c;
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c = s->cipher;
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if (c == NULL ||
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/* This function doesn't deal with EVP_AEAD. See
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* |ssl_cipher_get_aead_evp|. */
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(c->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD) ||
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enc == NULL ||
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md == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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switch (c->algorithm_enc) {
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case SSL_3DES:
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*enc = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
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break;
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case SSL_RC4:
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*enc = EVP_rc4();
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AES128:
|
|
|
|
*enc = EVP_aes_128_cbc();
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AES256:
|
|
|
|
*enc = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_cipher_get_mac(s, md, mac_pkey_type, mac_secret_size)) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert(*enc != NULL && *md != NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* TODO(fork): enable the stitched cipher modes. */
|
2014-08-30 19:43:27 +01:00
|
|
|
#if 0
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
if (s->ssl_version>>8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ||
|
|
|
|
s->ssl_version < TLS1_VERSION)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 &&
|
|
|
|
c->algorithm_mac == SSL_MD5 &&
|
|
|
|
(evp=EVP_get_cipherbyname("RC4-HMAC-MD5")))
|
|
|
|
*enc = evp, *md = NULL;
|
|
|
|
else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 &&
|
|
|
|
c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 &&
|
|
|
|
(evp=EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1")))
|
|
|
|
*enc = evp, *md = NULL;
|
|
|
|
else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 &&
|
|
|
|
c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 &&
|
|
|
|
(evp=EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1")))
|
|
|
|
*enc = evp, *md = NULL;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2014-08-30 19:43:27 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int ssl_cipher_get_mac(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_MD **md,
|
|
|
|
int *mac_pkey_type, int *mac_secret_size) {
|
|
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
c = s->cipher;
|
|
|
|
if (c == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (c->algorithm_mac) {
|
|
|
|
case SSL_MD5:
|
|
|
|
*md = EVP_md5();
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_SHA1:
|
|
|
|
*md = EVP_sha1();
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_SHA256:
|
|
|
|
*md = EVP_sha256();
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_SHA384:
|
|
|
|
*md = EVP_sha384();
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mac_pkey_type != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
*mac_pkey_type = EVP_PKEY_HMAC;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mac_secret_size != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
*mac_secret_size = EVP_MD_size(*md);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int ssl_get_handshake_digest(int idx, long *mask, const EVP_MD **md) {
|
|
|
|
if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MAX_DIGEST) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*mask = ssl_handshake_digests[idx].mask;
|
|
|
|
*md = ssl_handshake_digests[idx].md_func();
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define ITEM_SEP(a) \
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
(((a) == ':') || ((a) == ' ') || ((a) == ';') || ((a) == ','))
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
CIPHER_ORDER **tail) {
|
|
|
|
if (curr == *tail) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (curr == *head) {
|
|
|
|
*head = curr->next;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (curr->prev != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
curr->prev->next = curr->next;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (curr->next != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
(*tail)->next = curr;
|
|
|
|
curr->prev = *tail;
|
|
|
|
curr->next = NULL;
|
|
|
|
*tail = curr;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
CIPHER_ORDER **tail) {
|
|
|
|
if (curr == *head) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (curr == *tail) {
|
|
|
|
*tail = curr->prev;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (curr->next != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (curr->prev != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
curr->prev->next = curr->next;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
(*head)->prev = curr;
|
|
|
|
curr->next = *head;
|
|
|
|
curr->prev = NULL;
|
|
|
|
*head = curr;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-12 20:55:27 +00:00
|
|
|
static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *ssl_method,
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int num_of_ciphers,
|
|
|
|
CIPHER_ORDER *co_list,
|
|
|
|
CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
|
|
|
|
CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
|
|
|
|
int i, co_list_num;
|
|
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We have num_of_ciphers descriptions compiled in, depending on the method
|
|
|
|
* selected (SSLv2 and/or SSLv3, TLSv1 etc). These will later be sorted in a
|
|
|
|
* linked list with at most num entries. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get the initial list of ciphers */
|
|
|
|
co_list_num = 0; /* actual count of ciphers */
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_of_ciphers; i++) {
|
|
|
|
c = ssl_method->get_cipher(i);
|
|
|
|
/* drop those that use any of that is not available */
|
|
|
|
if (c != NULL && c->valid) {
|
|
|
|
co_list[co_list_num].cipher = c;
|
|
|
|
co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL;
|
|
|
|
co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL;
|
|
|
|
co_list[co_list_num].active = 0;
|
|
|
|
co_list[co_list_num].in_group = 0;
|
|
|
|
co_list_num++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare linked list from list entries. */
|
|
|
|
if (co_list_num > 0) {
|
|
|
|
co_list[0].prev = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (co_list_num > 1) {
|
|
|
|
co_list[0].next = &co_list[1];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) {
|
|
|
|
co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1];
|
|
|
|
co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*head_p = &co_list[0];
|
|
|
|
*tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list,
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int num_of_group_aliases,
|
|
|
|
CIPHER_ORDER *head) {
|
|
|
|
CIPHER_ORDER *ciph_curr;
|
|
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER **ca_curr;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* First, add the real ciphers as already collected. */
|
|
|
|
ciph_curr = head;
|
|
|
|
ca_curr = ca_list;
|
|
|
|
while (ciph_curr != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
*ca_curr = ciph_curr->cipher;
|
|
|
|
ca_curr++;
|
|
|
|
ciph_curr = ciph_curr->next;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Now we add the available ones from the cipher_aliases[] table. They
|
|
|
|
* represent either one or more algorithms, some of which in any affected
|
|
|
|
* category must be supported (set in enabled_mask), or represent a cipher
|
|
|
|
* strength value (will be added in any case because algorithms=0). */
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_of_group_aliases; i++) {
|
|
|
|
*ca_curr = cipher_aliases + i;
|
|
|
|
ca_curr++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*ca_curr = NULL; /* end of list */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(
|
|
|
|
unsigned long cipher_id, unsigned long alg_mkey, unsigned long alg_auth,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long alg_enc, unsigned long alg_mac, unsigned long alg_ssl,
|
|
|
|
unsigned long algo_strength, int rule, int strength_bits, int in_group,
|
|
|
|
CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
|
|
|
|
CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last;
|
|
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
|
|
|
|
int reverse = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) {
|
|
|
|
/* needed to maintain sorting between currently deleted ciphers */
|
|
|
|
reverse = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
head = *head_p;
|
|
|
|
tail = *tail_p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (reverse) {
|
|
|
|
next = tail;
|
|
|
|
last = head;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
next = head;
|
|
|
|
last = tail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
curr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
|
|
if (curr == last) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
curr = next;
|
|
|
|
if (curr == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
|
|
|
|
cp = curr->cipher;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Selection criteria is either the value of strength_bits
|
|
|
|
* or the algorithms used. */
|
|
|
|
if (strength_bits >= 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (strength_bits != cp->strength_bits) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if ((alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey)) ||
|
|
|
|
(alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth)) ||
|
|
|
|
(alg_enc && !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc)) ||
|
|
|
|
(alg_mac && !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac)) ||
|
|
|
|
(alg_ssl && !(alg_ssl & cp->algorithm_ssl)) ||
|
|
|
|
(algo_strength && !(algo_strength & cp->algo_strength))) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */
|
|
|
|
if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) {
|
|
|
|
/* reverse == 0 */
|
|
|
|
if (!curr->active) {
|
|
|
|
ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
|
|
|
|
curr->active = 1;
|
|
|
|
curr->in_group = in_group;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Move the added cipher to this location */
|
|
|
|
else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) {
|
|
|
|
/* reverse == 0 */
|
|
|
|
if (curr->active) {
|
|
|
|
ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
|
|
|
|
curr->in_group = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) {
|
|
|
|
/* reverse == 1 */
|
|
|
|
if (curr->active) {
|
|
|
|
/* most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions
|
|
|
|
* for any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop
|
|
|
|
* works in reverse to maintain the order) */
|
|
|
|
ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail);
|
|
|
|
curr->active = 0;
|
|
|
|
curr->in_group = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) {
|
|
|
|
/* reverse == 0 */
|
|
|
|
if (head == curr) {
|
|
|
|
head = curr->next;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
curr->prev->next = curr->next;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tail == curr) {
|
|
|
|
tail = curr->prev;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
curr->active = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (curr->next != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (curr->prev != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
curr->prev->next = curr->next;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
curr->next = NULL;
|
|
|
|
curr->prev = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
*head_p = head;
|
|
|
|
*tail_p = tail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) {
|
|
|
|
int max_strength_bits, i, *number_uses;
|
|
|
|
CIPHER_ORDER *curr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting must
|
|
|
|
* keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting routine as
|
|
|
|
* '+' movement to the end of the list. */
|
|
|
|
max_strength_bits = 0;
|
|
|
|
curr = *head_p;
|
|
|
|
while (curr != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (curr->active && curr->cipher->strength_bits > max_strength_bits) {
|
|
|
|
max_strength_bits = curr->cipher->strength_bits;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
curr = curr->next;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
number_uses = OPENSSL_malloc((max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int));
|
|
|
|
if (!number_uses) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cipher_strength_sort, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(number_uses, 0, (max_strength_bits + 1) * sizeof(int));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Now find the strength_bits values actually used. */
|
|
|
|
curr = *head_p;
|
|
|
|
while (curr != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (curr->active) {
|
|
|
|
number_uses[curr->cipher->strength_bits]++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
curr = curr->next;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending order. */
|
|
|
|
for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--) {
|
|
|
|
if (number_uses[i] > 0) {
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, 0, head_p,
|
|
|
|
tail_p);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(number_uses);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
|
|
|
|
CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p,
|
|
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned long alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl, algo_strength;
|
|
|
|
const char *l, *buf;
|
|
|
|
int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen, in_group = 0, has_group = 0;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long cipher_id = 0;
|
|
|
|
char ch;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retval = 1;
|
|
|
|
l = rule_str;
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
|
|
ch = *l;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ch == '\0') {
|
|
|
|
break; /* done */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (in_group) {
|
|
|
|
if (ch == ']') {
|
|
|
|
if (!in_group) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cipher_process_rulestr,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_GROUP_CLOSE);
|
|
|
|
retval = found = in_group = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (*tail_p) {
|
|
|
|
(*tail_p)->in_group = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
in_group = 0;
|
|
|
|
l++;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ch == '|') {
|
|
|
|
rule = CIPHER_ADD;
|
|
|
|
l++;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
} else if (!(ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z') && !(ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z') &&
|
|
|
|
!(ch >= '0' && ch <= '9')) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cipher_process_rulestr,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_OPERATOR_IN_GROUP);
|
|
|
|
retval = found = in_group = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
rule = CIPHER_ADD;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (ch == '-') {
|
|
|
|
rule = CIPHER_DEL;
|
|
|
|
l++;
|
|
|
|
} else if (ch == '+') {
|
|
|
|
rule = CIPHER_ORD;
|
|
|
|
l++;
|
|
|
|
} else if (ch == '!') {
|
|
|
|
rule = CIPHER_KILL;
|
|
|
|
l++;
|
|
|
|
} else if (ch == '@') {
|
|
|
|
rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL;
|
|
|
|
l++;
|
|
|
|
} else if (ch == '[') {
|
|
|
|
if (in_group) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cipher_process_rulestr, SSL_R_NESTED_GROUP);
|
|
|
|
retval = found = in_group = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
in_group = 1;
|
|
|
|
has_group = 1;
|
|
|
|
l++;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
rule = CIPHER_ADD;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If preference groups are enabled, the only legal operator is +.
|
|
|
|
* Otherwise the in_group bits will get mixed up. */
|
|
|
|
if (has_group && rule != CIPHER_ADD) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cipher_process_rulestr,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_MIXED_SPECIAL_OPERATOR_WITH_GROUPS);
|
|
|
|
retval = found = in_group = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ITEM_SEP(ch)) {
|
|
|
|
l++;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
alg_mkey = 0;
|
|
|
|
alg_auth = 0;
|
|
|
|
alg_enc = 0;
|
|
|
|
alg_mac = 0;
|
|
|
|
alg_ssl = 0;
|
|
|
|
algo_strength = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
|
|
ch = *l;
|
|
|
|
buf = l;
|
|
|
|
buflen = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) || ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) ||
|
|
|
|
((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.')) {
|
|
|
|
ch = *(++l);
|
|
|
|
buflen++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (buflen == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* We hit something we cannot deal with, it is no command or separator
|
|
|
|
* nor alphanumeric, so we call this an error. */
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cipher_process_rulestr,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
|
|
|
|
retval = found = in_group = 0;
|
|
|
|
l++;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) {
|
|
|
|
found = 0; /* unused -- avoid compiler warning */
|
|
|
|
break; /* special treatment */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* check for multi-part specification */
|
|
|
|
if (ch == '+') {
|
|
|
|
multi = 1;
|
|
|
|
l++;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
multi = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Now search for the cipher alias in the ca_list. Be careful with the
|
|
|
|
* strncmp, because the "buflen" limitation will make the rule "ADH:SOME"
|
|
|
|
* and the cipher "ADH-MY-CIPHER" look like a match for buflen=3. So
|
|
|
|
* additionally check whether the cipher name found has the correct
|
|
|
|
* length. We can save a strlen() call: just checking for the '\0' at the
|
|
|
|
* right place is sufficient, we have to strncmp() anyway. (We cannot use
|
|
|
|
* strcmp(), because buf is not '\0' terminated.) */
|
|
|
|
j = found = 0;
|
|
|
|
cipher_id = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (ca_list[j]) {
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) &&
|
|
|
|
(ca_list[j]->name[buflen] == '\0')) {
|
|
|
|
found = 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
j++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!found) {
|
|
|
|
break; /* ignore this entry */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey) {
|
|
|
|
if (alg_mkey) {
|
|
|
|
alg_mkey &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
|
|
if (!alg_mkey) {
|
|
|
|
found = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
alg_mkey = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth) {
|
|
|
|
if (alg_auth) {
|
|
|
|
alg_auth &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth;
|
|
|
|
if (!alg_auth) {
|
|
|
|
found = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
alg_auth = ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc) {
|
|
|
|
if (alg_enc) {
|
|
|
|
alg_enc &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc;
|
|
|
|
if (!alg_enc) {
|
|
|
|
found = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
alg_enc = ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac) {
|
|
|
|
if (alg_mac) {
|
|
|
|
alg_mac &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac;
|
|
|
|
if (!alg_mac) {
|
|
|
|
found = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
alg_mac = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength) {
|
|
|
|
if (algo_strength) {
|
|
|
|
algo_strength &= ca_list[j]->algo_strength;
|
|
|
|
if (!algo_strength) {
|
|
|
|
found = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
algo_strength |= ca_list[j]->algo_strength;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ca_list[j]->valid) {
|
|
|
|
/* explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version does not become
|
|
|
|
* part of the search pattern! */
|
|
|
|
cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* not an explicit ciphersuite; only in this case, the protocol version
|
|
|
|
* is considered part of the search pattern. */
|
|
|
|
if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl) {
|
|
|
|
if (alg_ssl) {
|
|
|
|
alg_ssl &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl;
|
|
|
|
if (!alg_ssl) {
|
|
|
|
found = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
alg_ssl = ca_list[j]->algorithm_ssl;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!multi) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Ok, we have the rule, now apply it. */
|
|
|
|
if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) {
|
|
|
|
/* special command */
|
|
|
|
ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (buflen == 8 && !strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8)) {
|
|
|
|
ok = ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cipher_process_rulestr,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ok == 0) {
|
|
|
|
retval = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We do not support any "multi" options together with "@", so throw away
|
|
|
|
* the rest of the command, if any left, until end or ':' is found. */
|
|
|
|
while (*l != '\0' && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) {
|
|
|
|
l++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (found) {
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac,
|
|
|
|
alg_ssl, algo_strength, rule, -1, in_group, head_p,
|
|
|
|
tail_p);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
while (*l != '\0' && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) {
|
|
|
|
l++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (in_group) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_cipher_process_rulestr, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
|
|
|
|
retval = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *
|
|
|
|
ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *ssl_method,
|
|
|
|
struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st **cipher_list,
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) * *cipher_list_by_id,
|
|
|
|
const char *rule_str, CERT *c) {
|
|
|
|
int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases;
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack = NULL, *tmp_cipher_list = NULL;
|
|
|
|
const char *rule_p;
|
|
|
|
CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr;
|
|
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *in_group_flags = NULL;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int num_in_group_flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *pref_list = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Return with error if nothing to do. */
|
|
|
|
if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled in ciphers.
|
|
|
|
* We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so it is used for
|
|
|
|
* allocation. */
|
|
|
|
num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers();
|
|
|
|
co_list =
|
|
|
|
(CIPHER_ORDER *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CIPHER_ORDER) * num_of_ciphers);
|
|
|
|
if (co_list == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_create_cipher_list, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers, co_list, &head, &tail);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Now arrange all ciphers by preference:
|
|
|
|
* TODO(davidben): Compute this order once and copy it. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Everything else being equal, prefer ECDHE_ECDSA then ECDHE_RSA over other
|
|
|
|
* key exchange mechanisms */
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kEECDH, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
|
|
|
|
0, &head, &tail);
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, &head,
|
|
|
|
&tail);
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kEECDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, 0, &head,
|
|
|
|
&tail);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Order the bulk ciphers. First the preferred AEAD ciphers. We prefer
|
|
|
|
* CHACHA20 unless there is hardware support for fast and constant-time
|
|
|
|
* AES_GCM. */
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_has_aes_hardware()) {
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES256GCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0,
|
|
|
|
&head, &tail);
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0,
|
|
|
|
&head, &tail);
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD,
|
|
|
|
-1, 0, &head, &tail);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD,
|
|
|
|
-1, 0, &head, &tail);
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES256GCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0,
|
|
|
|
&head, &tail);
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0,
|
|
|
|
&head, &tail);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Then the legacy non-AEAD ciphers: AES_256_CBC, AES-128_CBC, RC4_128_SHA,
|
|
|
|
* RC4_128_MD5, 3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA. */
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES256, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, &head,
|
|
|
|
&tail);
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, &head,
|
|
|
|
&tail);
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, ~SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0,
|
|
|
|
&head, &tail);
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0,
|
|
|
|
&head, &tail);
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_3DES, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, &head,
|
|
|
|
&tail);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Temporarily enable everything else for sorting */
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, 0, &head, &tail);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Move ciphers without forward secrecy to the end. */
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, ~(SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD,
|
|
|
|
-1, 0, &head, &tail);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Move anonymous ciphers to the end. Usually, these will remain disabled.
|
|
|
|
* (For applications that allow them, they aren't too bad, but we prefer
|
|
|
|
* authenticated ciphers.)
|
|
|
|
* TODO(davidben): Remove them altogether? */
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, 0, &head,
|
|
|
|
&tail);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, 0, &head, &tail);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We also need cipher aliases for selecting based on the rule_str. There
|
|
|
|
* might be two types of entries in the rule_str: 1) names of ciphers
|
|
|
|
* themselves 2) aliases for groups of ciphers. For 1) we need the available
|
|
|
|
* ciphers and for 2) the cipher groups of cipher_aliases added together in
|
|
|
|
* one list (otherwise we would be happy with just the cipher_aliases
|
|
|
|
* table). */
|
|
|
|
num_of_group_aliases = sizeof(cipher_aliases) / sizeof(SSL_CIPHER);
|
|
|
|
num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1;
|
|
|
|
ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER *) * num_of_alias_max);
|
|
|
|
if (ca_list == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_create_cipher_list, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases, head);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule before
|
|
|
|
* using the (possibly available) additional rules. */
|
|
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
|
|
rule_p = rule_str;
|
|
|
|
if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, &head, &tail,
|
|
|
|
ca_list);
|
|
|
|
rule_p += 7;
|
|
|
|
if (*rule_p == ':') {
|
|
|
|
rule_p++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ok && strlen(rule_p) > 0) {
|
|
|
|
ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, ca_list);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ca_list); /* Not needed anymore */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error
|
|
|
|
* if we cannot get one. */
|
|
|
|
cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
|
|
|
|
if (cipherstack == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
in_group_flags = OPENSSL_malloc(num_of_ciphers);
|
|
|
|
if (!in_group_flags) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added
|
|
|
|
* to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER). */
|
|
|
|
for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) {
|
|
|
|
if (curr->active) {
|
|
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher);
|
|
|
|
in_group_flags[num_in_group_flags++] = curr->in_group;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(co_list); /* Not needed any longer */
|
|
|
|
co_list = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipherstack);
|
|
|
|
if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pref_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st));
|
|
|
|
if (!pref_list) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pref_list->ciphers = cipherstack;
|
|
|
|
pref_list->in_group_flags = OPENSSL_malloc(num_in_group_flags);
|
|
|
|
if (!pref_list->in_group_flags) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(pref_list->in_group_flags, in_group_flags, num_in_group_flags);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(in_group_flags);
|
|
|
|
in_group_flags = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (*cipher_list != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ssl_cipher_preference_list_free(*cipher_list);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*cipher_list = pref_list;
|
|
|
|
pref_list = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cipher_list_by_id != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (*cipher_list_by_id != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list_by_id);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list;
|
|
|
|
tmp_cipher_list = NULL;
|
|
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*cipher_list_by_id);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(tmp_cipher_list);
|
|
|
|
tmp_cipher_list = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return cipherstack;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (co_list) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(co_list);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (in_group_flags) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(in_group_flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cipherstack) {
|
|
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tmp_cipher_list) {
|
|
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(tmp_cipher_list);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pref_list && pref_list->in_group_flags) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(pref_list->in_group_flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pref_list) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(pref_list);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf,
|
|
|
|
int len) {
|
|
|
|
const char *ver;
|
|
|
|
const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, alg_ssl;
|
|
|
|
static const char *format = "%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s\n";
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
|
|
alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
|
|
|
alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc;
|
|
|
|
alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac;
|
|
|
|
alg_ssl = cipher->algorithm_ssl;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (alg_ssl & SSL_SSLV3) {
|
|
|
|
ver = "SSLv3";
|
|
|
|
} else if (alg_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) {
|
|
|
|
ver = "TLSv1.2";
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ver = "unknown";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (alg_mkey) {
|
|
|
|
case SSL_kRSA:
|
|
|
|
kx = "RSA";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_kEDH:
|
|
|
|
kx = "DH";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_kEECDH:
|
|
|
|
kx = "ECDH";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_kPSK:
|
|
|
|
kx = "PSK";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
kx = "unknown";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (alg_auth) {
|
|
|
|
case SSL_aRSA:
|
|
|
|
au = "RSA";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_aNULL:
|
|
|
|
au = "None";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_aECDSA:
|
|
|
|
au = "ECDSA";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_aPSK:
|
|
|
|
au = "PSK";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
au = "unknown";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (alg_enc) {
|
|
|
|
case SSL_3DES:
|
|
|
|
enc = "3DES(168)";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_RC4:
|
|
|
|
enc = "RC4(128)";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AES128:
|
|
|
|
enc = "AES(128)";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AES256:
|
|
|
|
enc = "AES(256)";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AES128GCM:
|
|
|
|
enc = "AESGCM(128)";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AES256GCM:
|
|
|
|
enc = "AESGCM(256)";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
|
|
|
|
enc = "ChaCha20-Poly1305";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
enc = "unknown";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (alg_mac) {
|
|
|
|
case SSL_MD5:
|
|
|
|
mac = "MD5";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_SHA1:
|
|
|
|
mac = "SHA1";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_SHA256:
|
|
|
|
mac = "SHA256";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_SHA384:
|
|
|
|
mac = "SHA384";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_AEAD:
|
|
|
|
mac = "AEAD";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
mac = "unknown";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (buf == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
len = 128;
|
|
|
|
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
|
|
|
|
if (buf == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return "OPENSSL_malloc Error";
|
|
|
|
} else if (len < 128) {
|
|
|
|
return "Buffer too small";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BIO_snprintf(buf, len, format, cipher->name, ver, kx, au, enc, mac);
|
|
|
|
return buf;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CIPHER_is_AES(const SSL_CIPHER *c) {
|
|
|
|
return (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_AES) != 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CIPHER_has_MD5_HMAC(const SSL_CIPHER *c) {
|
|
|
|
return (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_MD5) != 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CIPHER_is_AESGCM(const SSL_CIPHER *c) {
|
|
|
|
return (c->algorithm_mac & (SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM)) != 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CIPHER_is_CHACHA20POLY1305(const SSL_CIPHER *c) {
|
|
|
|
return (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) != 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c) {
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (c == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return "(NONE)";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
i = (int)(c->id >> 24L);
|
|
|
|
if (i == 3) {
|
|
|
|
return "TLSv1/SSLv3";
|
|
|
|
} else if (i == 2) {
|
|
|
|
return "SSLv2";
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
return "unknown";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* return the actual cipher being used */
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c) {
|
|
|
|
if (c != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return c->name;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return "(NONE)";
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 01:37:53 +01:00
|
|
|
const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_name(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
|
|
|
|
if (cipher == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return "";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (cipher->algorithm_mkey) {
|
|
|
|
case SSL_kRSA:
|
|
|
|
return SSL_TXT_RSA;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 01:37:53 +01:00
|
|
|
case SSL_kEDH:
|
|
|
|
switch (cipher->algorithm_auth) {
|
|
|
|
case SSL_aRSA:
|
|
|
|
return "DHE_" SSL_TXT_RSA;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_aNULL:
|
|
|
|
return SSL_TXT_DH "_anon";
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return "UNKNOWN";
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 01:37:53 +01:00
|
|
|
case SSL_kEECDH:
|
|
|
|
switch (cipher->algorithm_auth) {
|
|
|
|
case SSL_aECDSA:
|
|
|
|
return "ECDHE_" SSL_TXT_ECDSA;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_aRSA:
|
|
|
|
return "ECDHE_" SSL_TXT_RSA;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_aNULL:
|
|
|
|
return SSL_TXT_ECDH "_anon";
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return "UNKNOWN";
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-12 01:37:53 +01:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return "UNKNOWN";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
/* number of bits for symmetric cipher */
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits) {
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (c != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (alg_bits != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
*alg_bits = c->alg_bits;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = c->strength_bits;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { return c->id; }
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) { return NULL; }
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, void *cm) { return 1; }
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const void *comp) { return NULL; }
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* For a cipher return the index corresponding to the certificate type */
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(const SSL_CIPHER *c) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned long alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
|
|
|
|
return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
|
|
|
|
} else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) {
|
|
|
|
return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key returns 1 if |cipher| involves a server
|
|
|
|
* public key in the key exchange, sent in a server Certificate message.
|
|
|
|
* Otherwise it returns 0. */
|
|
|
|
int ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
|
|
|
|
/* Anonymous ciphers do not include a server certificate. */
|
|
|
|
if (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Neither do PSK ciphers, except for RSA_PSK. */
|
|
|
|
if ((cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK) &&
|
|
|
|
!(cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA)) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* All other ciphers include it. */
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange returns 1 if |cipher| requires a
|
|
|
|
* ServerKeyExchange message. Otherwise it returns 0.
|
2014-07-12 18:27:45 +01:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Unlike ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key, some ciphers take optional
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
* ServerKeyExchanges. PSK and RSA_PSK only use the ServerKeyExchange to
|
|
|
|
* communicate a psk_identity_hint, so it is optional. */
|
|
|
|
int ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
|
|
|
|
/* Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchanges require a ServerKeyExchange. */
|
|
|
|
if (cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kEDH || cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kEECDH) {
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* It is optional in all others. */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|